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Abstract
Migration in EU welfare states has become a source for social conflict about con-
ditions of in- and exclusion. Particularly since the implementation of EU citizen-
ship, the concept of national membership is in dispute. Scholars have therefore
returned to investigate legal and political implications of citizenship in the EU in
the face of increasing migration flows and reinvigorated right-wing sentiments.
Yet, the question of how people themselves contest citizenship in relation to
migration in the EU has received less attention. Therefore, this thesis sets out
to empirically investigate a ‘bottom-up’ approach to citizenship contestation ac-
cording to people’s views of their relationship with political authorities as well as
concerning questions of how to organise just social interaction among each other.
Here, the thesis argues that online media allow people to constitute themselves
as political subjects regarding migration. The thesis then identifies two separate
and distinct forms of contestation: commenting on national news media websites
among critics of immigration and participation in Facebook ’expat’ groups among
EU mobiles.
In order to understand how critics of immigration contest citizenship, the
thesis conducts an inductive comments analysis and compares them across Ger-
man and Danish online news sites. Regarding EU mobiles’ citizenship contesta-
tion, it draws from two online surveys distributed in Facebook groups and ana-
lyses and compares semi-structured interviews with EU mobiles living in Den-
mark and Germany.
The findings of the thesis shed light on the connection between people’s per-
ceptions of migration and their demands toward political authorities. These find-
ings raise questions regarding the meaning of membership in the EU and suggest
that ordinary people challenge the legitimacy of political representation within
the framework of the nation-state.
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Migration i EU velfærdsstater har de seneste år været årsag til sociale konf-
likter omkring forholdene for in- og eksklusion. Begrebet ’nationalt medlemskab’
er særligt siden implementeringen af EU-borgerskabet blevet diskuteret. Forskere
er derfor begyndt at undersøge de politiske og legale konsekvenser af stigende in-
dvandring og den politiske højrefløjs voksende succes.
Men spørgsmålet om, hvordan folk selv anfægter betydningen af borgerskab
i denne kontekst har ikke tiltrukket sig meget opmærksomhed. Derfor foretager
jeg i denne phd.- afhandling en empirisk baseret ’bottom-up’ tilnærmelse til be-
grebet om borgerskab. Jeg argumenterer, at via online medier kan folk synligør
sig selv som politiske subjekter om migration. Følgelig fokuserer afhandlingen
på to separate former af bestridelse: Kommentarsektioner på web nyhedssider
for immigrationskritikere og deltagelse i Facebook ‘expat’ grupper for mobile EU-
borgerne.
Med henblik på forståelse for hvordan immigrationskritikere anfægter betydnin-
gen af borgerskabsbegrebet, foretages der i afhandlingen en induktiv komment-
aranalyse på danske og tyske web nyhedssider. For det andet fortages der semis-
trukturerede interviews med mobile EU-borgerne, som bor i Danmark og Tysk-
land. Disse interviews er baseret på to online spørgeskemaer distribueret i Face-
book grupper for ‘expats’.
Fundene i denne afhandling belyser forbindelsen mellem folks opfattelse af
migration og deres krav til politiske autoriteter. Fundene giver anledning til
spørgsmål vedrørende betydningen af EU-medlemsskab og peger på, at borgere
udfordrer legitimiteten af den politiske repræsentation indenfor rammerne af na-
tionalstaten.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
National democracies have established procedures to raise questions of social
justice through public debates and discussions. Ideally, at least two conditions in
this situation are fulfilled. First, the actors involved agree on the actual problem.
That is, they all acknowledge underlying assumptions about the type of justice
or injustice at stake. Second, the actors involved agree on the scope of the prob-
lem, i.e. they share an understanding about who is legitimately concerned by this
injustice, thus defining the borders of the community in which problem-solving
should take place. Debates about justice can then be procedurally channelled
and limited to controversies about the causes and consequences of justice and
injustices as well as appropriate solutions.
Critically, the issue of migration in the EU neither fulfils the first nor the
second condition. In this thesis, I consider the issue of migration as a matter
of social conflict about the political frame for in- and exclusion and about the
organisation of social interaction between people within a national welfare com-
munity. In other words, citizenship as the political frame as well as an organising
principle of legitimate social order within this frame is contested.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate how ordinary people contest citizenship
in these respects. In this introductory chapter I set the stage for a ’bottom-up’
approach to such citizenship contestation. I will further introduce how to tackle
contestation of citizenship theoretically and methodologically.
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1.1 Social conflict about migration in the EU
Since 2010 EU member states have been dealing with a period of economic reces-
sion that triggered a number of austerity measures. Especially implemented in
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain, these austerity measures have led to
a dramatic worsening of people’s living conditions there. The political debates,
protests, and rising unemployment rates that accompanied this economic reces-
sion, which has become known as ’the Eurocrisis’1, has further pronounced a
socio-economic asymmetry between people in economically stable member states
in the EU’s Northwest (excluding Ireland) and the southern and eastern countries
in the EU (Mau and Verwiebe, 2010).
Two developments especially have caught the attention of the research com-
munity as well as of politics and the public eye. On the one hand, there has been
an increase in economic risk perception as well as a rise of right-wing and anti-
immigration sentiments among populations in less crisis-affected welfare states
in the EU (Keskinen, Norocel, and Jørgensen, 2016). This development suggests
that the Eurocrisis has made the vulnerability of economically weaker groups of
people in these countries visible, who increasingly seek protection and stability
from the nation-state (Kriesi, Grande, Dolezal, et al., 2012). On the other hand, the
growing economic asymmetries between EU member states have produced new
reasons for EU citizens to become mobile and move to the economically stable
EU member states (see OECD, 2015, p. 18). Particularly the younger and highly
educated people from crisis-affected countries have made use of their right to
move freely as EU citizens and to seek employment and better living conditions
elsewhere (Duru, Michailidou, and Trenz, 2016, p. 183).
The Danish and German contexts are a case in point for these developments.
Denmark and Germany have experienced an increased influx of mobile EU cit-
izens since the aftermaths of economic recession (Eurostat, 2015). In this way, the
crisis has reconfirmed these countries as attractive destinations for high-skilled
and young, mobile EU citizens seeking careers, adventures and international ex-
periences. This increased intra-EU migration has become a contested issue in
public debates in both countries (Lafleur and Stanek, 2017). Despite the public
1Here, the economic crisis in the EU denotes a chain of events and collective experi-
ences of political, economic, and social challenges. Nevertheless, with reference to polit-
ical and economic challenges for and in the EU, the term ’crisis’ as a certain point in time
or period is contested. Scholars are discussing (the European) crisis also in relation to
meaningful experiences and narratives. See e.g. Roitman (2013) and Trenz (2016).
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perception that national economies are stable (83% of people in Germany and
77% in Denmark do think so) and a sense of political trust in national govern-
ments and parliaments that is higher than the EU-28 average (European Com-
mission, 2016b), anti-EU and -immigration sentiments are prevalent among some
parts of the population and successful right-wing and populist parties could gain
ground (Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2014, p. 390). Mobilising people’s concerns
about unemployment and the economic situation among the population, political
parties such as the Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark and the German Alternative für
Deutschland have successfully attracted votes in the European Parliament elec-
tions in 2014, the Danish general election in 2015 as well as in German state elec-
tions in Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony-Anhalt in 2016.
Together, these developments speak for a ”growing politicization of migration”
that has become salient in the EU in the recent years (Castles, De Haas, andMiller,
2014, p. 16). This thesis suggests that explanations for such a renewed salience can
be found in the ways in which citizenship in the EU regulates national welfare
communities but also how citizenship partially overrides national sovereignty to
decide about in- and exclusion. These aspects point to a social conflict over migra-
tion especially in two respects: citizenship as organising principle among people
within a national welfare community and citizenship as the political frame for in-
and exclusion.
First, citizenship as an organising principle for establishing and maintaining
a just and legitimate social order is contested. The ’infrastructure’ of welfare sys-
tems facilitates boundary-making between national and foreign citizens based on
certain membership criteria (Sainsbury, 2012). Thus, as the institution to regulate
citizens’ as well as non-citizens’ access, rights, obligations as well as possibly na-
tional identification, citizenship is supposed to organise social interactions among
people sharing rights and access in a community.
Yet, it is unclear how to organise rights and access in a just way: EU citizens
can be both national and foreign citizens and national citizenship as the signifier
to grant access within a welfare state is not sufficient any longer. In this regard,
scholars have identified newly emerging societal structures in the form of groups
of perceived ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ with unequal opportunities to benefit from
transforming labour markets, welfare communities, migration and globalisation
(Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, et al., 2008). The political mobilisation of such groups has
evoked cleavages along the lines of socio-economic divides (Mills, Blossfeld, and
Klijzing, 2005; Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, et al., 2008). Moreover, scholars focusing on
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the attitudes of such mobilised groups find cleavages in citizens’ ideological dis-
positions particularly between communitarian and cosmopolitan belief systems
(Teney and Helbling, 2014; Teney, Lacewell, and de Wilde, 2014).
Second, there is contestation about the role of boundaries of the national
welfare community and to what extent national or EU frames represent legit-
imate political authorities for deciding about in- and exclusion. Traditionally, the
nation-state has been considered as a yardstick for in- and exclusion. While it
is agreed upon that national borders continue playing a significant role in de-
fining people’s formal status and substantive rights and, therefore, inclusion and
exclusion, scholars also acknowledge that state-centred conceptualisations of cit-
izenship are being challenged (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul, 2008, p. 154).
Conceptualisations of ’post-national citizenship’ (Soysal, 1994), ’nested citizen-
ship’ (Maas, 2008), ’transnational citizenship’ (Balibar, 2004), ”a new geography
of citizenship” in the EU (Wiener, 1997, p. 531) but also rights claimed in urban
spaces (Sassen, 2005) illustrate such scholarly engagement with the collision and
overlap of citizenships in the EU. They present different approaches toward a
conceptual understanding of the ”mismatch between citizenship and the territ-
orial scope of legitimate authority” between the EU and member states (Bauböck,
2008, p. 31). Critically, EU migration is legally and politically regulated not only
through the sovereignty of the nation-state but has gradually been institutional-
ised beyond the nation-state through EU citizenship rights which can be claimed
on local, national and EU levels. This means that people’s ”legal rights and du-
ties are determined not only by one political authority, but by several” (Bauböck,
2010, p. 848).
Contestation of citizenship as the political frame for in-and exclusion then
refers to people’s opposition of the EU and the nation-state as legitimate political
authorities that constitute members and non-members. Traditionally, national
citizenship status confined such debates when it presented a legitimate way of
distinguishing between national citizens with rights and migrants with no or con-
siderably less rights. Particularly among EU citizens, this distinction has become
blurry. EU citizenship has created new political frames from where EU citizens
can claim rights that are often based on country of residence instead of origin
(see Guild, 2014).2 The right to claim and exercise these rights is not any longer
a mere question of national legal status that draws a line between the citizen and
2See, for example, the right of family reunification for EU citizens with non-EU
spouses living in another member state than from the member state of origin.
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the migrant, but of being an EU citizen in general.
This salience of migration in the EU regarding citizenship as organising prin-
ciple within a national welfare community and in terms of political frames and
authorities now presents a well established field in the respective research com-
munity. However, less is known so far about how people contest citizenship in
these respects during in this time of heightened attention to migration issues.
Specifically, since the issue of migration in the EU has triggered political debates
and public contestation about citizenship, understanding how people themselves
make sense of this situation seems important.
1.2 A ’bottom-up’ approach to contestation of citizenship:
Research questions
Accordingly, the thesis is guided by the following broader question:
• How do people contest citizenship in relation to migration in the EU ?
As the formulation of this question implies, I do not investigate the legal or
political implications of the link between migration in the EU and conceptual
questions of citizenship in the thesis. Much more, I propose a ’bottom-up’ ap-
proach that interprets ordinary people’s perceptions and experiences of migration
in relation to contestation of citizenship. My inquiry into these aspects adds to
predominantlymacro-level perspectives that focus on socio-economic and ideolo-
gical cleavages among citizens or questions of legal status in the context of trans-
forming EU welfare states.
My reading of the literature suggests a distinction between ‘top-down’ and
‘bottom-up’ approaches of citizenship. In the current literature questions of cit-
izenship and migration are predominantly approached via ’top-down’ conceptu-
alisations. By ’top-down’ I refer to approaches which predominantly define cit-
izenship as a legal or political framework that is bestowed upon or granted to
citizens (or not). ’Top-down’ approaches describe the development and implica-
tions of citizenship from an institutionalist perspective or with a normative focus.
Such approaches focus on how political and legal principles define or fragment
citizenship status and rights as well as how national conceptions of citizenship are
challenged by international norms: One the one hand, citizenship is considered to
be ”a powerful instrument of social closure” for national states (Brubaker, 1992,
p. 23). In other words, it is the key element that presents the understanding of
11
nationhood of a state and so defines the boundaries between members and non-
members. On the other hand, states are more and more challenged in their sover-
eignty over membership. International human rights discourse has increasingly
led to a redefinition ofmembership beyond national borders (Soysal, 1994). Partic-
ularly in the EU, national citizenship, EU citizenship and the exclusion of non-EU
citizens3 have created a fragmentation of citizenship statuses and of the rights
that can be claimed accordingly (Benhabib, 2004). Generally, this stream in the
literature focuses on how people are affected by their type of legal status, e.g.
as national citizens, EU citizens, non-EU citizens, refugees, asylum seekers, and
undocumented migrants.4
Other scholars following a ’top down’ approach argue that EU citizenship
is being constantly negotiated and constructed by a multitude of actors (Mee-
han, 1993). Emphasising the ”constructive potential of citizenship”, Wiener (1997;
1998; 1999) suggests understanding EU citizenship as ”citizenship practice” that
eventually develops into institutionalised legal frameworks. This latter stream
in the literature has introduced citizenship as a dynamic and constructed phe-
nomenon which can be challenged, developed and changed by social and polit-
ical actors. This perspective has focused particularly on how political elites and
civil society organisations construct citizenship and scrutinises their intentions,
interests and goals at stake.
However, in this thesis I propose that the investigation of people’s contest-
ation of citizenship requires a ’bottom-up’ approach. The essence of a ’bottom-
up’ approach is to shift attention away from relying on people’s legal statuses as
conceptual starting point for contestation toward people’s own social practices
and performances. This stream in the literature focuses on people’s ways to ”en-
act” themselves as political subjects, no matter their legal status (see Isin, 2013,
p. 20). Scholars are concerned here with how political subjects construct, claim
and contest legal status and rights of citizenship and identities (e.g. Sassen, 2005;
Rygiel, 2011). The literature following a ’bottom-up’ approach therefore engages
with the non-institutionalised, everyday experiences of citizenship. It emphasises
people’s active role in claiming rights and justice for themselves and others. This
active role remains hidden when looking at institutionalised forms of citizenship
on national and international levels. Practices can in so far become ”acts of cit-
3The official term used by institutions in the EU is ’third country nationals’.
4This is not an exhaustive list. See the International Organization for Migration (www.
iom.int) for further details.
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izenship” when people claim rights and ask ”questions of justice and injustice”
(Isin, 2008; Isin and Saward, 2013; Isin and Nyers, 2014). Such acts challenge the
limits and set-ups of existing political and legal frameworks. In other words, by
asking questions of justice people contest the ways in which citizenship ’from
above’ organises access and rights between people as well as defines the political
frame for in- and exclusion as a condition for such access and rights.
’Bottom-up’ approaches are therefore not concerned with questions such as
’who disagrees about citizenship with whom?’. Rather, these approaches under-
stand people’s contestation to be directed against the status-quo of citizenship
’from above’ by asking ’contestation about what?’. The latter question emphas-
ises the active role of people who constitute themselves as political subjects re-
garding a certain issue. Based on this scholarship that highlights how people
constitute themselves as political subjects of citizenship, citizenship contestation
is not a universal, civic practice that comes along with the status of ’being a cit-
izen’. Instead, non-citizens are also considered to be contestants, political subjects
(Isin, 2008; Isin, 2013). ’Bottom-up’ scholarship opposes an understanding of the
political subject as being defined by her legal status. It emphasises that polit-
ical subjects constitute themselves out of their own social situations of how they
understand to be affected by a certain issue and ask questions of justice regard-
ing this issue. Therefore, ’bottom-up’ approaches to citizenship require different
analytical categories than ’top-down’ approaches.
In this thesis I follow this line of argumentation and propose that contestation
of citizenship in relation to migration requires to be investigated through a focus
on people who enact their affectedness of migration. I argue that approaching
people’s contestation through their legal status is insufficient since people feel
affected by migration for different reasons and independently from their status
but through more personal ways. There might also be those people to whom
migration is not a relevant aspect or who are indifferent.
Therefore, instead of approaching contestation of citizenship in relation to
migration through a focus on people’s legal statuses, I suggest that contestation
becomes visible among people who enact their affectedness of migration. This
requires focusing on people according to how they constitute themselves as polit-
ical subjects regarding migration. In other words, by ’enacting’ I mean that they
constitute themselves as political subjects as they make their perceptions and ex-
periences of migration visible to others.
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I propose to look at how people contest citizenship by drawing on recent de-
velopments in the ways in which online media become part of ordinary people’s
everyday practices (see Couldry, 2006). Previous research has provided valuable
insights into people’s specific political acts and actions of contestation. In this
way, contestation is often related to political efficacy as a form of participation
undertaken in order to influence social or political actors and systems (see McPh-
erson, Welch, and Clark, 1977). Here, research suggests that online media have
positive effects on political participation (Boulianne, 2009). Yet, in my view, there
are more subtle forms of contestation which, perhaps because of their subtlety,
have attracted less attention so far. These forms of contestation can, but do not
have to be civic or political practices that are intended at political change as such.
Rather, I suggest that they appear in people’s daily perceptions and experiences
as well as opinions about an issue that has personal relevance to them (see debate
between Jenkins and Carpentier, 2013).
Accordingly, I suggest accessing people’s contestation of citizenship through
their migration-related online practices. Two types of political subjects regarding
migration have become particularly prevalent in the years after the Eurocrisis.
The first one refers to critics of immigration. The second one concerns EUmobiles.
The years of economic recession and risk perceptions have contributed to
an increasing political scepticism among people who are critical of immigration.
Denmark and Germany have not been hit as hard by the Eurocrisis in comparison
to other member states in eastern and southern Europe. Interestingly, risk per-
ceptions in the population have been higher during economic recession. Looking
at election results in Denmark and Germany during that time, the threemost com-
mon concerns among voters in the EP elections were unemployment, economic
growth and on third place immigration (European Parliament, 2014). In these
elections, the issue of immigrationwas particularly emphasised as a pressing issue
and risk factor which contributed to support for Euroceptic parties (see Hernán-
dez and Kriesi, 2016). Specifically through online news and social media, anti-
immigration sentiments have been circulated more easily and far-reaching (see
Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007). An emerging right-wing online sphere
via different channels and through different genres has facilitated this circula-
tion (e.g. Cammaerts, 2009; Ekman, 2014). Regarding mainstream online news
sites, comment sections below news articles have provided a platform to engage
in more moderate ways of articulating anti-immigration viewpoints, where the
risk of ”ideological segregation” is not as extreme there (see Flaxman, Goel, and
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Rao, 2016, p. 299). Through these events, critics of immigration in Denmark and
Germany can express their voice and, in this way, constitute themselves as polit-
ical subjects regarding migration.
Furthermore, the economic stability of Denmark and Germany might have
been one reason for why these countries have become even more attractive for
higher skilled EU citizens from crisis-affected countries during economic crisis
(Castles, De Haas, and Miller, 2014, p. 118). However, foreign EU citizens are
usually regarded as rather ’unproblematic migrants’, which results in a lack of
empirical data regarding their political opinions, participation rates as well as
well-being (Düvell, 2009). Indeed, mobile EU citizens are usually not particularly
visible in national public debates in their countries of residence. The voter turn-
out in the 2014 EP elections suggests that on average, younger people presented
the largest group of non-voters: 27,8% of 18 to 24 year-old people voted, compared
to 51,3% of people aged 55 and older and among EU citizens living abroad the voter
turn-out was at a usual low (European Commission, 2015a, pp. 11-13).
Yet, instead of voting, young EU mobiles have become more and more visible
on Facebook and other social media where they can find like-minded people with
similar experiences in Denmark and Germany. Indeed, research has suggested
the rising significance of Facebook as a social network to socialise, exchange in-
formation, cope with hurdles for young and mobile people and form their own
discussion groups about migration issues that are relevant to them (Georgiou,
2006; M. Christensen, Jansson, and C. Christensen, 2011; Duru and Trenz, 2016).
By committing to online groups such as ’Foreigners in Denmark’, ’Expats in Ber-
lin’ and others and by participating in their discussions, a considerable number5
of EU mobiles constitute themselves political subjects within their countries of
residence (here Denmark and Germany), detached from national public debates.
Together, these trends raise crucial questions regarding the ways in which
these political subjects experience migration and contest citizenship. In other
words, by means of such online media practices these people ”assert their political
significance as peoplewith something to say” aboutmigration (see Coleman, 2013,
p. 219). The ways in which they enact themselves as political subjects suggests
that citizenship contestation regarding migration is not a homogeneous practice
but emerges in diverse ways from people’s migration-related practices.
5The Facebook group ’berlin EXPATS’, for example, has around 27.137 members, as of
18.08.2017.
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In following a ’bottom-up’ approach that focuses on political subjects based
through their enactments of how they feel affected by migration instead of legal
statuses, it is possible to tackle the overall research question regarding people’s
contestation of citizenship through an empirical investigation of two, separate
sub-questions:
1. Sub-question 1: How do critics of immigration contest citizenship in the
EU?
2. Sub-question 2: How do EU mobiles contest citizenship in the EU?
Each of these two questions addresses a distinct category of social practice
regarding migration that is linked to contestation. These questions need to be
approached separately, but they present two sides of the same coin, that is, two
distinct forms of how people contest citizenship regarding migration in the EU. In
so far, the questions engage with distinct points of view on how migration chal-
lenges citizenship as organising principle within a national welfare community
and as a political frame for in- and exclusion are perceived and experienced ’from
below’.
The thesis approaches each sub-question with a comparative case study on
its own. This means that I approach the study of critics of immigration and the
study of EU mobiles separately through two different sets of methods. Regard-
ing the critics of immigration, I conduct a qualitative content analysis of online
commentary on Danish and German national online news sites. Regarding EU
mobiles, the thesis draws from an online survey distributed in Facebook ’expat’
groups and, from there, conducts semi-structured interviews with respondents
who live in Copenhagen and Berlin. Both sub-questions are therefore approached
in a cross-national, comparative way across Danish and German contexts.
It is in suchways that people’s contestation of citizenship regardingmigration
has not yet received sufficient attention in the respective literature. A focus on
contestation as issue-directed, i.e. asking ’contestation of citizenship of what?’, re-
garding migration will inform the still under-researched issue of citizenship ’from
below’. Such a ’bottom-up’ approach has to employ a theoretical framework that
does not rely on scholarly definitions of citizenship concepts, such as legal status,
practices and identity, but on a framework that can analyse people’s ”questions
of justice and injustice” (see Isin, 2013, p. 21). In the next section, I introduce such
a framework concerning justice.
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1.3 Analytical framework: People’s notions of justice
So far, I have introduced the focus of this thesis which takes its departure in the
social conflict about migration as a matter of citizenship contestation. Migration
challenges citizenship as organising principle for establishing and maintaining
just social interaction within a national welfare community but also raises prob-
lems regarding the legitimate political frame to provide access to this community.
In order to understand how people contest citizenship regarding migration in
the EU, I have suggested following a ’bottom-up’ approach to citizenship contest-
ation that focuses on people who enact themselves as political subjects regarding
migration. The ’bottom-up’ approach I have introduced here emphasises that crit-
ics of immigration as well as EU mobiles establish themselves in their ”political
significance as people with something to say” about migration via online media
(see Coleman, 2013, p. 219). Through their distinct migration-related online media
practices, these people enact themselves as political subjects: It is here that their
”questions of injustice and justice” regarding migration become visible (see Isin,
2013, p. 22). Consequently, the empirical investigation of how people contest cit-
izenship requires adopting an analytical framework that conceptualises people’s
questions or notions of justice and injustice with reference to citizenship as or-
ganising principle within a national welfare community and as political frame for
in- and exclusion.
In order to conceptualise and categorise people’s notions of justice, I draw
from Nancy Fraser’s (2008) seminal work on ”reframing justice in a globalizing
world”. Fraser defines a ”three-dimensional theory of justice” that centres around
the question of how the cultural, economic and political dimensions of justice, i.e.
recognition, redistribution and representation, can be accommodated within the
context of global crises and inter- and transnational dependencies that reach far
beyond national sovereignty (Fraser, 2008, p. 16).
One the one hand, within a national welfare community questions of justice
are concernedwith organising equal participation of all which is provided through
a balance between recognition and redistribution and democratic representation
(Fraser, 2008, pp. 58-59). On the other hand, in a more and more globalised world,
political justice and injustice concerns how to determine the boundaries of the
political community and, therefore, to decide about in-and exclusion. This latter
aspect regards political representation as a problem of the frame, i.e. ”frame-
setting” or ”misframing” (Fraser, 2008, p. 16). In this way, both the ”substance”
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(”the What”) of justice (Fraser, 2008, p. 2) and the ”frame of justice” (Fraser, 2008,
p. 15) need to be considered when looking at questions of citizenship.
Redistribution refers to socio-economic questions, especially about how to
equally distribute resources and access to goods among people within a com-
munity. It is concerned with negotiating how to diminish inequality by means of
just distribution of resources and goods (Fraser et al., 2004, p. 9).
Recognition covers the cultural dimension of justice. It is primarily concerned
with questions of how to value and accept differences among people and to avoid
unequal access due to these differences (Fraser, 1996; Fraser, 2003; Fraser, 2008).
Therefore, recognition addresses the question of how to deal with different cul-
tural identities but also of how to outbalance the devaluation of collectivities such
as the poor, certain gender, or sexuality, or nationality (Fraser, 2003, p. 12).
Finally, the political dimension of justice representation, according to Fraser
(2008, p. 15), poses not only questions about what is just within a community, but
who can decide about who is included as political subject, the ”frame of justice”.
The ordinary type of misrepresentation refers to domestic or community-intern
problems regarding the political system and democratic processes (Fraser, 2008,
p. 19). Yet, the problem of the frame-setting of justice becomes especially salient
at times when the role of nation-state is becoming increasingly unclear and chal-
lenged. Misrepresentation in reference to the political frame, i.e. ”misframing”,
arises if the boundaries of a political community are drawn and the criteria for
both in- and exclusion are considered unjust (Fraser, 2008, p. 19). This type of
political injustice promotes the constitution of ”both members and non-members
in a single stroke” (Fraser, 2008, p. 19). In other words, this relates to questions
regarding the political frame of reference and the overlap and reach of political
authorities.
According to Fraser, justice requires ”social arrangements” to create possib-
ilities of equal participation (Fraser, 2008, p. 16). Citizenship can be considered
such a ’social arrangement’. Thus, the ”substance” and the ”frame of justice” raise
crucial questions regarding citizenship: ’how can we organise justice in a national
welfare community in which not everyone is an official member, i.e. a citizen of
this community?’ and ’how can we define who is an official member of this com-
munity?’. These questions are especially relevant for citizenship and migration in
the EU where EU citizenship has blurred the lines of the political frame, that is,
where it has established overlapping political authorities.
Accordingly, I suggest that these questions can be translated for a conceptual
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understanding of citizenship contestation. Fraser’s first question speaks to con-
testation of citizenship as organising principle for just social interaction among
people within a national welfare community. Her second question concerns con-
testation of citizenship regarding the political frame of reference for in- and ex-
clusion.
In this way, people’s notions of justice can be conceptualised within the three
broad dimensions of justice Fraser introduces, i.e. recognition, redistribution and
representation; or ”maldistribution”, ”misrecognition” and ”misrepresentation” or
”misframing” as corresponding injustices (Fraser, 2008, pp. 16-21). Here, I suggest
that people’s notions of justice speak to at least two relationships that capture con-
testation of citizenship in relation to migration in the EU. The first one addresses
the relationship between the self and political authorities. It touches upon notions
of representation and misframing and consequently addresses contestation of cit-
izenship regarding the political frame. Crucially, it allows to investigate which
political authority people refer to, for example, the EU or national politicians. The
second one concerns the relationship between people, that is, themselves and oth-
ers and what the just balance between recognition and redistribution should be.
This relationship enables to scrutinise how people define themselves and others as
legitimate recipients of access to welfare and rights, i.e. it refers to citizenship as
an organising principle of just social interactions within a national welfare com-
munity.
In sum, the overall empirical contribution of this thesis is thus focused on
findings from two in-depth investigations of two distinct types of people contest-
ing citizenship as an organising principle and as the political frame for in- and
exclusion; or in other words, on how they contest citizenship as the ’social ar-
rangement’ regarding the ”substance” as well as the ”frame of justice” (Fraser,
2008, p. 2).
1.4 Contribution and structure of the thesis
Having introduced the analytical framework and research design, it is now time
to consider the contribution of this thesis. Generally, scholars agree that there is
a need for more qualitative research and micro-level analysis regarding migration
and citizenship in order to develop robust theoretical and normative frameworks
(Tonkiss, 2014, p. 447). This thesis makes a contribution to the empirical body of
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work regarding ’bottom-up’ approaches to citizenship in an in-depth manner by
offering rich empirical data on people’s engagement withmigration and their con-
testation of citizenship. The empirical data about EU mobiles’ experiences of mi-
gration add to the proclaimed lack of qualitative insights here. Furthermore, this
research responds to the demand ”for a new vocabulary of citizenship” (Isin, 2009,
p. 368) by offering an original research design which combines under-researched
cases that emerge due to changing media landscapes (commenters as critics of
immigration and EU mobiles in ’online expat groups’) and their contestation of
citizenship. More precisely, the thesis offers rich data about EU mobiles’ experi-
ences particularly on the local level across contexts.
Moreover, it contributes to the research by means of a unique data set of on-
line commentary about migration and how it is contested among ordinary people.
Since online comment discussions have been undermore rigorous control through
web administrators of online newspapers themselves, sampling comments is a
task that happens under time pressure. In fact, only parts of the comment sec-
tions that are analysed here are still available online. With regards to immigra-
tion, scholars point to the need to combine questions of politics of culture and
national belonging with questions of stereotypes and claims for social exclusion
during economic turmoil (Keskinen, Norocel, and Jørgensen, 2016, p. 323). The
data provided here offer rich insights not only contestation about citizenship but
also in relation to practices of stereotyping and social boundary-making, nation-
alist narratives and, in some instances, online racism, all across two national con-
texts.
Furthermore, the social relevance of this research is worth mentioning. In-
stead of relying on ’social proxies’ by focusing on macro processes only and em-
ploying prior assumed concepts, this research highlights the impact of citizenship
on ordinary people’s lives. Everyday lives and people’s ways of making sense of
their perceptions and experiences hardly fit the abstract modelling of citizenship
and migration through legal frameworks and political discourses. Understand-
ing their active role highlights the need to further investigate the different ways
in which people constitute themselves vis-à-vis institutions, political actors and
rights-granting authorities.
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature
on citizenship in an EU context. It distinguishes between ’top-down’ and ’bottom-
up’ approaches. It makes a case for the latter approach by introducing the ana-
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lytical framework of the thesis in order to analyse distinct forms of contestation
of citizenship as organising principle and yardstick for in- and exclusion.
Chapter 3 describes and discusses the research design as well as the method-
ological approach of this thesis. It begins with introducing how the thesis will
empirically analyse the contestation among people critical of migration as well
as among EU mobiles. The chapter also highlights how each of these cases will
be addressed across contexts in Denmark and Germany. It then elaborates on the
methodology and operationalises the theoretical framework. In the last part, it
describes the research methods used for data collection and analysis.
Chapters 4 and 5 present the empirical findings of the thesis. Regarding sub-
question 1, chapter 4 shows how people critical of migration in comment sections
categorise and stereotype migrants as undeserving and feel politically misrep-
resented. Nationalist conceptions of in- and exclusion confirm the nation-state
as only legitimate frame. Citizenship is understood in moral terms: In a sym-
bolic trade ’good citizenship’ is traded for justice within the nation-state. Here,
perceptions of political misrepresentation occur as the most dominant notions of
injustice.
Regarding sub-question 2, chapter 5 shows how EU mobiles living in Copen-
hagen and Berlin contest citizenship. The chapter highlights that there is a shift
in the meaning of citizenship from mobility periods to settlement periods. Dur-
ing EUmobiles’ phase of mobility, EU citizenship is ’normalised’, that is, taken for
granted as an individual right. Questions of justice as well as injustice are ’absent’.
During settlement EU citizenship loses its perceived benefit, as the respondents
report ’entering’ a national system of regulations and bureaucracy that is often
accompanied with struggling for access on the local labour markets. This leads to
underlying impressions of being ’foreign’, in some cases to misrecognition if ex-
pectations of rights deriving from EU citizenship are disappointed. Citizenship is
understood in pragmatic terms, as an instrument to pursue one’s individual way
of life and freedoms.
Chapter 6 discusses the findings of the two previous chapters and synthes-
ises the findings regarding citizenship contestation in relation to the meanings of
membership and the relationship between people and political authorities.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. It reflects on the implications of the findings
regarding to the broader questions raised in the introduction and highlights the
contribution. Finally, it broadens the scope of the findings by suggesting avenues
for further research.
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Chapter 2
Conceptualisations of citizenship
This chapter will address the respective literature on citizenship in relation to
migration issues in the EU and present the theoretical framework of this thesis to
investigate the research question:
• How do people contest citizenship in relation to migration in the EU?
This chapter presents a discussion of how to approach citizenship contestation
regarding migration in the EUwhere EU citizenship has modified the political and
social boundaries between people. I suggest that the respective literature can be
divided into ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches to citizenship.
’Top-down’ approaches conceptualise the link between citizenship and mi-
gration in legal and political terms. They focus on how EU citizenship has created
a new legal status that defines both migrants and national citizens residing within
one member state, i.e. foreign and national EU citizens. I will focus on the schol-
arly debates on how formal status and substantive rights define contemporary
understandings of citizenship in the nation-state and beyond, on the development
of citizenship through law and principles and on political practices that construct
citizenship. Scholars following ’top-down’ approaches emphasise that the group
of EU citizens is a case in point to understand how migration challenges citizen-
ship in two aspects. Migration challenges citizenship understandings as an organ-
ising principle for the social order between members of a political community; it
also raises new questions regarding the political frame to decide about a yardstick
for in- and exclusion of members and non-members. Based on this literature, I
propose that these two aspects regarding citizenship, i.e. the challenges migra-
tion poses to citizenship as an organising principle between citizens and to the
yardstick for in- and exclusion, are contested by ordinary people.
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Yet, the focus in ’top-down’ approaches on legal or political categories of
people, such as foreign and national EU citizens or migrants and national cit-
izens, is insufficient for an investigation of how people contest citizenship as an
organising principle and as the political yardstick regarding in- and exclusion.
This line of argument is developed in ’bottom-up’ approaches. The reason is that
legal status and rights that are bestowed upon people ’from above’ do not neces-
sarily overlap with the ways in which people perceive and experience migration
and contest citizenship, nor should it be assumed that being an EU citizen auto-
matically comes with contestation. ’Bottom-up’ approaches shift attention away
from legally defined groups and how they are affected by citizenship toward their
social practices and enactments of citizenship. Here, it is argued that, although
concepts of status, rights or identity as used in the literature are invaluable to
understand the implications of citizenship for people’s lives, they might not find
direct expression among ordinary people’s lived experiences themselves.
I argue that a ’bottom-up’ approach is necessary that conceptualises contesta-
tion not as a commonly shared practice among EU citizens. Instead, a ’bottom-up’
approach can identify people’s practices regardingmigration when they ask ques-
tions of justice and injustice. In the last part of this chapter, I will elaborate on this
conceptualisation of citizenship contestation regarding migration by developing
a theoretical framework that identifies critics of immigration and EU mobiles as
people who constitute themselves as political subjects regarding migration issues
by making their notions of justice and injustice visible.
2.1 ’Top-down’ approaches to citizenship
Increasing migration has triggered questions about the role of formal status as a
form of membership in a nation-state denoting the citizen as the sole bearer of
rights. These discussions have received another edge with the introduction of EU
citizenship as the product of political decision-making. Not only does EU citizen-
ship add a new legal status on top of national citizenship. It has also defined EU
citizens’ rights that go beyond nationally confined boundaries, most prominently
expressed in the right to EU freedom of movement.
It is therefore not surprising that debates about a distinction between formal
status and substantive rights among scholars of citizenship in the field of soci-
ology are ongoing. Discussions about formal status refer to access to and mem-
bership in a political communitywhich depends on the individual being or becom-
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ing a citizen. Hereby, one distinguishes between ius sanguinis, i.e. citizenship by
descent, and ius soli, that is, citizenship by birthplace. Debates about substant-
ive rights relate to the development and quality of rights which are granted to
citizens and non-citizens. Traditionally, the development of welfare states has
led scholars to discuss citizenship through a gradual expansion of rights which
flesh out the individual’s legal status. However, after the postwar period from
1945 onwards, increasing mobility and migration flows across national states due
to globalisation and economic integration have triggered new debates about the
role of citizen status as a condition for receiving rights (see Bottomore, 1992, p. 66).
Migration in the EU is now regulated through a complex set of formal statuses
and substantive rights that challenge traditional understandings of the organisa-
tion of rights through the state and membership. Besides national citizens also
foreign EU citizens are granted rights in another member state, while non-EU
citizens remain at the margins. In order to understand this area of tension of cit-
izenships in the EU it is therefore necessary to review how scholarship addresses
the concepts of status and rights and how these elements of citizenship have be-
come subject to political changes.
By means of a focus on citizenship from ’top-down’, such debates ensue mod-
els of citizenship based on normative and conceptual accounts of citizenship and
its development on the one hand, or are embedded in analyses of political decision-
making on the other hand. Yet, these debates remain inconclusive regarding the
role of ordinary people. They are treated as actors in the development of cit-
izenship towards a fixed set of merely national principles and norms or as rather
passive audiences to citizenship frameworks that are bestowed upon them.
2.1.1 Legal-norms perspective: Formal status and substantive rights
T.H. Marshall’s (1950) sociological account of citizenship is an often quoted mile-
stone in the literature describing the development and expansion of substantial
rights in reference to British society from the 19th century up to the postwar
period. At the core of his analysis lies the observation that citizenship has de-
veloped through an expansion of rights which has contributed to further equality
between social classes in a national market economy (Bottomore, 1992, p. 55). In
reconstructing this historical development, Marshall (1950, p. 44) argued that de-
velopment from a feudal system to the process of industrialisation and toward
a market economy with a shared culture enabled the expansion of substantive
civil, political and, finally, social rights. Worker movements and continuous in-
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dustrial and economic transformations had further pressed for these rights. This
expansion, as Marshall theorised, described also a tension between social class
and citizenship: The dynamics of capitalism forged a continuous struggle between
economic profit, workers rights to welfare and the tax requirements of modern
states.
Together, legal status and rights organise the interaction between citizens. In
other words, the legal status of holding citizenship is fleshed out by rights (civil,
political and social) that allow the citizen to enjoy the privileges, rights and duties
of being amember of a particular national community. Marshall’s account is often
understood as to describe an ”expansive logic of citizenship” as a means for in-
creasing equality in the class system of postwar Britain and the status differences
in British society (Mosher, 2007, p. 121). As a way to organise society in a just
way, citizenship has evolved in reaction to inequalities of economic dynamics.
Although influential, Marshall’s work has received criticism concerning the
role of states as well as in relation to his single focus on the nation-state. Crit-
ics question especially Marshall’s account of the development of citizenship as
a historically chronological process and merely influenced by capitalist dynam-
ics. For example, it is argued that Marshall underestimated the differences among
states and the role of institutions such as judicial courts, parliamentary systems
or welfare systems in the development of such substantial rights (Mann, 1987;
Turner, 1990). Pursuing an expansion of Marshall’s conceptualisation of citizen-
ship, Mann (1987, p. 340) argued that an understanding of modern citizenship
needed to include the type of ”ruling class” and the ”strategies” it adopted to
accommodate the working class. Criticising earlier sociological work including
Marshall’s, the influence of worker movements and other involvement had been
overstated and the power of the ”ruling class” in influencing ”social structures”,
such as citizenship, underestimated (Mann, 1987, p. 340). Mann’s focus on citizen-
ship from above was criticised by Turner (1990, p. 194), who argued that social
rights had developed especially from social violence ”bringing the state into the
social arena as stabiliser of the social system.”The states failure to counterbalance
different demands would then lead to more protest and social movements and this
forcing the state from below to introduce or expand social rights (Turner, 1990,
pp. 199-200). Consequently, in every western nation-state there was a minimum
of involvement of civil society that depended on the state’s structuring of public
and private spaces, i.e. in allowing and answering to such demands (Turner, 1990,
p. 200). In this way, Turner proposed a framework for the analysis of citizenship
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which encompassed different modi operandi of how citizenship develops and is
realised under different state regimes while criticising scholarship that neglects
the development of rights through struggle in democratic and capitalist states.
Marshall’s framework referred primarily to privileged, male citizens in British
society but does not address the substantive dimension of citizenship for women,
minorities and migrants. In particular, feminist accounts have driven debates
about the substantive dimension of citizenship. Since Marshall’s account focused
on social rights developing from the workforce and the workers movement from
which women had mostly been excluded, feminist and other civil rights move-
ments had not been accounted for (Lister, 1998). Scholarly engagement with the
new social movements in the 1960s and 70s demanding collective rights with re-
gards to gender, the environment and immigration further expanded Marshall’s
account of citizenship. Citizenship rights were not longer a matter of social class
but of broader social struggle for the recognition of other collectivities. Pressure
by these new social movements, welfare states began introducing policies and
principles that went beyond a universal-individualistic notion of rights by target-
ing social groups and collectivities and, by this, attributing rights not only based
on legal status but based on differentiated needs (Lister, 1998, p. 11). Before, social
rights had mainly referred to economic resources. Now, these rights also touched
upon immaterial, or postmaterial aspects (see Inglehart, 1971; Inglehart, 1977;
Inglehart, 2008). In this way, not only formal status as a universal citizen defined
rights but a more substantive understanding of rights based on more personal and
social aspects was developed.
Such debates about formal and substantive conceptualisations of citizenship
and the state as organiser of society have been further critiqued and complemen-
ted in more normative accounts. Not only does citizenship define the univer-
sal citizen through legal status and social groups based on their needs, it should
also contribute to the development of a national identity among citizens. In ob-
serving a Return of the Citizen, Kymlicka and Norman (1994) argued that citizen-
ship includes an identity-building element necessary to maintain the political
community of a state by activating citizens’ sense of democratic responsibility.
Critically, this line of argument suggests that citizenship imposed on political
subjects in itself evokes a civic identity with shared norms. Normative theories
of democracy and justice, as they argue, cannot explain what desirable activities
create ’good citizens’ (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994, p. 377). In their view, a theory
of citizenship need not be encompassed by theories of justice and democracy but
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should stand as an independent theory explaining cohesion among members of a
political community (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994, p. 377). The scholarly focus on
political institutions is said to ignore the identity-building aspect of citizenship,
i.e. the forming of a ”citizenship identity” not through political or legal frame-
works but through the national norms of citizenship as an independent institu-
tion (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994, p. 353). Kymlicka’s and Norman’s account of
citizenship therefore can be understood as a normative perspective on citizenship
based on the assumption of citizenship as an identity-building institution in itself.
In this way, the concept of citizenship is considered not only in legal terms based
on status and rights but in normative terms as well.
However, one has to be critical as to whether the concept of ”citizenship iden-
tities” can or should be separated from questions of democracy and justice. The
problem with such normative accounts is, first, that without empirical investiga-
tion it is hardly possible to assume that citizenship - in itself or through political
institutions - establishes a shared identity among ordinary people. Second, sim-
ilar to the above discussed literature on legal principles, such normative accounts
of citizenship assume the nation-state as a frame of reference for citizenship and,
thus, identity. Third, since one can now observe a tension between different cit-
izenships, especially between national and EU citizenship, its is questionable, to
what extent the integrative function of citizenship is achievable or desirable after
all. Given the assumption that collective identities are imposed by majorities, this
would increase pressure on minorities. Consequently, such a focus on citizenship
raises normative questions about the function of democracy and the role of justice
in terms of maintaining a just social order. For instance, current anti-immigration
sentiments in Europe illustrate how national citizenship norms are instrumental-
ised to justify nationalist views on belonging and access to rights.
Yet also the further developments of Marshall’s conceptualisation cannot ac-
count for the development of international rights regimes and the development
of rights based on EU citizenship beyond national boundaries. Published in 1950,
Marshall’s Citizenship and Social Class presumed the nation-state as frame of ref-
erence for the development and distribution of legal status and rights. While
addressing the relationship between status and substantive rights of citizenship
and the establishment of an identity, these aforementioned debates ignore how in-
creasing immigration since the 1970s had started to change and challenge citizen-
ship models based on the state as frame of reference. Within a European context,
on which I am focusing here, such questions have been prominently addressed
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by Soysal (1994) and Brubaker (1992). In different ways, the works of these au-
thors are considered to have changed the debates about formal status, rights and
identity by problematising the impact of increasing migration flows to European
welfare states on citizenship - an aspect other accounts ignore, yet which is cru-
cial for an understanding of citizenship contestation regarding migration in the
EU context of today.
At first sight, these works seem to contradict each other. Brubaker (1992) in-
vestigates the aforementioned membership component of national citizenship in
European states and argues that nationalmembership is a powerful instrument for
boundary-making between national members and migrants. On the other hand,
by investigating guestworkers’ rights in Germany Soysal (1994) finds that not
only national citizenship defines membership any longer but that international
human rights discourse increasingly challenges membership based on national-
ity. Both works have been published around the time when the Maastricht Treaty
was signed by the then 12 member states6 in 1992. With the treaty coming into
force on November 1st in 1993, it established EU citizenship for all citizens of the
member states. Around this time, the implications of EU citizenship and whether,
as non-national model, it would compete with national membership models, as
Soysal (1994) argues, or whether national citizenship status would be the key to
control access and rights, following Brubaker (1992) in this case, were hardly fore-
seeable.
Submitting this thesis more than 20 years later than the publication dates of
these two seminal books by Soysal and Brubaker, one might consider both ac-
counts less as contradictory than as complementary to each other. Rather than
considering both accounts to present contrasting analyses of the development of
citizenship in relation to migration, I suggest in the following that together they
serve as a description of the relationship between national and EU citizenship as
an area of tension. In particular, they emphasise how citizenship ’from above’
shapes the lives of migrants in national states. According to Brubaker (1992),
scholarship has paid attention to substantive rights but keeps ignoring the influ-
ence of national conceptions of citizenship that maintain a distinction between
members and non-members. As far as migration is concerned, legal frameworks
and interpretations of nationhood create exclusion not necessarily on the level
6The EC member states were Belgium, Denmark (after initial rejection in a referen-
dum), Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal
and the United Kingdom.
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of rights but on the level of membership (Brubaker, 1992, p. 22). The state as
a ”membership organisation” is made possible because formal national citizen-
ship denotes the cultural distinctiveness of a nation-state (Brubaker, 1992, p. 22).
In other words, formalistic (or ’official’) definitions of citizenship articulate self-
understandings of nationhood and, by this, present specific ”model[s] of mem-
bership” that shape migrants’ lives (Brubaker, 1990, p. 380). It defines the criteria
for in- and exclusion not through legal status only but through distinct under-
standings of nationhood distinguishing the foreigner from the national citizen.
Therefore, the legal framework of citizenship presents a ”powerful instrument of
social closure” since it delimits a territory to which only citizens have unlimited
access while foreigners are subject to conditions and need to plan their lives ac-
cordingly (Brubaker, 1992, p. 24). Consequently, citizenship as formal institution
is unavoidably attached to the state’s and its citizens’ entitlement over national
territory in relation to others.
While Brubaker foregrounds the nation-state’s sovereignty over citizenship,
Soysal’s (1994) conceptualisation of citizenship challenges the national grounds of
membership. Similarly to Brubaker, she uncouples national membership from the
receipt of rights. Yet instead of territorial closure (see Brubaker, 1992, p. 23), she
identifies ”a more universal model of membership, anchored in deterritorialized
notions of persons’ rights” (Soysal, 1994, p. 3). The guestworker experience, she
argues, indicates that national models of membership have lost their significance
against ”human rights as a world-level organizing principle” resulting in what she
calls ”postnational” citizenship (Soysal, 1994, p. 3). Ultimately, she underlines the
importance of international rights discourses pressuring formal membership in a
national polity. Despite a lack of formal citizenship, guestworkers have achieved
permanent residence in other states and their incorporation. According to this
analysis, the ’tasks’ of the national state regarding citizenship have changed: Post-
national citizenship describes the nation-state as organiser ofmembership, yet not
as the basis of membership (Soysal, 1994, p. 140). Rather, this basis is implemen-
ted through an international human rights discourse, orchestrated by states and
grounded on ”universal personhood” (Soysal, 1994, p. 140).7 In this regard, there
is more and more debate about whether the nation-state is and, in normative ac-
counts, should define the principles of citizenship and present the sole provider
7A somewhat similar point is made by Joppke (2007). He observes that the citizen-
ship regimes of national states increasingly develop toward a broader, state-overarching
conceptualisation of liberal citizenship.
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of status as membership as well as of rights.
In light of these debates and disagreements about the development of citizen-
ship and the different conceptualisations that have emerged since Marshall’s ac-
count, scholars have adjusted previous theoretical accounts andmodels of citizen-
ship to the social, political and economic transformations emerging in and around
EU countries. Delanty (1997) considers an alternative postnational model of cit-
izenship which shifts not only formal membership, but also substantive rights
including duties, responsibilities and participatory opportunities to a legal frame-
work beyond the state. Arguing that European citizenship as postnational model
is compatible with other more traditional ones, Delanty (1997) conceptualises five
models of citizenship: the rights model, the conservative model, the participatory
model, and the communitarian model as traditional forms as well as the post-
national model of citizenship to address the more recent developments with re-
gard to migration. While the rights model is based on the formal dimension of
legal status, the conservative model has introduced duties and responsibilities but
equally rests on passive notions of the citizen (Delanty, 1997, p. 290). The particip-
atory model ”stresses participation as an active processes” that extends the idea
of duties and responsibilities (Delanty, 1997, p. 290). The communitarian model
develops further the relationship between citizenship and identity. It is similar to
a participatory model since it also emphasises the substantive dimension of cit-
izenship. In this model, the community is not a only a political one, but a cultural
one maintained through citizens sharing a cultural identity that developed in a
historical process and is upheld, for example, in traditions (Delanty, 1997, p. 291).
A postnational model of citizenship must incorporate these four components but
do so by decoupling them from the ”spatial dimension”, i.e. a territorial frame of
reference, that underlines the first four models (Delanty, 1997, p. 293).
However, such considerations assume EU citizenship as yet another citizen-
ship model from above where aspects of contestation are not addressed. Con-
sequently, this focus on how principles and legal norms continuously develop
citizenship foregrounds membership and political models of incorporation as de-
terminants for the relationship between citizenship as legal institution and polit-
ical subjects. I would argue, however, that Brubaker’s and Soysal’s accounts make
a more direct relationship visible focusing on the implications of citizenship for
ordinary people’s lives. This link needs to be empirically investigated from a
’bottom-up’ approach to citizenship since it is usually taken for granted in ’top-
down’ approaches.
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Put differently, one could argue that Brubaker’s and Soysal’s analyses com-
bined offer an adequate verdict of today’s situation of how migration is regulated
from ’top-down’ in the EU and how it affects the lives of people residing in it:
The sovereign nation-state continues to use citizenship as an ”instrument for so-
cial closure” (Brubaker, 1992, p. 24) now particularly excluding non-EU citizens in
exchange for porous national borders with regards to intra-EU mobility. Strong
EU welfare states articulate their sovereignty over national borders and territory
to decide about immigration flows and also to steer intra-EUmobility. These artic-
ulations of sovereignty are based on the claim to represent the will of the national
citizenry. Yet, such recurrent claims of territorial entitlement and politicization
of migration would not be necessary if member states’ sovereignty over immigra-
tion was unchallenged. Indeed, the implementation of EU citizenship also needs
to be considered as an institutionalised, transnational discourse on rights of mo-
bility that intervenes with national legal frameworks which tie membership to
nationality (see Soysal, 1994, p. 142).
In this sense, it becomes increasingly visible that citizenship in the EU does
not merely present a single model of citizenship but an area of tension between
member states and supranational decision-making about immigration and free-
dom of movement.8 That being said, not legal principles and models of citizenship
make salient the area of tension in the EU but the different articulations of sover-
eignty deriving from national and EU levels.
This area of tension has lead to new discussions about who is a member and
who can decide about membership, i.e. draw boundaries, in a legitimate way.
In The Rights of Others Seyla Benhabib (2004) gives a normative account of how
the area of tension between national and international conceptualisations of cit-
izenship can be encompassed in a theory of global justice. In other words, she
is concerned with determining when and how political communities can legitim-
ately decide about inclusion and exclusion: Only the ”communicative freedom”
(of the individual in relation to the same freedom of others) that allows all to
reason with each other and to reach a rational consensus over the in- and exclu-
sion can justify political membership (Benhabib, 2004, p. 167).9 Yet, the various
8See for the classic debate in European integration literature about the role of national
and EU institutions in the development of the EU as an institution of policy- and decision-
making, for example, Ernst B. Haas’ The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic
Forces from 1958 for a neo-functionalist perspective focusing on the role of supranational
institutions and AndrewMoravcsik’sTheChoice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power
from Messina to Maastricht from 1998 for a liberal intergovernmentalist account.
9A discussion of her normative-analytical approach in form of a discourse-ethical jus-
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ways to accommodate articulations of sovereignty between the EU and member
states have created a ”disaggregation of citizenship” (Benhabib, 2004, pp. 154-156).
This fragmentation of status and rights hinders persons’ communicative freedom.
On the one hand, human rights discourse has decoupled national citizenship from
the receipt of rights (especially regarding EU citizens living in another member
state). On the other hand, articulations of entitlements to control immigration
have defined certain people to be without rights or only some rights, particularly
with regards to asylum seekers, refugees and, broadly speaking, non-EU citizens.
Thus, citizenship in the EU has not created a certain status of all people but is ”a
checkered landscape” that leaves open the question of what membership means
and where it is located (Benhabib, 2004, p. 153).
As statuses are diverse, so are the rights attached to them. EU citizenship has
not somuch defined a common European polity than it has drawn new boundaries
between EU and non-EU citizens (Maas, 2008, p. 584). The idea of EU citizenship
to present a form of ”nested citizenship” in order to accommodate the various ar-
ticulations of sovereignty and entitlements has not only led to a multitude of legal
statuses but to ”tensions between centralized and decentralized sources of rights”
(Maas, 2008, p. 586). Again, the problem at hand is the area of tensions between
states aiming to preserve their sovereignty, that is in this case, to remain able
to control immigration both in the domestic arena and the EU level (Maas, 2008,
p. 586). National citizenship has been in constant struggle with local, sub-national
units of competencies over rights (Maas, 2008, p. 587). Similar developments are
visible between member states and the EU regarding legal norms and European
and national law (Maas, 2008, p. 587). In this way, EU citizenship has created a
new type of migrant and citizen, the ’mobile EU citizen’; a term which is used in
the official language of EU institutions instead of ’migrants’ (Geddes and Schol-
ten, 2016, p. 6). The new boundary between EU and non-EU citizens points to the
shared understanding of entitlement of EU citizenship vis-à-vis non-EU citizens.
Nevertheless, the question of how ordinary people engage in such issues of
status and rights as organisation of social order and membership, and contest
them, remains unanswered in such ’top-down’ legal-norms perspective. Nor is
it particularly concerned with how the tension area of citizenship between dif-
ferent levels is established through colliding articulations of entitlements among
political actors. Thus, it does not consider the constructive elements of citizen-
ship, that is, how such discussions about sovereignty and entitlements among
tification of political membership would go beyond the scope of this thesis.
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political actors and states have contributed to new definitions of boundaries of
inclusion and exclusion. Before approaching the question of citizenship contest-
ation further through ’bottom-up’ approaches in the literature, it is necessary to
understand how this tension area has evolved in the first place. The next section is
concerned with scholarship that understands EU citizenship as a political practice
that challenges national levels of citizenship.
2.1.2 Political practice perspective
So far, I have discussed literature that takes a legal-norms perspective which is
primarily concerned with how states, international discourse and principles of in-
clusion and exclusion define membership and provide substantive rights. While
this perspective was traditionally applied to state-centred conceptualisations of
citizenship, later accounts have criticised this focus by analysing the impact of
increasingmigration flows on national membership regimes and changing dimen-
sions of in- and exclusion in the EU context.
In this following section, I will discuss literature that describes this area of
tension from a perspective on political practices. This perspective asks to what
extent citizenship, and particularly EU citizenship is shaped by informal ideas,
negotiations and political practices. This branch is primarily positioned in the so-
cial constructivist school of thought. While not disregarding how legal principles
develop further the various models of citizenship, the following literature focuses
on diverse actors’ construction of EU citizenship as they bring different visions
and ideas to the negotiating table and, in this manner, develop a different type
of citizenship on the EU level. In this way, EU citizenship is regarded as having
established a ”new geography of citizenship” in which EU and member state act-
ors’ practices challenge and change patterns of inclusion or exclusion or equality
and rights that have immediate effects on the lives of ordinary people (Wiener,
1997, p. 531). I will begin with recapitulating two examples that show how polit-
ical actors with discretionary powers as well as courts can re-negotiate the legal
principles of citizenship.
Thefirst example concerns the French government’s treatment of Roma people
around 2010. After a period of violence involving Roma people and police through-
out France, then president Nicolas Sarkozy ordered Roma camps to be cleared.
The French government had expelled and deported the circa 1000 Romanian and
Bulgarian nationals of Roma origin and reimbursing them with around 300 Euros
(Severance, 2010). It had become clear from the wording of an internal document
33
ordering the police intervention that the French government had targeted Roma
explicitly as ethnic group. This had finally led the European Commission to inter-
vene condemning the French government’s violation of the EU laws on freedom
of movement and discrimination. The result of the intervention, however, was a
change of the wording of the respective document by French government officials
while the deportations continued. The wording of the document now justified the
expulsion with concerns over member state security, a reason that allows mem-
ber states to expel foreign EU citizens according to article 21 of the EU Directive
2004/38 on EU freedom of movement (Severance, 2010).
Another example is the ’Dano case’ illustrating member states’ capacities to
restrict of social welfare for foreign EU citizens in certain situations. In the ’Dano’
case the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that economically in-
active EU citizens are generally entitled to non-contributory social benefits under
EU lawwhile themember states can decide on the conditions based onwhich such
social benefits are granted (C-333/13. Judgement of 11.11.2014, 2014).10 Mem-
ber states can thus prevent social benefits to economically inactive EU citizens in
order to prevent them posing ”an unreasonable burden on the social assistance
system of the host Member State” (para 74).
The above examples suggest that EU citizenship has developed not as much
through a linear process. Rather, outcomes of court decisions as well as political
negotiations and decision-making are important signs for a dynamic and some-
times ruptured citizenship in themaking. In this respect, there is a socio-historical
dimension to how citizenship develops from practices, an aspect not addressed
in legal-norms perspectives on citizenship models and regimes. Since such per-
spectives do not take into account actors’ interests and practices to construct and
modify existing legal principles, the development EU citizenship in itself seemed
unlikely.
According to Meehan (1993, p. xii) however, the meaning of citizenship can
only be grasped if one understands how actors use it in their historical contexts.
By reconstructing the socio-historical processes of how EU citizenship has taken
shape, Meehan (1993, p. 185) observes that
10”While a Union citizen may in principle rely on the prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of nationality laid down in Article 18 TFEU, as the provision is given more spe-
cific expression in Article 24 of Directive 2004/38 and Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004
and are applicable to Ms. Dano, as someone exercising free movement rights, it is these
provisions that need to be examined (paras 61-62).”
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a new kind of citizenship is emerging that is neither national nor cosmo-
politan but which is multiple in enabling the various identities that we all
possess to be expressed, and our rights and duties exercised, through an in-
creasingly complex configuration of common institutions, states, national
and transnational interest groups and voluntary associations, local or pro-
vincial authorities, regions and alliances of regions.
A focus on social identities and informal ideas of multiple actors allows to con-
sider how these informal ideas have become institutionalised practices according
to what seemed politically appropriate for the involved actors (Meehan, 1993;
Wiener, 1997; Wiener, 1998; Wiener, 1999).
Building onMeehan’s work,Wiener (1999, p. 273) argues that in order to grasp
the development of EU citizenship, scholarship is in need of ”a [conceptual] shift
from principles to practice.”This perspective enables to analyse the ways in which
individuals and the state or community practise and, thus, institutionalise citizen-
ship (Wiener, 1997, pp. 533-534). A perspective on citizenship through political
practices does not ignore legal norms and principles - such as state sovereignty,
human rights and the concept of membership in a polity - but adds a new, so-
cial constructivist approach, i.e. ”citizenship as practice” (Wiener, 1997, p. 531).
The legal criteria of citizenship defining membership and rights between the in-
dividual and the national community alone cannot explain the boundaries and
structures of citizenship in the EU (Wiener, 1997, p. 533).
For an understanding of the contestation of citizenship, this approach raises
the question of the role of citizens, or ordinary people, and whether it can account
for contestation in everyday life contexts as opposed to political practices and
participation.
According to scholars in this stream of the literature citizenship is constructed
in interaction and therefore dynamic. Citizenship consists of ”three constitutive
elements”: the individual, the community or state, and the relationship between
those two, that is, the ”citizenship practice” (Wiener, 1997, pp. 533-534). This ”re-
lational element” of citizenship describes how ”citizens contribute to the creation
of a community” (Wiener, 1997, p. 534). Citizenship is the practice which res-
ults in ”the establishment of rights, access, and belonging (the latter being the
component for identity-building) (Wiener, 1997, p. 535). In this sense, EU cit-
izenship has established ”a new geography of citizenship” that becomes visible in
tensions, practices and claims of diverse actors who are not positioned within the
same ”geographical space” or share the same legal status (Wiener, 1997, pp. 533-
534). In other words, citizenship practice is what builds citizenship and the way
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it is build is constructed through political discourses, contestation, i.e. practices.
Therefore, citizenship does not only present a model composed of legal principles
of status and rights but a set of relationships which are constantly ’under con-
struction’.
Based on these accounts, it is possible to go beyond analyses of formal status
and rights of the individual vis-à-vis the polity since they position the citizen as
participant in the construction of citizenship. The organisation of legitimate social
order through citizenship can therefore be understood as not pre-determined but
as subject to negotiations as well. Nevertheless, when looking at membership
issues, perspectives focusing on political practices consider the dynamics of in-
and exclusion mostly in relation to political authorities and actors. The potential
for contestation ’from below’ of such dynamics and tension areas is treated only
marginally.
Rather, emphasis is put on the link between citizenship practice and polity-
formation. Questions about the role of membership are derived from an under-
standing of EU citizenship to having contributed to a new and so far unseen de-
tachment of the polity from the state. Scholars argue that EU citizenship is not
tied to an already established and national-bound community but it contributes
to the institution-building of the EU as a political union (Wiener, 1999; Shaw and
Wiener, 2000). In analogy to the historical role of citizenship played in the pro-
cess of state-formation, EU citizenship contributes to the making of a ’non-state
polity’ (Wiener, 1999, p. 283). Therefore, EU citizenship can be considered to
be an instrument to further achieve polity formation, European integration and
identity-building by mobilising citizens to practice and claim it (Wiener, 1999,
p. 284). Such an analysis therefore also points to these actors’ potentially original
aims for EU citizenship to creating a common European identity beyond national
identities Wiener (1999, p. 286).
An analysis of the negotiations about the Schengen area and freedom ofmove-
ment during the period around the establishment of the Maastricht Treaty seems
to be as much an illustration of such tensions of in such a polity as of how a
new citizenship practice was established: In the negotiations about the European
passport policy it was determined who should be able to access and travel within
Schengen without control and who should not be able to do so (Wiener, 1999,
p. 283). New groups of ’insiders’ and ’outsiders’ were defined not so much by
national membership as by being able to practice and claim EU citizenship or
not (Wiener, 1999, p. 283). Hence, these developments cannot be seen as to have
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grown from legal advancements but ”as a new development of citizenship prac-
tice” through political practices (Wiener, 1999, p. 284). The legal status of the EU
citizen manifested in primary law as a consolidation of already existing judiciary
and civic practices, i.e. case law and worker’s EU migration.
Thus, the social construction of EU citizenship raises crucial issues regarding
the role of membership not merely in terms of legal statuses and rights but of
practices both within and beyond nation-states. Nevertheless, this stream in the
literature focusesmainly on the goals and intentions behind themaking of citizen-
ship through political actors, elites and organised civil society. A perspective on
citizenship through political practices and informal ideas focuses on the mean-
ing of citizenship deriving from the way in which it was historically practised
within a specific socio-historical context (see Meehan, 1993). The development of
citizenship is under scrutiny.
Insufficient attention has so far been paid to ordinary people’s everyday life
contexts as well as not development but contestation of citizenship. Both in terms
of coming to grips with negotiating who can practise and claimwhich rights as an
organising principle and of drawing new yardsticks, maybe ’geographies’, of in-
and exclusion, civil society and political actors are considered as dominant interest
groups. Furthermore, This leaves less space for considering how ordinary people
contest citizenship.
In other words, scholars in this stream of the literature underline the ’polit-
ical space’ of citizenship but do not include its everyday life aspects. One might
therefore argue that the concept of citizenship as political practice conveys more
”implicit understandings of practice” in that it implies the influence and power
of institutional and organisational authorities on European integration (Adler-
Nissen, 2016, p. 89). In this sense, ”citizenship as practice” adds to the literature on
formal and substantive citizenship by investigating how ideas and conceptions as
well as norms and regulations emerge and become routine beyond member state
competencies in an attempt to build a community. Thus, citizenship as political
practice highlights the political aim of organising the EU through European in-
tegration and the re-definition of EU borders dividing EU from non-EU citizens.
What distinguishes a perspective on political or elite practices from conceptual-
normative perspective on citizenship is the engagement with the relationship
between citizens and the polity in terms of politics rather than law. While the
legal-norms perspective assumes a formalised and, thus, static relationship, cit-
izenship seen as political practice is based on the notion that this relationship is
37
under constant development, contested and shaped by political discourses. Cit-
izenship as practice is then an ”evolutionary process”which promotes such norms,
rules and principles to become routines and, in this way, institutionalised (Wiener,
1999, p. 273). It is therefore not so much the development through the law but
the development through politics and integration that characterises this approach
(Wiener, 1999, p. 272).
However, as citizens are considered to be actively involved in citizenship con-
struction, it is not clear in how far their own ’social realities’ (here in the form
of perceptions and experiences of migration) overlap with the area of tensions of
citizenship in the EU that develops through political practices and envisioned by
elite actors. The traditional cleavage between themigrant and the national citizen,
at least in relation to EU citizens, has dissolved to some extent. In turn, the trans-
formation of the nation-state in accordance with changing citizenship regimes
and freedom of movement in the EU bigger has created and aggravated new so-
cial cleavages between people as potential ’winners’ and ’losers’ (Kriesi, Grande,
Lachat, et al., 2008; Teney, Lacewell, and de Wilde, 2014): Research suggests that
people who are more affluent and socially mobile are ’winners’ of denationalisa-
tion processes. They can use migration as a means for economic growth enabled
through EU citizenship rights. Those people, who by means of lack of educa-
tion and financial dependency cannot make use of migration as an opportunity,
are considered as ’losers’ of such denationalisation processes. Social mobility is
almost impossible to achieve for them and structural changes in welfare states
through internationalisation and economic liberalisation of labour markets make
them more vulnerable.
This suggests that a focus on the legal status and rights of EU citizens does
not serve as a ’social proxy’ about how intra-EU mobility affects them. Recent
backlashes against EU integration, such as the Brexit referendum in the UK as
well as a rise in Euroscepticsm across member states suggest that EU citizenship
rights are not perceived and experienced in the same way, as do new motivations
and needs for intra-EU mobility during the Eurocrisis.
Therefore, I suggest considering that the meaning of citizenship in everyday
life is considerably different - and contested - than the meaning it conveys as a
means of community-building. In order to investigate such questions, a ’bottom-
up’ approach to citizenship is required. The emergence of EU citizenship is not
only related to social changes within political communities. It is also particularly
relevant in the face of people’s right of freedom of movement as a corner stone of
38
EU citizenship which finds application beyond the nation-state, thus pointing out
heterogeneous migration perceptions and experiences among EU citizens. This
aspect has so far received less attention in macro-level, institutionalist research
about social cleavages within states and among national populations.
In sum, ’top-down’ approaches to citizenship contribute to an understanding
of how institutions, norms and law have promoted the development of a political
community and membership based on formal status, substantive rights, access
and identity-formation and how it is imposed on ordinary people. In this way,
it is possible to see how institutions and law of citizenship have shaped ordinary
people’s lives by defining ’insiders’ and ’outsiders’ in different geographies and in
reference to tensions between national and EU levels. The discussed approaches,
so far, do not sufficiently develop an account of how ordinary people contest cit-
izenship. Furthermore, they assume a different political purpose of citizenship
and engage less in the actual outcomes and consequences of political practices
for citizenship in people’s everyday lives as such. In order to overcome these is-
sues, one point of departure could therefore be to look at those aspects of (EU)
citizenship that relate to ordinary people’s lives, especially their perceptions and
experiences of migration, in a more direct way. The following will consequently
take a closer look at ’bottom-up’ approaches of citizenship which focus on these
kinds of questions.
2.2 ’Bottom-up’ approaches to citizenship
So far, I have discussed ’top-down’ approaches to citizenship, which are con-
cerned with the development of formal status that is bestowed upon citizens and
how this status is fleshed out with certain collective and individual rights, re-
sponsibilities and duties (legal-norms perspective, 2.1.1) or how political practices
bend, introduce or make law through political discourses and purposes (perspect-
ive on political practices, 2.1.2). I will now turn to ’bottom-up’ approaches. These
are particularly concerned with how citizenship becomes manifest among ordin-
ary people focusing on people’s practices and performances and conceptually de-
couple them from people’s legal statuses.
In fact, work in this stream of the literature follows a different definition of cit-
izenship practices than outlined in 2.1.2. It complements ’top-down’ approaches
with a focus on (empirical) research asking how ordinary people experience and
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contest the ways in which citizenship is bestowed upon them (J. Newman and
Tonkens, 2011, p. 11). In this way, scholars pursuing ’bottom-up’ approaches are
often critical of conceptualising citizenship as merely organising the distinction
between national citizens and migrants. Instead, they focus on people’s percep-
tions and experiences of marginalisation and cultural and social practices that
come along with marginalisation. They also question the dominant focus in the
literature on national citizenship regimes by pointing out other social spaces in
which citizenship can be performed orwhere in- and exclusion takes place. There-
fore, ’bottom-up’ approaches emphasise ordinary people as active participants
rather than passive citizens and migrants. Emphasis is put on ordinary people’s
practices of citizenship from a perspective on meaning- and sense-making, not on
how political actors envision and construct citizenship.
Following a ’bottom-up’ approach, I argue that in order to investigate how
people contest citizenship regarding migration in the EU, one has to start from
people’s different categories of social practices. Based on this line of argument, I
have formulated the two sub-questions:
• How do critics of immigration contest citizenship in the EU?
• How do EU mobiles contest citizenship in the EU?
In the following, I will first discuss how the respective literature approaches
questions of citizenship ’from below’. Afterwards, I outline and explain the par-
ticular ’bottom-up’ approach on citizenship contestation as pursued in this thesis.
Here, I elaborate on people’s contestation of citizenship as organising principle
of social order and yardstick for in- and exclusion. I also discuss the theoretical
framework through which I empirically investigate contestation of citizenship.
The approach pursued in this thesis conceptualises citizenship contestation
as an expression of people’s notions of justice that become manifest in their per-
ceptions and experiences of migration. While there is a rich body of work that
engages with citizenship practices and performances as well as people’s political
acts, more subtle forms of contestation through expressions of opinions and shar-
ing experiences about migration in everyday life and the questions people raise
themselves regarding justice and injustices have received less attention so far.
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2.2.1 Perspective on citizenship through ordinary people’s practices
and performances
At the centre of ’bottom-up’ approaches are people’s sense-making processes of
citizenship through practices and performances. Such approaches assume that cit-
izenship can be ”re-imagined” by ordinary people (Miller-Idriss, 2006). Since this
re-imagination is based on their perceptions and experiences of social phenom-
ena, it cannot be prior assumed to overlap with political conceptualisations from
above. More generally, ’bottom-up’ approaches are often embedded within the
tradition of critical theory by highlighting the everyday life aspects of citizenship
for those being marginalised or who have so far been unheard in state-centred
perspectives of citizenship.
Several practices of citizenship find expression in ’bottom-up’ approaches.
Scholarship, for example, considers marginalised people’s and migrants’ prac-
tices as destabilising factors of national, dominant citizenship conceptualisations
that are imposed by state and other political authorities. Through more informal
practices such as the use of international media (see e.g. Carøe Christiansen, 2004;
Andersson, 2013), diaspora attachment (see e.g. Moores and Metykova, 2010), and
also transnational political engagement (see e.g. Castles and Davidson, 2000), mi-
grants practise citizenship in a way that continuously challenges legal principles
and political intentions regarding the provision of status and rights as well as
boundaries of and membership in the national community.
For instance, EU freedom of movement might have increased the social resili-
ence of more vulnerable groups, such as younger people who seek opportunities
elsewhere during the Eurocrisis (Olsen, 2015; Duru, Michailidou, and Trenz, 2016).
In these cases, EU citizens from the crisis-affected member states have began to
move to parts of northern Europe in order to gain professional experience and put
their university degrees at use. These cases speak for reasons of migration that go
beyond economic survival but touch upon individual desires and life plans. Chan-
ging the thresholds for migration has therefore led to new opportunities through
mobility but also increased pressure on national conceptions of in- and exclusion.
These new meanings attached to citizenship require in-depth scrutiny.
In other words, ’bottom-up’ approaches raise the question of why and how
ordinary people become active participants regarding citizenship. The often em-
pirical focus on people’s everyday life practices and experiences point out how
people themselves feel affected by legal status and rights that are bestowed upon
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them. While ’top-down’ approaches canmerely suggest the legal implications and
consequences, a perspective on ordinary people addresses how they feel affected
and by which circumstances.
The scrutiny of everyday life practices reveals gaps between formal citizenship
and people’s ’social reality’ regarding the implementation and functioning of cit-
izenship ’on the ground’. For example, EU migrants experience several obstacles
during settlement in another member state suggesting that there is a gap between
legal status and rights and EU migrants’ actual experiences (Henningsen et al.,
2013). Administration offices can be defined as such sites where citizenship be-
comes contested and show the gap between local and national implementation of
rights and (EU) migrants’ actual access to welfare and social protection. Note fur-
ther that these experienced problems vary between different socio-demographic
groups (see Spencer, Ruhs, et al., 2007). More generally, since member states can
impose certain conditions on EU migrants’ access to welfare in the first five years
of residence (art. 16 and 17 of Directive 2004/38), Kostakopoulou (2014, p. 430)
argues that the practices of EU migrants make visible how their settlement in an-
other member state ”becomes a theatre of conflict” during this time. Looking at
such practices, it becomes clear that despite legal status and rights of EU citizen-
ship, there are different ’realities’ for EU migrants than what is legally defined
through legal status and rights (see e.g. Spencer and Price, 2014).
Furthermore, not only do people respond to, challenge and contest citizenship
’from above’ in the form of status, rights or identity-forming element imposed
upon them. Looking more closely at social struggle that such experiences bring
with them, particularly critical theorists point out how a focus on mere reactions
to citizenship from above ignores more creative, performative ”acts of citizenship”
(Isin and Turner, 2002; Isin, 2008).
As Isin (2008) argues, a more nuanced conceptualisation of citizenship re-
quires a distinction of ”acts of citizenship” from practices. Acts and practices then
describe two different ways of how people engage with citizenship either by com-
plying with existing legal and political frameworks or by breaking such routines.
In the latter, the act occurs in a social struggle in which people, intentionally or
not, are faced with obstacles to what they understand as a legitimate or just situ-
ation. Isin (2008, p. 38) distinguishes between practices by ”active citizens” and
acts as performed by ”activist citizens.” While practices refer to routines and ac-
tions within already ’written scripts’, an act of citizenship is performed by the
”activist citizen” through ”rupture” and the creation and writing of new scripts
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(Isin, 2008, pp. 37-38). ”Acts of citizenship” are performative and creative since
they emerge from the need to break with existing rules (Isin, 2008, p. 39). In this
way, ”acts of citizenship” make visible people’s self-awareness as political subjects
and so stage a scene of social struggle of citizenship: ”Enactment of citizenship
[…] means […] that people perform their right to have rights by asking questions
about justice and injustice” (Isin, 2013, p. 22). ”Acts of citizenship” then refer to
the creation of new rights or to force political authorities into ”answerability” and
”responsibility” (Isin, 2008, p. 28).
In this sense, acts of citizenship might be related to concrete political claims
of such ”activist citizens”. Often, in order to successfully break with legal frame-
works and regulations at least a critical mass of people, if not legal and political
expertise or, as in the case of refugee and asylum seeker camps on Oranienplatz in
Berlin in 2014, the experience of being stripped of one’s human rights is required;
citizenship as an act of ’last resort’ so to speak.
In an attempt to adapt these activist conceptions of people’s performances of
citizenship to the context of the EU, Saward (2013) introduces different types of
acts. He distinguishes between ”two broad types of European citizenship: […]
acts under the dynamic of extension […], and acts under the dynamic of asser-
tion” (Saward, 2013, p. 50). The ”dynamic of extension” refers to an extension of
citizenship bymeans of enacting ”the [legal, political or social] contourswhich are
already substantially in place” (Saward, 2013, p. 50). Still differentiating between
practices and acts of citizenship, Saward (2013) conceptualises how EU citizenship
can be developed by extending the rights that are laid out, yet not sufficiently de-
veloped. In doing so, he implies a dynamic in citizenship frameworks in the EU,
an area of tension among legal and political frameworks on different levels of
political authority. With regards to ”enactments through the dynamic of asser-
tion” he refers to a ”creative or aesthetic act” (Saward, 2013, p. 50). While the first
dynamic extends a rule, ’a written script’, the dynamic of ”assertion” points to
enactment of European citizenship outside such rules, potentially in an informal
way, independently from actual status (Saward, 2013, p. 54). Since empirical ’real-
ity’ is hardly every congruent with either one act or the other, these two types
of enactments ”may be understood as end points on a spectrum of acts of cit-
izenship” (Saward, 2013, p. 51). In this way, Saward connects ”enactments” in
the sense of ”extensions” to status and rights of citizenship if such acts happen
in accordance with legal frameworks. ”Acts of assertion”, on the other hand, lead
to ”ruptures”, that is, they pose new demands of justice outside already ’written
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scripts’ of citizenship regulations (Saward, 2013, p. 53).
Yet, it can be argued here that the empirical identification of an act remains
rather vague. In all the above mentioned instances it is difficult to establish
whether something new, a change of rules, has effectively taken place if it has in
fact affects ordinary people if it does not resulted in actual policy or legal changes.
Last but not least, in distinguishing acts of citizenship from practices assumes that
people practising citizenship feel less concerned or affected by an issue and thus
are less motivated to express dissent. From this perspective, the majority of EU
citizens probably never enacts citizenship as understood in the above sense of
’rupture’ and, if they do, it is unclear to empirically determine whether, for ex-
ample, the signing of an online petition or participating in a protest presents an
act of citizenship or a routine practice to the individual.
What the literature on people’s practices and acts has treated rather margin-
ally so far, are the more subtle, less political or ’civic’ ways in which ordinary
people engage with citizenship. Indeed, traditional forms of political participa-
tion, such as voting, are now increasingly accompanied by more informal ways
to participate (Bennett, Wells, and Rank, 2009). This makes a conceptual shift
toward more creative performances of citizenship invaluable. Yet, on the other
side of this spectrum of how people contest or generally engage with citizen-
ship can we identify debates and discussions, expressions of opinions, in which
contestation presents less a specific act or a practice but a more subtle, everyday
life engagement with issues that people feel affected by. Given that the issue of
migration in the EU has become a subject of heated debate and political opinion-
formation, more attention needs to be paid to people expressing their perceptions
and experiences of migration in everyday life. It might not be specific acts of
contestation but debates and discussions where ordinary people’s contestation of
citizenship in relation to migration becomes visible.
Another relevant issue for this thesis is to discuss how ’bottom-up’ approaches
address the different levels of citizenship, i.e. the area of tension in the EU. Given
that the concepts of membership, rights and also identity have become more and
more dynamic in light of increasing flows of migration and economic integration,
new spaces of involvement beyond the nation-state have been enabled. ’Bottom-
up’ approaches highlight the dynamics of citizenship which can be realised bey-
ond politically or legally defined frameworks.
Not only has freedom of movement through EU citizenship created new prac-
tices for EU citizens, it also challenges the nation-state as single yardstick for
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in-and exclusion. This being said, scholars point out how practices can occur
transnationally and cross-border. Faist (2010, p. 79) argues that ”cross-border so-
cial and symbolic ties and their concatenation” are still under-researched despite
their significance regarding transnational spaces for migrants and ’inner work-
ings’ of diverse populations. Accordingly, if defined as practices of boundary-
making, an analysis of citizenship shows that exclusion and inclusion is not con-
fined by national territory but along the lines of other social boundaries (Faist,
2013, p. 34). Research on boundary-making questions the appropriateness of the
nation-state as a ’container’ for citizenship practices since concepts such as ethni-
city, social ties and stereotypes permeate national borders and often have diverse
implications for people not sharing the same status and rights (Wimmer and Glick
Schiller, 2002; Faist, 2013). Such practices can concern differentiations between
an ’us’ from ’the others’ based on a variety of supposed social, ethnic, or religious
differences.
The literature here points at the various struggles of citizenship that emerge
on different scales and sites respectively (Isin, 2008; Isin and Saward, 2013). A
focus on citizenship from below in the form of practices and acts requires ”a new
vocabulary of citizenship” to accommodate for the appearance of
new ’sites’, ’scales’ and ’acts’ through which ’actors’ claim to transform
themselves (and others) from subjects to citizens as claimants of rights (Isin,
2009, p. 368).
Such a reformulation of citizenship, therefore, emphasises the need to invest-
igate how people position themselves vis-à-vis legal frameworks and political elite
practices of citizenship and others more generally. This is crucial due to the vari-
ous institutions defining a multitude of overlapping and contrasting statuses and
given the diversity of people’s statuses11 who nevertheless practice citizenship
independently from or despite of national membership.
Since EU citizenship has permeated national membership and rights by estab-
lishing a supranational legal framework for EU citizens, especially by practising
freedom of movement, EU migrants can create new, transnational spaces of cit-
izenship. From this point of view, for some the debates about whether citizenship
is a status or a political practise have become ”enervated” since, as it is argued, cit-
izenship is influenced by both (Isin, 2009, p. 369). An engagement with status and
rights alone cannot accommodate for the complexity of citizenship, or to what
11For example, non-citizens, (EU) migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, stateless, cit-
izens.
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Wiener (1997, p. 533) refers to as the ”relational element” of citizenship; nor does
it facilitate an understanding of how people themselves contest citizenship as a
yardstick for in- and exclusion.
In so far, authors in this branch of the literature question the prevailing ”scalar
thought” that assumes the analysis from national or European levels towards sub-
jects (Neveu, 2014). This scalar thought refers to the conception of citizenship as
hierarchical, i.e. what I am referring to as ’top-down’, often by taking the national
state as highest instance (Neveu, 2014, p. 204). ’Bottom-up’ approaches, in turn,
are critical of the concepts of status, rights and provided identity by assuming
that citizenship bestowed upon people does not automatically lead to meaning-
making among ordinary people and by identifying other sites where different
meanings of membership through in-and exclusion become visible. The under-
lying argument is that without an investigation of ordinary people’s practices of
citizenship, struggles and conflicts remain invisible to the researcher. By focus-
ing on how rights are claimed on different sites and scales through a multitude
of potential actors enacting themselves, a more ”fluid and dynamic conception of
citizenship” is possible (Isin, 2009, p. 368).
Therefore, analysing citizenship from the bottomup reveals people’s very own
social struggles and obstacles. As status and rights can be provided or denied and
exclusive and inclusive measures implemented, citizenship has significant effects
on individual life plans and circumstances. However, less is known about how
people contest the different frames of references regarding citizenship. Analys-
ing contestation of the yardstick for in-and exclusion relates to these everyday
life experiences as it sheds light on how people relate to the different scales and
levels from which status and rights are provided. A ’bottom-up’ approach to cit-
izenship contestation regarding political authorities therefore establishes a direct
link between legal and political citizenship from above and ordinary people’s life
prospects.
To sum, given the different ways to practice and perform (EU) citizenship,
a ’bottom-up’ approach is especially suitable to investigate how ordinary people
contest citizenship regardingmigration. A focus on citizenship as ordinary people’s
performances and practices counters the aforementioned ’top-down’ approaches
by giving voice to individuals to whom the more abstract status and rights are
provided or denied. In this sense, empirical investigations provide insight into
how people practice or enact citizenship outside legal frameworks and beyond
borders of national states. Whereas ’top-down’ approaches take as a vantage
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point citizenship as a political and legal framework developed by institutional
actors, ’bottom-up’ approaches can shed light on those phenomena and events,
contexts and situations related to citizenship that happen ’outside’ such models.
Nevertheless, while ’bottom-up’ approaches are helpful because they shift at-
tention to ordinary people as active participants in the issue of migration and
citizenship, the literature falls short concerning the questions of why and how
people contest citizenship. The ’how’ question implied here presents the research
aim of this thesis. The ’why’ question leads us to the theoretical framework of
this thesis. In order to investigate how people contest citizenship in relation to
migration in the EU, we need to know why the issue of migration in the EU is
connected to such contestation from ordinary people’s perspectives. Thus, the
thesis requires a ’bottom-up’ approach that can grasp people’s contestation and
operationalise people’s everyday life experiences and perceptions of migration
for an analysis of citizenship contestation.
2.2.2 Contesting citizenship: Enacting affectedness of migration
As I have discussed above (see section 2.1), ’top-down’ approaches highlight the
critical importance of EU citizenship in the construction of the legal status as EU
citizen that challenges the traditional dichotomy between national EU citizens
and EU migrants. They emphasise that EU citizens qua this status and the right
to freedom of movement have become more affected by but also challenge na-
tional citizenship regimes. EU citizenship collides and overlaps with the tradi-
tional sovereignty of member states regarding the restriction of access and rights
to ’their’ national citizens. Simultaneously, the role of national states in the EU are
transforming through increasing economic interdependence and a liberalisation
of labour markets (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles, 2006). This has lead to social
cleavages among EU citizens who can benefit from freedom of movement or feel
disadvantaged by it (see Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, et al., 2008; Mau and Verwiebe,
2010; Teney, Lacewell, and de Wilde, 2014). Thus, seen from ’top-down’ perspect-
ives EU citizenship rights challenge national citizenship regimes and permeate
the boundaries that constitute political communities. These developments have
also led to shifts in how legal statuses and access to rights distinguish migrants
from national citizens, with the creation of the EU citizen prominently illustrating
how this dichotomy, which prescribes the legal status of the citizen to a national
territory, is under scrutiny.
’Top-down’ approaches have thus contributed to considering EU citizens as
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a group that illustrates the conflict about migration regarding the provision of
rights and status in a tension area between different political frames. Qua status
and rights, mobile (foreign) EU citizens and national EU citizens present import-
ant cases that highlight migration as a challenge to national boundaries as well
as in- and exclusion regarding welfare, representation and integration. However,
these approaches are insufficient to analyse how people relate to this conflict in
contestation. The reasons is, as I argue, that legal status or socio-economic back-
grounds are not reliable indicators for whether and how people contest citizen-
ship. In other words, the categories of the EU citizen who lives in another member
state or the national EU citizen who lives in a migration receiving welfare state
cannot provide sufficient information as such on how these people perceive and
experience migration and whether and how they contest citizenship. Doing so
would assume an automatic overlap of one’s legal status with one’s practices in
everyday life.
That being said, while there is a rich body of work regarding the link of how
top-down citizenship regimes and accompanying migration patterns change the
transformation of societies and populations, less emphasis has so far been put
on these developments from a micro-level perspective. I have therefore argued
for ’bottom-up’ approaches which emphasise the active role of people as self-
constituting political subjects regarding migration (see section 2.2). In this stream
of the literature, people’s practices regarding migration and citizenship represent
the focal point for analyses of people’s social boundary-making as well as their
struggles against marginalisation. Furthermore, the latter stream in the literat-
ure points out that citizenship is constructed through people’s practices in social
struggle, and thus, is dynamic and contested.
Following the ’bottom-up’ literature on citizenship, I approach contestation of
citizenship by focusing on people who enact their affectedness of migration and,
by this, constitute themselves as political subjects. Since the aim is to understand
citizenship contestation in relation to migration in the EU, I propose focusing on
people who express, share or discuss their own perceptions and experiences of
migration.
Based on such a ’bottom-up’ approach, it is possible to approach the overall
research question through an empirical investigation of two sub-questions:
1. How do critics of immigration contest citizenship in the EU?
2. How do EU mobiles contest citizenship in the EU?
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Accordingly, the thesis departs from the dominant analytical focus on EU cit-
izens as a ’top-down’ defined group that shares a legal status. Similarly, the thesis
also questions the use of macro-level groups of ’winners’ and ’losers’ as being
in conflict with each other for an investigation of citizenship contestation; like-
wise to understand the conflict of migration from which citizenship contestation
emerges as a conflict between migrants and national citizens.
This section is structured as follows. First, It considers insights from literat-
ure on online political engagement and media practices. I propose focusing the
analysis on national critics of immigration in reader commentary sections below
national online news and EU mobiles who are members in Facebook groups for
foreign residents. I argue that through such migration-related online media prac-
tices these people constitute themselves as political subjects in the social conflict
about migration in the EU and ask questions of justice and injustice.
Second, in order to conceptualise such questions of justice regarding migra-
tion, I draw from Nancy Fraser’s (2008) theory of justice. More specifically, I
suggest an interpretation of citizenship contestation through people’s subjective
notions of recognition, redistribution and representation. While the first two no-
tions, recognition and redistribution, make contestation of citizenship as an or-
ganising principle of the social order between members in a political community
visible, the notion of representation refers to contestation of citizenship as the
legitimate political frame that determines the line between in-and exclusion.
Doing so, I develop a theoretical model which conceptualises people’s notions
of justice alongside two relationships. The first two notions, recognition and re-
distribution, make contestation of citizenship visible as an organising principle for
access and rights between themselves and others. The notion of representation
explains how people contest citizenship as the legitimate political frame that de-
notes the boundaries between in-and exclusion. I argue that from the perspective
of these people the issue of migration challenges their views on how to establish
and maintain justice among each other (relationship 1) and between people and
political authorities (relationship 2).
The framework will be employed to both sub-questions, that is, in relation to
commenters as critics of immigration (chapter 4) as well as EU mobiles (chapter
5).
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2.2.2.1 Critics of immigration and EU mobiles as self-constituting political
subjects
As aforementioned, the advantage of a ’bottom-up’ approach is to remedy the cat-
egorical assumption that legal status and people’s practices and experiences re-
garding citizenship necessarily overlap. Focusing on legal categories risks to con-
textualise migration as a conflict between legal groups of people. The thesis fol-
lows Rogers Brubaker’s (2004, p. 7) criticism of ”groupism” that can often be found
in macro-level social analysis. His considerations help clarify how a ’bottom-up’
approach can encompass EU citizens that are involved in the issue of migration
for an understanding of citizenship contestation by avoiding some of the short-
comings of ’top-down’ approaches to citizenship.
By ”groupism” Brubaker criticises scholarship that understands groups of people
who share the same ethnicity, religion, legal status, nationality or other categories
”as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed” (Brubaker,
2004, p. 8). Brubaker (2004, p. 10) looks particularly at ethnic conflict and disagrees
with approaches that understand it as conflict between ethnic groups. Similarly,
he argues that racial conflict should not be understood as occurring between ra-
cial groups and national conflicts not between nations (Brubaker, 2004, p. 10).
This does not mean that people do not take sides along ethnically or nationally
demarcated lines. Nevertheless, taking such groups as substantially bounded and
using them as analytical concepts conceals questions regarding what conflict is
about by a focus on between whom the conflict is about.
If we turn to the social conflict over migration in the EU, focusing on legally
defined groups implies an understanding of this conflict based on dichotomies.
It concerns a conflict between EU migrants and national EU national citizens or
between ’winners’ and ’losers’ within a nation-state. Following Brubaker (see
2004, p. 59), however, this understanding of social conflict is misleading. Indeed,
contestation is often regarded in terms of cleavages between groups, people, polit-
ical actors. This understanding seems to obfuscate pressing questions that ask
about the ’what’ and the ’how’ of contestation.
In order to understand the ’what’ and ’how’ of citizenship contestation re-
gardingmigration ’from below’, I suggest investigating contestation from the per-
spective of people who constitute themselves as political subjects. For these pur-
poses, I suggest revisiting Isin’s (2008) concept of ”acts of citizenship”. Although
I have criticised this concept in terms of its vagueness to empirically distinguish
practices and habits from acts (see section 2.2.1), it underlines that people assert
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their political subjectivity based on what they understand as relevant. According
to Isin and Saward (2013, p. 9),
People may and do act on, and act out, their conceptions of citizenship of
Europe driven by concrete struggles in their everyday lives.
This emphasis paths the way for an analytical shift from investigating people’s
affectedness of citizenship to their reaction to this affectedness, their contestation,
i.e. a shift from a ’top-down’ to a ’bottom-up’ oriented analysis. Consequently,
citizenship can be enacted and such enactment means that ”people perform their
right to have rights by asking questions of justice and injustice” (see Isin, 2013,
p. 22). Rarely people mobilise in the name of abstract political or universal prin-
ciples but by means of feeling affected by injustice and claiming justice (Isin, 2013,
p. 22). Rather, such questions of justice are personal and subjective. People mo-
bilise for issues that derive from their lived experiences (Isin, 2013, p. 22). For ex-
ample, people who protest for same sex marriage do not necessarily do so because
of their civic rights given by their legal status but act from their social stances,
their social positions as those who are affected by same-sex marriage laws.
In this way, contestation can be scrutinised as it emerges from people’s own
social realities. Drawing from these theoretical considerations regarding ’acts’, I
suggest that people constitute themselves as such political subjects by ’enacting’
their affectedness of migration. Starting from the individual’s perspective then
denotes a shift of attention to the micro-level where contestation begins. The dif-
ference between affectedness and contestation is important since it characterises
a ’bottom-up’ approach that foregrounds people’s active role regarding citizen-
ship matters such as migration. While many EU citizens might feel affected by
migration in the EU, not everyone enacts this affectedness. In turn, also non-
citizens can assert themselves as political subjects through enactment (Isin, 2008;
Isin, 2013). Thus, my ’bottom-up’ approach narrows the analytical focus to those
people who ’do something’ with their affectedness of migration.
I consequently focus on people who enact their affectedness of migration.
This conceptualises citizenship contestation regarding migration not as a civic
practice, but as people’s personal and subjective expressions of how and why mi-
gration affects them. It is therefore heterogeneous and not stable but emerges in
distinct forms and from diverse viewpoints.
The pointsmade above raise the question of how to determine bywhichmeans
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they enact their affectedness of migration.
Here, I suggest drawing from recent scholarship on media practices and polit-
ical engagement. I propose a focus on people’s media practices by which critics of
immigration as well as EU mobiles express their perceptions and experiences of
migration and thus constitute themselves as political subjects. This requires tak-
ing a step back from more normative theoretical work on democratic discourse,
deliberation and political participation. Generally, people’s social practices ”in-
tersect” with the ways in which people use media (see Couldry, 2006, p. 328). Such
media practices might not be intended to enact a ’civic’ or ’political’ will in public
or in political discourse, which is usually a premise of democratic participation in
classic public sphere theory (e.g. Habermas, 1996) or scholarship on deliberative
digital democracy (see e.g. Dahlberg, 2011). In the literature on political particip-
ation lots of emphasis has been put on conventional forms of participation such
as voting and protesting. Yet, there is also a shift in attention to more unconven-
tional forms of participation in the literature. Here, online media become increas-
ingly significant for mobilisation purposes. Isin’s and Saward’s theorising about
enactment of citizenship and the understanding of political engagement online
brought forward by scholars of media practices and political engagement support
each other in arguing how people’s online media practices can be considered as
forms of contestation of citizenship.
For example, online and social media are considered important tools and plat-
forms for social movements for organisation purposes as well as have made these
groups more fluid and issue-oriented; the term ”personalized politics” comes to
mind here, also in relation individuals’ ways to participate in political issues (Ben-
nett and Segerberg, 2011, p. 771). Political engagement emerges not only based
on citizens’ duties but through personal relevance addressed in social networks
also online (see Loader, Vromen, and Xenos, 2014). Others scholars distinguish
between ”actualizing citizenship” as opposed to ”the dutiful citizen”, the latter
referring to older generations that understand political engagement as a civic ob-
ligation while the former form of mobilising occurs due to personal interests in
certain issues and are more frequently found among younger people (see Bennett,
Wells, and Rank, 2009; Bennett, Wells, and Freelon, 2011). In this regard, increas-
ing media literacy today correlates positively with higher likelihood of online
political engagement that is often related to life style choices and political con-
sumption (Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti, 2005; Ward and de Vreese, 2011).
Thus, as Papacharissi (2013, p. 153) argues, political emancipation today is
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more likely to begin ”via a private sphere of reflection, expression and behavior”.
This implies that contestation also derives from this more personal, subjective
sphere. Indeed, contestation is now increasingly carried out on online and social
media (see Michailidou, Trenz, and de Wilde, 2014). The ways in which people
use media can be spontaneous and triggered by emotions, feelings of affectedness
or disagreement, for example. This means that via online and social media people
can decide themselves how private or public their expressions can be. In par-
ticular, online and social media present arenas or platforms where people make
sense of their own social position and articulate how they perceive and exper-
ience migration in a more spontaneous, evaluative, possibly personal manner.
Here, people make their voices heard but also exchange, organise and cope with
individual experiences of migration.
I suggest that in these ways these people constitute themselves as political
subjects regarding migration. More precisely, I propose that by commenting in
national online news about migration and being part of discussion groups for for-
eigners on Facebook, commenters and EU mobiles mobilise their perceptions and
experiences of migration and hereby enact their affectedness regarding migra-
tion by pointing out justice and injustices (see Isin, 2008; Isin and Saward, 2013).
It is therefore not their potentially different legal statuses which characterise their
contestation but their ownways of making themselves visible as political subjects.
In this sense, online and social media have become channels and platforms
for people ’to talk back’ to news, politicians and to each other and to voice how
they feel personally affected by a certain issue. On the one hand, mass media
have remained important platforms for contestation of issues of national import-
ance (see Statham and Trenz, 2013). On the other hand, the mass media respond
to economic pressures of decreasing readership by establishing commentary sec-
tions and to engage readers into discussions (Domingo et al., 2008). Some con-
sider such comment sections, although not representative for public opinion in
general, as a part of public debates where people can articulate claims, demands
and concerns (Park, 2013, pp. 581-582). For others they represent a sort of inter-
action between elites and ’the people’ (Toepfl and Piwoni, 2015). It is therefore
acknowledged that comments are an active way of engaging one’s views, while
mere news consumption is rather passive (Springer, Engelmann, and Pfaffinger,
2015, p. 800). Hereby, comments are ”reactive”12 in the sense of appearing below
or following something else (Reagle, 2015, p. 2). Being critical of immigration via
12Emphasis by author.
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commenting then is a way to constitute oneself as a political subject regarding
migration.
Turning to EU mobiles in Facebook groups, media practices also concern the
subscription and commitment to a specific network of people and to identify one-
self as a member of a group of ’foreigners’, ’expats’ or ’internationals’ in Den-
mark and Germany. Across disciplines such as media anthropology and com-
munication studies scholars discuss how online and social media facilitate cop-
ing with personal obstacles in everyday life, transgressing geographical distances
and, thus, providing an opportunity to exchange experiences of migration and
support amongst each other (e.g. the volume by M. Christensen, Jansson, and C.
Christensen, 2011). Online and social media afford people with the opportunity to
express their everyday perceptions and experiences of migration and share them
with others to find support (see Andersson, 2013; Papacharissi, 2013).
The focus on EU mobiles as people who contest citizenship regarding migra-
tionmight seem unorthodox at first because via EU citizenship they are enabled to
become mobile. This initially questions that they have reason to contest citizen-
ship. In macro-level research, mobile EU citizens are often regarded as ’winners’
of European integrationwith ’exit options’ (e.g. Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, et al., 2008;
Mau and Verwiebe, 2010). Such research, however, often ignores that even within
the EU freedom of movement is still also concerned with ’entry’ into another wel-
fare community, national system and locality (see Olsen, 2015). A ’bottom-up’ ap-
proach to EUmobiles specifically responds to assumptions that understand young
and highly skilled EU mobiles as ‘unproblematic’ cases of migrants resulting in a
lack of empirical data (Düvell, 2009, p. 336).
And indeed, there is now evidence showing that EU mobiles face their own
challenges when becoming mobile and moving to another EU member state, for
example, regarding local administration, a lack of social networks, feelings of
loneliness and economic deprivation (see Georgiou, 2006; M. Christensen, Jans-
son, and C. Christensen, 2011; Duru and Trenz, 2016). The emergence of Facebook
groups for ’expats’ and mobile people suggests that among these people there is a
need to exchange, seekmutual support and information regarding these struggles.
This relates to the concept of diasporic and transnational communities, which is
not new, but has been transferred to the online sphere as well: By means of social
media, mobile people have established a sense of their own ’imagined community’
(Georgiou, 2006). Facebook groups that are especially established for mobiles liv-
ing in Danish or German contexts (as the group names suggest) offer an online
54
space in which EUmobiles can identify themselves as ’mobiles’ and, by this, signal
their specific needs, points of view and interests that is tied to these national and
local contexts. Their networks are detached from mainstream media and more
personalised. Therefore, EU mobiles who become involved in such networks to
share their experiences constitute themselves as political subjects regarding mi-
gration.
Together, online and social media have become a means for people to enact
their affectedness of migration and ”to assert their political significance as people
with something to say” (Coleman, 2013, p. 219). Indeed, media practices regard-
ing migration speak for people’s lived experiences that do not fit the often used
concepts in citizenship scholarship such as private vs. public or national citizen
vs foreigner. Rather, the different ways in which people use online media makes
their different views on migration visible. EU mobiles and commenters critical
of immigration use online media to enact their affectedness of migration. Yet,
their reasons, motivations, understandings of why they constitute themselves as
political subjects are subjective, distinct and not related.
Self-constitution means then, for example, to commit yourself to a certain
collectivity or to make yourself visible as a certain ’foreigner’ or to start criti-
cising how national mainstream media portray immigration. Expressing one’s
perceptions and experiences of migration as a social (media) practice then makes
visible distinct social struggles, which present the entry points for a bottom-up
analysis of citizenship contestation. While their perceptions and experiences re-
gardingmigration are influenced by national and foreign EU citizens’ statuses and
rights, these attributes do not make them political subjects in these regards, nor
make visible how they contest citizenship. Through their online media practices,
contestation of citizenship can be conceptualised as a subjective, fluid and het-
erogeneous phenomenon which escapes comparisons across legal groups. Thus,
combining theoretical advances from a practice approach in media studies with
a ’critical theory take’ on citizenship enables to focus on people as contestants
of citizenship by means of participating in online platforms and enacting their
perceptions and experiences of migration.
One of the pitfalls of such an approach is then that the focus on these self-
constituting groups of practices does not represent broader populations. Given
the diverse ways in which people with different perceptions and experiences of
migration constitute themselves as political subjects, their contestation is not
comparable nor influenced by each other. In turn, the advantage is that con-
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testation of citizenship can be investigated in clear relief from where it emerges.
While not being able to look at macro-level transformations and implications of
globalisation or other political processes (Postill, 2010, p. 12), by focusing onmedia
practices this thesis emphasises the everyday life aspects of migration in relation
to citizenship contestation on the micro-level.
2.2.2.2 Approaching contestation of citizenship through people’s notions of
justice
So far, I have argued that citizenship contestation regarding migration requires a
’bottom-up’ approach that focuses on people enact their affectedness of migration
and, by this, constitute themselves as political subjects. Furthermore, I have sug-
gested that critics of immigration and EU mobiles present such political subjects
through their migration-related online media practices. Therefore, my overall
line of argument is that contestation of citizenship emerges from people’s own
political subjectivity as a reaction to certain issues or challenges they interpret
as relevant, and cannot be grasped through an understanding or comparison of
different groups.
This reaction toward an issue (the question of ’contestation of what?’) is im-
portant because, from a ’bottom-up’ perspective, it implies that people’s contest-
ation of citizenship is directional (see Isin, 2008, pp. 38-39). More precisely, I
approach citizenship contestation as it develops from people’s own awareness as
political subjects and propose that it is directed against how citizenship organ-
ises social interaction within a national welfare community and determines the
political frame of in- and exclusion. In order to understand their contestation of
citizenship regarding migration, it is necessary to investigate their questions of
justice and at what or whom these questions are directed.
This raises the question of how people’s questions of justice can be encom-
passed in a common framework of citizenship contestation. This becomes particu-
larly crucial when looking at people whose social interactions are not dominantly
organised based on the dichotomy between the national citizen and the migrant
any longer and whose status and rights derive frommore than one political frame
or from colliding frames when EU citizenship rights and national rights contradict
each other. As I have argued above, Isin’s (2013, p. 22) work on acts of citizenship
has been helpful to understand that people’s own awareness of being personally
affected by citizenship mobilises them to constitute their political subjectivity by
asking ”questions of injustice and justice”. Yet it does not elaborate how such
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questions of justice can be analytically developed further.
Therefore, I draw here from Nancy Fraser’s (2008) seminal work on ”refram-
ing justice in a globalizing world.” Most generally, in order to establish justice,
one requires ”social arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social
life” (Fraser, 2008, p. 16). Fraser defines three dimensions of justice which such
social arrangements need to address: the cultural dimension regarding recogni-
tion, the economic dimension regarding redistribution and the political dimen-
sion regarding representation as well as their corresponding forms of injustices:
”maldistribution”, ”misrecognition” and ”misrepresentation” (Fraser, 2008, pp. 16-
17). In order to permit equal participation, political communities negotiate how
these three dimensions relate to each other.
However, in her ”theory of postwestphalian democratic justice” Fraser fore-
grounds that due to the social transformations regarding economic interdepend-
encies, supra-national political decision-making and the accompanying outcome
of increasedmigration, nation-states have become insufficient entities tomaintain
justice (Fraser, 2008, p. 16). The negotiation of justice needs to be accommodated
within the context of global crises, inter- and transnational dependencies that
reach beyond capacities of democratic states (Fraser, 2008, pp. 16-17). Not only
is it required that these arrangements organise social life and equal opportunit-
ies within one national community. The consequences of globalisation and other
denationalisation processes also require justice to be considered beyond nation-
states.
Consequently, social arrangements require responding to both the ”substance”
(”the What”) of justice (Fraser, 2008, p. 2) and the ”frame of justice” (Fraser, 2008,
p. 15). The problem Fraser observes is a ”radical heterogeneity of justice discourse”
in which there is disagreement about what claims are considered appropriate to
solve a certain issue (Fraser, 2008, p. 2). There is a lack of a common problem
formulation about what is just, i.e. about the substance, (”redistribution or re-
cognition or representation?”, (Fraser, 2008, p. 5)) and about who is a subject to
justice, i.e. what is the frame of justice: Is it ”territorialized citizenries or global
humanity or transnational communities of risk?” (Fraser, 2008, p. 6). In other
words, the social arrangements to maintain justice are in dispute.
I argue that Fraser’s theory of justice is particularly useful for an understand-
ing of citizenship contestation in the EU because it enables citizenship as such a
social arrangement in dispute to be considered. From the literature on citizen-
ship discussed earlier (see section 2.1), migration in the EU has raised new ques-
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tions about citizenship as an organising principle of just social interaction among
people within a national welfare community as well as about the legitimate polit-
ical frame for in- and exclusion. Understood as an institution which formulates
a legal and political framework, citizenship regulates who receives which rights
and access as well as defines the exclusive criteria for such a provision. In the EU
context, such an account makes salient how such social arrangements of formal
membership and substantive rights, and inclusion and exclusion on the basis of
nationality have become challenged by intra-EU migration enabled through EU
citizenship. In other words, citizenship as a social arrangement for justice is con-
tested.
I suggest that by adopting Fraser’s dimensions of justice as analytical frame-
work to understand people’s subjective notions of justice, this contestation can
now be empirically investigated. I argue that these dynamics can be captured in
two relationships. The first relationship is the one between the individual and
political authorities. This relationship corresponds especially to notions of (mis-
)representation and frame-setting. In the context considered here, questions of
political justice are conceptualised as a form of ’democratic feedback’. In accord-
ance with Fraser’s discussion of a political dimension of justice, this relationship
does not only inform people’s contestation of citizenship within a national wel-
fare community. Crucially, it enables people’s contestation of the frames denoted
by various political authorities from where they can claim status and rights to be
analysed. The second relationship concerns the one between the self and others.
Others can, for example, be migrants or fellow citizens. This relationship is based
on the individual’s reflection on justice in relation to others and relates to notions
of redistribution and recognition. I call this relationship ’horizontal evaluation’ of
justice. The conceptual framework is summarised in figure 2.1 on page 59 and il-
lustrates the involved parties in perceptions and experiences of migration through
contestation of citizenship.
Now it is possible to specify how citizenship contestation regarding migra-
tion in its two relationships (as formulated in the two questions above) can be
encompassed through a theoretical framework that focuses on people’s contest-
ation regarding the ”substance” and the ”frame of justice” based on their notions
about redistribution, recognition and representation.
In order to not confuse the more normative dimension of Fraser’s theory on
justice with notions of justice that I aim to investigate empirically, I apply the di-
mensions that relate to the substance and the frame of justice as ”folk paradigms”,
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i.e. expressed by ordinary people when they share their views on migration (see
Fraser, 2003, p. 11). While Fraser understands these folk paradigms in their ”polit-
ical references” as ”ideal-typical constellations of claims that are currently con-
tested in public spheres” (see Fraser, 2003, p. 11), I will refer to them as people’s
subjective notions of justice expressed regarding their perceptions and experi-
ences of migration.
Horizontal evaluation
Democratic feedback
self
authorities
others
repres.
recogn./redistr.
Figure 2.1: Relationships: Contestation of citizenship regarding migration in relation to
authorities and others
Fraser’s discussion of the ”substance of justice” lends itself to approach the first
sub-question of how people contest citizenship as an organising principle. This
principle refers to the relationship between the self and others (’horizontal eval-
uation) and describes people’s notions of recognition and redistribution. With
the introduction of EU citizenship migration in the EU has changed the previ-
ous parameters of redistribution and recognition. Contestation of citizenship as
organising principle under such changed conditions can be interpreted in this re-
lationship between the self and others through subjective, normative notions of
what is or should be a just social interaction among people livingwithin a national
welfare community.
Socio-economic redistribution refers to questions about how to equally distrib-
ute resources and access to goods for all. Redistribution is a remedy of injustice
concerned with determining how much economic inequality is just and to dimin-
ish differences by means of just distribution of resources and goods (Fraser et al.,
2004, p. 9). The unjust equivalent is maldistribution which is caused by the eco-
nomic system, the political economy of distribution (Fraser, 1996; Fraser, 2003).
59
Those who suffer from maldistribution constitute socio-economic ”collectivities”
created by the peculiarities of the economic system, i.e. social classes as well as
racialised groups (Fraser et al., 2004).
Particularly welfare states have to face questions of how to distribute ac-
cess to economic participation and social welfare. The welfare state regulates
and controls access to social benefits and services and, depending on the sys-
tem or strategy, can adopt several versions of social equality or inequality among
its residents and in this way promote or decrease perceptions of risk and eco-
nomic competition (see Esping-Andersen, 1990). Experts and policy-makers pub-
licly disagree over a common problem formulation as to whether social inequal-
ity or changes in political culture have led towards more contestation (Rudzio
and Schieritz, 2016). Some could show that the recent social transformations of
European welfare states have created social conflict due to concerns over eco-
nomic competition, cultural diversity and political integration and thus contrib-
ute to the emergence of ’winners’ and ’losers’ in societies (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat,
et al., 2008). Others have expanded the criteria on how to distinguish between
such ’winners’ and ’losers’ and found that also ideological dispositions such as
attitudes characterise such cleavages (Teney, Lacewell, and de Wilde, 2014).
Redistribution, as used in this thesis, therefore concerns the relationship between
the self or individual and perceived others. Questions such as who should re-
ceive which access to social welfare are often answered in terms of identifying
and labelling in- and outgroups (Taber, 2011). These questions are relevant with
regards to migration since migrants often do not receive equal access. Tradition-
ally, national citizenship legitimises the exclusion of non-citizens from economic
participation. Yet, the establishment of EU citizenship which provides access to
social welfare also to foreign EU citizens has changed the parameters of redis-
tribution between national citizens and migrants in a member state. Here, the
non-discrimination principle prescribes equal treatment of all EU citizens living
within the same country. This challenges the privilege of the status of the national
citizen and can thus create conflict over migration. With EU citizenship, redistri-
bution is not longer amatter of national sovereignty but amatter of justice beyond
national frameworks of citizenship.
In this sense, EU citizenship has ’re-shuffled’ the organisation of social order
within EU welfare states between national and foreign EU citizens. Looking at
critics of immigration as well as EU mobiles by means of a ’bottom-up’ approach,
one can expect claims of redistribution and maldistribution about whether the
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privilege of national citizens in contrast to excluded non-citizens upholds in prac-
tice despite legally enshrined rights. Yet, since redistribution concerns questions
of how inequality between social classes or groups can be diminished (Fraser et
al., 2004), legal distinctions between people are not sufficiently explanatory of
people’s contestation. In the EU, national citizenship does not automatically lead
to economic privilege. Rather, a ’bottom-up’ approach needs to highlight dis-
tinct forms of contestation that emerge from people’s different practices regard-
ingmigration, and not from their legal definitions, in order to understand people’s
claims regarding redistribution among EU citizens.
Recognition as the cultural dimension of justice is concerned with questions of
how to achieve status equality among people (Fraser, 1996; Fraser, 2003; Fraser,
2008). Status equality involves recognising different cultural identities but also
includes collectivities that are devalued due to economic differences, gender, or
sexuality (Fraser, 2003, p. 12). In this sense, not only top-down defined ethnic,
religious or national groups but social collectivities can be perceived as having
more or less ”prestige” (Fraser, 2000, p. 111). Injustices in the cultural dimension,
i.e. misrecognition, occurs in ”institutionalized hierarchies of cultural value that
prevent some members of society from participating as peers in social interac-
tion” (Fraser et al., 2004, p. 377). Unlike redistribution, recognition does not aim
to diminish difference; its remedy would be ”cultural and symbolic change”, for
example, by ”revaluing disrespected identities” (Fraser, 1996, p. 7). In contrast to
people suffering from maldistribution, misrecognition occurs not by a definition
of class through the market but through being part of a lower social status rank
than others (Fraser, 1996, p. 7). Therefore, since recognition refers to both legal,
social and cultural attributes, to social status (Fraser, 2000; Fraser, 2003; Fraser,
2008), these can be racialised groups but also socio-economic groups, such as the
poor. More generally, the concept of recognition is not to be reduced to legal
status and rights.
Recognition then aims at organising social order in a way that allows for
differences among people without devaluing one against the other but securing
equal participation. While different from redistribution in approaching injustices,
from a ’bottom-up’ approach recognition also concerns contestation of the rela-
tionship between the individual and others. It addresses the social boundaries that
people perceive and experience regarding migration in the EU and does not a pri-
ori assume legal boundaries between people. Understanding people’s subjective
notions of recognition and how they relate their perceptions and experiences of
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migration to this relationship makes contestation of citizenship as an organising
principle between people within a national welfare community visible. Similar to
redistribution, the principles or criteria of recognition are in dispute. Although
EU citizenship provides a common legal status with more equal participation in
other member states, people contest in various ways whether they feel recognised
in relation to others as well as who ’the others’ are in this sense. The ways in
which people self-identify and face identification and stereotyping through oth-
ers might be related to legal status and rights, but cannot be reduced to these
top-down definitions. Consequently, people’s categorisations of themselves and
others through cultural criteria and their contestation thereof make their notions
of recognition or misrecognition visible.
A focus on people’s subjective notions of recognition challenges the assump-
tion that people’s legal status and rights automatically overlap with the ways in
which they contest the relationship between themselves and others in terms of
cultural justice. Not in direct comparison but by acknowledging the existence
of independent and distinct ways to experience migration, no matter one’s legal
status, such a ’bottom-up’ perspective questions ’top-down’ approaches regard-
ing political practices of citizenship for identity-building purposes (see section
2.1.2). Such an investigation can then provide information about how far people
understand EU citizenship as having unifying or exclusionary potential. In other
words, this regards the boundary-making processes between an ’us’ and a ’them’.
Here, one needs to consider in how far the common framework of EU citizenship
enables people to challenge such preconceived boundaries or whether national
and cultural stereotypes prevail.
Together, I suggest that the contestation of citizenship as an organising prin-
ciple of social order can be considered as people’s disagreement about how redis-
tribution and recognition relate to each other rather than disagreement between
different groups. While both dimensions are analytically distinct, they influence
each other in ’social reality’. Understanding contestation of citizenship through
people’s notions of both recognition and redistribution requires acknowledging
their interdependency. Claims for redistribution or perceived maldistribution can
collide or overlap with claims for recognition, even create misrecognition (Fraser,
2008, pp. 16-17).
Nevertheless, the focus on only two dimensions of justice ignores the polit-
ical consequences for people who are or feel affected by recognition and redis-
tribution. Misrecognition might justify the devaluation of certain people based
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on socio-economic, cultural, or other differences. Maldistribution might exclude
socio-economic groups that, due to misrecognition, do not have equal access to
the same resources. In fact, this can further lead to problems for these people
to be politically represented or to be ignored in democratic processes (Fraser,
2008, p. 17). These questions add to the complexities regarding the ”substance”
of justice, referring to the in-and exclusion to participation, economic resources
and cultural-legal acceptance of subjects based on nationality or citizenship as a
criterion (Fraser, 2008, p. 15).
The political dimension of justice, according to Fraser (2008, p. 15), poses
not only questions about what is just within a community, but who can decide
about who is included as political subject, the ”frame of justice”. The problem
of the frame-setting of justice becomes especially salient at times when the role
of nation-state is becoming increasingly unclear and challenged. In order to ac-
commodate both the problem regarding ’ordinary’ representation in democratic
processes as well as the political frame, Fraser complements her theory of justice
with a third, political dimension, i.e. representation (Fraser, 2008, p. 15).
For the ’bottom-up’ approach followed here, representation as political dimen-
sion of justice enables people’s contestation of citizenship regarding the political
frame for in-and exclusion to be analysed. Political frames are denoted by political
authorities, i.e. the EU and national governments or politicians. These political
authorities establish, maintain or change the boundaries between those who can
claim recognition and redistribution and those who cannot - the political frame
constitutes and affects political subjects. In this way, citizenship establishes a re-
lationship between the self and political authorities. Moreover, it also describes
a perceived relationship by the individual between others and political authorit-
ies. If applicable, it describes the evaluation of how others receive justice through
political authorities.
Fraser’s distinction between ”ordinary-political misrepresentation” and ”mis-
framing” clarifies the ways in which people’s contestation (their democratic feed-
back) regarding this relationship between themselves and political authorities can
be understood Fraser (2008, pp. 19-20). The former type of misrepresentation con-
cerns domestic or community-intern dysfunctions of how political actors repres-
ent the members of the community (Fraser, 2008, p. 19). Representation in its
unjust form as ”ordinary-political misrepresentation” is concerned with legitim-
ate social order and chances of participation among members of a political com-
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munity.13 More concretely, this concerns procedural issues such as voting sys-
tems and whether people feel that their voices are being considered in political
decision-making. Regarding the issue of migration, ordinary representation can
refer to how oneself feels democratically represented in decisions about migration
policies, for example.
On the other hand, ”misframing” arises when the boundaries of the political
community are drawn in a way that includes some people but excludes others and
when the criteria for both in- and exclusion are considered illegitimate (Fraser,
2008, p. 19). This type of political ”frame-setting” of political boundaries allows
some people to participate and make claims of justice, while it excludes others,
thus ”constituting both members and non-members in a single stroke” (Fraser,
2008, p. 19). This form of injustice results in the loss of the right to have rights
(Fraser, 2008, pp. 19-20).14 As a consequence, the excluded cannot claim recogni-
tion, redistribution or ordinary representation.
Concerning the contestation of citizenship as the political frame for in- and ex-
clusion, Fraser’s concept about ”misframing” as a form of ”meta-political justice”
is therefore insightful (Fraser, 2008, p. 19). Regarding migration in the EU, the
dimension of representation addresses the disagreement about the frame of in-
and exclusion which derives from the fact that EU citizens’ ”legal rights and du-
ties are determined not only by one political authority, but by several” (Bauböck,
2010, p. 848).
Crucially, and as the discussed literature on citizenship points out, migration
also raises questions about in- and exclusion and challenges the nation-state as
single boundary-making authority from where redistribution and recognition de-
rive. Traditionally, national citizenship status confined debates about the political
yardstick when it presented a legitimate way of distinguishing between national
citizens with rights and migrants with no or considerably less rights.
Notably among people living within a migration receiving welfare state, this
distinction has become blurry. On the one hand, in the EU questions of member-
ship have become contested and challenged as nationally defined borders of polit-
13While it is important to acknowledge representation as a matter for organising so-
cial order, the definition of contestation of citizenship is oriented at different relationships
between the self and others and the self and political authorities. Fraser locates the ’or-
dinary’ type of political (in)justice on the same level as recognition and redistribution.
14Hannah Arendt’s formulation of ’the right to have rights’ relates to her argument in
The Origins of Totalitarianism that every human being has the ”right to belong to some
community.” Due to the scope of this thesis, the scholarly debate evolving from this will
not be further addressed here.
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ical communities are permeated by supra-national decision-making (see Fraser,
2008, p. 26). On the other hand, EU citizenship has created a new political arena
beyond national borders yet with only limited political rights. For EU mobiles,
political rights are mostly provided on the local level and the EU, yet not anchored
on national levels. By means of freedom of movement rights, new life trajectories
and plans have developed that depend on people’s EU citizen status. The right to
claim and exercise these rights is not any longer a mere question of national legal
status that draws a line between the citizen and the migrant. Rather, for EU cit-
izens in general such rights have created new frames of reference for where they
can be claimed based on country of residence instead of origin, for example.15
This situation now challenges the traditional distinction between national
members and foreign non-members. It raises the question of how people possibly
(re-)define the meaning of membership. Misframing then addresses contestation
about a potential ”mismatch between citizenship and the territorial scope of le-
gitimate authority” between the EU and member states (Bauböck, 2008, p. 31).
Citizenship as the criterion to include members and exclude non-members based
on national citizenship is being challenged by EU citizenship rights. It has cre-
ated another frame at which such justice claims can be directed both in terms of
allowing even more supranational frame-setting or less.
The co-existence of these various levels of political authorities from which
citizenship status, rights and possibly collective identity are provided raises the
problem of how which frame is considered to be the legitimate one. Not only can
contestation relate to perceiving one political authority as il-/legitimate. It is also
possible to contest the existence of several frames. Contestation of citizenship in
these terms can therefore be understood as a problem of deciding for one political
frame instead of another, with according implications for the dynamics of in-and
exclusion. It can also refer to demands to include people based on socio-cultural
attributes, or claims to include non-nationals into local levels but not on national
levels. Having been granted rights on various levels, their discontent with these
rights trigger notions of justice about the legitimacy of these levels that decide
whether one is in- or excluded.
Contestation of citizenship regarding the political frame for in- and exclu-
sion is therefore two-fold: First, people can contest to be politically excluded or
claim who should be in- or excluded from political decision-making about mi-
15See, for example, the right of family reunification for EU citizens with non-EU
spouses living in another member state than from the member state of origin.
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gration issues. Second, people can contest the political authority that decides
about in-and exclusion as well as the existence of several political authorities.
Together, these aspects describe contestation of citizenship regarding the ”frame
of justice” as a relationship between the self and political authorities as well as
an assumed relationship between others and political authorities. This relation-
ship becomes contested in what I have suggested calling ’democratic feedback’
and expresses people’s subjective notions regarding democratic representation
within the nation-state, yet also regarding other political authorities beyond na-
tional welfare communities.
In sum, by adopting the dimensions of representation, recognition and redis-
tribution as well as the corresponding forms of injustices, it is possible to adopt
a ’bottom-up’ understanding of citizenship in which not only formal status and
substantive rights can be addressed in a relationship between ordinary people and
authorities or political authorities but also questions of distribution and recogni-
tion as perceived by people in relation to each other.
2.3 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed relevant literature on citizenship in the EU and distin-
guished between ’top-down’ and ’bottom-up’ approaches to citizenship.16 It has
further outlined the way in which I am theoretically approaching the research
questions of this thesis. I have argued that in order to answer these questions,
not legal or institutional perspectives of citizenship, but a focus on people’s act-
ive role in the social conflict about migration in the EU and their related practices.
First, I have described the more dominant ’top-down’ approaches in the cit-
izenship literature. In the respective section, I have distinguished between a legal-
norms perspective and a political-practice perspective. While both perspectives
engage in the debate about citizenship as formal status and substantive rights,
they approach these aspects differently. In the legal-norms perspective, the focus
is put on how status and rights have developed through an expansion of legal
principles and how national and international norms challenge various ways of
defining membership within and beyond nation-states. Scholarly work in the
political-practice perspective is critical of a sole focus on legal norms and prin-
16These are the approaches relevant for the purpose of this thesis only. Given the rich
body of work, no claims of completeness are intended here.
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ciples. It is argued here that political actors’ ideas, routines and practices are in-
fluential in the development of citizenship beyond status and rights but in order
to build a political community.
Crucially, ’top-down’ approaches highlight that EU citizens as legally defined
group have raised new questions about citizenship in the EU. This literature links
conflict about migration to citizenship by, first, addressing that migration chal-
lenges citizenship as organising principle of social order among people in a polit-
ical community. Second, particularly relevant in the EU, migration triggers ques-
tions about the role of the nation-state and finding the political frame as a yard-
stick for in- and exclusion of members and non-members. I have suggested that
these two aspects combined need to be considered when analysing citizenship
contestation.
Yet, as I have argued, it cannot be taken for granted that people’s conceptions
of citizenship overlap with the ’top-down’ conceptualisations by state actors and
politicians or legal principles. Nor do the ways in which citizenship is practised
and challenged by both citizens and ’non-citizens’ always comply with its legal
and political frameworks. Given these developments, I have argued that ’top-
down’ approaches to citizenship are insufficient to analyse people’s contestation
as they do not acknowledge people’s practices regarding citizenship from below.
In the second part of this chapter I have therefore discussed literature that fol-
lows a ’bottom-up’ approach to citizenship as well as elaborated such an approach
for this thesis. Scholarly work in this stream of the literature criticises the use of
theoretical and normative ’top-down’ conceptualisation of citizenship as an ex-
planation for ordinary people’s engagement in boundary-making, development
of political or civic identities and practices. Here, the focus is rather put on mi-
grants’ and citizens’ practices and acts of citizenship, which challenge and shape
membership and rights in their own ’social realities’. ’Bottom-up’ approaches are
therefore particularly helpful in defining citizenship as a contested and dynamic
concept which needs to be considered beyond legal framework. They citizenship
as social struggle over justice and conceptualise it beyond distinctions between
national citizens and migrants.
In order to investigate how people contest citizenship as an organising prin-
ciple and political frame - and in relation to migration in the EU -, I have first ar-
gued that this requires to identify those peoplewho constitute themselves as polit-
ical subjects regarding migration. Doing so, I have suggested a focus on people’s
media practices through which they enact their affectedness by migration. On
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the one hand, such a focus acknowledges the complexities of social conflict over
migration to occur not between different legal or socio-economic groups but as
disagreement about how to organise social order and legitimately decide about
in- and exclusion. On the other hand, this focus recognises the diversity of lived
experiences regarding migration that cannot be captured when looking at legally
defined groups of people.
In combining traits from critical theorists’ works on how people constitute
themselves as political subjects and from a practice approach in media scholar-
ship, I have proposed focusing on national critics of immigration in reader com-
mentary sections below national online news (commenters in Danish and German
comment sections) and EU mobiles who are members in Facebook groups for for-
eign residents in Denmark and Germany. Based on their migration-related online
media practices, these EU citizens constitute themselves as political subjects re-
garding migration in the EU; yet are not defined through legal status.
In a second step, I have then developed a framework to interpret these people’s
perceptions and experiences of migration in relation to citizenship contestation as
defined above. Following Isin’s work (2008, 2013) on how people’s enactment of
citizenship is a matter of making claims about justice, I have argued that contest-
ation of citizenship regarding the challenges of migration can be approached by
scrutinising their subjective notions of justice. However, to my knowledge, there
is no operational framework to capture such notions of justice in the respect-
ive citizenship literature. Therefore, I draw from Nancy Fraser’s (2008) theory
of justice and suggest an interpretation of citizenship contestation regarding the
”substance” and the ”frame of justice”. Both concepts lend themselves to address
how people contest citizenship as organising principle and political yardstick for
in- and exclusion as they formulate their subjective notions of justice regarding
recognition, redistribution and representation. The first two notions, recognition
and redistribution, make visible contestation of citizenship as organising principle
of social order among themselves and others (called ’horizontal evaluation’ here),
the notion of representation refers to how people contest citizenship as the legit-
imate yardstick of political authority deciding about in-and exclusion (referred to
as ’democratic feedback’).
For the ’bottom-up’ approach followed here this means that the institutional
contexts from which people experience and perceive migration, that is, their legal
status, rights and national context (which defines the rights EU citizens havewhen
residing there) need to be considered for their contestation of citizenship. Yet
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these aspects should not be starting points for the analysis but points of reference.
These aspects becomemethodologically and empirically important since they em-
bed contestation of citizenship into specific macro-level contexts that are chosen
for the analysis as well as they help to understand people’s ways of perceiving
and experiencing migration better. I will therefore address the relevant context
and political framework for an analysis of citizenship contestation in chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Researching citizenship
contestation ’from below’
So far, I have introduced and discussed the relevant literature regarding citizen-
ship and migration in the EU. I have argued for a ’bottom-up’ approach to citizen-
ship contestation that differs from the more dominant scholarship by focusing on
people as self-constituting political subjects. I have further developed and elabor-
ated on the theoretical model regarding people’s notions of justice and how they
speak to citizenship contestation as an organising principle for social interaction
among people within a national welfare community and as the political frame for
in- and exclusion. Here, I have suggested to understand citizenship contestation
in two relationships. Regarding contestation of citizenship as an organising prin-
ciple within a community, the analysis focuses on people’s notions of recognition
and redistribution. Concerning contestation of citizenship as political frame that
defines teh members and non-members of this community, the analysis scrutin-
ises people’s notions of representation and, especially, misframing.
In the following chapter, I will elaborate how I approach citizenship contesta-
tion methodologically as well as empirically. The first section introduces a cognit-
ive perspective which is based in the constructivist research tradition and enables
to understand people’s notions of justice as results of their own, subjective percep-
tions, experiences and interpretations of migration. The section also describes the
research design; in particular, it details how critics and EU mobiles will be empir-
ically approached through a comparative case study across the respective Danish
and German contexts each. The second section describes the social and political
contexts regarding migration and citizenship in Denmark and Germany with spe-
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cial reference to the Eurocrisis and EU citizenship. The third section describes the
set of methods which is employed for sub-question 1 and for sub-question 2. This
section also includes a discussion of the limitations of this research.
3.1 Methodology and research design
As I have discussed in chapter 2, ’top-down’ approaches ask whether and how
people feel affected by migration and, by this, aim for representative results for
groups of people sharing a legal status, socio-economic background, ethnicity or
other attributes (see Brubaker, 2004; Brubaker, 2009). However, as I have argued,
it cannot be assumed that contestation of citizenship is a universal, civic practice
that can be grasped by an understanding of people according to their legal status
and rights. In other words, not everyone who is affected by migration contests
citizenship.
Therefore, I have proposed and developed a ’bottom-up’ approach to the ques-
tion of how people contest citizenship in relation to migration in the EU. I have
drawn from scholarship that emphasises the active role of people regarding cit-
izenship through an understanding of ”enactment” (see Isin, 2008; Isin, 2013). ’En-
actment’, first, sheds light on the ways in which people constitute themselves as
political subjects regarding an issue that they themselves feel affected by. It there-
fore highlights that people constitute themselves as political subjects from their
own perspective and social situation (Isin, 2013, p. 22). I have argued that by
enacting their affectedness of migration, people constitute themselves as political
subjects in the issue of migration. I have suggested a focus on people’s migration-
related online media practices that make such an enactment visible. From there,
the thesis will engagewith people’s citizenship contestation by empirically invest-
igating critics of immigration in online comment sections as well as EU mobiles
from Facebook ’expat groups’.
Second, a focus on ’enactment’ has to do with people asking ”questions of
justice and injustice” in response to a certain issue and directed towards other
actors (Isin, 2013, p. 21). In other words, their questions of justice constitute other
actors regarding citizenship (Isin, 2008, pp. 38-39). As the dominant literature on
citizenship points out, migration in the EU challenges citizenship as an organ-
ising principle of just social interaction between people within a national welfare
community. Migration in the EU also raises questions regarding citizenship as
the political frame for in-and exclusion to this community.
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In this way, I have suggested that contestation of citizenship in relation to mi-
gration is directional, that is, it emerges out of people’s enactment of affectedness
of migration and addresses political authorities, who denote the political frame,
and other people within this national welfare community. In order to encompass
critic’s of immigration and EU mobiles’ questions of justice (or notions), I have
drawn here from Fraser’s (2008) conceptualisation of redistribution and recogni-
tion as well as representation as dimensions of justice. I have categorised them in
two relationships. The first relationship describes people’s notions of represent-
ation directed at political authorities. The second relationship refers to people’s
notions of redistribution and recognition that are directed towards other people
within the national welfare community (see figure 2.1 on page 59). Together, they
emphasise and shed light on people’s own interpretations of how they are subjects
of justice in relation to political authorities and others.
This section sets out to elaborate on how to empirically approach critics’ of
immigration (sub-question 1) as well as EU mobiles’ (sub-question 2) notions of
justice based on this theoretical model and ’bottom-up’ approach to citizenship
contestation. In this section, I suggest a cognitive perspective that emphasises
the subjective and interpretative nature of these people’s notions of justice which
emerge from people’s own understandings of how they feel affected by migration.
I further describe my research design that employs a cross-national comparison
between the respective Danish and German context for each sub-question.
The advantage of such a research design is, first, that it can investigate distinct
forms of contestation and thus acknowledges the diversity of people’s viewpoints
regarding migration. Second, it is not methodologically dependent on legal cat-
egories of people. By focusing on enactment and political subjectivity it is not
interested in similarities and differences between legal groups but can shed light
on the heterogeneous and subjective nature citizenship contestation (see Andri-
jasevic, 2013, p. 49).
3.1.1 A cognitive perspective to people’s subjective notions of justice
In order to empirically investigate people’s notions of justice in relation to polit-
ical authorities and other people, I follow a cognitive perspective. More specific-
ally, this thesis is inspired by Brubaker’s (2004) cognitive perspective in social
analysis. According to Brubaker (1996, p. 22), the purpose of cognitive perspect-
ives is to understand the concepts of ethnicity, nationalism, or identity not as
”categories of analysis” but as ”categories of practice”. As the concepts ethnicity,
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nationalism or identity need to be investigated as practices, so does contestation
of citizenship (Brubaker, 2004, p. 31). This shifts the focus away from the question
’what is citizenship’ to ’what do people think about citizenship’. In other words,
a cognitive perspective allows to analyse citizenship contestation in terms of an
organising principle among people within a national welfare community and the
political frame of this community not as a manifest, ’real’ objects, but in terms of
people’s own interpretations thereof.
It is worth quoting Brubaker (2004, p. 79) at length to highlight the definition
of cognitive perspectives and their usefulness in sociological analyses in these
respects. Cognitive perspectives treat groups not as ”substantial entities” but as
”[…] widely shared ways of seeing, think, parsing social experience, and inter-
preting the social world.” And further, concepts such as race, nationality, ethnicity
are ”not things in the world, but perspectives on the world”.
Therefore, the term ’cognitive’ has to be understood here in the broadest sense
as interpretative ways to make sense of an event or a phenomenon by drawing
from previous knowledge, experiences and perceptions. This means, I do not refer
to research on media effects which distinguish between cognitive, affective and
behavioural effects (McQuail, 2010, p. 556), but as methodological strategy that
is rooted in the constructivist research paradigm and relates the term ’cognitive’
to broader practices by which people construct meaning and make sense of the
world ’through their own eyes’.
In order to empirically investigate people’s notions of justice regarding how
migration affects just social order and legitimate political yardsticks for in- and ex-
clusion, these insights from cognitive perspectives define people’s self-understandings
and the interpretation of relationships with others in subjective and evaluative
ways. When people enact their affectedness of migration it is unlikely that they
will engage in rational deliberation about the legal and political implications of
freedom of movement. Rather, a cognitive perspective emphasises people’s sub-
jective interpretations, their evaluations of howmigration affects them andwhether
they are subjects of recognition, redistribution and representation. This means
to focus on people’s perceptions and experiences of migration as they interpret
them in relation to aspects of recognition, redistribution or representation. In this
way, these notions of justice emerge from people’s interpretations and meaning-
making of their perceptions and experiences of migration. Cognitive perspect-
ives consequently help clarify that legal or political frameworks which determine
what citizenship is or what justice ’means’ might not reflect the interpretations of
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people in this regard. In other words, people’s migration-related media practices
online through which they enact their affectedness of migration provide insights
into their subjective notions of (in-)justices of migration.
Methodologically speaking, this implies to approach contestation by critics of
immigration and EU mobiles not in terms of their legal status and rights but in
terms of how they interpret themselves and others as subjects of justice. In section
2.2.2 I have argued that these two groups of people emerge as political subjects
by enacting their affectedness of migration (i.e. raise questions of justice) via on-
line media practices. Their ”reflection, expression, and behavior” does not have
to be politically intended, but can derive from the private and personal sphere
(see Papacharissi, 2013, p. 153). Thus, adopting a cognitive perspective, I under-
stand people’s enactment of migration affectedness online neither as deliberat-
ive, well-reasoned process, nor as entirely emotional and spontaneous acts, but
as a hybrid way thereof. Understood in this sense, committing to the affordances
of online media in relation to migration, people intentionally or unintentionally
make themselves seen to others as having something to say about migration.
They ways in which people present themselves can be curated or spontaneous
(see Goffman, 1959). Cognitive perspectives then allow to consider notions of
justice among people who enact their affectedness through online and social me-
dia as ways through which individuals share memories, attitudes, emotions but
also knowledge and information. This includes their interpretative processes such
as labelling and categorising others and oneself, processes of of self-identification
which are ways in which people develop attitudes (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stam-
atov, 2004, 32; citing Jenkins 1997), but also how they define appropriate beha-
viour towards in-groups and out-groups (Taber, 2011, p. 378). Table 3.1 provides
an overview of how a cognitive perspective speaks to the theoretical model re-
garding the two relationships of contestation.
Together, drawing from a cognitive perspective then presents an alternative
way to approach people not based on certain attributes but based on what they
think, interpret, or express. It focuses on their own justifications for why particu-
lar experiences or perceptions of migration are challenging, present struggles or
problems.
Therefore, such a micro-level perspective stands in contrast to macro-level re-
search in the field. Here, previous research has approached the challenges of mi-
gration and European integration and other transformations by considering how
this has affected social cleavages between groups of ’winners’ and ’losers’. So-
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Relationships Subjective notions
of justice
Interpretations of migration
perc./exp. through cognitive
processes
Relationship of
self with others
(social order)
Recognition/
redistribution
Social boundary-making,
categorising/labelling groups,
’othering’, judging
deservingness, perceiving
differences,
expressions/feelings of in- and
exclusion
Relationship of
self (and others)
with political
authorities
(political frame for
in- exclusion)
Representation,
incl. misframing
Demands about political
system/role of politicians,
assessing political effectiveness,
dissatisfaction with political
responsibilities,
expressions/feelings of being
heard or excluded from
political decision-making,
national boundary-making or
questioning legitimacy of
territorial sovereignty
Table 3.1: Subjective notions of justice regarding migration
cial cleavages could be identified along the lines of socio-economic background
(Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, et al., 2008) as well as along their ideological disposi-
tions corresponding to dimensions of ’cosmopolitan’ and ’communitarians’ belief
systems (Teney, Lacewell, and de Wilde, 2014), and in their EU attitudes (Mau,
2005). These findings are based on surveys, attitudinal research and institutional
analysis and give rich insights into how the recent social transformations around
globalisation and European integration as well as increasing migration flows have
contributed to the formation of social cleavages in societies as a whole. Others
do engage in more subjective dimensions of citizenship. Carens (2000, p. 116),
for example has introduced a ”psychological dimension” of citizenship in order
to analyse the ways in which citizens identify with a political community and
that justice also depends on the specific context of these political communities.
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Yet, in this way justice is assumed as within the frame of nation-states only and
concerned with national citizens.
Indeed, these research designs and findings do not allow for an in-depth ana-
lysis which is required for a ’bottom-up’ approach to citizenship contestation that
becomes visible among people who constitute themselves as political subjects in
the form of their interpretations, perceptions and experiences regarding migra-
tion as a matter of justice. Furthermore, macro-level research is interested in
differences between groups of people based on legal, ethnic, nationality or socio-
economic attributes. Instead, a cognitive perspective puts emphasis on when and
how people themselves evoke their understandings of citizenship in these regards,
that is, when and how they employ such attributes regarding citizenship as an
organising principle between the self and other people within a national wel-
fare community and as the political frame for in- and exclusion (see Brubaker,
Loveman, and Stamatov, 2004). Thus, by drawing from cognitive perspectives it
is possible to analyse how people constitute themselves as political subjects in
the social conflict about migration by expressing (enacting) how they understand
themselves to be treated as subjects of justice (or injustice). This shifts attention
away from potential group differences and emphasises a focus on people’s own
’social realities’.
However, it has been argued that particularly in research on experiences and
other subjective processes, there is a risk of detaching such processes from ”ob-
jective”, manifest aspects and phenomena in the world (Iosifides, 2012, p. 36). This
might result in leaving the analysis of meaningful connections with macrolevel
structures and transformations to others, or to rejecting ”the possibility of adju-
dicating between different interpretations […]” (Iosifides, 2012, p. 36). Although
Brubaker (2004, pp. 17-18) argues that a cognitive perspective can ”link macro-
level outcomes to microlevel processes”, it is crucial to acknowledge this criti-
cism. In the next part, I will describe how this criticism can be addressed in the
research design of this thesis by conducting one comparative case study for each
sub-question, that is, first, regarding critics of immigration and then for EU mo-
biles.
3.1.2 Two comparative case studies
Particularly for ’bottom-up’ approaches, there is a risk that research findings re-
garding people’s lived experiences and subjectivities remain separated from their
broader socio-cultural contexts. Yet, according to Fraser et al. (2004, p. 378),
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”justice pertains by definition to social structures and institutional frameworks”.
Likewise, these ’social realities’ regarding recognition, redistribution and repres-
entation are context-sensitive. Thus, especially regarding questions of how people
experience migration and citizenship in the EU, these contexts appear crucial be-
cause they enable a deeper understanding of how people react to, engage with
and interpret broader social structures. This necessitates to develop a research
design that can mediate between the potential gap between subjective impres-
sions on the micro-level and institutional frameworks and social structures on
the macro-level.
In order to bridge the gap between people’s subjective notions of justice and
the particularities of economic crisis and citizenship frameworks in the EU, I con-
duct one comparative case study for type of political subject on which this thesis
focuses (sub-question 1: critics of immigration; sub-question 2: EU mobiles). Fig-
ure 3.1 illustrates and visualises this research design. The blue and connected
rectangles denote the cases of comparison that investigate sub-question 1; the
green and connected rectangles consequently refer to the comparative case study
for sub-question 2. The dotted lines denote the context(s), described in further de-
tail in section 3.2, to which the findings of the analysis will be related in order to
gain a nuanced and contextualised understanding of people’s notions of justice.
In this way, people’s citizenship contestation in relation to migration in the EU
can be analysed by acknowledging its heterogeneous nature and nuances.
Therefore, the aim of such a research design is to understand contestation of
citizenship by giving voice to people and their subjective ’social realities’ as they
constitute themselves as political subjects regarding migration while acknow-
ledging their distinct forms of contestation in relation to socio-cultural contexts
in which people develop them.
This research design seems appropriate to understand citizenship contestation
regarding migration in its complexity since each comparative case study enables
in-depth insights into one distinct form of contestation by transgressing national
boundaries. Generally, case comparisons allow social phenomena to be under-
stood as they manifest beyond one single socio-cultural setting (see Hantrais,
1999). One of the strengths of this strategy is the ability to constantly engage
in re-building the cases for ”understanding, explaining, and interpreting diverse
historical outcomes and processes” (Ragin, 2014, p. 6). The purpose of comparative
case study research then ”is to discover contrasts, similarities, or patterns across
the cases” (Campbell, 2010, p. 174). One particular outcome of case-oriented re-
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Contestants Contestants
EU mobiles EU mobiles
EU context
Danish context German context
Figure 3.1: Research design: Two comparative case studies in their contexts
search designs is therefore ”the construction of types and the allocation of cases
to them” (della Porta, 2008, p. 209).
Case study designs have received considerable criticism especially regarding
questions about the validity and the possibility to generalise from the results as
well as its logic of research concerning causality (see e.g. G. King, Keohane, and
Verba, 1994). Yet, it has been argued that case studies do not aim to present gen-
erally representative findings as more ”variable-oriented” studies do (Flyvbjerg,
2006; della Porta, 2008). Case study designs ”aim at an understanding of a complex
unit” (della Porta, 2008, p. 198). While ”variable-oriented” studies seek to determ-
ine how different variables affect each other causally, ”case-oriented” research
designs explain how the different components and aspects of the cases relate to
each other (della Porta, 2008, p. 205). This requires in-depth knowledge of cases
and contexts. Such knowledge is usually achieved by using primarily qualitative
methods which are most suitable to describe and understand situations and con-
texts in complex detail (Schofield, 1993, p. 202). This allows to draw more general
conclusions from the case studies within a specific context instead of by statistical
inference (Ragin and Sonnett, 2005).
Indeed, since this ’bottom-up’ approach begins with people’s subjective no-
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tions of justice, i.e. micro-level, cognitive processes, and from there aims to con-
textualise with broader social structures and institutional frameworks, no casual
relationship is assumed. Neither can hypotheses be formulated and tested that
imply such a causality as it is often the case in controlled Small-N studies. Rather,
by means of the two comparative case studies, each across Denmark and Ger-
many within the EU, it is possible to investigate citizenship contestation not only
within the limits of national frameworks but beyond. For this thesis, on the one
hand, this means to produce meaningful interpretations and engage in contextu-
alisation of immigration critics’ notions of justice; on the other hand, the same is
necessary for EU mobiles’ notions of justice.
In this way, the thesis follows the demand for a stronger methodological plur-
alism here (see Keating and della Porta, 2010). While a cognitive perspective is
rooted in the constructivist tradition, I suggest that it can be fruitfully embed-
ded in the above described research design by employing two comparisons across
national contexts. In this way, it is possible to establish a connection between
people’s subjective experiences and broader social contexts on macro-levels. On
the one hand, this research design enables to analyse national commenters’ no-
tions of justice in an in-depth manner based on how they unfold in Denmark and
Germany (sub-question 1). On the other hand, it allows to analyse EU mobiles’
notions of justice across these national contexts (sub-question 2).
Doing so, I will now turn to the specifics of these comparisons before describ-
ing the broader social contexts in section 3.2. This means, one has to become fa-
miliar with critics of immigration and EUmobiles, which will be accessed through
Danish and German commentary sections and Facebook groups for migrants liv-
ing in Denmark and Germany. Today, mobilisation and participation increasingly
take place on and through online media platforms which points to less conven-
tional (e.g. through voting) and more creative and personal ways of how people
constitute themselves as political in debates and social conflicts. Online and social
media have shown particular potential for cognitive mobilisation (Alaminos and
Penalva, 2012), and have become main platforms where people develop contesta-
tion (Statham and Trenz, 2013; de Wilde, Michailidou, and Trenz, 2014).
Regarding the critics of immigration, this does mean to not dismiss people’s
own, personal expressions online due to a lack of rational deliberation or quality
of democratic discourse. The fact that comment sections might assemble people
with a more negative stance on immigration makes them the focal point of ana-
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lysis for sub-question 1. Comment sections are more and more connected, being
manipulated, and moderated and they present easy prey for the simplifications of
anti-immigration and Eurosceptic populism that is currently on the rise through-
out Europe (see Weber, 2014; Hsueh, Yogeeswaran, and Malinen, 2015). Instead
of leaving current debates on online commenting to policy negotiations about
restrictions, anonymity and freedom of speech, in this research I argue to use
comments as empirical material that can provide insight into the underlying in-
terpretative processes of people’s perceptions and experiences of migration from
where their notions of justice become visible. Thus, rather than ignoring or dis-
regarding commenters’ views as an isolated phenomenon or as uncomfortable
side-effects of the affordances of online and social media, I suggest understand-
ing online comments within the wider context of these people’s sense-making
and interpretations.
Accordingly, comment sections do not adequately represent processes of pub-
lic opinion-formation; but they allow immigration critics’ opinions, emotional re-
actions and claims, that is their notions of justice, to be accessed. Research has
shown that motivations to comment online are often to contest and criticise other
content, such as news. It cannot be expected that this happens in a rational or de-
liberative manner: Studies suggest that comments are more evaluative, personal
and subjective expressions and interpretations of news content (see e.g. Baden
and Springer, 2014). Results from the Reuters Digital Report 2016 and the En-
gaging News Project at the University of Texas suggest that commenting might
be associated with lower levels of trust or general dissatisfaction with political
issues: While 56% (the majority) of people, who comment17 on a news website
do so in order to ”express an emotion or opinion”, ”to add information” directly
follows with 38% and ”to correct inaccuracies or misinformation” with 35%. Other
reasons have found to be ”to educate others” (29%) and ”to note missing inform-
ation” (22%) (N. Newman et al., 2016, pp. 100-101). Furthermore, an analysis of
German comments and news coverage on the rise of the party Alternative für
Deutschland suggests that commenters are ”counterpublic-minded individuals”,
thus highlighting contestation (Toepfl and Piwoni, 2015, p. 471). Research could
also show that the institutional set-up of comment sections on news sites en-
17People who have ”made an original or public contribution to news coverage”, referred
to as ”proactive participators” (N. Newman et al., 2016, p. 99) are more likely to have high
interest in news and to access the news more than five times a day than those that do not
comment. In Denmark, it is estimated that 22% are proactively participating, in Germany
18% (N. Newman et al., 2016, p. 101).
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able readers to form their own debates and, thus, to form fora of contestation of
mainstream debates (Domingo et al., 2008). This means that comment sections
on news websites provide direct access to contestation ’in context’ as they relate
to (national) news articles about a certain issue, especially targeting migrants as
’groups’.
Furthermore, comments on news websites are not only relevant because of
active participation but also regarding the influence they can have on the more
passive readership. Here, research suggests that discussions about migration in
comment sections and on other platforms have an impact on attitudes and ste-
reotyping about migrants also for people who do not comment but merely read
comments (Hughey and Daniels, 2013; Hsueh, Yogeeswaran, and Malinen, 2015).
As more passive readers of the comments become part of such debates as observ-
ers, comment sections can create ’opinion bubbles’ in which people find other
’like-minded’ individuals (see Springer, Engelmann, and Pfaffinger, 2015). Com-
ments have, for example, shown Eurosceptic attitudes during the Eurocrisis (Mi-
chailidou, Trenz, and de Wilde, 2014) and the Brexit debates (Trenz and Galpin,
2017).
On the other hand, mobile EU citizens have privileged access to economic
and social participation in other member states than non-EU citizens. They might
therefore experiencemigration in a positiveway. Indeed, young and highly skilled
EU mobiles are often considered ‘unproblematic’ categories of citizens which has
resulted in a lack of empirical data (Düvell, 2009, p. 336). Generally, the majority
of EUmigrants is highly educated (although country of origin-specific differences
occur) and geographically younger and more flexible than the average population
(Braun and Arsene, 2009, p. 32). EU citizens’ mobility patterns might also suggest
social resilience provided by EU citizenship (Duru, Michailidou, and Trenz, 2016).
Although these social mobility patterns that might come with intra- EU mobil-
ity are not yet fully researched, they indicate that young and high-skilled foreign
EU citizens can be considered potential beneficiaries of migration as they can put
their social and economic resources to use and thus exploit their ’exit options’ to
their advantage (see Favell, 2008; Olsen, 2015).
However, these findings refer to mobile EU citizens in general, more repres-
entative terms. Despite these potential privileges, approaching EU mobiles via
Facebook ’expat groups’ focuses on these people’s lived experiences of accom-
modating in their new surroundings by means of exchanging information, giving
support both in practical terms but also emotionally. For EUmobiles online media
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enable to meet other migrants and to exchange information between ’newcomers’
andmore ’experienced’ migrants. A recent study found that migrants use particu-
larly Facebook to socialise and network, exchange information about the country
and city they have moved to and support each other in getting accommodated
(Duru and Trenz, 2017). Especially newly arrived migrants use online and social
media and incorporate them into their everyday life experiences of migration (see
M. Christensen, Jansson, and C. Christensen, 2011). Therefore, becoming a mem-
ber of a Facebook ’expat group’ and possibly reflecting on differences, labelling
groups, expressions of marginalisation or efforts to learn more about one’s indi-
vidual surroundings highlight the crucial role of social media from where people
make themselves visible to others when they experience migration first hand.
In many cases these groups are local, since people use them also to meet ’off-
line’ to make new friends after arrival and to cope with obstacles and negative
experiences when settling in. With regards to EU mobiles’ social rights, the ten-
sion between European mobility and national requirements (e.g. concerning res-
idence) has made visible the existing inequality between EU mobiles and locals to
actually accessing welfare and social services (Moriarty et al., 2016, p. 212). This
hints at possible problems when it comes to bureaucracy, local administration and
perceptions of discrimination.
This is particularly important from a comparative perspective. On the one
hand, urban, especially capital areas are attractive destinations for young and
high-skilled migrants due to the broad range of professional opportunities as well
as leisure activities. Ideally, since EU citizenship facilitates employment in an-
other member state, EU mobiles can, for example, avoid the more traditional so-
cial mobility pattern via the national capital by moving to other EU capital cities
(Favell, 2008, pp. 93-94). People from crisis-affected countries in central and east-
ern as well as southern Europe seek higher education and employment there. On
the other hand, the local level plays an important role for the access of welfare and
social service provision (Graauw and Vermeulen, 2016). Opportunities to access
rights and benefits in the ‘receiving state’ after their arrival are as crucial as the
initial period of moving (Olsen, 2015).
In sum, these immigration critics’ and EU mobiles’ forms of contestation can-
not be analysed in direct comparison since the thesis approached them as self-
constituting political subjects regarding migration not as groups with different
legal statuses. This is not to say that different legal statuses, rights as well as so-
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cial and national contexts should be ignored. On the contrary, these differences
need to be considered as contextual factors that create the conditions for why
people perceive and experience migration in such contrasting ways as. They do,
however, not present the basis for comparison but need to be understood as con-
textual factors that make each sub-question an investigation of a distinct form of
citizenship contestation.
It is therefore necessary to provide some background on the social structures
and institutional frameworks to which people relate when they contest citizen-
ship as an organising principle of social interaction among people within a na-
tional welfare community and as the political frame for in- and exclusion. In
other words, this bottom-up approach does not ask ’how context affects people’
but ’how people’s notions of justice can be related to context’. In this sense, the
research aim is not to compare people. By this, the findings shed light on people’s
subjective meanings regarding rights, membership and representation in the EU
and across Danish and German contexts. It is in this way that the research design
addresses the potential pitfall of decoupling people’s subjective experiences from
their social contexts. At the same time, this research strategy questions ’top-
down’ approaches that assume an overlap of people’s contestation of citizenship
with citizenship ’from above’ by investigating group differences.
In the following section, I will describe the national and EU contexts in which
each comparative case study is embedded and highlight how critics of immigra-
tion and EUmobiles in these contexts form appropriate case studies to investigate
how people contest citizenship regarding migration in the EU by means of empir-
ically investigating each group cross-nationally (sub-question 1 and 2).
3.2 Background: Economic, political and social challenges
of migration
Given the strong Danish and German welfare state system in combination with
a clearly defined conception of citizenship based on national membership, free-
dom of movement seems to be a particularly sensitive subject in public debates
there. Therefore, these national contexts seem appropriate choices for an analysis
of citizenship contestation regarding migration by means of focusing on a com-
parison between immigration critics on Danish and German online news sites and
a comparison between EU mobiles living in Denmark and Germany.
First, the section will describe the Danish and German context with reference
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to immigration rates and the relevant social implications of the Eurocrisis in both
countries. In the second part, I will elaborate on the for this thesis relevant aspects
of the Danish and German citizenship regimes and relate them to the political and
legal framework in the EU.
Doing so, the section provides an overview of social conflict over migration
in both countries which makes them relevant contexts to scrutinise citizenship
contestation among critics of immigration and EU mobiles.
3.2.1 EU freedom of movement and welfare states during the Euro-
crisis: indicators for conflict about migration
Particularly in welfare states, such as Denmark and Germany, where EU citizens
are allowed access to social benefits and financial support, debates about the scope
and extent of rights for EU citizens, both national and foreign, are prevalent.
Scholars have recently called more attention to such ”emotionally driven policy-
making” in order to understand exclusion and inclusion in welfare states (Carmel
and Cerami, 2011, p. 11). This shifts attention away from measuring effects of
policies for in-and exclusion toward the social conflict potential migration in the
EU creates. Political decision-making and citizens’ attitudes constantly convince
each other about the supposed necessity of preferring national citizens over ’oth-
ers’ (see Carmel and Cerami, 2011, pp. 8-9). In other words, in order to understand
forms of contestation of citizenship regarding migration it is necessary to embed
them within the social conflict over migration in welfare states, that is, one needs
to pay attention to how immigration rates and debates about rights and welfare
state sustainability relate to each other.
From the discussion of the relevant literature in chapter 2, migration in the EU
challenges citizenship as an organising principle of social order as well as raises
questions about finding the political frame of reference for in- and exclusion. Mar-
shall (1950) observed an expansion of social citizenship, i.e. inclusion, alongside
economic growth which would later lead to the development of welfare states in
the postwar era after the 2nd World War. However, in an age of globalisation and
European integration the dynamics of economic growth have changed and with it
the monopoly of the nation-state to independently steer economic development
and welfare within a closed system based on national membership (see Schierup,
Hansen, and Castles, 2006, pp. 1-3). EU citizenship has expanded rights of EU
citizens but has left the implementation of access to welfare to the member states.
The welfare system is therefore a key instrument for social in- and exclusion both
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in terms of organising who is subject to recognition and redistribution as well as
who is and who is not a subject of justice (i.e. is represented and included in the
frame of justice or not).
Indeed, the role of the state for controlling or adapting tomigration andmobil-
ity patterns in the EU has become an issue of scholarly and public debate in terms
of its wider societal implications. The processes of globalisation and European in-
tegration have contributed to increasing asymmetries between EU member states
as well as within member state populations. Such processes have resulted in a
two-fold transformation (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles, 2006, pp. 1-3): First, a
”restructuring of the modern welfare state” is visible which continuously increases
the social exclusion of the economically weakest parts of the population. Second,
a political and cultural ”transformation of the nation and established national iden-
tities” takes place which can be observed in the politicisation of immigration and
in a boost of nationalist political parties in European welfare states.
Crucially, in the years after the Eurocrisis, Denmark and Germany have ex-
perienced an increasing influx of EU migrants (see table 3.2). Overall, intra-EU
migration had to some degree decreased in the years of economic recession (2009
to 2011) although migration from southern EU member states continuously in-
creased (Castles, De Haas, and Miller, 2014, p. 118). Generally, permanent migra-
tion flows to OECD countries recovered when looking at the period 2012 to 2014
(OECD, 2015, p. 18). Since 2010, immigration from EU member states to Denmark
andGermany and residence permits have started to rise again and steadily keep on
doing so (see table 3.3).18 As of January 2014, the share of the foreign population
Denmark and Germany was slightly above EU average.19 Therefore, both coun-
tries could report a positive net migration rate during the described time period,
meaning that more people moved to these countries than people who emigrated.
This means that the Eurocrisis has maintained, and potentially, reinforced Den-
mark and Germany as ”old host countries” which generally, despite restrictive
migration regimes, experience higher numbers of immigration (Triandafyllidou
and Gropas, 2014, p. 390).
This increasing attractiveness of Denmark and Germany as destinations for
18Immigration rates are generally difficult to compare due to the high variability in how
immigration is measured on the national level (Poulain, 2006). For large scale population
prospects see e.g. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population
Division, 2015.
19More detailed numbers for each country are provided by Statistics Denmark (2016)
and Destatis (2016).
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Population EU member states as of 1 Jan. 2014
Total res-
ident pop-
ulation
Share in total resident population (%)
Nationals Foreign
citizens
Of which:
Citizens of
other EU
member
state
Non-EU
citizens*
EU 506.847.612 93.3 6.7 2.8 3.9
Denmark 5.627.235 92.9 7.1 2.8 4.2
Germany 80.767.463 91.3 8.7 3.8 4.9
Table 3.2: Adapted from Eurostat (2015) news release 230/2015.
*Including legal statuses: stateless, recognised, and unknown citizenship.
**Aggregate for sum of EU member states; provisional data; EU citizens living in another
member state are counted as foreigners.
Immigration of EU citizens to Germany, residence permits granted in Denmark*
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Change
2015/2014
EU to
Ger-
many**
243.813 356.778 442.159 521.509 630.243 685.485 +8.8%
EU/EEA
to
Den-
mark***
25.361 27.395 30.059 32.027 35.415 37.366 +5.5%
Table 3.3: *Data are not directly comparable for reasons given below.
**Adapted from BAMF (2015b, p. 6), including Croatia
***Adapted fromTheDanish Immigration Service (2016, p. 5). Data do not directly display
immigration numbers. A person can be granted residence permit several times (double-
counting) or not make use of it after being granted.
foreign EU citizens might also be observable in naturalisation rates. The rate of
foreign EU citizens’ naturalisation in another member state has so far been rather
low possibly due to the accompanying entitlements that allow economic parti-
cipation in other member states (Dronkers and Vink, 2012, p. 409). On the other
hand, as Graeber (2016) finds, the Eurocrisis might have contributed to a lack of
trust in political institutions which has rendered national citizenship of less crisis-
affected member states, such as Denmark and Germany, more relevant again.
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Either way, increased immigration to welfare states is commonly accompan-
ied by debates over pressure on welfare system sustainability. The ways in which
immigration impacts on welfare states has often been approached by focusing
on specific welfare state systems facilitating or hindering access to welfare for
certain social groups. Highly skilled migrants with legally provided access to
welfare, such as mobile EU citizens, usually find themselves in a privileged pos-
ition. As Bommes and Geddes (2000) show, welfare states have created different
categories of migrants with different sets of rights, obligations and restrictions re-
spectively. Germany is usually categorised as a conservative corporatist welfare
system (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This type is founded on access to welfare and
insurance through labour market participation, i.e. citizens and migrants alike
receive access to welfare if they are economically active in the German labour
market. This system is more likely to show welfare gaps between workers and
economically inactive persons. The German welfare state system is therefore de-
scribed as to be prone to stratification because labour market participation is mer-
ited (Sainsbury, 2012, p. 59). One the one hand, the system can enhance migrant
workers’ social rights especially if they are high-skilled and therefore deman-
ded by employers. At the same time, it widens the welfare gap between national
citizens and foreigners given the fact that long-term contribution to the welfare
state increases welfare benefits (Sainsbury, 2012, p. 54). Furthermore, since the
taxes paid during labour-market contribution finance the insurance-based wel-
fare system, the German welfare state strongly depends on high employment
rates. Policies have therefore targeted unemployment and resulted in a steady
rise of atypical forms of employment, such as short-term and part-term employ-
ment (’mini-jobs’) and, parallel to this a rise in standard employment (Blum and
Kuhlmann, 2016, p. 139). Atypical employment, however, results more often in
old age poverty since it makes long-term employment and therefore better access
to social welfare more difficult and in Germany particularly affects women and
migrants (Blum and Kuhlmann, 2016, p. 139). Since EU citizens are to be preferred
before non-EU citizens for employment according to the priority principle, this
has created a class system between immigrant categories, particularly between
EU and non-EU citizens (Sainsbury, 2012, pp. 57-59).
These developments suggest a general growth of inequalities among resid-
ents in Germany and the development of economically vulnerable groups partic-
ularly during economic crisis. Yet, in economic terms the Eurocrisis has not led
to long-term effects. The German economy recovered comparatively fast after an
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economic downturn in 2009/10 with low youth unemployment rates (Blum and
Kuhlmann, 2016, p. 141). Immigration rates have increased in the aftermath of the
crisis especially from struggling member states in southern and eastern Europe
(BAMF, 2015b). Since EU citizens enjoy protection from discrimination to the ad-
vantage of national citizens, EU migration remains controversial and the debates
about welfare sustainability are persistent. In particular, the immigration from EU
member states Romania and Bulgaria remains a contested issue (Blum and Kuhl-
mann, 2016, p. 154). Debates about migrants from southern EU member states
after the Eurocrisis might have also become more salient. Together, the German
welfare state system and the debates it triggers during periods of increased im-
migration are an indicator for social conflict over migration. This conflict in parts
is based on public concerns and fears over the lower threshold for EU migrants to
access welfare and participate in labour markets.
Thewelfare state type of Denmark is categorised as social democratic (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). Unlike in Germany, where entitlement to welfare is based on
labour market participation, the Danish welfare state follows the principle of uni-
versalism, i.e. citizenship or residence feature as basis of entitlement. Denmark
has been more successful in redistributing welfare and working against inequal-
ity than Germany (Sainsbury, 2012, p. 97). Furthermore, Sainsbury (2012, p. 107)
found ”little differentiation in benefit levels of non-citizens and citizens.” Yet, such
universalist systems can regulate the in- and exclusion of migrants via residence
requirements since they differentiate access to welfare between long-term and
temporary residents (Sainsbury, 2012, p. 108). In this sense, EU migrants have
become the centre of heated debates about the dangers of ’welfare tourism’, i.e.
migrants who potentially move to a country to receive social welfare without
seeking employment. Particularly migration to Denmark from central and east-
ern EU member states has raised questions in political debates about ”the sustain-
ability and legitimacy of the [Danish] system” (Greve, 2016, p. 165). This might
have become exacerbated during the Eurocrisis. Unlike the German economy,
Denmark was economically affected by the crisis.20 The level of debt in Den-
mark is also comparatively low and a few years of public growth, as it is argued,
will improve the situation (Greve, 2016, p. 170). Yet, unemployment rates in 2013
were higher compared to the time before 2008/09 and particularly the younger
generation was affected in this regard (Greve, 2016, p. 168). Observers point to
”work-first approach” rhetoric. On the one hand, this rhetoric refers to EU mi-
20Although still to a low degree when compared to other countries in the EU.
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grants suspected of seeking out social welfare instead of work but, on the other
hand, also to social benefit recipients in general (Greve, 2016, p. 167). This has
resulted in a higher pressure on economically inactive people in Denmark but
it is also expected that inequality between those in work and the economically
inactive will further increase (Greve, 2016, p. 175). This overview suggests that,
at least, the number of those who have been affected in a negative way through
unemployment and financial insecurity has grown during this time. In fact, one
might argue that the recessionmight haveworsened living conditions inDenmark
for those who had already been worse off but allowed those with socio-economic
and cultural resources to maintain their standard of living and, thus, resulting in
increased inequality.
However, it seems that debates about immigration as a problem for welfare
sustainability are not based on actual statistical evidence about EU citizens’ poten-
tial burden to national welfare systems due to their rights of access to social bene-
fits. In fact, migrants still make a positive net contribution to Danish and German
welfare states in fiscal terms (European Citizen Action Service, 2014; Martinsen
and Rotger, 2016). The political saliency of migration might therefore be influ-
enced by concerns and fears articulated by political actors (see Kriesi, Grande,
Lachat, et al., 2008). Recent research has shown that immigration is a contrib-
uting factor for social cleavages between in such countries where European in-
tegration and globalisation have different effects on people, describing potential
structures of ’winners’ and ’losers’ (Kriesi, Grande, Dolezal, et al., 2012). Particu-
larly when issues such as increasing immigration rates and multiculturalism gain
salience in public and political debates, right-wing populist parties are more likely
to gain ground in elections (Mudde, 2007). This is in part due to these politicians’
focus on mobilising impressions of future insecurity regarding living standards
and job security. In so far, in times of heightened attention to economic tur-
bulences and their potential implications for ordinary people, right-wing parties
claim links between immigration as a threat to job and welfare insecurity (Mudde,
2007, p. 301).
EU citizenship has blurred the lines between categories of national citizens
and migrants and citizenship as organising principle for social order and political
frame of reference are less clear cut. In these regards and particularly in Denmark
and Germany, citizenship regarding migration has become a matter of contesta-
tion. In this way, the economic crisis might have contributed tomore convergence
between the socio-political situation of the German and Danish welfare systems
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and increasing inequality as indicators for social conflict about migration based
on emotional, more subjective grounds as a justification for the exclusion of mi-
grants. This subjective aspect has further become salient by looking at the Euroba-
rometer results during these years. Here, one can see how the socio-economic and
political consequences of the crisis become salient. Economic concerns over EU-
wide recession as well as unemployment and the domestic economy rank high
among both Danish and German populations with immigration on the rise (see
figures 3.2 and 3.3).
Figure 3.2: Concerns among Danish population from 2009 to 2014, data from interactive
Eurobarometer database (2016)
Interestingly, the Eurobarometer results suggest that the tipping point for
when immigration as a concern manifests occurs in 2014. Despite growing im-
migration levels during the years of the economic crisis, the majority of people
in Denmark and Germany were not concerned about migration until 2014, more
precisely during the run-up to the EP elections in the spring of 2014 (see figures
3.2 and 3.3). Possibly, the EP elections mark the point in timewhen political actors
of the populist right were able to articulate the ”political potentials” (see Kriesi,
Grande, Lachat, et al., 2008, p. 4). This can be further confirmed by findings that
show how the crisis has contributed to renationalisation sentiments and a return
of national identities in the long term (Galpin, 2017). Especially Danish politicians
instrumentalised the Eurocrisis to raise concerns regarding the sustainability of
the welfare state and social cohesion (Cochran Bech and Lindekilde, 2014). As
Guiraudon, Ruzza, and Trenz (2015, p. 5; citing Habermas, 1975) write, ”[a] crisis
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Figure 3.3: Concerns among German population from 2009 to 2014, data from interactive
Eurobarometer database (2016)
can only be described in relation to the individuals who are subjectively undergo-
ing it and who as subjects are condemned to passivity and temporarily deprived
of the possibility of being in full possession of their powers.” Possibly, for people
contesting migration, EU citizenship, leading in principle to a more equal treat-
ment between national and foreign EU citizens within the Danish and German
welfare state, might be perceived as to increase inequality to the disadvantage for
Danes and Germans. Consequently, this might suggest that social conflict about
migration is nurtured by perceived, subjective pressure on welfare states as jus-
tifications for exclusion. In turn, for EU mobiles EU citizenship has created more
inclusion into Danish and German welfare systems and labour markets. Both
countries have increasingly become attractive alternatives to economic recession
in crisis-affected member states.
Therefore, the ways in which migration is understood as a challenge on the
macro-level contains debates about recognition and redistribution, that is, how so-
cial order is maintained among people. Such debates also problematise aspects of
representation and frame-setting, that is, questions regarding the political frame
or yardstick for in- and exclusion and how political actors deal with such issues.
One important subjective criterion for contestation regarding citizenship as so-
cial order and political frame for in- and exclusion are notions of deservingness
and ’welfare chauvinism’ as a common characteristic in European welfare states.
The concept of welfare chauvinism has been introduced in order to address (right-
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wing) political actors’ aim to define the ’deserving’, ’good’ citizen and distinguish
her from a culturally or ethnic ’other’ (e.g. J. Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990). This
concepts has also increasingly been used to investigate how ordinary people per-
ceive deservingness (e.g. van Oorschot, 2006). Indeed, one can argue that both
uses of welfare chauvinism in the literature complement each other assuming
that claims and articulations by political actors and ordinary people regarding
who, what and why is deserving reciprocally promote each other (see Carmel
and Cerami, 2011, pp. 8-9).
Particularly in European welfare states, migration as immigration is now de-
termined by sorting ’deserving’ migrants from ’undeserving’ ones or ’desired’
and ’undesired’ (Keskinen, Norocel, and Jørgensen, 2016, p. 324). Neoliberal argu-
ments about deservingness as well as the perception of ’cultural others’ ground
on ”welfare chauvinist logic” (Keskinen, Norocel, and Jørgensen, 2016, p. 324).
Respective immigration and integration policies reflect such developments (Ke-
skinen, Norocel, and Jørgensen, 2016, p. 324). In its medium-term effects and
consequences, the economic crisis has raised new questions for Denmark and
Germany as ’wealthier’ EU member states with regards to migration. Experi-
ences of economic recession followed by recent terrorist attacks draw a picture
of Europe in economic turmoil and threatened by perceived ’cultural outsiders’.
With regards to Denmark, research shows that mainstream right parties have ad-
apted to welfare chauvinistic claims of right-wing populist parties as did left-wing
populist parties (Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2014). Welfare chauvinism has
become a prevailing political strategy for political parties taking different forms
in the country in the recent decade (Jørgensen and Thomsen, 2016). In Germany
welfare chauvinism is considered to have at least an indirect effect on welfare
state policies (Emmenegger and Careja, 2012, p. 142).
With regards to ordinary people’s attitudes of ’welfare chauvinism’, van Oors-
chot (2006) can show that migrants are usually ranked lowest when it comes eval-
uations of their deservingness. According to van Oorschot (2006, p. 37), ”[t]he
fact that the solidarity rank order is basically the same for all European coun-
tries indicates that the underlying logic of deservingness has deep roots in pop-
ular welfare culture.” Debates about the deservingness of migrants might have
become more explicit since the Eurcrisis and be a reason to contest migration
more publicly. The existing challenges, for example, for the modern welfare state
as addressed by Schierup, Hansen, and Castles (2006) continue and become sali-
ent through the implementation of austerity policies, a dropping GDP, or elect-
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oral successes of right-wing parties. With implemented austerity measures to se-
cure financial liquidity and governmental functionality in Portugal, Ireland, Italy,
Greece, and Spain, the ’Eurocrisis’ has defined an asymmetry of living conditions
between people particularly from the southern European countries that have been
hit hard by this crisis and the economically stable northern part of the EU. Con-
cerning the oftenmentioned political challenges, scholars refer to decline of polit-
ical legitimacy and lack of political trust on an EU level (deWilde and Trenz, 2012;
Statham and Trenz, 2013). Furthermore, the crisis is expected to have worsened
the already existing ”welfare gap” between western and eastern EU countries as
well as between northern and southern EU member states and regions (Mau and
Verwiebe, 2010, p. 296). This also relates to public debates in Germany and Den-
mark about ’welfare tourism’ particularly stigmatizing people from the newmem-
ber states in central and eastern Europe.
All in all, the existing political discourses, the peculiarities of the Danish and
German welfare state types as well as already existing socio-economic asymmet-
ries among EU citizens throughout the member states, make visible how contest-
ation emerges regarding the potential implications for migration in the EU re-
garding how to establish and maintain just recognition and redistribution as well
as deciding what a legitimate political frame for such a social order should be.
Crucially, increasing insecurity about economic recession paired with increasing
immigration rates from EU citizens to Denmark and Germany might not be dir-
ectly related but have still become salient since the Eurocrisis. In the aftermath of
economic crisis, the then existing ’blend’ of economic concerns, anti-immigration
sentiments and increasing immigration rates are important to understand the ex-
tent of how people’s perceptions and experiences of migration ’branch out’ and
go into different directions. While the socio-economic aspects might have almost
bounced back to pre-crisis conditions, political, economic and social asymmetries
are likely to have triggered a perception gap between socio-economic situation
and the different reasons for feeling affected by migration and enacting this af-
fectedness online. While for some migration is economically and politically con-
troversial (national commenters), for others it is a way to expand individual life
prospects (EU mobiles).
However, the fact that such contrasting ways appear within the same national
and EU contexts does not imply that these people’s interpretations and notions
of justice are comparable. Since contestation of citizenship regarding social order
and political frames of reference emerges from people’s own ways of interpreting
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their migration perceptions and experiences within these contexts, comparisons
across contexts need to develop from the ’bottom-up’, that is, by taking one cat-
egory of contestant after the other and separately. The welfare state type, im-
migration rates and numbers showing economic impact of migration, that is, the
structures of the national welfare state do not sufficiently explain in which way
ordinary people’s perceptions and experiences can diverge and what they contest
regarding citizenship. An empirical analysis needs to focus on a detailed study of
each of these categories.
In other words, this implies a subjective dimension about migration among
ordinary people which cannot be explained by mere economic or political divi-
sions among residents in terms of ’nationals’ and ’migrants’ in receiving welfare
states. Instead, this issue needs to be investigated from ’bottom-up’ in people’s
cognitive processes, their interpretations about ’deservingness’, social hierarchies
as well as demands for access to rights and individual freedoms.
So far, I have described how Denmark and Germany in the aftermath of the
Eurocrisis present appropriate contexts to empirically investigate sub-question 1
regarding national commenters’ contestation of citizenship aswell as sub-question
2 which refers to EU mobiles. Yet, not only the economic and social cleavages in
both countries speak for migration as a challenge of how to establish and main-
tain social order and to decide about what a legitimate political frame of in- and
exclusion looks like. In addition, also top-down political practices signal how
the status-quo regarding recognition, redistribution and representation (includ-
ing frame-setting), in which the two comparative case studies are embedded, need
to be taken into account. In the following, I will therefore describe the national
conceptions of citizenship in Denmark and Germany in relation to EU citizenship.
3.2.2 Political practices of citizenship ’applied’: Exclusion and inclu-
sion in Denmark and Germany
Particularly in the aftermaths of the Eurocrisis, political actors have increasingly
expressed concerns over increasing immigration and the sustainability of the wel-
fare state which has also become more visible in the implementation of laws and
regulations regarding conditions for citizenship and integration, but also in both
countries’ national conceptualisations of what ’good citizenship’ means.
In the EU, mobility has become legally institutionalised as a right of freedom
of movement. The right to move freely across EU member states is enshrined in
EU citizenship which was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Less
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than defining new rights, the Maastricht Treaty institutionalised EU citizenship
through a consolidation of already existing legislature concerning free move-
ments of workers within the common market (except for electoral rights, which
are a newer element of EU citizenship). The rights that come with EU citizenship
are now listed in primary law (Treaty on the functioning of the European Union,
consolidated version, 2016 (hereafter TFEU), art. 20). They entail:
• ”the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member
States” (TFEU, 2016, art. 21).
• ”the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the
Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals
of that State” (TFEU, 2016, art. 22(1)).
• that citizens, ”in the territory of a third country in which the Member State
of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the
diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same con-
ditions as the nationals of that State” (TFEU, 2016, art. 23), i.e. diplomatic
protection.
• ”the right to petition the European Parliament in accordance with Article
227” as well as the right to ”apply to the Ombudsman established in accord-
ance with Article 228” and the right to ”write to any of the institutions or
bodies referred to in this Article or in Article 13 of the Treaty on European
Union in one of the languages mentioned in Article 55(1) of the Treaty on
European Union and have an answer in the same language” (TFEU, 2016,
art. 24).
EU citizenship has defined a new legal status of EU citizens in addition to
national citizenship for citizens of the member states (TFEU, 2016, art. 45 and
48). Freedom of movement has come to define a cornerstone of EU citizenship
entitling all EU citizens tomove freely within the area of themember states. Intra-
EU migration among EU citizens might be considered a form of enabled mobility
which is encouraged through a legal framework beyond national boundaries.
With the further development of EU citizenship21 member states are now ob-
liged to grant foreign EU citizens access and, to some extent, economic, political
21Especially via the 2004 Citizenship Directive (Directive 2004/38/EC, 2004), the Racial
Equality Directive and the Employment Equality Directive
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and social rights. In particular, the Directive 2004/38/EC (2004) encompasses le-
gislation and several case laws concerning freedom of movement. On the one
hand, it extends freedom of movement to EU citizens’ family members and EU
citizens in general, not merely workers. On the other hand, in contrast to its
formulation in the TFEU, the directive does not only spell out rights but also ob-
ligations and defines member states’ abilities to restrict freedom of movement in
certain situations. Its key provisions are:
• ”the right of residence on the territory of another Member State for a period
of up to three months without any conditions or any formalities other than
the requirement to hold a valid identity card or passport” (Directive 2004/38/EC,
2004, art. 6(1)).
• the right for residence longer than three months if they are (self-)employed,
self-sufficient, students (art. 7(1)), family members of EU citizens with these
rights (art. 7(2)), or are recognised and registered as unemployed (art. 7(3)).
• the right of permanent residence in another member state for ”[u]nion cit-
izens who have resided legally for a continuous period of five years in the
host Member State” and their family members (art. 16(1,2)).
• restriction of these rights (art. 17): ”Member Statesmay restrict the freedom
of movement and residence of Union citizens and their family members,
irrespective of nationality, on grounds of public policy, public security or
public health. These grounds shall not be invoked to serve economic ends”
(art. 17(1)).
Consequently, migration in the EU is legally anchored and regulated by a
blend of rights citizens can claim on local, national and EU levels. Crucially, on
the national levels, member states retain the right to restrict freedom of move-
ment and settlement. The blend of rights, status and legal frameworks makes EU
citizenship a set of relationships between people and different levels of legal in-
stitutionalisation. This has created an area of tension between local, national and
EU levels of citizenship that now challenges the traditional distinction between
national citizens and foreign citizens or migrants. Via EU citizenship, EU citizens
are encouraged to become ’mobile’, yet subject to the respective regulations of
the member states.
Given this blend of aspects, EU citizenship presents a constant challenge to
both countries’ conceptions of membership and national boundaries. Denmark
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and Germany are known to have adopted the most selective and restrictive cit-
izenship regimes across the EU. EU freedomofmovement is a fundamental right of
all EU citizens implemented with the commencement of the Treaty of Maastricht
(1992). The legal basis of EU citizenship are articles 9 to 12 of the Treaty on
the European Union (hereafter TEU (2016)) and articles 18 to 25 in TFEU (2016).
Since 2004 the provisions governing this right are laid down in the EU Directive
2004/38/EC (2004). With the set of rights granted in other EU member states, EU
migrants are less affected by the strict Danish and German regulations of rights
and access. In this sense, the Danish and German definitions of membership illus-
trate a continuous tension between national and EU citizenship in which political
actors articulate the entitlement of the sovereign nation-state to decide over in-
and exclusion (see sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2).
Generally, scholars disagree on how to characterise citizenship regimes of
European welfare states. While Joppke (2007) observes a broader convergence
trend of regimes that tend towards more civic and liberal types, there are still
stronger indicators that suggest the general orientation of citizenship regimes at
the culturally bounded nation-state (Mouritsen, 2012). Denmark andGermany are
typically seen as among the most restrictive member states when it comes to the
inclusion of migrants. Both countries have been reluctant to acknowledge their
migrant population, which grew particularly during the 1970s when the coun-
tries’ economies invited workers from, for instance, Turkey and Italy in order
to fill the skills shortage. Only in 2005 Germany passed its Immigration Law
which has been accompanied by heated debates about the potential dangers of
becoming a country of immigration (’Einwanderungsland’). According to Bade
and Oltmer (2011, p. 81), this law came 20 years late if one considers migrants’
actual situation in Germany. This late concession describes the country’s devel-
opment ”from an informal to a de jure formal modern immigration country with
the requisite legal and administrative tools” (Bade and Oltmer, 2011, p. 81). In
Denmark, a restrictive approach to immigration developed from the 1980s: After
a liberal immigration law had been adopted in 1983, restrictive measures and ad-
ministrative tools started to characterise Danish immigration approaches from
1986 onwards (Kjeldstadli, 2011, p. 12). The uprising of the Dansk Folkeparti also
in the recent years further characterises a ”general skepticism” towards immig-
rants (Kjeldstadli, 2011, p. 12).
One of themost obvious signals for both countries’ reluctance to engage inmi-
gration management is the broad public opposition to national policies support-
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ing a multicultural society. According to Kraus and Schönwälder (2006, p. 202),
multiculturalism is not favoured in German public debates and, in fact, does not
constitute a political programme. Political efforts on the national level are per-
ceived to have failed (Kraus and Schönwälder, 2006). Likewise in Denmark a
multicultural programme is lacking (Holtug, 2012). Since 2001 the Danish gov-
ernment has engaged in ”rhetorical denunciations of multiculturalism” (Lægaard,
2013, p. 117). One example is the presupposition of Muslims in both countries as
being ’incompatible’ with the perceived national culture and values. Such sus-
picions have gained more importance since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade
Center in New York and have been further promoted by the Muhammad cartoon
crisis in Denmark in 2006 as well as other attacks from extremist religious groups
or individuals in both countries (Hervik, 2015).
Yet, this opposition to multiculturalism relates mainly to the official, national
level. Scholars recognise that cities play an important role in migration man-
agement and have adopted their own approaches towards and policies for multi-
cultural residents and immigrant integration (e.g. Koopmans, 2004; Graauw and
Vermeulen, 2016); others acknowledge the active role of migrants in shaping cities
as socio-territorial spaces (e.g. Glick Schiller and Çağlar, 2011). There is further
evidence for a ”hidden agenda of Danish multiculturalism” on the municipal level,
in civil society and in informal networks (Duru and Trenz, 2017, p. 614) as well as
similar multicultural elements in Germany Kraus and Schönwälder (2006, p. 202).
For instance, the municipality of the Danish capital Copenhagen have invested
heavily in diversity management and in the establishment of religious and cul-
tural groups that politically influence local politics (Jørgensen, 2012). The German
capital Berlin, however, is described as ’overburdened’ both in administrative ca-
pacities and financial resources and might so be less successful in accommodating
the diversity of its residents (Bruzelius, Chase, and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2016). Since EU
mobiles are required to formalise their stay in these cities when registering, for
example, local administration potentially shapes how they perceive and experi-
ence what it means to be an EU citizen there.
However, citizenship regimes in Denmark and Germany differ in their un-
derstandings of nationhood (see Brubaker, 1992). This relates especially to the
expectations of what defines the ’good’ citizen, i.e. what is required of a mem-
ber of the political community. Citizenship requirements in Denmark are now
among the most restrictive in Europe (Cochran Bech and Lindekilde, 2014, p. 98).
Danish policy-makers and politicians emphasise citizens’ active participation in
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democratic processes. Civic engagement reaches beyond the public and into the
private lives of citizens. Liberal-democratic values should be ’lived’, for example,
by rejecting male-only breadwinner families as well as emphasising community
engagement and voluntary work (Mouritsen, 2012, p. 101). People with certain
religious beliefs or cultural backgrounds are seen to be incompatible with such
values and thus perceived as a problematic or unwilling to integrate, such as
Muslims. Migrants are expected to obtain cultural and language knowledge by
being ’taught’ the values of the Danish society (Mouritsen, 2012, p. 99). One
underlying reason is that values such as liberal-democratic orientations are be-
ing seen as part of national identity and defines what makes ’Danishness’. Con-
sequently, living and acting on such values is what characterises the ’good citizen’
in Denmark (Mouritsen, 2012, pp. 100-105).
On the other hand, Germany differs from Denmark in the sense that it has
rather ”passive conception of the virtuous citizen” (Mouritsen, 2012, p. 92). While
in Denmark citizens are expected to actively participate and engage in demo-
cratic processes, German conceptions are grounded in requirements emphasising
education and diligence (Mouritsen, 2012, p. 92). There is a strong focus on the
concept of ’Rechtsstaatlichkeit’, a rule of law, to which citizens are expected to be
loyal. In the last years, Germany shifted from an ethnic toward a civic model of
citizenship (Sainsbury, 2012, p. 55). This can be seen with regards to a stronger
focus on constitutional loyalty but also the expectations that citizens particip-
ate in the economy and make use of their skills and education (Mouritsen, 2012,
p. 92). In comparison to Denmark, the ’good citizen’ in Germany can decide what
to do and believe in private in so far as it does not stand in opposition to the
rule of law and the terms of the constitutional Basic Law and is not expected to
engage in the community as such. Also, as Mouritsen (2012) observes, there is a
stronger opposition against cultural ethno-nationalism than in Denmark which
derives from German history and is critical of a definition of what it means to be
’German’. Nevertheless, Muslims and ’culturally others’, i.e. not fitting to what
is understood as Western European traditions, are often regarded as a security
threat to the state and political system (Mouritsen, 2012, p. 92). This also relates
to the efforts to advertise sports and other forms of engagement in clubs and as-
sociations for both first and second generation migrants. Such efforts of cultural
civic integration aim at preventing the emergence of isolated groups, possibly
with an extremist agenda (Mouritsen, 2012, p. 100). This being said, there is still
considerable focus on national conceptions of the ’good citizen’ in both Denmark
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and Germany, with a focus on active engagement of citizens in what is under-
stood as democratic, Danish values and a more passive conceptualisation of the
’Bildungsbürger’ who participates in the social market economy in Germany.
The distinction between active and passive conceptions of citizenship is fur-
ther salient with regards to migrants’ rights to participate in political and social
life. With regards to political inclusion, Denmark and Germany have adopted
different modes. The Danish state has followed an active integration policy illus-
trated bymigrants’ voting right introduced in 1991 (Kjeldstadli, 2011, p. 11). Based
on Denmark’s focus on active engagement, immigrants have wide-spread parti-
cipation rights on the local level and about 50 per cent of municipalities have set
up local integration councils to represent ethnic minorities in front of local polit-
ical authorities (Cochran Bech and Lindekilde, 2014, p. 104). Denmark is among
those countries that allows municipal voting rights for both EU and non-EU na-
tionals. The German state is more restrictive in this regard. Only EU citizens are
granted the right to vote and participate in municipal or local elections, while
non-EU citizens do not have any voting rights. In both countries, foreigners do
not have national voting rights but EU citizens can take part in the elections of
the European Parliament.
The inclusion of EU citizens on the local level illustrates how EU citizenship
challenges the boundaries of the nationally bounded citizenship regimes in Den-
mark and Germany. With the implementation of EU citizenship and its further
development, Denmark and Germany as EUmember states now grant EU citizens
from other countries similar legal status as national citizens. The entitlements of
EU citizenship based on Article 18 and 25 TFEU, the 2004 Citizenship Directive
(2004/38/EC) aswell as the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment Equality
Directive protect EU citizens against discrimination, for example, on the grounds
of nationality, economic status, gender and sexuality, ethnic or racial status as
well as in the workplace.22 Such protection against discrimination has its limita-
tions with regards to (and among others) the right to social welfare benefits or the
duration of residence in another EU member state. Still, unemployed EU citizens
have the right to settle in Denmark and Germany for 3 months and those migrat-
ing there for work do not require a residence permit. This is why especially for
young and highly skilled EU mobiles the legal framework of EU citizenship might
be seen as a wide-ranging set of individual rights since it strengthens their legal
22Neither an extensive list of rights and entitlements nor a complete overview of the
legal framework of EU citizenship is intended here.
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status and access to rights in Denmark and Germany. Consequently, the nexus
between national and EU citizenship has added a certain degree of stratification
among foreigners in Denmark and Germany. With EU citizenship mobile EU cit-
izens in Denmark and Germany are granted more rights than non-EU citizens.
Specifically with regards to the issue of migration and citizenship, ’bumpy’
implementation processes due to political opposition signify how supranational
and national frameworks collide. As an example for the tension between national
and EU citizenships, the implementation in 2004 of the EU Citizenship Direct-
ive was controversial particularly in Denmark. This is relevant since, as Falkner
(2013, p. 13) argues, non-compliance with or reluctant implementation of EU law
might de-legitimise the EU in its entirety not only concerning the legal integration
process but also regarding the effects of practices of identity-building on public
opinion. Denmark has taken a “puzzling position on European cooperation” with
EU Justice and Home Affairs in having a formal opt-out from the migration and
refugee policy but nevertheless participates (Adler-Nissen, 2014, p. 66). The im-
pact of the EU Citizenship Directive into the national legal framework turned into
an issue of national sovereignty and the Danish government’s approach to the
matter has been described as ”reactive” (Wind, 2014, p. 160). In other cases, such
as the right to cross-border healthcare, the practical implementation collided with
administrative peculiarities on the side of the Danish government and so made
visible a gap between juridical compliance and actual implementation (Martin-
sen, 2013). Unlike Denmark, Germany was among a subset of member states to
sign the first Schengen Agreement in 1985, the basis for the later EU-wide visa
policy. More generally, Germany is considered one of the member states benefit-
ing the most from European integration and also as being among the main drivers
of Europeanisation with ups and downs in mass public opinion on European in-
tegration during the economic crisis (see Katzenstein, 1997). Migration becomes
politically salient depends ”on the internal infrastructure of welfare states, differ-
ent traditions of immigration, diverse legal traditions and other factors” (Freeman,
2013, p. 23). The extent to which other EU nationals are allowed to access social
welfare nevertheless remains a constant issue in public debates in both countries
and there have been attempts to tighten the legal basis for EU citizens to be gran-
ted access, in some cases through national courts 23.
Since migration is steered, enabled, and hindered by legal frameworks and
23See, for example, the ’Dano case’ (C-333/13. Judgement of 11.11.2014, 2014) in Ger-
many
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political practices of citizenship (see chapter 2), these rather restrictive framings
of citizenship in the political arena do not directly affect EU citizens. Nevertheless,
EU citizenship enables people to sidestep national citizenship. The political frame
of reference for in- and exclusion is therefore contested. Danish and German legal
frameworks and the political conceptions with regards to civic duties and migrant
incorporation show that both countries still rely on a cultural-national frame for
belonging and membership. The national level mainly defines and articulates the
boundaries of the nation state but on the local level policies address in a more
pragmatic manner the needs, responsibilities and integration of all residents.
Citizenship incorporation regimes of states organise and control the extent
to which migrants receive access and rights in the economic and political system
of welfare states, that is, they reflect how states construct their national iden-
tity and boundaries between assumed in- and outgroups. With the establishment
of EU citizenship such boundaries have been redefined from ’top-down’. Policy-
makers and political actors, but also courts and to a lesser extent civil society act-
ors therefore shape different parts of the EU citizenship-migration nexus. Table
3.4 provides an overview of the relevant differences and similarities between Den-
mark and Germany that this section has touched upon including the economic
aspects discussed before.24
What these differences and commonalities of the Danish and German systems
of welfare and citizenship as well as the patterns of intra-EU migration illustrate
is that the citizenship-migration nexus is neither a matter of national decision-
making nor of supranational interference alone. Historical developments and so-
cial transformations, political practices and legal frameworks all shape trends to-
wards more or less convergence and divergence and suggest an area of tension
that is difficult to grasp particularly in relation to how people perceive and exper-
ience it. However, contrary to what many ’top-down’ approaches to citizenship
are restricted to, I have argued that implemented citizenship regimes, welfare state
types and other macro-level factors provide contextual knowledge but are insuf-
ficient ’social proxies’ to understand how ordinary people contest citizenship in
terms of social order and the legitimate political frame of reference for this social
order.
24An explanation for similarities and differences is not intended here, nor is it possible
to account for the development for different incorporation and citizenship regimes and
how they might or might not be affected by the EU and other various actors.
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Denmark Germany
Relations with EU
regarding freedom
of movement
reactive, conflicted promoting European
integration of labour
markets
Access to welfare
through
Citizenship or residence Labour market
participation
Consequences of
economic crisis
Increased unemployment
rates and notions of
’deservingness’
Fast economic recovery
Immigration
inflow
Positive net migration
since beginning 2000 and
during crisis
Positive net migration
esp. since crisis
Citizenship
incorporation
Restrictive; focus on
’active citizenship’
Restrictive; focus on
’passive citizenship’
Conception of ’the
good citizen’
-Liberal democratic
values
-Compliance with and
loyalty to Basic Law
-Voluntary work -Participation in social
democracy and culture
-’Medborgerskab’
(engaged for common
good)
-’Bildungsbürger’
(educated, diligent
citizen)
Social
fragmentation
Regional disparities,
social inequalities
between poor and rich
Regional disparities,
social inequalities
between poor and rich
Local
administration
Copenhagen: Pioneer in
diversity and migration
management
Berlin: Lack of financial
and administrative
resources
Table 3.4: Convergences and divergences in Danish and German contexts as indicators
for social conflict about migration
3.3 Data collection and methods
In order to answer the research questions and to receive the richest sample of
empirical data, this thesis has conducted multiple methods. Mixed methods re-
search has been proposed to balance the weaknesses and strengths of qualitative
and quantitative research in standalone projects (Bryman, 2012, p. 628). It refers
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to the mixing of data collection and analysis with both quantitative and qualit-
ative methods (Blaikie, 2010, p. 218) Mixed methods research has become more
accepted in the recent decade and is now conducted in several ways (Bryman,
2006). For the underlying research purpose, I conducted both quantitative and
qualitative methods but employ the quantitative ones particularly for reasons of
sampling of the richest data for further, qualitative analysis. This adaptation is
widely used (Bryman, 2006, p. 108). The main part of this research is based on
qualitative methods and analysis.25
Beginning with the first sub-question regarding critics of immigration, this
sectionwill describe document clustering for exploratory purposes of online news
on migration. Afterwards, I will go into further detail and explain the inductive
online comments analysis. The section then describes the data collection in or-
der to investigate sub-question 2 regarding EU mobiles. Here, an exploratory
online survey was conducted to learn more about their socio-demographic back-
grounds. After this the section outlines the use of semi-structured interviews
sampled from this online survey in order to analyse their experiences of migra-
tion. The third part concerns a discussion of the limitations of the methodology
and applied methods in this thesis.
3.3.1 Online comment sections: Sub-question 1
Before describing the methods, I will briefly describe the sampling process and
time frame of data collection.
3.3.1.1 Sample and time frame
The analysis of people’s subjective notions of justice visible in their interpreta-
tions of migration perceptions and experiences is based on online articles and
comments on Danish and German news platforms. A two-year period for articles
published from 2012 to 2014 was chosen as time frame. These three years capture
social conflict over migration in both Denmark and Germany as the aftermath of
the Eurocrisis (see 3.2.1). This time period therefore indicates the political saliency
of migration in the EU. It describes an interesting period of decreasing support
for the EU among EU citizens, where everyday perceptions and experiences of
migration among national commenters can be studied by avoiding the influence
25Due to this focus, it does not seem expedient to engage with the scholarly debates
about mixed-method research here. See Blaikie, 2010, p. 218 for an overview of the debate
and Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011 for more details.
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of later, more ’extreme’ events such as ’the refugee crisis’ and ’Brexit’, of which
both have triggered and driven anti-immigration sentiments. In order to obtain a
most relevant sample, the at the timemost visited mainstream news outlets online
with accessible comment sections have been selected via the online tool ’Alexa’.26
For the same reason, a purposive sampling strategy via keyword searches for
thematically relevant articles and related comment threads was chosen. They
were conducted on two databases: Infomedia for the Danish sample with the
keywords: indvandrer, EU, udlændinge, europæisk, EU-borgere; and the European
Media Monitor (EMM) for the German sample using the keywords: Einwanderer,
europäische Einwanderer, Europa, Immigration, EU-Bürger.27
In order to obtain a most accurate sample, four criteria were used to guide the
data collection:
• Only accessible and subscription-free articles were included, i.e. no ’prime
content’.
• Among these, only articles with at least one user comment were included
for clustering analysis.
• The format of the article had to be a news article, commentary or any other
type of articles by journalists, experts and public intellectuals, or politicians
in order to exclude reader’s letters.
• Only articles with a focus on European or national issues were included
while articles that mainly focused on, for example, US immigration policy
have been excluded from the sample.
With regards to the comment collection for the qualitative analysis, only com-
ment threads with 20 (Danish sample) and 40 (German sample) or more user com-
ments have been included. This is due to the fact that the German sample needed
to be reduced to a manageable size. In subsequent steps, every comment among
the first 50 comments in the comment thread was coded. After this, every second
comment up to 100 comments; then every fourth comment up to 200 and so forth.
During the coding process, it became clear that saturation would be the appropri-
ate criterion to determine when to stop coding. Tables 3.6 and 3.5 provide more
26www.alexa.com
27Tomy knowledge as well as according to several librarians employed at German pub-
lic university libraries, no database specifically for German online articles exists. There-
fore, the EMM was chosen.
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details about the document collection of online articles. Appendix A.2 provides
further detail regarding the complete article collection for the clustering process.
Online
newspapers
Articles/threads analysed Total number articles
Bild 13 16
Spiegel Online 23 124
Die Welt 51 220
Zeit Online 50 158
Total 138 (saturation, out of
327 with 40+ comments)
517
Table 3.5: German sample of online articles (2012-2014)
Online
newspapers
Articles/threads analysed Total number articles
Ekstrabladet 71 121
Jyllandsposten 14 25
Berlingske 22 72
Politiken 28 83
Total 135 (saturation, out of
162 with 20+ comments)
301
Table 3.6: Danish sample of online articles(2012-2014)
3.3.1.2 Cluster analysis: exploration of Danish/German online news articles
on (im-)migration
In order to contextualise the comments, the broader content of the online art-
icles was explored first. Scholarly debates often analyse the news frames through
which migrants are represented, for example, regarding security concerns or the
economy, and aim to establish possible trends (Caviedes, 2015). Such frames are
likely to present cues for people to comment on. Yet, as suggested by other stud-
ies on comments online (Baden and Springer, 2014, p. 545), commenters do not
necessarily stick to the information given in the news articles and also use pop-
ular wisdom or personal experiences as well as historical analogies (but rarely
new information). Given this issue and since the article collection was sampled
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through thematic keyword search - and thus thematically already narrowed down
- an extensive frame analysis would have provided detailed information about the
articles, yet comparatively little information about the actual object of analysis,
i.e the comments.
This was done by computer-automated document clustering. Here, document
clustering generates ’research leads’ on how (im-)migration is covered. Further-
more, it provides an overview over specific topics in the samples. With the help
of computer-automated textual analysis, document clustering was applied to the
news articles in order to find broader thematic patterns. Textmining, as the um-
brella term for several other techniques next to document clustering, is specific-
ally useful to discover new information without prior knowledge (Miner et al.,
2012, p. 12). Cluster analysis is an unsupervised machine learning technique and
widely used in (statistical) data analysis (Su, Kogan, and Nicholas, 2010, p. 81).
But it offers an inductive approach to larger samples, which is less time costly
than qualitative content analysis. It allows exploring texts with regards to specific
topics or broader themes that come up without prior expectations of the results
(Burscher, Vliegenthart, and de Vreese, 2016). With document clustering specific
topics that emerge inductively and that may possibly have remained hidden if a
more deductive content analysis had been applied. Therefore, it can be considered
as an unobtrusive exploration, one of the major benefits of textmining proced-
ures (Miner et al., 2012). Since clustering is a randomized computing process,
the clusters as such cannot be taken as findings but provide leads to meaningful
themes or topics assessed by the researcher (Everitt et al., 2011, p. 13).
Unstructured text, such as online articles, requires extensive text preprocessing
(’cleaning’) before the actual clustering process can be conducted. Text prepro-
cessing is crucial in order to convert the unstructured text into a vector-space
model. A vector-space model therefore results in a ”high-dimensional” space
(Miner et al., 2012, p. 45). It represents text as vectors, that is, every word in
the text has a dimension. This model is based on the ’bag of words’ assumption,
which means that the order of how the words in the text occur does not mat-
ter, which is suitable if clustering is intended here (Miner et al., 2012, p. 45). The
text was first tokenised, i.e. split into a sequence of tokens, into single words.
After this, words with less than 3 and more than 35 letters were filtered out in
order to reduce ’noise’. Then, stopword lists were applied in order to sort out
Danish and German fill words that carry no relevant meaning for the analysis
(see appendix A). The next step was to stem the words to make sure that the
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same words with different endings (e.g. ’channel’ instead of ’channels’) would
not be processed differently. Afterwards all the words were transformed to lower
case. Having pre-processed the text, it was then converted into the vector-space
model using the term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) weighted
measure. The TF-IDF describes the relation between the frequent occurrence of a
term within a document yet low number of documents in which that term occurs.
That means, that a high TF-IDF can help identify specific terms used in the art-
icles and to discriminate between the articles in the document collection (Spärck
Jones, 1972; Burscher, Vliegenthart, and de Vreese, 2016). The TF-IDF measure
is now widely adopted in the relevant fields due to its robustness and efficiency
(Robertson, 2004). After this, it was possible to conduct document clustering.
Clustering is particularly useful when one aims at results on the document
level (instead of words) to sort these documents into specific categories such as
themes or topics, for example, that have been unknown before (Miner et al., 2012,
p. 33). This technique is used for exploring a data set (here text in news articles)
to find out whether they can be sorted into meaningful smaller parts that differ
from each other (Everitt et al., 2011, p. 13). An algorithm for the clustering pro-
cess is applied to compute the clusters. For this purpose the k-means algorithm
was chosen, a flat clustering algorithm which assigns a document to exactly one
cluster. K-means is the most popular algorithm for this type of clustering tech-
nique.28 In the words of Burscher, Vliegenthart, and de Vreese (2016, p. 536):
”The algorithm defines the cluster centres and assigns each article to the cluster
for which its distance to the cluster centre is the smallest.” The most commonly
used distance measurement, Euclidean measurement, was used for this (Everitt
et al., 2011, p. 49).
One challenge for k-means clustering is determining k which stands for the
number of clusters to which the documents should be assigned. The method has
no knowledge of k. For inductivemethods in unstructured text this is crucial since
there might be no ‘wrong or right’ number of clusters (Weiss, Indurkhya, and
Zhang, 2010, pp. 111-112). Consequently, a starting number for k was established
and calculated with a common ‘rule of thumb’ k 
q
n
2 ; (n, number of documents
in collection) serving as initial k from which the number will be reduced depend-
ing on the outcome of initial k-means clustering (Can and Ozkarahan, 1990). The
number of clusters is, of course, dependent on the words occurring in the text.
28I.e. partitional clustering algorithm, other types are hierarchical and spectral clus-
tering (Miner et al., 2012, p. 960).
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Since keyword sampling was used to collect the articles, the document collection
was already less heterogeneous than a random sample of articles spanning across
diverse topics. This further increases the possibility of bigger clusters (i.e. more
documents with similar words in one cluster) and smaller clusters that point at
specific debates or ’outliers’ to the bigger clusters.
The number of clusters then also depends on evaluating the quality of the
clusters. Finding k in a collection of documents with unstructured text, as it is the
case here, therefore meant to combine ’hunches’ about the existing sample with
performance tests while critically evaluating their usefulness. In a fist step, this
was done by an overview of the cluster centroids with the largest average TF-IDF
measures, as it is suggested by Weiss, Indurkhya, and Zhang (2010, p. 121). The
researcher as ‘human expert’ has to make the final assessment since the data dis-
play information retrieved by means of an algorithmic exercise and need to be
put in context in a meaningful way (Weiss, Indurkhya, and Zhang, 2010, p. 121).
This required iterative clustering to avoid empty clusters, i.e. clusters without any
articles sorted into, by reducing k as the number of clusters. In other words, itera-
tions mean repeating the computing process with different numbers of k clusters.
The quality of the clusters depends on the terms that are selected to function as
cluster centroids, that is, the term aroundwhich the articles would be clustered ac-
cording to term similarities.29 The highest centroids (words with highest TF-IDF
measure) where then selected as features and the clustering processes reiterated.
The software Rapidminer was used for the entire process.
3.3.1.3 Online news comments analysis: Qualitative coding ofDanish/German
comment debates
The cognitive approach I have chosen allows conducting a qualitative content
analysis of commenters’ interpretations of their own migration perceptions and
experiences which they posted in Danish and German online newspaper com-
ment sections from 2012 to 2014. Initially, the analysis started out on the basis
of a political claims analysis by understanding people’s active engagement with
commenting as political claims. However, this proved to be unsuccessful: After
careful exploration, it became obvious that only in rare instances can comments
be identified as political claims as defined by Koopmans and Statham (1999).
Instead, commenters draw from personal knowledge in how to perceive, in-
29See Burscher, Vliegenthart, and de Vreese (2016) for an overview of the scholarly
debate of feature selection.
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terpret and contest of political situations. A cognitive perspective is particularly
helpful here since it does not require the text material to be in a certain form
of expression, such as claims, rational argumentation or have a high quality of
debate. Rather, by focusing on people’s ways to categorise differences, express
stereotypical views of migrants, politicians, their concerns and demands related
to these issues, these cognitive or mental processes (understood in the broadest
sense, see section 3.1.1) make ’groupism’ visible and (see Brubaker, 2004).
Based on previous findings on the socio-demographic details of commenters
(see N. Newman et al., 2016), as well as the public reach of news comment sec-
tions, comments serve as source of everyday life opinions, concerns and demands,
expressions of emotions and normative assumptions of people on a certain is-
sue that cannot be as easily achieved via opinion surveys or interviews. This
research is less interested in frames, themes and discourse as ”communication
formats” (Altheide and Schneider, 2013, p. 50), nor in attitudinal research but in
people’s the subjective evaluations. In contrast to attitudinal research via sur-
veys and questionnaires, qualitative document analysis usually focuses on mean-
ing, which is understood here as perceptions, categorisations, interpretations and
sense-making (Blaikie, 2010, p. 210; Bryman, 2012, p. 556). While surveys and
questionnairesmight ask about concrete risks peoplemight associate with immig-
ration while forcing them to answer in a more deliberative and rational manner,
comments are an unobtrusive way to study what kind of concerns and demands
occur as well as what kind of meaning such perceptions have in terms of subject-
ive notions of justice.
The coding was conducted via QSR NVivo 10, a qualitative data analysis soft-
ware in order to facilitate and manage the analysis and interpretation. A mix-
ture of a priori and inductive coding was applied allowing for overlap enables
commenters’ most dominant categorisations of migrants to be traced. The overall
structure of the code bookwas divided into two broad sections with a priori codes:
The first section concerned the addressees which was further divided further into
whether commenters referred to categories of migrants or political actors. The
analysis will present how sub-categories, that is ’migrant groups’ further emerge
from the online comments; second, the section of commenters‘ concerns and de-
mands guided by the question of ‘theWhat’ in the debates: ‘What about foreigners
is being contested/ supported/ criticized/ conflicted?’This part evolved mainly in-
ductively allowing concerns and demands regarding migration to emerge. Doing
so facilitates an understanding of the different ways in which commenters raise
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topics and reflect on the relationships between themselves andmigrants and polit-
ical authorities. In other words, the section of concerns and demands contains the
different aspects from which commenters perceive, experience and interpret is-
sues related to migration. Together, commenters’ subjective notions of justice
can then be analysed by means of the conceptualised relationships of ’democratic
feedback’ and ’horizontal evaluation’ (see figure 2.1 on page 59).
3.3.2 EU mobiles: Sub-question 2
The following describes the time frame and sampling process regarding EU mo-
biles’ interpretations of their own perceptions and experiences of migration from
which it is possible to analyse their subjective notions of justice. Then it will
elaborate on the methods used.
3.3.2.1 Sample and time frame
The sample for the Danish case study was conducted as part of the EuroChallenge
project 30 and then adapted to the German context. The aim of the surveys was to
obtain a sample of non-Danes and non-Germans, who consider themselves as ‘ex-
pats’ (see Duru and Trenz, 2017). After a screening relevant Facebook groups, for
example, “Foreigners in Copenhagen” or “Expats in Berlin” screening, an online
questionnaire was designed and distributed via a link on Facebook ’expat groups’
living in Denmark and Germany (see appendix C). Before distribution, the admin-
istrators of the groups were contacted for consent to be respectful and ethical in
the face of the groups’ privacy guidelines. The EuroChallenge survey focused on
migrants who had arrived in Denmark since the economic crisis in 2008 and a
similar time-frame for the survey in the German case was used. The surveys en-
abled to reach out to people who are broadly considered to fit the pattern of young
and highly-skilled EUmobiles. Purposive sampling via ’snowballing’ was chosen.
Snowball sampling is particularly useful in this regard, especially via Facebook:
Young, mobile, more educated people present one of the larger groups of Face-
book users and Facebook’s network structure allows snowball sampling based
on shared interests and practices (Brickman Bhutta, 2012). The pool of survey
respondents was further used to contacted people for interviews. An overview
about the countries of origins of the sample of EU mobiles who responded to the
surveys is presented in figures 3.4 and 3.5.
30www.eurochallenge.ku.dk
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Figure 3.4: Survey respondents’ country of origin, living in Denmark
Figure 3.5: Survey respondents’ country of origin, living in Germany
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3.3.2.2 Online survey
By means of an online questionnaire respondents’ demographic details, motiva-
tions for mobility, and information about their social lives can be identified and
described. This explorative step serves as a springboard for the qualitative inter-
views as it provides insight into their general backgrounds and social experiences
within the Danish or German context. Questionnaires are prepared in a way that
allows the respondents to complete them on their own (Blaikie, 2010, p. 205). In
order to guarantee that questions and prompts were clear, a pilot study was con-
ducted with 13 respondents which lead to slight modifications in the structure
of questions and wording. The questionnaire was structured into the following
parts:
• Demographics and background information
• ‘Migration narrative’, including previous countries of residence, motiva-
tions and current living situation
• Motivations to move, including civic rights within the EU
• Social aspects before and after moving, including social practices via online
media
• Ranking current life satisfaction
• Additional information (written part) and informed consent for follow-up
interviews
1034 foreigners living in Denmark and 688 foreigners living in Germany com-
pleted the questionnaire. I am focusing here on responses frommobile EU citizens
only. 360 EU citizens or people coming from the EU and European Economic Area
living in Germany and 652 living in Denmark responded to the survey.
3.3.2.3 Semi-structured interviews
From there, those EU mobiles, who had been staying in Denmark and Germany
for at least more than 3 months were contacted for a follow-up, semi-structured
interview. 45 interviewswith EU citizens living in Copenhagen andAarhus and 33
interviews with EU citizens living in Berlin and Hamburg have been conducted.31
31Also here, the Danish interview processed was embedded in the EuroChallenge pro-
ject. In addition to this, 25 interviews with non-EU citizens living in Denmark and 15 (of
113
As researchmethod the in-depth, semi-structured interview ”represents awin-
dow into the interviewees’ consciousness” (Sánchez-Ayala, 2012, p. 123). They are
therefore appropriate with regards to a cognitive perspective on how people ex-
perience and perceive their surroundings similar to a narrative. In this way, the
informants’ own interpretations and meaning-making become even more visible
(Blaikie, 2010, p. 207). This method further allows the researcher to focus on a
general direction while, at the same time, gives the participant the opportunity to
extend the conversation, add other information and to emphasise subjectively sig-
nificant life events, thoughts and opinions or emotions. One of the disadvantages
of interviewing is that experience is reported, not directly observed (Blaikie, 2010,
p. 207). However, such reports make visible how participants contest , construct,
and so perceive and experience migration which is relevant for this research. The
reporting aspect therefore served to ask questions inwhich the participants would
evaluate and interpret their experiences and perceptions of migration.
The interview guide (see appendix D) was comprised of several stages that can
be related to how people understand themselves in relation to others as well as
political authorities (see framework of analysis, figure 2.1 on page 59). It was di-
vided into an introductory part with questions addressing rather general aspects
of the personal migration experience, then extended towards social interactions
with other people. In the main part, the questions focused on the participants’
opinions about politics in which subjective impressions about themselves and
others also in relation to political authorities. This was mixed with political opin-
ions about the economic crisis and immigration in Denmark or Germany. In this
part, also questions about news and media usage were asked and more personal
elements integrated, for example, about people’s social media usage. The conclud-
ing section focused again mainly on the participant herself with regards to future
plans in Denmark or Germany. Here, also questions about citizenship applica-
tions and long-term settlement came to the fore. This interview guide therefore
accounted for the participant’s own interpretation not only of her personal mi-
gration experience but also for the reflection on her direct surroundings in Berlin
and Copenhagen, Germany and Denmark, and the EU.
The approach was to focus on both challenges and opportunities through the
participant’s eyes with regards to the personal aspect of the migration experi-
which 3 have acquired EU citizenship at a later stage and are included in the sample of
33 EU mobiles) were conducted. Except for those 3, the interviews with non-EU citizens
could not be included in the analysis due the scope of this thesis.
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ence as well as more opinionated aspects with regards to broader socio-cultural
contexts. As mention earlier (see 3.1.2), metropolitan areas generally attract a
higher number of young and highly-skilled EU mobiles due to the various sub-
cultures they have developed, a high degree of international outlook and English-
speaking population as well as international accessibility in terms of logistics and
infrastructure, tourism as well as consumerism (see Castles, De Haas, and Miller,
2014, p. 329). Therefore, this research focuses particularly on EU mobiles living in
Berlin and Copenhagen especially where settling in periods are being narrated.
In this way, the earlier mentioned connection between local contexts and EU cit-
izenship can be investigated.
The interviews were recorded with the informants’ consent and most of them
transcribed. Similarly to the coding of the online comments, the analysis was
mainly inductive and interpretative by looking at evolving categorisations and
themes in the participants’ accounts to understand how their migration experi-
ences make visible notions of justice regarding authorities and others. QSR Nvivo
10 was used for managing the text and audio data.
3.3.3 Limitations
Several limitations need to be discussed with regard to this research. I will es-
pecially address issues related to the comparability of the case studies and the
generalisability from the findings.
One major point of criticism for qualitative research and case studies refers to
how representative their findings are in order to generalise from them beyond spe-
cific contexts. Yet, representativeness is not the major aim of case study research
(e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2006; della Porta, 2008). Using more than one case is particularly
helpful to dissect a social phenomenon from various perspectives (see Blaikie,
2010, p. 191). Comparison of cases across contexts further allows to theorise from
findings while drawing conclusions based on variables and representative data
samples is neither possible nor intended (Ragin and Sonnett, 2005). The data and
findings present a rich and in-depth study of how ordinary people contest citizen-
ship regarding migration in the EU. I have argued that research endeavour needs
to take into account two categories of citizens or practice, national commenters
and EU mobiles, which has been formulated in two sub-questions. These sub-
questions will be dealt with separately, while each of them is approached via one
compaartive case study across Denmark and Germany. In this way, the findings
in this thesis do not claim to be representative to all news readers or commenters
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or mobile EU citizens but provide insight into distinct forms of citizenship con-
testation among people who constitute themselves as political subjects regarding
migration within the specific contexts of receiving welfare states in the EU.These
insights are not meant to deliver a ”thick description” as pursued by ethnographic
research (see Geertz, 1973). Rather, the two comparative case studies present
selected insights into these people’s subjective notions of justice regarding cit-
izenship, thus contestation, based on their own interpretations of their migration
perceptions and experiences. Like in ethnographic research, this is done from
a perspective that centres on the active, possible participatory role of ordinary
people in a mainly inductive way.
Comment sections allow to sample and access ordinary people’s own inter-
pretations regarding migration. Comment sections are part of public debates at
a certain point in time (Park, 2013, p. 581). Yet, despite their rich empirical ma-
terial, their potential for making visible people’s interpretative, subjective ways
of making sense of their ’social reality’ has not yet been particularly exploited
in research (see Park, 2013, p. 581). Crucially, such online research needs to pay
attention to the dynamics of the web in terms of accessibility of past comment sec-
tions (Altheide and Schneider, 2013, p. 108). This aspect impacted on the choice
of sampling strategies for comment sections as well as news articles. One might
have, for example, expected more articles on Bild Online or to have included Süd-
deutsche Zeitung Online, both being among the largest nationwide newspapers
(in print) in Germany. With regards to Bild Online, a short overview of the most
commented articles showed that those were related to sports articles and other
human interest topics. Thus, topics about migration might not have been a core
topic that triggered a lot of comments. With regards to Süddeutsche Zeitung
Online, the comment sections had been delegated to another service provider32
which manages comments but for Süddeutsche Zeitung deleted comments after
48 hours. One could argue that this limits the sample. Spiegel Online and other
news sites also in the Danish sample (Politiken) have previously - yet, before the
time of data collection - followed suit in deleting or restricting their comments
possibly in order to restrict racist comments and to save staff capacities. This
makes the underlying sample a unique data set.
Another issue that could be raised in this regard is the more recently debated
influence of ’social bots’, algorithms programmed in order to generate comments
and so engage in and influence online debates. I do not expect comments to be
32Called ’Disqus’.
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entirely autonomous or independent from the various dynamics of the web. It
needs to be acknowledged that news commenting follows a commercial logic. On
the one hand, comments have become valued commodities as ‘click baits’ and
vulnerable to manipulation (Reagle, 2015, p. 17). For instance, political, economic
or other actors have the means to pay for algorithms or people who engage in
excessive ‘liking’ to make a comment they have written for their own purposes
(for example, a product or an idea) more for visible and so increase their profit.
In some cases, these ‘bots’ are easily detectable and identified as spam. In other
cases, they are not. The question then is how presumable it is that there is a high
number of such ’bots’ in the empiricalmaterial. Given that the aim of the sampling
was to collect articles with regards to a topic and not coverage over a political
event, such as an election or a referendum considerably reduces the probability of
external influence via such ’bots’. Furthermore, since this research did not intend
to measure the quality of democratic discourse or political opinion formation,
’bots’ are less likely to interfere with the analysis, which is not dependent on
criteria of representativeness or quantifiable results.
With regards to the methodological limitations of the specific case study ap-
proach chosen for the survey with EU mobiles, the validity and generalisability of
my findings should not be discussed in relation to the statistical representative-
ness of my sample. EU mobiles were not selected in order to obtain a represent-
ative sample of the overall population in Denmark and in Germany. Instead, the
aim was to reach out to a group that was socially active and engaged in online
activities through which experiences were reflected and contestation of citizen-
ship was channelled. Given the socio-demographics of Facebook users and the
structure of the social network to show activities and posts from ’friends’ more
often, ’snowball’ sampling for the distribution of the online questionnaire made
it more likely to obtain a sample of young and highly educated mobile EU cit-
izens in specific locations (see Brickman Bhutta, 2012). The questionnaire resul-
ted in a higher number of respondents in the study on the Danish context than
in Germany. My assumption is that the ’Facebook expat scene’ in Denmark and
especially Copenhagen is smaller and thus more connected. In Berlin and Ger-
many, the Facebook groups have more members. Therefore, the posts with the
survey might have disappeared faster in the masses of other posts. More likely is,
however, that the Facebook groups in Germany are already quite ’saturated’ with
regards to survey requests and therefore less interesting for people to participate.
Yet, the survey results were used to describe the socio-demographic back-
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ground of the interview respondents and for contextualisation, not for a direct
comparison. The surveys were also crucial to sample this specific group of EUmo-
biles who, as I have argued for when developing the theoretical framework, con-
stitute themselves as political subjects regarding migration (see section 2.2.2.1).
Furthermore, sampling via such Facebook groups provided easier access to inter-
view respondents than through other means. For example, it cannot be expec-
ted that my respondents read German or Danish newspapers which excludes the
possibility of an advertisement there. At local job centres, it was more unlikely
to meet young and highly educated people since many of them are still students,
work part-time or are full-time employed. In contrast, through access via univer-
sities the sample would have been too narrow, i.e. only students.
The possibilities of social media in this regard are useful to obtain rich em-
pirical material about EU mobiles’ experiences in Berlin and Copenhagen. As it
is the case with online commenters, it was relevant for this research that mobile
people use these Facebook groups to exchange migration experiences (Duru and
Trenz, 2016). Against this background, it would also have been useful to look at
posts in these Facebook groups. However, first, this would have raised issues re-
garding research ethics as Facebook groups often host private exchanges between
individuals. Second, even if informed consent could have been obtained from in-
dividual group members to investigate the posts, the comment material was not
sufficient for such an analysis.
The goal of the interviews was to get detailed insights into their interpret-
ations of migration experiences in Denmark and Germany in order to analyse
their subjective notions of justice regarding citizenship. Many Facebook groups
have a local focus and groups in Berlin and Copenhagen often have the highest
number of members. While this challenges the general representativeness for
the population of EU mobiles living in smaller cities and rural areas, the focus
on capital cities increases the relevance of the sample since capital cities are at-
tractive destinations for the EU mobiles, which are often young and high-skilled
mobiles. Consequently, the majority of interviews was conducted with people
living in Berlin and Copenhagen. Since in qualitative research, saturation is an
accepted phenomenon the high number of interviews conducted delivered suffi-
cient narrations about migration experiences and repetition thereof to make sure
such saturation is reached; particularly also because, again, the aim was not to
achieve a representative sample of EU mobiles living in Denmark and Germany,
but to target especially those people who live in Copenhagen and Berlin, i.e. who
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are more likely to experience migration as positive and possibly an adventure;
therefore, not as what is usually categorised as ’labour migrants’. By focusing on
Berlin and Copenhagen as European capitals and allowing respondents to nar-
rate their personal experiences in this urban context, this thesis obtains data that
specifically shed light on metropolitan life. This highlights EU mobiles’ experi-
ences regarding settling in another place which likely shapes their contestation
of citizenship in particular way.
The above addressed aspects are related to limitations regarding the compar-
ability of cases in this thesis. Case studies are not intended as a basis for general-
isations or representative findings (see above) which also reflects on the conclu-
sions that can be drawn from comparison of cases (see della Porta, 2008, p. 198).
This is further complicated here since this thesis has selected cases that are not
comparable in this sense, i.e. people contesting migration and mobile EU citizens.
Rather, the comparison across national contexts (see figure 3.1) provides a more
in-depth understanding of distinct forms of contestation of citizenship and ac-
knowledges that foreign and national EU citizens cannot compared in terms of
migration since they do not engage in migration the same way. A cognitive per-
spective shifts attention away from these people as groups or analytical cases to-
wards an understanding of national commenters and EU mobiles as categories of
practices regarding migration. The analysis starts from people’s own interpreta-
tions regarding justice which allows to investigate citizenship contestation ’from
below’. This enables to understand them as categories with certain legal status
(foreign and national EU citizens) as two, separate sides of the same coin regard-
ing citizenship contestation. Each category of practice (for each sub-question) is
approached by its own comparative analysis and can thus serve “as a springboard
for theoretical reflections about contrasting findings” (see Bryman, 2012, p. 75).
Indeed, scholarly demands for ”a new vocabulary of citizenship” point to the ne-
cessity to analyse citizenship that is not only structured along the lines of political
or legal frameworks (see Isin, 2009, p. 368). Therefore, the research design as ap-
plied here addresses and emphasises the need to reach beyond national contexts
by considering citizenship ’from below’ and emphasising people’s active role in
constructing and making meaning of citizenship through their lived experiences
and perceptions. This necessitates the use of mixed methods as well as to take
into account that the two categories of citizens cannot be used for social scientific
comparison in the methodological sense. On the other hand, this also means to
acknowledge the ’trade-off’ to compare within national contexts.
119
In order to access peoplewho become actors in relation to citizenship and their
subjective notions of justice, newly emerging platforms and sites of contestation
need to be considered. Consequently, such concessions through the ’bottom-up’
approach requires taking into account the pitfalls regarding comparability. The
merits of comparing mobile EU citizens’ experiences of migration with people
contesting migration would have to be questioned in the first place. It is, for ex-
ample, unclear how such contestation of citizenship between national and foreign
EU citizens themselves could escape conclusions based on traditional dichotomies
between national citizens and migrants. In this way, an analysis regarding cit-
izenship would be restricted again by questions of inclusion and exclusion based
on nationality, for example. Approaching each category across national contexts
puts the research in a better position to understanding contestation of citizenship
in distinct forms.
To sum, these aspects impact on the possibilities to generalise from the find-
ings. Yet, since neither a representative study of online news coverage and com-
menting on migration in Denmark and Germany nor of foreign EU citizens’ ex-
periences in these countries was intended here, I would argue that the applied
methods were appropriate. As I have mentioned above, the aim was to access or-
dinary people’s discursive practices with regard to contesting migration as well as
its ’lived experiences’ and to empirically approach from there subjective notions
of justice. Despite these pitfalls, the research design and conducted methods en-
abled to generate and analyse rich empirical data for the purpose of investigating
in-depth two distinct ways in which people who constitute themselves as polit-
ical subjects in the conflict aboutmigration contest citizenship. I therefore suggest
that the methodology and methods of this thesis are suitable to answer the overall
research question of how ordinary people contest citizenship regarding migration
in the EU.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has described and explained the overall research design and meth-
odology of the thesis. It has first elaborated on the methodological approach to
people’s subjective notions of justice. Here, I have suggested drawing from a
cognitive perspective in the broadest sense, that is, focusing on people’s own in-
terpretations of their migration perception and experiences. In this way, by high-
lighting interpretative processes such as social boundary making, categorising
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differences and labelling, ’group-making’, or expressing concerns and demands,
it is possible to analyse people’s understanding of themselves as subjects to recog-
nition, redistribution and representation in relation to others as well as political
authorities.
In order for the findings ’from below’ to go beyond national contexts and to
link such a micro-level analysis with macrolevel conceptions of citizenship and
current debates about the challenges of migration, I have argued for a research
design that consists of two comparative case studies. The first comparison ad-
dresses sub-question 1 regarding national EU citizens investigates how national
commenters in Danish and German contexts contest citizenship. The second com-
parison is concerned with sub-question 2 regarding foreign EU citizens and scru-
tinises how EU mobiles living in Denmark and Germany, more precisely Copen-
hagen and Berlin, contest citizenship. These two comparisons serve for in-depth
understanding of these people’s distinct forms of citizenship contestation. While
they cannot be compared directly with each other, they shed light on contest-
ation of citizenship based on people’s own ’social realities’ and thus provides a
more nuanced and complex picture of how citizenship contestation is embedded
in legal and political frameworks regarding status, rights and access.
In this regard, it was also necessary to familiarise oneself with the socio-
cultural contexts in Denmark and Germany. Given that both countries have
become increasingly attractive destinations among EU citizens during the Euro-
crisis and both countries socio-economic structures during crisis, I have argued
that both EU member states serve as appropriate contexts that make social con-
flict about migration visible. This part has identified and outlined three aspects
regarding this conflict: exclusive welfare state systems, reinvigorated notions of
deservingness during the Eurocrisis despite comparatively low levels of economic
affectedness and restrictive and nationally defined conceptions of citizenship as
membership.
In the third section, I have described the data collection and primarily qualit-
ative, inductive analyses. The first comparative case study is based on comment
sections with an exploration of corresponding Danish and German online news
articles about migration (sub-question 1). The second comparative case study em-
ploys an explorative online survey and semi-structured interviews with EU mo-
biles living in Berlin and Copenhagen (sub-question 2). Last but not least, I have
discussed the main limitations of this research.
In light of the specific context of the cases and the research methods, the next
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chapter will present the findings regarding national commenters in Danish and
German online news comment sections, followed by the investigation on mobile
EU citizens in Berlin and Copenhagen.
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Chapter 4
Critics of immigration in Danish
and German commentary sections
Both Denmark and Germany have experienced increasing rates of immigration
as well as heightened concerns over the sustainability of the welfare system (see
section 3.2.1 and Blum and Kuhlmann, 2016; Greve, 2016). Such concerns over
immigration have been particularly mobilised by reinvigorated right-wing parties
(Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2014). In this regard, scholarly work points to a
return of redistribution claims during the Eurocrisis (see Mau and Verwiebe, 2010;
Statham and Trenz, 2013). These developments might suggest that especially the
ways in which recognition and redistribution are organised between people living
together in a national welfare community are contested by critics of immigration.
This chapter presents the findings regarding how critics of immigration con-
test citizenship (sub-question 1). The analysis focuses on immigration critics com-
menting below online news articles who, as I have argued earlier (see section
2.2.2.1), constitute themselves as political subjects regarding migration through
these online media practices.
Before going into further detail how these commenters contest citizenship, the
chapter will describe the broader topics in the sampled online articles to provide
a more general overview of the material. Since commentary is ”reactive” (Reagle,
2015), in this case to the respective news coverage, the media’s role regarding
framing and agenda-setting might guide the ways in which these commenters
engage with immigration issues. Generally, national mass media select and cover
topics that appear as particularly relevant to their national audiences (McQuail,
2010). This ’national lens’ might also speak for a particular focus in the comments
123
on national aspects, that is, a focus on recognition and redistribution within the
welfare community.
The chapter then turns to the inductive analysis of Danish and German on-
line comment sections. It first addresses the ways in which commenters contest
the relationship between themselves and political authorities, also by reflecting
on how authorities engage with migrants. Here, the analysis suggests a strong
sense of political dissatisfaction and a lack of trust in domestic politicians, point-
ing to notions misrepresentation and misframing. Differences between Danish
and German comment sections occur regarding the role of the EU. While in the
German comments politicians engaging in EU affairs raise discontent with being
themain contributor to the EU (’Zahlmeister der EU’), among Danish commenters
the EU poses a threat to national sovereignty. The findings of the analysis suggest
that political actors are perceived to breach the rules and regulations of the polit-
ical community, while national citizens are expected to fulfil their roles as ’good
citizens’.
The second part of the inductive comments analysis is concernedwith contest-
ation of citizenship regarding the perceived relationship with migrants. I invest-
igate here the ways in which commenters understand themselves as subjects to
recognition and redistribution. Overall the analysis suggests a general tendency
to declare and categorise certain ’groups’ of migrants as ’undeserving’ of inclu-
sion. These are ’(perceived) Muslims’, ’bogus’ refugees, migrants from central and
eastern Europe, ’criminal foreigners’, and labour migrants. These categorisations
highlight commenters’ notions of misrecognition and maldistribution. Among
German commenters notions of maldistribution seem to be more dominant as
well as the focus on ’bogus’ refugees and labour migrants. The Danish comment
sections with their stronger focus on ’Muslims’ and ’criminal foreigners’ seem
to tend towards notions of misrecognition. These tendencies might be attributed
to the different national conceptions of ’good citizenship’: the Danish concep-
tion of ’the liberal and engaged medborger’ and the principle of universal access
to welfare based on citizenship or residence and the German conception of the
more private but ’diligent and educated worker’ who contributes to the Soziale
Marktwirtschaft (see 3.2.2 and Mouritsen, 2012).
Together, the findings suggest that notions of misrepresentation andmisfram-
ing are particularly dominant in both comment sections. There is a strong sense
that political authorities and immigration threaten national welfare communities.
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4.1 Cues for comments in the news
There has been a considerable amount of research into news frames and news
coverage of migration in general. News frames influence readers’ interpretations
of a certain topic (see Entman, 1993). According to Entman (1993, p. 52), ”fram-
ing essentially involves selection and salience.” In European news media, fram-
ing of immigration issues has often become salient in relation to economic or
security issues (Caviedes, 2015). Securitisation and economic frames are con-
sidered as having a particular influence on stereotypical portrayals of migrants
and immigration. Often, single country studies find that securitisation frames in
news coverage about immigration have increased while an economic framing is
fading (Caviedes, 2015). For example, coverage on EU policy-making to tighten
EU border controls, to deal with trafficking or safeguarding migrants crossing
the Mediterranean Sea has played an important role on news front pages in the
most recent horrific situation for refugees to enter the EU. On the other hand,
Caviedes (2015, p. 898) questions the competition between an economic and a se-
curity frame showing that theyways in which news framemigration also depends
on which group of people is being addressed.
In other words, different frames are applied to different types of migrants,
or what is being defined as a ’migrant group’. The ways in which these differ-
ent types or ’migrant groups’ are constructed and portrayed can be indicative
of representations or stigmatisation of people based on ethnicity, country of ori-
gin or other social attributes such as crime, welfare dependency and poverty (see
Helbling, 2014). By means of a certain framing of immigration, the mass media
take part in the reproduction of stereotypes about people as representing groups
sharing socio-demographic backgrounds and socio-cultural attributes (e.g. Hain-
mueller and Hopkins, 2014).
Frames become visible through ”the presence or absence of certain keywords,
stock phrases, (and) stereotyped images” (Entman, 1993, p. 52).33 Therefore, by
presenting the most specific words in news articles, content patterns in the news
collections can be identified and described. Only recently scholars have started
to make use of computer-automated cluster analysis in order to inductively ex-
plore topics and patterns, also frames, in online (news) texts. In one study, cluster
analysis was used to show how such a method facilitates frame analysis of news
33For an overview of the debate about news frames, which cannot be discussed in fur-
ther detail here, see, for example Entman (1993) and Semetko and Valkenburg (2000).
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articles based on similar and different key words in the texts and to reduce the risk
of a priori assumed topical patterns (Burscher, Vliegenthart, and de Vreese, 2016).
This technique is also called a ’bag of words’ approach and takes words as fea-
tures to describe the topical patterns in the text. This technique does not require
in-depth interpretation but is suitable for an exploration of content without much
interpretative input from the researcher (Burscher, Vliegenthart, and de Vreese,
2016, p. 4).
However, one cannot assume that readers automatically adopt the presented
frames in news articles. Indeed, people might not ’decode’ media messages in the
same ways as the communicators have ’encoded’ them (Hall, 1980). Other mean-
ings and ways to interpret migration according to one’s own ’social reality’ are
likely. Here, research has found that while frames might have less influence on
the individual’s opinion than expected, media influence people’s opinions about
whom and what to think as agenda-setters (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007; Fac-
chini, Mayda, and Puglisi, 2009). Such effects could also be found in an experi-
mental study, specifically in relation to people’s anti-elitism and anti-immigrant
sentimentswhen presentedwithmedia cues (Sheets, Bos, and Boomgaarden, 2016).
Therefore, an exploration of patterns as media cues of the Danish and German
article collections can highlight specific focal points in news coverage on migra-
tion. It provides helpful cues for an in-depth analysis of the respective online com-
mentary. While the frame analysis as conducted by Burscher, Vliegenthart, and de
Vreese (2016) goes beyond exploring content patterns in news articles, document
clustering more generally makes exploration of unstructured texts cost-effective
and reduces researcher bias in the interpretation of empirical material (Miner et
al., 2012). Exploring the articles in the Danish and German samples via clustering
documents can therefore help to identify a focus on certain groups of migrants
and according to which criteria these groups are being established. The usefulness
of such an exploration of patterns in news articles via clustering is particularly
helpful for research aim in this thesis. In order to analyse comment sections, as
I argue, news articles contain useful information about access points to the qual-
itative analysis of comments. Clustering of articles, as it is applied here, is based
on specific terms in a document collection and groups them together. Since the
clustering was based on the vector presentation of words based on their TF-IDF
measure (see section 3.3.1.2), i.e. how specific they are within the document in re-
lation to the entire document corpus, this ’bag of words’ for each cluster describes
the broad topic of articles in the cluster.
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Accordingly, the clustering process does not provide insight about topics and
frames on the article level. Rather, exploring Danish and German news about mi-
grationwith clustering helps to become familiar with the overall content structure
of the article sample and to identify possible cues which commenters might take
up. This means, the aim of this exploratory step is to gain an overview of how
migration is being addressed in Danish and German online news (from 2012 to
2014) in a broad sense and to guide the comment analysis in terms of finding out
what issues regarding migration commenters respond to. In contrast, a detailed
frame analysis would not provide sufficient insight into the subjective ways of
meaning-making among commenters. Much more, by means of clustering, an
exploration and description of broader topics of the article collections is possible
that does not require more extensive analysis of frames.
4.1.1 National debates in Danish online news: 2012-2014
In order to establish meaningful patterns across article collection, finding the
number of clusters (k) is crucial. Starting with the ’rule of thumb’ (k 
q
n
2 )
for an orientation of a cluster number, k was calculated to be 12 for 301 articles in
the Danish sample. The automated analysis was iterated for 1-12 clusters and k
was determined by the ”elbowmethod”. This method serves to test different num-
bers of clusters in terms of their validity; it helps to establish and justify k as the
number of clusters since the ’rule of thumb’ can only be used as first orientation
(see 3.3.1.2).
K-means clustering is based on minimising the total within-cluster variation.
Plotting the total within-cluster variation (or the average within-cluster sum of
squares) for each cluster in a graph will depict an ’elbow’ at a cluster number after
which the within cluster variation does not get more compact and the between-
cluster variation decreases. The ”elbow method” is not unambiguous because
particularly in unstructured, more homogeneous text as it is the case here, the
between-cluster variation might not be very high in the first place. The plotted
line might therefore not depict a particularly strong ’elbow’. Nevertheless, it has
been used in similar research to justify the number of clusters (i.e. k), which is
why I have chosen to rely on this method (see Burscher, Vliegenthart, and de
Vreese, 2016). The plot in figure 4.1 depicts an ’elbow’ at cluster 6. Therefore, I
decided to use a solution with six clusters.
Table 4.1 displays this six-cluster-solution by means of its first ten centroids
around which the articles have been clustered (i.e. the words with the highest
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Figure 4.1: Plot of explained variance: Determining the number of clusters (k), Danish
sample
x-axis: k number of clusters; y-axis: average within-cluster sum of squares
means). These tenwords have been selected as features in order to explore and de-
scribe patterns in the news articles (see Miner et al., 2012; Burscher, Vliegenthart,
and de Vreese, 2016). By means of these words for the clusters, it is therefore pos-
sible to identify six broader patterns regarding immigration in the Danish news
articles. In the following, I will describe these patterns by means of these words.
These patterns serve as ’first hunches’ for the subsequent, in-depth comment ana-
lysis. They can be seen as an exploration of how immigration is broadly presented
in these news articles and thus might indicate to what national commenters re-
spond to. Since these words form the topical ’centre’, not individual words but
their occurrence together in the cluster can be used for such a description.
As shown in table 4.1, D1 and D2 address migration in relation to security
concerns and criminal issues, yet from different angles. D1 refers to the political
debate in the run-up to the referendum (’folkeafstemning’) about Denmarks opt-
out (’retsforbehold’) from ’EUROPOL’. The referendum took place in December
2015 and Danes should decide whether Denmark should cooperate (’samarbejder’,
’politisamarbejd’) with EUROPOL on justice and criminal (’kriminel’) issues. The
referendum, in which 53% of Danes voted against Danish participation in EURO-
POL, was particularly mobilised by Eurosceptic political actors. Nevertheless, the
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D1 (38
articles)
D2 (32) D3(76) D4 (38) D5 (53) D6 (65)
Retsfor-
behold
Tålt Dag-
penge Børnecheck
Venstre Europa
Forbe-
hold
Udvis-
ning
Virksom-
hed
Optjen-
ingsprin-
cippet
Muslim De-
mokrati
Europol Kriminel Arbejd-
skraft Børnepenge
Flygt-
ning
Verden
Kriminel Fængsl Uden-
landsk
Skatte-
fradrag
Lars
Løkke
Frihed
Samarbe-
jde
Dom Tysk EU Kom-
mission Muslimsk
Men-
nesker
Stemmer Bødskov Løn Børn Vesten Ven-
strefløj
Politis-
amarbe-
jde
Justits-
minister-
iet
Hjemløs Skat-
teminis-
teriet
Parti De-
mokrat-
isk
Folkeaf-
stemning
Pind Job Mike Ind-
vandrer
Værdier
Asylansøger
Ophold Østarbe-
jder
Konser-
vative
Svensk Kvinder
Indbrud Justits-
minister
Kroner Brian In-
tegrerer
Liberal
Table 4.1: Ten highest centroids for each cluster in Danish sample
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D1 cluster might not only concern the opt-out, but it must also be assumed that
broader aspects of crime and justice are addressed here. For example, it cannot be
assumed that the reference to asylum seekers (’asylansøger’) only refers to this
particular debate. Rather, the cluster might be understood as illustrating discus-
sions about the role of the EU and its impact on Denmark in terms of criminal
justice and security concerns. D2, on the other hand, focuses on group-specific
aspects of security and crime. The occurrence of ’tolerated stay’ (’tålt’ ’ophold’)
in Denmark explicitly refers to foreigners who have lost their residence permit
because of committed crimes who, due to risk of torture or maltreatment, cannot
be expelled and send back to the country where the hold citizenship in (Ersbøll,
2013). The issue has been recurring inDanish debates presenting criminal foreign-
ers as a major problem not only for security but also regarding the administrative
capacities and costs in Danish prisons (’fængsler’) (see Ersbøll, 2013).
D3 is the biggest cluster and can potentially be described in relation to the
influence of migration on the Danish welfare state and labour market. There is
a focus on labour migration from an economic perspective which the words re-
ferring to general workforce and foreign workforce (’udenlandsk’, ’arbejdskraft’,
’job’), salaries (’løn’, ’kroner’), Danish companies (’virksomhed’) as well as unem-
ployment benefits (’dagpenge’) indicate. The term ’østarbejder’ refers to labour
migrants from central and eastern EU member states. People from CEE countries
and Germany (’tysk’, engl. German) represent a large group among foreign stu-
dents and labour migrants in Denmark (see Statistics Denmark, 2016). Therefore,
this cluster suggests a pattern in Danish news reporting that focuses on migrants
from central and eastern EU member states, Germans but also homeless people
(’hjemløs’) in terms of their participation on the Danish labourmarket andwelfare
state.
D4mainly presents a political debate about child benefits (seewords ’børnecheck’
and ’børnepenge’) beginning in 2013. The debate concerns EU migrants’ access to
and receipt of welfare in Denmark. Initiated by the government coalition of the
parties Venstre and the Conservative People’s Party party as well as the Danish
People’s Party in 2010, the ’optjeningsprincip’ (Danish for ’accumulation prin-
ciple’) was set up to regulate that EU foreigners, whose children do not reside in
Denmark, are eligible to receive child benefits only after they can show that they
have worked two of the last ten years in Denmark. In April 2013, the EU Com-
mission (’EU kommission’) criticised the Danish government and the respective
ministry of taxes (’skatteministeriet’) that this regulation was in violation with
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the right to freedom of movement, resulting in the Danish government’s revok-
ing of the bill. Given the specific words in this cluster, this suggests a focus on the
rights of EU citizens to receive child benefits in Denmark and to make use of tax
deductions (’skattefradrag’). The debate regarding the receipt of child allowance
from the Danish welfare state is salient, particularly the discussions about finan-
cially supporting foreigners who then move money to other EU countries where
their children live.
D5 and D6 might be subsumed under addressing issues of multiculturalism,
diversity and democratic values in opposition to other regions in the world. To-
gether, these two clusters present more than a third of the articles in the Dan-
ish news sample (118 articles out of 301). Indeed, there has been a considerable
amount of debate in Denmark about the compatibility of Danish national values
and migrants from countries with primarily Muslim population. In these debates
Danish actors often define Denmark to be based on democratic and liberal values
that are in direct contrast to countries with a Muslim majority population (Her-
vik, 2011). D6 focuses on values (’værdier’) in Europe, such as individual freedom
(’frihed’), liberalism (’liberal’) and democratic (’demokratisk’). The reference to
women (’kvinder’) likely relates to gender equality as a liberal-democratic value.
Political conservatives are known to criticise the left (’venstrefløj’) as being too
soft on these differences. D5 refers particularly to the Muslim population and
migrants as well as refugees or (perceived) Muslims (’Muslim’, ’muslimsk’, ’ind-
vandrer’, ’flygtninge’). The occurrencewith the term ’vesten’ (engl. ’theWest’) in-
dicates discussions of their integration (’integrer’). This points to a group-specific
way of reporting on the integration of migrants or Danish citizens that are per-
ceived as Muslims. The occurence of Lars ’Løkke’ Rasmussen (back then leader
of the ’Venstre’ Party) indicates a political debate or signifies his involvement in
these debates. Likely, the differences between Denmark and Sweden (’svensk’)
do play a role in these debates as well. Before the increasing number of refugees
fleeing to the EU, the Swedish government has been considered as comparatively
open towards refugees and less restrictive in integration policies than Denmark
(see Huddleston et al., 2015).
4.1.2 National debates in German online news: 2012-2014
For the German clustering process the same steps as for the Danish analysis were
followed. For 517 articles in the German sample, k was calculated at 16. Figure
4.2 shows an ’elbow’ at seven clusters.
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Figure 4.2: Plot of explained variance: Determining the number of clusters (k), German
sample
x-axis: k number of clusters; y-axis: average within-cluster sum of squares
Table 4.2 shows the ten highest centroids for each cluster based on which
common patterns in the text collection will be explored and described in the fol-
lowing.
G1 and G4 both address the increasing number of refugees, yet from differ-
ent perspectives. G1 is the bigger cluster (59 articles) and refers to the policy and
political bargaining about border controls with the EU and illegal crossing of these
borders (’Grenzkontrollen’, ’Schengen’, ’illegal’). In combination with the occur-
rence of the referrence to then Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich as a high
centroid, the cluster might be interpreted as focusing on security issues regard-
ing refugees. G4, on the other hand, rather addresses the humanitarian crisis and
seems to foreground the horrific conditions and deaths of many refugees dying on
their way, mostly in the Mediterranean Sea before Sicily and Lampedusa. Partic-
ularly, the occurrence of both boat (’Boot’) and ship (’Schiff’) as well as reference
to the coastal guard (’Küstenwache’) suggest a focus on people crossing towards
Italy. With 19 articles this way of framing the refugee issue is less dominant as
the reporting on refugees in relation to security issues (G1).
G2 and G3 relate to EU freedom of movement in relation to other countries
than Germany. G2, the smallest cluster highlights a specific topic, i.e. the Swiss
referendum on freedom of movement in February 2014. Besides the obvious in-
dicators, i.e. the occurrence of Switzerland, cantons, referendum, immigration
(’Schweiz’, ’Kanton’, ’Referendum’, ’Zuwanderung’), the peculiarity of the debate
becomes clear through the terms ’ECOPOP’ and people’s initiative (Volksinitiat-
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G1 (59
articles)
G2 (13) G3 (37) G4 (19) G5 (143) G6 (170) G7 (76)
Flücht-
ling
Schweiz Cameron
Lampedusa
Zuwan-
derung
Gauck Hartz
Schen-
gen
Initiative Gross-
britan-
nien
Flücht-
ling
OECD CDU CSU
Friedrich ECOPOP Britisch Schiff Fachkraft AFD IV
Illegal SVP UKIP Küste Studie SPD
Rumänien
Gren-
zkon-
trolle
Referen-
dum
London Boot Spanien Wahl Rumäne
Abkom-
men
Bern David Sizilien Aus-
ländisch
Staats-
bürger-
schaft
Bulgare
Grenze Volksini-
tiative
Premier Küsten-
wache
Migrant Türkisch Bul-
garien
EU Kom-
mission
Kanton Briten Mittel-
meer
Arbeits-
markt
Gruss Sozial-
leistung
Türkei Zuwan-
derung
Farage Italien Qualifiz-
iert
Partei Kom-
mune
Innen-
minister
Regier-
ung
Freizü-
gigkeit
Italien-
isch
Ausland Flücht-
ling
Roma
Table 4.2: Ten highest centroids for each cluster in German sample
ive’). As a non-profit organisation, ECOPOP was involved in the run-up to the
referendum on restricting freedom of movement to Switzerland, which despite
being a non-EU country is part of the Schengen area, and criticised as racist and
xenophobic. G3 refers to UK politics; in particular, the co-occurrence of its spe-
cific terms suggests to relate the issue of freedom of movement (’Freizügigkeit’)
to the debate in which Nigel ’Farage’ and the Eurosceptic and anti-immigration
party ’UKIP’ were involved at that time. Therefore, this cluster indicates a focus
on foreign EU citizens as ’migrant group’.
In G5 articles cover more general issues of migration in relation to the Ger-
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man labour market as well as required qualifications and positions to be filled
(’Fachkraft’, ’Qualifiziert’). This cluster might present a a broader way of report-
ing about migration in the German news article sample. This is also suggested by
the co-occurrence of words referring to more factual information provided by re-
search (’Studie’) regarding developments on the labour market (’Arbeitsmarkt’).
The occurrence of the word ’Spanien’ (engl. Spain) also indicates labour migra-
tion due to economic recession in the southern European country. Although this
type of migration is based on EU freedom of movement, the highest centroids do
not suggest such a topical focus as it is the case for G2 and G3. Rather, the terms
indicate that articles address the implications of migrants (possibly from southern
EU countries) for the German labour market.
G6 is the biggest cluster with 170 articles. It might reflect migration as a polit-
ical issue or through news coverage focusing on political actors. This might be
implied by the occurrence of the abbreviation of the major two German parties
(CDU, SPD) as well as the in 2013 established anti-immigration and EU-sceptic
AFD. The cluster implies a strong focus in the German sample on political party
struggle. The fact that the then German President (Joachim ’Gauck’) appears in
this cluster in combination with references to the terms ’türkisch’ and ’Staats-
bürgerschaft’ might be indicative of political debates about dual citizenship for
Turkish citizens in Germany in which he was involved and in which the CDU
and AFD opposed his remarks. Given that the cluster contains 170 articles, it is
unlikely that it can be understood as presenting one specific debate or topic.
G7 highlights the issue of migration from a perspective on unemployment
and social benefits (’Hartz IV’, ’Sozialleistung’) which are claimed from the mu-
nicipality (’Kommune’). This cluster might suggest that news coverage makes
a connection between these social benefits and people from specific countries,
Romania and Bulgaria, or based on ethnicity, here Roma people (’Rumänien’,
’Rumäne’, ’Bulgare’, ’Roma’). The cluster contains 76 articles, which makes it
the third biggest cluster. Relative to the other clusters, this might speak for a
’group-focused’ reporting targeting people from these countries (or of Romani
ethnicity) as recipients of social and unemployment benefits. This stigmatisation
is in line with research on the representation of Romanians and Bulgarians as well
as the Romani people in news media as burdens on welfare systems in other EU
countries (see e.g. Fox, Moroşanu, and Szilassy, 2012).
.
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4.1.3 Summary
The explorative clustering process of Danish and German online news articles on
migration issues points to group-specific reporting on immigration. Research in
social psychology has shown that group-specific reporting on immigration affects
immigration attitudes towards such potential groups (e.g. Lee and Fiske, 2006).
References to refugees and asylum seekers, foreign EU citizens and specifically
people from CEE countries as well as labour migrants occur in different clusters
in both Danish and German samples. People from CEE countries are part of both
samples and in the comment sections they might equally be addressed in relation
to the welfare state and labour market. The clusters suggest an economic per-
spective on immigration particularly in relation to people from Spain (G5) and
Romanians and Bulgarians (G7) and citizens from CEE countries more broadly
(D3).
The differences in the clusters can in parts be explained through news selec-
tion criteria. National news select and present news stories through a national
lens, focusing on what is considered to be relevant to the national audience (Mc-
Quail, 2010). Differences in group-specific reporting become particularly visible
regarding the occurrence of group-specific focal points on refugees, the Muslim
population and references to crime committed bymigrants. There are two clusters
in the German sample that relate to refugees. G1 suggests an angle of security and
border control, while G4 points to amore humanitarian perspective. In the Danish
sample, refugees are less emphasised but part of the cluster focuses on (perceived)
Muslims and immigration in general (D5). The focus on (perceived) Muslims and
criminal foreigners is a visible pattern in the Danish (D1, D2, D5), yet not in the
German sample. Possibly, with the cartoon crisis in 2006, these issues have been
framed as relevant for the Danish national context. The emphasis on refugees in
two clusters in the German sample compared to the Danish sample might be re-
lated to the increasing number of refugees moving to Germany (see BAMF, 2015a,
p. 28).
Furthermore, in both samples, the issue of freedom of movement is addressed
and the ’group’ of EU citizens implied. In Danish news, D4 presents the debate
about child benefits for foreign EU citizens with children not living in Denmark.
In the German sample, freedom of movement is also discussed in relation to spe-
cific debates. However, these debates are not concerned with national issues, as
it is the case in Denmark, but with Switzerland (G2) and the UK (G3). G2 and G3
in the German sample refer to debates about possible restrictions on freedom of
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movement in other countries. In the Danish sample (D4) it concerns a political
debate between national politicians and the EU Commission regarding limiting
foreign EU citizens’ rights to social welfare in Denmark. This is interesting given
that Denmark has been described as more reluctant towards the implementation
of EU regulations regarding freedom of movement and its accompanying rights,
while Germany is considered a driving force in enabling intra-EU migration (see
discussion of literature in section 3.2.2).
The question is now to what extent these identified patterns and differences
across the Danish and German samples can be related and used for the qualitat-
ive analysis of Danish and German comment sections. On the one hand, it has
been argued that media frames influence how audiences interpret and form their
opinions about a certain issue (Entman, 1993; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000).
Research on framing of immigration in European news media provides evidence
that the most dominant frames in this regard, economic and securitisation frames,
do not compete but are adopted for different ’migrant groups’ (Caviedes, 2015,
p. 898). Regarding issues that relate to EU migrants, the clusters suggest a more
economic frame which could hint at a focus on the economic recession in both
countries and questions of redistribution. Given that the clustering indicates that
such frames occur in the Danish and German samples, one might assume to find
such topics to re-emerge in the comment sections.
On the other hand, it is widely acknowledged that audiences and users do not
automatically adopt media frames. People can interpret media messages in vari-
ous ways by drawing from their own knowledge, perceptions and previous ex-
periences (Hall, 1980). Commenters can, for example, generally contest, modify,
but also follow and adapt to the aspects that become visible in the clusters in their
perceptions of migration. Thus, the role of media cues has been taken into consid-
eration here by means of using clusters as potential identifiers and descriptions
of such media cues (see Facchini, Mayda, and Puglisi, 2009).
All in all, the explorative aspect of document clustering needs to be high-
lighted here. This avoids the risk of using the clusters as definite frames and
topics (see Burscher, Vliegenthart, and de Vreese, 2016). I suggest that the spe-
cific groups that have been identified via clustering in the article samples serve
as cues and entry points for the analysis regarding whom Danish and German
critics of immigration address in the comment sections. By means of a cognitive
perspective which I am following, the analysis can focus on such specific groups
and identify whether and how commenters engage in ’group-making’ themselves.
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This way of instrumentalising the findings of the clustering for the in-depth ana-
lysis of commentary sections supports and facilitates a ’bottom-up’ approach that
highlights people’s own interpretations of events and situations, as they are rep-
resented through media cues, for example.
To sum, the clustering has provided starting points for the analysis by identi-
fying potential ’migrant groups’ and political actors as addressees in these re-
lationships. Following a ’bottom-up’ approach, I argue that the ways in which
these commenters interpret and make meaning of migration in relation to others
and themselves require an in-depth analysis of the commentary sections where
they express their affectedness of migration. By means of the theoretical model
developed in section 2.2.2, it is possible to investigate how Danish and German
commenters contest citizenship themselves in relation to political authorities and
others (see also figure 2.1 on page 59).
4.2 Notions of injustice in Danish and German comment
sections
This section presents the findings of the qualitative analysis on how national crit-
ics of migration contest citizenship in online comment sections. Earlier I have
proposed that commenting is a way for people to enact their affectedness of mi-
gration. Given the affordances for users of online commentary sections to ’talk
back’, I have argued that particularly critics of immigration voice their opinions of
how political actors and the media engage in migration issues and to make their
own interpretations of what is politically, economically, and culturally appropri-
ate visible.
In order to empirically investigate such contestation, I have developed a the-
oretical framework that understands citizenship contestation based on two re-
lationships: first, the relationship of the self with others which concerns evalu-
ations of how to establish or maintain redistribution and recognition; second, the
relationship between the self (and others) and political authorities which refers
to people’s feedback on representation both within and beyond a political com-
munity (ordinary-political representation and misframing).
I have further suggested that these relationships and subjective notions of
justice regarding migration are best approached through a cognitive perspect-
ive (see section 3.1). A cognitive perspective helps to identify whom people ad-
dress, that is, whether they address others or political authorities and highlights
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how people categorise, label and justify differences between different people (see
Brubaker, 2004 and table 3.1 on page 75).
The comment analysis points to the importance of notions regarding the polit-
ical frame of justice and misframing more generally. I argue that the findings can
be best understood if one considers that commenters make sense of citizenship
and justice as two products in a social exchange - in the broadest sense, ’com-
modities’. Understanding justice and citizenship as commodities describes the
way in which these critics of immigration perceive themselves as recipients of
rights and their obligations within a community, i.e. as subjects of justice. In
welfare states justice is being symbolically traded by political representatives in
exchange for ’good citizenship’ to the community. In order to become recipients
of justice, members (i.e. national citizens) need to fulfil the moral obligations of
’good citizenship’. These moral duties are, for example, to abide the law, to be
economically self-sufficient and to value and uphold national and cultural tradi-
tions of the political community. In other words, in welfare states justice has a
value - that is membership and thus access to welfare.
Yet, as the comment analysis suggests, specific ’migrant groups’ challenge this
bargain, which becomes visible in commenters’ notions of deservingness: Here,
commenters assume that certain migrants do not live up to these moral obliga-
tions. They are also considered to be non-citizens. Therefore, notions of injustice
become salient when the ’undeserving’ become recipients of redistribution and
recognition qua EU citizenship, refugee status or multiculturalist policies not-
withstanding.
This section is structured as follows: The first part provides an overview of
the coding procedure and presents the general findings and emerging patterns of
the comment analysis in this regard. Second, the section turns to the question of
how commenters contest citizenship in relation to political authorities in further
detail. Two recurrent themes are perceptions of political incompetence and the
impression of the political system as corrupt. After this, the analysis focuses es-
pecially on how commenters contest citizenship as organising principle of justice
between themselves and others. Here, the analysis points to commenters’ eval-
uation of migrants’ cultural and economic deservingness which relate to notions
of recognition and redistribution to the perceived advantage of ’undeserving mi-
grant groups’.
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4.2.1 Overview
The following provides an overview of the qualitative analysis in general. Earlier I
have developed the theoretical model to analyse contestation of citizenship based
on the relationships between the self and others as well as political authorities. In
order to analyse these relationships, I suggest to first identify who these ’others’
are as well as to which political authorities commenters refer. In other words, the
analysis has to establish the addressees in the comments.
As described in section 3.3.1, the analysis of the comment sections was based
on a mix of an a priori structure of codes with inductive coding. The structure
of the coding has been elaborated in section 3.3.1.3 and comprises the categories
of ’addressees’ and ’concerns and demands’. In this way, it was possible to ana-
lytically distinguish between the two relationships (between the self and others
or political authorities) and investigate commenters’ notions of justice regarding
these relationships.
This overview presents the broader patterns in the data and provides insight
into the manifold themes that emerged during the coding in relation to the ad-
dressees. For the analysis of notions of justice special attention has to be paid to
dominant categorisations that emerge in the coding regarding others and polit-
ical authorities. In this sense, in order to empirically investigate how commenters
evaluate the relationship between themselves and others regarding recognition
and redistribution, I focused on how they classify and label difference between
people, engage in ’group-making’ and draw social boundaries. This means to
scrutinise how dominant ’undeserving migrant groups’ are presented in the com-
ments. Overlapping coding, and relations between codes help to analyse these
aspects.
The codes of ’addressees’ could in parts be established through the cluster-
ing process of news coverage. For the relationship between commenters them-
selves and others, the different ’migrant groups’ established in the clusters served
as cues and provided entry points for the qualitative analysis of the comments.
Strictly speaking, these codes might be considered a priori codes as they did not
initially derive from the comments but from the news articles. However, this way
of starting the analysis did not exclude the possibility of identifying other ’mi-
grant groups’ inductively. Furthermore, this choice to enter the data responds
to the characteristics of comment sections. As I have discussed earlier, comment
sections are ”reactive” (Reagle, 2015, p. 2) and respond to an issue that is posted
’above’ the commentary section. In this way, it was possible to relate emerging
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addressees in the comments to the ’migrant groups’ in the clusters. Crucially, the
set-up of the analysis avoided to analyse the comment sections in direct relation
to their articles. The reason for this is that clustering cannot give sufficient in-
formation on the article level but on the patterns across a document collection
(Everitt et al., 2011). An overview and description of the labels of the codes are
given in tables 4.3 and 4.4. The tables also show which code was adopted from
the clustering process.
Crucially, the coding labels regarding group-specificity should not be under-
stood as describing actual ”substantial entities” but as constructed categories by
the commenters and their ways of ”group-making” (Brubaker ). Thus, the coding
of these ’migrant groups’ was not oriented at the article level but focused on the
comment material. This way, the coding stayed as close to the empirical material
as possible by focusing on commenters’ ways to categorise migrants. This de-
tachment of the comments from the article level avoided that the content of the
articles became part of the coding of comments.
For example, the code ’Eastern Europeans’ was not coded because it emerged
from the article but because the commenters categorised foreign workers as ’East-
ern Europeans’ or when they described Romani people as ’Eastern Europeans’, or
in other instances referring to people from the region (see table 4.3). The same
procedure was applied to the other ’migrant groups’ and codes. This way of cod-
ing allowed for overlaps and ambiguous meanings in the coding procedure to
emerge and thus focused on the ’group-making’ aspects in the comments. More
dominant or frequent references thus suggested particular categorisations and
’group-making’ among the commenters.
For an investigation of the relationship between themselves and political au-
thorities, the clustering could also provide cues on who is being addressed. Partic-
ularly, the codes ’EU and related actors/institutions’ and ’domestic political act-
ors’ could be identified and served as access points (see table 4.3). Also here,
the qualitative analysis was strictly focused on the comments. Often, it was not
possible to establish to which EU actor or institution commenters refer to, for ex-
ample. In other instances, ’domestic political actors’ referred to a specific political
party or an actor that was described as politician, although not being a political
or elected representative in the precise definition. Again, the aim was to capture
commenters’ interpretations and ways of categorising and labelling.
Turning to the coding category of commenters’ ’concerns and demands’ re-
garding migrants and political authorities (see table 4.4), the analysis also relates
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Code labels Description Cluster
Addressees
’Foreigners’ unspecified/ general mention of
foreigners
-
’Criminal
foreigners’
relating foreigners to crime issues or
explicitly describing them as criminal
D1, D2
’Good/bad
foreigners’
normative distinction between
foreigners
-
’EU citizens’ legal status D4/ G2, G3
’Eastern
Europeans’
relating foreigners to ’Eastern
European region’ or explicitly
referring to them
D3/ G7
’Southern EU
citizens’
referring to foreigners from Southern
EU countries
G5
’Labour migrants’ relating foreigners in relation to
labour
D3/ G5
’(perceived)
Muslims’
referring to people in terms of Islam,
as Muslims
D5, D6
’Non-EU citizens’ legal status -
’Refugees and
asylum seekers’
relating foreigners to refugees and
asylum
D5, D1/ G1,
G4
’Domestic political
actors’
Danish/German politicians, parties -
’External political
actors’
non-Danish/-German politicians,
parties, non-EU
-
’EU and related
actors/institutions’
political actors on EU level -
Table 4.3: Overview of coding structure and description of code labels in the comments:
Addressees
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to research on immigration attitudes and notions of deservingness and anti-elitism
in European welfare states. In fact, public opinion in welfare states generally
supports entitlements of needy people but distinguishes between different cat-
egories by ranking immigrants as most ’undeserving’ (van Oorschot, 2006). Cat-
egorisations of different ’undeserving groups’, i.e. a sense of ’groupism’ and
boundary-making can highlight such notions (see Brubaker, 2004). Within the
special context of the Eurocrisis, concerns over unemployment and economic re-
cession might have further sparked debates about the ’undeservingness’ of mi-
grants. The previous clustering analysis of news articles suggest that an eco-
nomic perspective on immigration-related issues can serve as a cue for people to
adopt such a perspective as well. This raises the question in how far people who
contest migration because they perceive it to risk or cause maldistribution. For
example, the codes ’benefits, expenses, other support’ and ’crisis and financial
sector’ emerged in relation to economic aspects.
Yet, a sense of undeservingness might not only derive from economic aspects
regarding redistribution. The coding category of ’concerns and demands’ is there-
fore a result of inductive coding. ’Social dumping’, for example, can concern
several aspects of why commenters perceive ’foreigners’ as undeserving such
as recognition. ’National identity’ might be defined based on economic as well
as cultural criteria. The code ‘Danes/Germans vs. foreigners’ emerged from in-
stances in which commenters group nationals and foreigners in direct opposition
to each other. It can also describe, for instance, comparisons between Danes and
foreigners of all kinds. In its broadest description, the code highlights a relation-
ship between nationals and foreigners. In similar fashion, the code ’good and
bad foreigners’ emerged inductively and highlights commenters’ frequent ways
to differentiate between foreigners based on normative attributes such as ’useful-
ness’, ’degree of/willingness to integrate’, ’behaviour towards national citizens’.
For example, figure 4.5 shows how this distinction emerged as a common way
to categorise and discuss ’refugees’ in German comment sections and describes
the recurring evaluation of deservingness of ’real refugees’ and supposed ’bogus
refugees’.
Regarding commenter’s concerns and demands about political authorities, the
code ‘EU vs. Danish/German sovereignty’ is interesting. This theme emerged
inductively and captures how commenters juxtapose national frames with the EU
frame. In general it describes commenters’ impressions of Germany/Denmark as
a polity, political actor or in terms of policies in relation to the EU (see table 4.4).
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Code labels Description Cluster
Concerns and demands
’National identity’ definitions of being German/Danish -
’Benefits,
expenses, other
support’
foreigners’ access to resources and
receipt of social welfare and benefits
-
’Crisis and
financial sector’
mention of economic and fiscal crisis
in EU
-
’EU vs national
sovereignty
referring to relationship between EU
and Danish/German sovereignty
-
’Nationals vs
foreigners’
juxtaposing Danes/Germans and
foreigners
-
’Immigration
issue’
referring to
number/intake/border-crossing of
migrants to Denmark/Germany
-
’Send foreigners
out’
sub-category to ’Immigration issue’,
demanding to expel migrants
-
’Too much
immigration’
sub-category to ’Immigration issue’,
relates to discussions about border
controls and number of immigration
rate
-
’Integration’ referring to cultural, social, economic
incorporation of foreigners into
Denmark/Germany
-
’Need for
foreigners’
arguing that immigration is necessary
for Denmark/Germany
-
’Negative EU
attitude’
anti-EU remarks or criticism of EU
and institutions
-
’Positive EU
attitude’
pro-EU remarks and support for EU
and institutions
-
’Social dumping’ referring to foreigners’ negative
impact on salary levels and living
conditions in Denmark/Germany
-
’Unfair treatment
of foreigners’
pointing out prejudices, stereotyping
mistreatment of foreigners
-
’Rights
discussions’
relating to foreigners’ rights in the
broadest sense
Table 4.4: Overview of coding structure and description of code labels in the comments:
Concerns and demands
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In sum, a cognitive perspective is further helpful to analyse people’s ways in
which they interpret the political system and political actors based on national
boundary-making and their demands of what a political community should look
like. More generally speaking, it shows where commenters denote the borders
of the political community. This also involves categorisation, (self-)identification
and labelling processes that distinguish between who should be included and ex-
cluded in this community and by whom.
4.2.2 The people vs. politics?
Notions of representation or misrepresentation and misframing concern the re-
lationship between ordinary people and political authorities and can be under-
stood here as the understanding or definition of the political community and the
reach and boundaries of that community (Fraser, 2008, p. 16 and 2.2.2.2). I ar-
gue that perceived breaches of these boundaries and definitions from authorities
trigger notions of political misrepresentation among the commenters. In other
words, impressions of misrepresentation consequently occur when, for instance,
actions, claims, or statements of political actors clash with people’s own defini-
tion and rules of the community. In section 3.2.1, I have presented how migration
is currently undergoing a politicisation in Denmark and Germany. This becomes
particularly visible if one looks at the reinvigoration of right-wing populism and
claims for more exclusive welfare and citizenship policies.
Commenters as critics of immigration are likely to be dissatisfied with polit-
ics and feel marginalised from domestic politicians and enact this affectedness of
migration in comment sections to make their voices heard. Figures 4.3 and 4.4
provide an overview of the links commenters make between political authorities
and foreigners as well as concerns and demands about migration. In particu-
lar, the figures visualise two aspects that are relevant to understand commenters’
notions regarding representation and misframing: First, they present how com-
menters discuss migration with regards to political authorities on the national
and EU level. The green lines show how commenters associate domestic political
actors with other ’addressees’ and ’concerns and demands’. The red lines show
the same with respect to EU actors and institutions. Second, in combination the
lines indicate which political authority receives more attention in the respective
sample by highlighting the focal points for domestic actors as well as EU institu-
tions.
In German comment sections (Figure 4.3), the peaks in the green line suggest
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Figure 4.3: Commenters’ concerns and demands regarding migration in relation to do-
mestic and EU political actors in German comment sections
* = sub-category of EU citizens
** = EU citizens and regional origin if unspecificed in comments
*** = sub-category of ’immigration issue’
that domestic political actors are particularly linked to issues regarding integra-
tion, the category of ’refugees and asylum seekers’, benefits for foreigners, the
competition between nationals and foreigners and the EU. Other categories of
migrants are reflected to a lesser degree. The peaks in the red line indicate that
German commenters link the EU to domestic political actors and to a lesser ex-
tent to external political actors. Discussions of foreigners’ rights, their receipt
of benefits and a negative EU attitude seem dominant as well. Regarding the re-
lationship between domestic and EU political authorities, the German comment
sections display a focus on the national level. This becomes visible in the higher
peaks in the green line (domestic political actors) than in the red line (EU institu-
tions and actors).
In Danish comment sections (Figure 4.4), the peaks in the green line suggests
particularly that commenters discuss the relationship between domestic author-
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Figure 4.4: Commenters’ concerns and demands regarding migration in relation to do-
mestic and EU political actors in Danish comment sections
* = sub-category of EU citizens
** = EU citizens and regional origin if unspecificed in comments
*** = sub-category of ’immigration issue’
ities and the EU. To a lesser extent do they link domestic politics to categorisa-
tions of ’(perceived) Muslims’, ’criminal foreigners’ and people from CEE coun-
tries (’Eastern Europeans’) as well as foreigners’ rights. The peaks in the red line
points to Danish commenters linking the EU to aspects of national sovereignty,
foreigners’ rights and express a negative attitude towards the EU. The relation-
ship between the EU and national political actors tends towards a focus on the
EU level, while domestic political actors are less frequently mentioned in these
regards (higher peaks at red line).
These trends and patterns can now be further discussed and analysed by using
examples and excerpts from the actual comments in order to gain a better under-
standing of commenters’ notions regarding representation and misframing. To-
gether, the findings of the in-depth analysis build on the above first description of
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the figures. Despite the different focal points between Danish and German com-
menters regarding national and EU political authorities, two themes have become
particularly dominant from the analysis and characterise both cases: Perceptions
of political incompetence and a lack of trust in a political system that is perceived
to be corrupted. I will address the first theme by looking at comment discussions
about integration of migrants as well as reactions to political claims for solidarity
and support for migrants more generally. The second theme emerges particularly
with regards to the EU and the way in which political actors engage in EU politics
which is understood as a turn away from national citizens and domestic interests.
Indeed, the analysis shows that perceptions of political incompetence to handle
issues related to immigration are a recurring pattern in the comment sections.
Further perceptions of corruption or failure become visible, mainly in relation
to how domestic political actors engage in EU affairs. Overwhelmingly, expres-
sions that oppose immigration and defy certainmigrants as being undeserving are
linked to impressions of political failure and a lack of political trust. Commenters
perceive themselves as marginalised citizens without proper political represent-
ation. Here, this refers to the notion of domestic political representation which
is traded in exchange of fulfilling moral obligations of membership to a political
community. In other words, commenters have expectations of the role political
actors are supposed to fulfil in this trade. Yet, political actors are perceived to not
fulfil their part of this exchange, i.e. to provide proper political representation as
they themselves understand it. The analysis suggests strong contestation of polit-
ics and political legitimacy among people across Danish and German contexts
and indicates how national critics of immigration challenge the political legitim-
acy not only of the EU but, as visible here, particularly of domestic political actors
and authorities. Differences in how the EU is perceived further indicate how the
EU becomes a matter of sovereignty particularly in Danish comment sections,
while this is less expressed across German comment threads.
4.2.2.1 Political naïveté and incompetence
One theme emerging from the comment sections is the general sense of incompet-
ent and naive domestic politicians. These perceptions are most salient in so called
’integration debates’ in German discussions (see peak at ’Integration’ green line,
table 4.3) or among Danish commenters when it comes to the regulations of rights
to social welfare (see peak at ’rights discussions’ green line, table 4.4). The ’na-
ive and incompetent politician’ can be characterised as someone who poses low
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demands on migrants when it comes to integration into labour markets and does
not oppose migrant claims for more religious or cultural freedom. One example
is the recurrent ’integration debate’ in public debates on cultural and religious
difference which is particularly visible in German comment sections (see peak at
’Integration’, green line, table 4.3). Integration is often understood as assimilation
to national traditions, language skills and religious symbols and to be economic-
ally self-sufficient. What distinguishes the ’good’ from the ’bad’ migrant is the
perceived success rate of integration. Politicians with a perceived weak stance on
integration obligations for migrants are thus considered to follow a ’multicultural
ideology’.
Jeder Mensch hat ein Anrecht auf seine Kultur und damit auf seine Sprache.
In Deutschland ist immer von Integration die Rede, und deshalb ist es sehr
wohl im Interesse von Migranten und auch von uns Deutschen, wenn diese
Deutsch reden. Ich kann auch das Multi-Kulti-Gedöns nicht mehr hören.
Auch wenn ich kein rechter Wähler bin, denke ich dass das hier Deutsch-
land ist und nicht die Türkei. Ich bin auch für ein Burka-Verbot wie in der
Schweiz oder in Frankreich. Dieses ideologische Gewäsch geht mir sowas
von auf den … Unsere Multikulti-Politker verschenken unsere Kultur und
spielen den Nazis damit in die Hände. Wiieso eigentlich⁇ Hier funktioniert
wohl die Gehirnwäsche durch unsere Politker und unsereMedien irgendwie
nicht!
[Every human being has a right to his culture and, thus, to his language.
In Germany everyone is talking about integration, and therefore it is very
well in migrants’ interest as well as from us Germans if they talk German. I
cannot listen to this multi-kulti-fuss anymore. Even though I am not a right-
wing voter, I think this is Germany and not Turkey. I’m also supporting a
burkha-ban same as in Switzerland or in France. This ideological bullshit
is …. annoying. Our multi-kulti-politicians give our culture away and play
directly into the hands of the Nazis. Why? Probably the brainwashing as
done by our politicians and media doesn’t seem to work here! ]
(Zweisprachigkeit anerkennen, nicht miesmachen, ZEIT, 08.12.2014)
Instead of accepting cultural diversity, politicians are expected to enforce as-
similation to national values.
Recurring is also the theme of ’nationals vs. foreigners’ where politicians are
perceived as passive bystanders in the threat migrants pose (see peak at green
lines, tables 4.3 and 4.4). Politicians’ claims for recognition of Muslims are hereby
understood as ‘leftist’ or ‘Green’ strategies to undermine national identity due
to ‘anti-Danish’ sentiments. In this way, commenters see mainly the established
political parties and politicians either willingly working against or simply too
passive in working to preserve national identities.
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Flaget på halv for de radikale’s “blandingsmisbrug” ! De radikale nedgør alt
dansk og kristent og forherliger det multi etniske ! Hvorfor er de radikale
blevet så antikristne og anti danske ? Er det måske fordi de radikale blev
oprettet for at varetage det jødiske borgerskabs interesser, at de radikale,
somderes ligesindede i Europa, enfoldigt har fyldt Danmark opmedmuslimer
i mangfoldighedens navn ! Det kan vi andre vist godt undvære ! […]
[Flag at half-mast for de radikale’s [Political party] ”mixed substance ab-
use”! De radikale belittle everything danish and christian and glorify the
multi ethnic ! Why have de radikale become so antichristian and anti dan-
ish? Is it perhaps because de radikale were established to look after the
interests of the jewish bourgeuoisie, that de radikale, as their like-minded
in Europe, simple-mindedly have filled Denmark with muslims in the name
of diversity! Certainly the rest of us can do without it![…]]
(Om flag og frihed, Berlingske, 03.04.2012)
This means that both in Danish and German comment sections, people react
to policies that potentially facilitate access to welfare and to provide support for
low-income groups. Resources, as it is argued, are being redistributed from the
national to the ’foreigner’ creating conflict and injustice between nationals and
foreigners, disturbing social peace and increasing crime rates.
Når man som den IDIOTISKE regering har fjernet loftet for børnepenge til
over 2 børn, så tilgodeser de generelt størstedelen af den muslimske be-
folkning. Og til hvilken nøtte? de fleste af deres afkombliver enten hjernevas-
ket og/eller kriminel. Hvis du ikke tror mig, så se på statistikkerne. i 2010
var 70% af alle kriminaliteter i København begået af muslimer, samtidig med
at der i Danmark er ca. 5% muslimske indbyggere.
[If one, as the IDIOTIC government, has removed the upper limit for child
benefits for more than 2 children, then they reaffirm in general the majority
of the muslim population. And to which [use]? most of their offspring
become either brainwashed and/or criminal. If you don´t believe me, then
look at the statistics. in 2010 70% of all criminalities in Copenhagen were
committed by muslims, at the same time as there in Denmark is about 5%
muslim inhabitants.]
(Borgmester træt af sende 66 børnechecks til Polen, Ekstrabladet, 03.09.2012)
The persistent mistrust, the impression of politicians favouring foreigners
over nationals, and, consequently, the perceived misrepresentation further con-
nects to commenters’ impressions of naïveté in terms of recognition and redis-
tribution of the culturally ’incompatible’ and economic ’useless’. Such political
claims for tolerance and support of those in need are seen as elitist and detached
from national citizens’ actual problems and needs.
Einen Herr Gauck wird diese ganze Asylpolitik wenig treffen, er bekommt
jeden Monat ein dickes Salär vom Steuerdeppen finanziert, hat Raum und
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Platz mehr als er jemals braucht, wie kann er also nachempfinden wie ein
normaler Bürger lebt und empfindet? Zahlen dürfen eh nur die Kleinen
diese Politik undwenn dann die Asylsuchenden ach so sehr verfolgten Schu-
len besetzten und unverschämt werden, aber nein doch, die doch nicht, es
sind nur die deutschen Bürger die unverschämt sind, gell.
[AMr. Gauck [German president, 2014] will not be affected by these asylum
policies, he receives a fat paycheck from the idiot-taxpayer, has enough
space than needed, how kann he empathise how an ordinary citizen lives
and feels? Only the little ones [referring to the ordinary citizens] finance
this political system and if the oh so prosecuted asylum seekers occupy
schools and turn cheeky, but no, not them, only the German citizens are
cheeky, right.]
(Grundsatzrede, Gauck fordert großzügigere EU-Flüchtlingspolitik, Welt,
30.06.2014)
As domestic politics seems to be increasingly estranged from the ’ordinary
citizen’, political representation is not possible. These understandings suggest
cleavages between self-perceived ’ordinary citizens’ and political elites. To both
Danish and German commenters, recognition and redistribution for migrants res-
ults in misrecognition and maldistribution of national citizens. By granting rights
to or demanding solidarity rights for foreigners, national citizens become mar-
ginalised. In this sense, commenters ’commodify’ rights, support and tolerance
to exclusive goods. Consequently, political claims for tolerance for cultural dif-
ference and support to migrants come to the disadvantage of national citizens in
the wake of increasing immigration and thus misrepresentation.
Together, political incompetence and naïveté become visible in the failure to
recognise national citizens as the ones that are entitled to social protection by
domestic politicians. This, in turn, leads to notions of political misrepresentation.
In fact, the recognition of especially Muslims and Islam in German and Danish
society through ’multiculturalist political ideology’ resonates among commenters
as a way of providing ‘special treatment’ for culturally different people, while
commenters see themselves as marginalized by their government and not being
entitled to the same ‘special treatment’. This makes visible a lack of political trust
and dissatisfaction towards domestic politicians which is based on commenters’
perception of political support for the rights and benefits of ’others’.
4.2.2.2 Politics as corrupted system
The role of political actors is poignant as commenters see political responsibil-
ity towards national citizens not only vis-à-vis migrants but also in relation to
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the EU. Studies suggest an increasing frustration among ordinary people about
the EU which becomes visible especially in the mass media (Statham and Trenz,
2013). Also in the comments people’s attitudes about the EU are widely negat-
ive. Yet, as shown in figures 4.3 and 4.4, this EU contestation does not occur
independently from national politics. Rather, this contestation refers to the as-
sumed relationship between domestic political actors and the EU, as the analysis
implies in the following. Impressions of political incompetence relate primarily
to domestic politics. Perceptions of political corruption and betrayal, in turn, are
expressed in relation to the EU level. The difference to the above theme is that
some commenters perceive politicians to serve EU interests or their own personal
purposes while disregarding national sovereignty and thus national citizens.
Indeed, commenters understand liberal positions of parties and national politi-
cians towards EU migration and European integration as evidence for improper
and undemocratic interests. There is a generally negative impression of the EU
across Danish and German commentary sections (see peaks at ’Negative EU atti-
tude’ in comparison to ’Positive EU attitude’, red lines, tables 4.3 and 4.4). Support
for growing economic and political integration within the EU is regarded a way
for politicians’ personal goals while, a the same time, this behaviour is perceived
to disregard the needs of their citizens.
Jeg brækker mig i den grad over vores politikere, som er mere interesseret
i deres rygte og det at få en plads i historiebøgerne end de er i Danmark
og danskerne alt imens vores gamle bliver behandlet dårligere end dyr og
patienterne ligger på gangene på vores hospitaler og fryser og skal de have
hjælp, skal de slå på et glas med en teske! Vores børn går en dyster fremtid
i møde.
[I am disgusted [not literally translated] by our politicians, who are more
interested in their own reputation and their desire be mentioned in history
books than they are in Denmark and Danes; while the elderly get treated
worse than animals and patients lie on the hallways of our hospitals and
freeze and if they need help, they have to strike the bell with a teaspoon
[idiomatic expression]! Our kids will face a dark future]
(Antallet af udenlandske studerender fra EU eksploderer, Ekstrabladet, 18.04.2013)
Yet, while Danish and German comment sections share negative EU attitudes,
they differ in the reasons for why they perceive the EU in negative terms. It seems
especially relevant to distinguish between concerns over sovereignty dominant in
Danish comment sections (peak at ’EU vs national sovereignty’, red line, 4.4) and
the sense of financial overburdening (peak at ’benefits, expenses, other support’,
red line, 4.3) among German commenters.
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Regarding Denmark, commenters are particularly concerned with the EU’s
influence on the independence of the Danish welfare system. In other words,
commenters regard the EU as constantly deciding about Danish matters.
Men sagen går jo langt videre end det rent økonomiske. Det handler jo om,
om EU skal diktere fordeling af danske (og udenlandske for den sags skyld)
velfærdsydelser. Kald det følelser, eller kald det holdninger og politik. Jeg
tror en ganske stor del af danskerne sidder med en følelse af, at det ikke
er noget vi er blevet spurgt om. Det var ikke det der var på menukortet
da politikerne bad os om at stemme om EU’s fortræffeligheder. Man har
røvrendt danskerne een gang for meget.
[The issue is much broader than only the economic aspect. It is about
whether the EU should dictate the distribution of Danish (and foreign, for
this sake) welfare benefits. Call it emotions or call it attitudes or politics. I
think a very big part of Danes feel that this is not anything we have been
asked about. This wasn’t on the menu when politicians asked us to vote on
the EU’s excellence [advantages, assumed irony]. Danes have been pranked
one time to often.]
(Danskere får tysk børnecheckfor 50 millioner, Ekstrabladet, 09.0.52014)
Since the EU ”dictates” who can access Danish welfare other than national
citizens, and national citizens have no say in the matter, this contributes to a sense
of political misrepresentation. As such, commenters perceive EU institutions to
dictate the rules of redistribution in Denmark towards foreigners while moderate
or pro-EU domestic politicians either seem incompetent or as a conspirator in
EU affairs. In this way, commenters perceive the EU to hinder Danish politicians
from taking self-determined decisions promoting Danish interests. Redistributing
social benefits to other EU citizens is perceived as democratically illegitimate and
imposed by the EU. Domestic politicians supposedly have their own interests at
stake in the EUwhich results in commenters’ perceivedmarginalization of Danish
citizens by ‘their own’ politicians.
Particulary visible in Danish comment sections, this understanding of the EU
as a danger to national sovereignty triggers nationalist interpretations of how
politicians allow EU influence to be imposed on a sovereign state. In this way,
commenters stylize ‘their country’ as a place that needs protection from the con-
sequences of European integration, such as immigration.
[…] Vi risikerer, som et lille land, at blive oversvømmet og løbet over ende,
langt hurtigere end et stort land. Hvorfor tager regeringen ingen hensyn
til det? Og hvorfor bruger de røde damer så mange milliarder på radikale
projekter, at danskerne rammes af den ene nedskæring og skatteforhøjelse
efter den anden? Det er også et illoyalt svigt overfor den oprindelige be-
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folkning, her danskerne, at nedlægge nationalstaten/ fædrelandet, ved at
nedlægge grænser, ved at acceptere fjernstyring udenom og hen over hove-
det på folket, og ved at favorisere indvandrere, så de tildeles boliger, penge,
jobs og andet forud for danskerne.
[We are risking, as a small country, to be flooded and run over much faster
than a big country. Why doesn’t the government consider this? And why
do the red ladies [assuming: female politicians from the social-democratic
bloc] use billions for radical projects, that Danes are hit by one cutback and
tax increase after the other? This is also a disloyal failure with regards to
the original population, here Danes, to cut down the nation state/homeland
by means of cutting down borders, by means of accepting distant control
and over the heads of the people, and by means of preferring immigrants,
to allocate to them housing, money, jobs and other things before the Danes.]
(No taxation without, Berlingske, 13.01.2014)
Not fulfilling the task of social protection, domestic politicians are perceived
to prioritise EU over national interests. This emphasises and ’either-or’ demand:
Either politicians are with national citizens or they are with the European Union.
In this way, commenters separate national, i.e. ’their’ interests from European
interests. In a similar way to assuming a zero-sum relationship between the
rights of nationals and the rights of migrants (s.a.), politicians’ involvement in
EU decision-making means to disregard national interests; thus leading to polit-
ical misframing. The recurring understanding of Denmark as ‘a small and unique’
country might be connected with the rather conflicted role it takes in EU political
decision-making processes. The recent EP campaigns in Denmark 2014 as well as
the national elections have proven successful for parties that run on rather Euro-
sceptic agendas, especially when it comes to the issue of immigration. One might
carefully relate this to Denmark’s rather peripheral role in EU politics: Danish
governments have traditionally taken a “puzzling position on European cooper-
ation” with EU Justice and Home Affairs in having a formal opt-out from the
migration and refugee policy (Adler-Nissen, 2014, p. 66).
Turning to the German comments, negative attitudes towards the EU depart
from a different perspective. Here, the theme of German responsibility for other
EU member states is more dominant. Among German commenters, politicians’
prioritising of European responsibilities over national ones becomes a matter of
questioning the political frame on the EU level. Notions of misframing become
visible in contesting German responsibility on the EU level (peak at ’benefits,
expenses, other support’, red line, 4.3). Unlike in the Danish case, where self-
determination is demanded and EU sovereignty perceived as a threat, people in
German comment debates perceive the EU as a cause for financial and economic
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overburdening on the national level. Politicians are perceived to stand by EU
politics despite the worsening living conditions of German citizens.
Die Politik redet uns Europa und deren Folgen schön , angeblich sei der
Friede damit zementiert worden. Ich sehe aber Unfrieden , Geldentwertung
, Enteignung , Sozialflucht , Subkulturenbildung , Verslumung , Verfall der
Infrastruktur, Bildungsmangel etc etc. Genug Sprengstoff für die Zukunft
dank ” Europa ” Die Sozialflüchtlinge und Scheinselbstständige Aufstocker
sind nur eine Zündschnur des Ganzen”.
[Politics sugarcoats Europe and its consequences, supposedly this is how
peacewas confirmed. But I see dispute, inflation, expropriation, social dump-
ing, establishment of subcultures, ghettoization, destroyed infrastructure,
lack of education etc. etc. Enough explosives in the future “thanks” to
Europe. Economic refugees and cheater are only the trigger of the whole
thing.]
(Rumänen und Bulgaren sind of Hartz-IV-Aufstocker, Welt, 16.01.2014)
As a consequence, migrants from the EU can now compete on the labour
market with lower wages or receive further social benefits. This notion becomes
particularly critical as commenters perceive that tax money has been flowing to
southern Europeanmember states, who have been affected by the economic crisis.
According to many commenters in the German sample, the government has taken
on too much political responsibility in the handling of the Eurocrisis. Migration
from crisis-affected countries represents a result of such ’well-intentioned’ re-
sponsibility.
Na, damit [immigration to Germany by crisis-affected migrants from South-
ern European countries] ist der dramatische Fachkräftemangel in Deutsch-
land ja behoben, uff, das wäre geschafft. Dann kann Deutschland weiter-
hin im Wohlstand leben… ach so ne, da ist ja noch die Eurokrise die Ende
des Jahres voll auf Deutschland durchschlägt und hier die Wirtschaft platt
machen wird… naja, vielleicht klappt’s nächstes mal mit der Sicherung des
Wohlstandes in Deutschland. Schaun mer mal ;-).
[Well, this way [by means of immigration to Germany by crisis-affected
migrants from Southern European countries] the dramatic skills shortage in
Germany is dissolved, phew, well done. Now Germany can continue living
in prosperity.. uh wait, there is still the Eurocrisis which is hitting Germany
at the end of the year and destroys the economy…. well, maybe we can
secure prosperity next time. Let’s see ;-)]
(Griechen und Spanier suchen ihr Heil in Deutschland, Welt, 27.06.2012)
In this way commenters contest what they understand as naïve solidarity with
other countries self-created economic problems. Established political parties have
been traditionally pro-EU and Germany is often declared as the driving motor of
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Europe, while it people agree that the country has dominantly benefited from the
EU (Diez Medrano 2003). However, in the comments, it seems that the financial
burdens have now began to outweigh the actual benefits of the EU: Mocking the
country as the ‘social welfare agency of Europe’ in which politicians sugarcoat
the effects migration has on domestic finances.
In sum, Danish and German commenters take different stances on the rela-
tionship between the EU and national sovereignty. Often among Danish com-
menters, the overall perception is that of Danish sovereignty under threat. In
German comment sections, negative EU attitudes relate to the perception of other
member states as a burden due to Germany’s role as a net payer supporting other
countries (‘Zahlmeister der EU’) and their supposedly continuous rescue efforts
due to responsibility in the EU. In this sense, the EU ’radicalises’ the debates in the
sense of citizens not only mistrusting their representatives but expressing a more
fundamental contestation about the relationship between national and EU polit-
ics. In other words, the analysis shows how perceptions of political misframing
do not only concern a critique of domestic democratic institutions, but also op-
position when these institutions engage in supranational decision-making. Com-
menters’ perceptions of misrepresentation also reflect discussions on a European
democratic deficit by challenging the legitimacy of domestic politicians’ involve-
ment in transnational affairs.
4.2.2.3 Summary
This part of the analysis has reported the findings regarding how critics of im-
migration in Danish and German commentary sections make sense of migration
issues regarding the relationship between themselves and political authorities.
Doing so, it has focused particularly on an investigation of these people’s sub-
jective notions of representation. Drawing from Fraser (2008), notions of repres-
entation can concern aspects regarding the role of domestic politicians and work-
ings of national democracy but also touch upon questions of the frame-setting for
the political community and in- and exclusion. In this sense, people’s notions of
representation make visible how they understand and contest citizenship as the
”frame of justice” (see Fraser, 2008, p. 16).
The analysis finds two recurring themes that emerge from both Danish and
German comment sections: A sense of political incompetence and distrust in
politics as a corrupted system. These findings suggests that commenters feel polit-
ically misrepresented due to political incompetence and even express notions of
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misframing where national politicians support or cooperate with EU institutions.
Regarding impressions of political incompetence, commenters complain about
domestic politicians’ supposed weak stance on migrants’ obligations to integrate
into their host societies and adapt to cultural and economic standards. In par-
ticular, the ’integration debate’ in German comment sections or in demands to
represent the interests of ’their own’ national citizens in the Danish sample. The
theme of political corruption and distrust indicates how commenters oppose the
EU as legitimate political authority. Such perceptions become salient with re-
gards to politicians in favour of the EU and declared economic advantages. In
Danish comments, the EU is perceived as a threat to national sovereignty which
is supposedly further exacerbated by pro-EU politicians. In German comments
the EU is perceived as an economic burden due to the political interdependencies
with other EU countries. Domestic politicians are perceived to prioritise these
responsibilities over national interests.
These differences regarding the latter aspect might in parts respond to the
exploration in Danish and German online articles. As shown in section 4.1, in
the German sample EU issues regarding foreign EU citizens and the role of the
EU seem to revolve around other EU member states, the UK and Switzerland. In
the Danish sample, EU issues are reported in relation to domestic issues regard-
ing a referendum and Danish policies to restrict foreign EU citizens’ receipt of
child benefits. The findings might therefore also reflect the role of the news as
agenda-setters and providers of cues that direct commenters’ attention to certain
addressees.
Despite these differences, the analysis points out that across national com-
ment sections there is an overwhelming sense of political misrepresentation and
misframing. In other words, this means that political statements of solidarity for
migrants in need or demand of migrants on the labour market are interpreted
as a disregard of national citizens to the advantage of ’undeserving migrants’, as
we will see in further detail in the following. What becomes visible is that com-
menters understand politicians to breach the rules and regulations of the political
community as claims of favouring treatment of migrants and indifference to ’their
own citizens’ suggest. While commenters understand to fulfil their part of the
bargain, i.e. to be ‘good citizens’, political representatives either fail to provide
proper political protection of national citizens in favour of migrants, or prioritise
European interests over national well-being.
Potentially, this relates to other research on comment sections as national
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platforms for ’issue’ or ’counter-publics’ (see Toepfl and Piwoni, 2015). They
might, for example, present an opportunity for people to express political dis-
trust more generally that is triggered by increased immigration numbers to both
countries or derives from risk perceptions during the economic crisis and the res-
ulting negative EU attitudes among certain groups in the national populations of
Denmark and Germany.
4.2.3 ’Undeserving’ outgroups
In the following the analysis engages with the ways in which critics of immig-
ration in comment sections evaluate deservingness of others and show how they
relate to notions of (mis-)recognition and mal- or redistribution. This part de-
scribes and analyses therefore how these people contest the relationship between
themselves and others and makes visible how they contest citizenship as a social
arrangement which organises the just social order of interaction between people.
The aim was therefore to gain deeper insights into the issues which the com-
menters, i.e. the critics of immigration, themselves highlight and raise regarding
the organisation of the national welfare community they share with other people.
Research on immigration attitudes has shown that people apply amultitude of cri-
teria that rank different social groups in their perceived deservingness (van Oors-
chot, 2006). An important pattern in European welfare states is that migrants are
commonly ranked as the most ’undeserving’ group (van Oorschot, 2006). People’s
criteria and evaluation of deservingness have been discussed under the broader
concept of ’welfare chauvinism’ that describes people’s negative sentiments of
immigration. These negative views on migration are based on the assumption
that migrants (or some specific ’migrant groups’) are undeserving because of cul-
tural attributes that supposedly implymigrants’ ’incompatibility’ with thewelfare
community or because of the belief that migrants are economically ’unfit’ and a
burden to this community (Kitschelt, 1997, p. 22). Welfare chauvinism is partic-
ularly visible in migration receiving welfare states (Kymlicka, 2015). It describes
attitudes and measures that support the provision of welfare benefits to national
citizens only by excluding particularly immigrants or the poor (J. Andersen and
Bjørklund, 1990).
As research in social psychology has shown, people’s evaluations of the un-
/deservingness of others are strongly rooted in their subjective justice motives,
that is, raise notions of justice (Feather, 1999; Callan, Sutton, and Dovale, 2010).
In other words, people’s evaluation of deservingness of a certain ’migrant group’
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make their notions of cultural recognition and economic redistribution regard-
ing these groups visible. Therefore, the analysis has focused on identifying such
’undeserving groups’ in the comments and on investigating which cultural or
socio-economic attributes are associated with their supposed deservingness. Fol-
lowing a cognitive perspective, the comment analysis has especially focused on
how commenters label, categorise and engage in ’groupism’ regarding migrants.
To do so, the analysis has acknowledged the explorative findings of the cluster
analysis for the inductive comment analysis. The initial assumptionwas that news
at least set agendas for readers and commenters in terms of what issue or group
to focus on. As I have mentioned above (see section 4.2.1), the clustering process
of Danish and German news articles could identify group-specific clusters which
make different categories of migrants visible. From there, the qualitative data
analysis proceeded inductively, that is, it focused not only on the entry points
that have been established via clustering but has paid specific attention to the
themes and patterns that emerge from the comments.
When looking at the overview of the coding structure regarding the ’addressee
category’ (see table 4.3 on page 141 as well as the outcome of the cluster analysis
(see section 4.1), the groups of ’refugees and asylum seekers’ and ’labourmigrants’
have emerged from the clustering of German news articles. ’(Perceived) Muslims’
and ’criminal foreigners’ evolved from the Danish sample. The group ’Eastern
Europeans’ could be identified in both Danish and German clusters.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 provide an overview of the tendencies regarding ’migrant
groups’ in the comments. Indeed, the analysis of the comments has found that
the ’groups’ that emerged as particular patterns from the clustering process have
received special attention in the comments as well: The codes with the three most
frequent references match the ’group-specific’ patterns in the article samples.34
Moreover, not only have these specific groups emerged as dominant categorisa-
tions of ’undeserving migrants’. They have also emerged in accordance with the
specific focus in the Danish and German article samples.
In light of these overlaps and matches between clusters and comments in both
the Danish and German samples, the qualitative comments analysis has focused
on an in-depth investigation of these five categorisations. In the following, I will
present the findings regarding commenters’ notions of redistribution and recog-
34Since the coding is qualitative and oriented at saturation of information, these num-
bers cannot be taken as representative percentage of how often these groups occurred.
Yet, in qualitative data analysis, the saturation principle is widely agreed upon as a tech-
nique to identify dominant themes and patterns (Bryman, 2012).
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nition with reference to these five groups.
German comments
Code labels Number of
references in
coding
’Criminal foreigners’ 323
’Good/bad foreigners’ 409
’EU citizens’ 271
’Eastern Europeans’ 514
’Southern EU citizens 130
’Labour migrants’ 622
’(Perceived) Muslims’ 237
’Non-EU citizens’ 109
’Refugees and asylum
seeker’
499
Table 4.5: Group-specific coding: Dominant representations in German commentary sec-
tions
Danish comments
Code labels Number of
references in
coding
’Criminal foreigners’ 388
’Good/bad foreigners’ 97
’EU citizens’ 129
’Eastern Europeans’ 365
’Southern EU citizens 11
’Labour migrants’ 252
’(Perceived) Muslims’ 322
’Non-EU citizens’ 54
’Refugees and asylum
seeker’
123
Table 4.6: Group-specific coding: Dominant representations in Danish commentary sec-
tions
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Figures 4.5 and 4.6 present an overview of the relationship between different
themes and groups in the comments and visualise how commenters categorise
the ’migrant groups’ that are dominant in Danish and German comment sections
respectively.
Figure 4.5: Three most ’undeserving groups’ of migrants in relation to commenters’ con-
cerns and demands in German comment sections
* = sub-category of EU citizens
** = EU citizens and regional origin if unspecificed in comments
*** = sub-category of ’immigration issue’
In similar fashion as the graphs regarding political actors (see section 4.2.2),
the above figures represent the coding based on frequency of references. They
present the dominant themes which describe the attributes, concerns and de-
mands commenters associate with the respective category of migrants. Each line
visualises the overlaps in the coding for the particular category of migrants. Peaks
in the lines indicate more overlaps. These peaks show dominant patterns of how
commenters characterise and label migrants and consider them as ’groups’ and
present focal points in the description and interpretation of the comments. Since
the analysis is based on qualitative coding, not the actual number of overlaps are
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Figure 4.6: Three most ’undeserving groups’ of migrants in relation to commenters’ con-
cerns and demands in Danish comment sections
* = sub-category of EU citizens
** = EU citizens and regional origin if unspecificed in comments
*** = sub-category of ’immigration issue’
161
important but the pattern of the lines in relation to other codes suggest relation-
ships between the ’migrant group’ and the other codes.
The figures provide a first glance of how Danish and German commenters
perceive, experience and construct these ’migrant groups’ as ’undeserving’. In
the German case, the peaks at the green lines (figure 4.5) suggest that ’labour
migrants’ are dominantly associated with social dumping, competition between
national and foreign citizens and often overlap with the category of ’Eastern
Europeans’. ’Refugees and asylum seekers’ (red line) are associated with distinc-
tions between ’bogus and real’ refugees (peak at ’good and bad foreigners’) and
are mainly being considered to be reliant on welfare support (peak at ’benefits,
expenses, other support’). Their rights to welfare are in doubt (peak at ’rights
discussions’) as well as the question whether politicians should grant these rights
(peak at ’domestic political actors’). ’Eastern Europeans’ (yellow line) are associ-
ated with working foreigners, indicated by the peak with ’labour migrants’ (s.a.).
They present the group that is most dominantly associatedwith relying onwelfare
support (peak at ’benefits, expenses, other support’).
In the Danish case (figure 4.6), ’criminal foreigners’ are associated especially
with other ’migrant groups’. The peaks in the green lines at ’Eastern European’
and ’(perceived) Muslims’ suggest that commenters engage in ’othering’ of crim-
inal foreigners according to socio-cultural attributes and differences. The peaks
at ’rights discussions’ and ’domestic political actors’ as well as at ’send them out’
indicate a strong sense of devaluing this ’migrant group’ in terms of rights and
stay in Denmark, as the more in-depth analysis below will describe. ’(Perceived)
Muslims’ (red line) as well as ’Eastern Europeans’ (yellow line) are also categor-
ised as ’cultural others’ who, despite their perceived cultural ’incompatibility’,
receive recognition of rights (peaks at ’rights discussion’). Similar to the German
comment sections, ’Eastern Europeans’ often overlap with categorisations as for-
eign workforce (peak at ’labour migrants’). This triggers notions of misrecogni-
tion and maldistribution of Danish and German national citizens. In combination,
the comment sections provide insight into how national critics of immmigration
perceive certain migrant groups as challenges to the social order of just interac-
tion within a shared community.
These patterns in the data suggests that German commenters focus particu-
larly on ’migrant groups’ which they associate with questions of economic dis-
tribution, while in Danish comment sections cultural recognition might play a
particular role. This comparison is, however, not clear cut. Indeed, all five ’un-
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deserving groups’ resonate in both samples. Mental processes such as categor-
ising, stereotyping, defining difference and boundaries, and ’othering’ are ’messy’
and present people’s interpretations and meaning-making (see Brubaker (2004)
and section 3.1.1).
Therefore, as aforementioned, these figures provide a first glance of tenden-
cies only regarding redistribution and recognition among commenters only. In
what follows, by using comment examples and excerpts from the comments, the
analysis is guided by these tendencies and describes and discusses them in fur-
ther detail. The section will start with the groups dominant in the German case,
’labour migrants’ and ’refugees and asylum seekers’. After this, it proceeds to
the dominant groups in the Danish case, ’criminal foreigners’ and ’(perceived)
Muslims’. ’Eastern Europeans’ in the last subsection emerges from both Danish
and German comments.
Before going into further detail, I will briefly address these patterns across
Danish and German comment sections in relation to their national contexts. This
will contextualise the in-depth discussions of the findings regarding each ’mi-
grant group’. The differences in dominance of categories across Danish and Ger-
man comment sections (’criminal foreigners’ and ’(perceived) Muslims’ in Danish
sample, ’labour migrants’ and ’refugees and asylum seekers’ in German sample,
’Eastern Europeans’ in both samples) indicate that Danish andGerman commenters
focus on different types of ’undeservingness’. By considering the contextual factors
for conflict over migration in Denmark and Germany, it is possible to relate these
similarities and differences in parts to the wide-spread concerns of welfare sus-
tainability also during the Eurocrisis but particularly to perceived incompatibility
with the national conceptions of ’good citizenship’.
As described in chapter 3 (see 3.2.1), both in Danish and German debates mi-
gration is often discussed as a challenge for the sustainability of the welfare sys-
tem. TheGermanwelfare system conditions access on labourmarket participation
(see Esping-Andersen, 1990; Sainsbury, 2012). In light of the focus on economic
deservingness in the empirical material, the understanding of labour as the cri-
terion for access to social welfare might be reflected in the comment sections
as well. Redistribution is concerned with determining what counts as economic
equality within a national welfare community (see Fraser, 2003; Fraser, 2008). The
focus on ’migrant groups’ in relation to their economic deservingness in German
comment sections might therefore imply that these critics of immigration under-
stand economic equality to be just when migrants are perceived as contributing
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to the labour market and do not present a potential ’burden’ to the national wel-
fare community of German citizens. This is further in line with the image of the
’good citizen’ in Germany which highlights diligence, self-education and labour
(Mouritsen, 2012). Deservingness then is confirmed based on the evaluation of the
migrant’s willingness to educate herself and to contribute to the society through
work (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) (see Mouritsen, 2012).
The Danish welfare state provides universal access on the conditions of resid-
ence or citizenship (see Esping-Andersen, 1990; Sainsbury, 2012; Martinsen and
Rotger, 2016). In a universalistic welfare state system economic equality, in prin-
ciple, guaranteed through residence or citizenship and not as strictly conditioned
on labour as it is the case in Germany (see Esping-Andersen, 1990; Sainsbury,
2012; Martinsen and Rotger, 2016). This might partially explain a tendency to
apply other, perhaps socio-cultural criteria of boundary-making between ’the de-
serving’ and ’the undeserving’. Recognition as a dimension of justice is concerned
with establishing what kinds of differences in a community are considered to be
acceptable (see Fraser, 2003; Fraser, 2008). In this sense, the focus on and categor-
isation of migrants as ’culturally different’ among Danish commenters points to a
tendency of cultural criteria for deservingness and devaluation of certain people
who are perceived to as being ’culturally incompatible’. Denmark supports a
rather ’active’ definition of citizenship based on the liberal and engaged fellow
citizen (medborgerskab) who actively engages in social and cultural life and up-
holds Danish values (Hervik, 2011; Mouritsen, 2012). This is also in harmony with
the understanding of the ’good citizen’ in Denmark who is defined through active
co-fellowship and the adoption of cultural and social attributes that characterise
’Danishness’ (Mouritsen, 2012).
Together, impressions of the different ’group-specific’ focal points in the com-
ments as well as the article samples match the differences in both countries con-
ceptions of ’the good citizen’ to certain degree. Danish commenters might tend
toward aspects touching upon recognition while the German focus on diligence
and labour in combination with the labour-market based access to welfare is
more prone to trigger notions of redistribution. In the following, the analysis
will provide in-depth insights into the categorisation of ’migrant groups’ which
further elaborate on the above mentioned findings so far. It will make use of tex-
tual examples and excerpts from the comments to illustrate the above mentioned
insights. This guarantees a certain degree of analytical reflexivity and increases
validity (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990).
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4.2.3.1 Labour migrants: Fears of economic competition in German comment
sections
Particularly in the German comment sections categorisations of labour migrants
become visible. In the Danish comments, this category is less expressed and if,
thenmostly with regards to central and eastern Europeans. Since in both samples,
migrants from central and eastern European countries form a dominant ’group’,
theywill be specifically addressed in a later section. Here, I will focus on howGer-
man commenters categorise and criticise labour migrants, i.e. ’labour migrants’
(see figure 4.5).
The analysis of comment sections particularly in the German case indicates
how labour migration triggers such a sense of ’losing out’ on the economic mar-
ket. In figure 4.5 the green line provides an overview of how ’labour migrants’
overlap with other themes. In particular, the highest peaks indicate that labour
migrants are associated with concerns of economic competition between national
and foreign labour (peak at ’nationals vs. foreigners’), a decrease of economic
opportunities and living conditions of German workers (peak at ’social dump-
ing’), and especially refer to labour migrants from central and eastern European
countries (peak at ’Eastern Europeans’). Such fears of being economically mar-
ginalised, i.e. becoming subjects to maldistribution, might be a more common
phenomenon during economic crises. Opinion polls show that the Eurocrisis has
contributed to a rise in political frustration and economic risk perceptions such
as unemployment (European Commission, 2016b). Such a sense of risk and insec-
urity is also common in the population of countries like Denmark and Germany
which are usually considered to be less affected by economic turmoil in com-
parison to countries such as Iceland, Spain, Greece, Portugal or Italy (European
Commission, 2016a; European Commission, 2016b).
Commenters discuss especially the reasons for this potential economic com-
petition between Germans and foreign workers. A recurring connection here is,
as the quote below illustrates, migration from people who are affected by eco-
nomic recession and low wages abroad.
[…]Gesteigerte Zuwanderung hat vorrangig etwas mit der katastrophalen
Lage im Ausland zu tun. Kenne Spanier, die hier arbeiten. Die tun das, weil
es hier Arbeit gibt, nicht weil Deutschland so cool und aufregend ist. Gäbe
es genug Jobs in Spanien, wären sie niemals ins achso beliebte Deutschland
eingewandert. Das ist nur eine Art von Armutszuwanderung. […]
[Increased immigration has most dominantly to do with the catastrophic
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situation abroad. Know Spaniards who work here. They do so because
there’s work here, not because Germany is so cool and exciting. If there
were enough jobs in Spain, they’d never immigrated into oh so beloved Ger-
many. This is only some sort of poverty immigration.]
(Einwanderungsrepublik Deutschland beliebt wie nie, Welt, 25.05.2014)
Economic recession abroad creates perceptions of having to compete with
more foreigners over work. These impressions of competitions relate to the as-
sumed skill set of labour migrants in Germany. Since people can immigrate to
Germany out of economic deprivation, the problem is that not qualification but
poverty dictates who wants to work in Germany (see ’poverty immigration’).
This can be especially emphasised by means of the term ’Fachkräftemangel’
that is put in parentheses to mark ambiguity or irony. The term refers to the pub-
lic debates about a skills shortage or lack of skilled labour in Germany. Among
commenters, the lack turns into a lie. The argument is that this supposed lack
should be filled with German graduates and the unemployed. Instead, what hap-
pens is an increase of labour migration from countries where salaries are lower
and educational standards do not apply.
Mir kann niemand erzählen das jeder Arbeitslose in Deutschland so unqual-
ifiziert und nutzlos ist. Dann muss man die Leute eben umschulen! Aber
das Problem ist doch vielmehr, dass hierzulande niemand für 2€ die Stunde
arbeiten möchte (völlig zurecht!), wie soll man schließlich davon leben⁈
 Also braucht man halt billige Arbeitskräfte aus dem Ausland die für jeden
Cent glücklich sind. Und damit dies funktioniert erfindet man halt einen
vermeintlichenMangel. Wobei derName ”Fachkräftemangel” eher unzutref-
fend ist.  Passender wäre: ”Billigkräftemangel”.
[No one can tell me that every unemployed person in Germany is that un-
qualified and useless. In this case, people have to be retrained! But isn’t the
problem rather that no one wants to work for 2 Euros per hour (absolutely
understandable!), how can one live from that⁈ Moreover, there simply is
a need for cheap workers from abroad who are happy about every cent.
For this to work does one invent the supposed lack [of skilled labour]. By
the way, the name ”skilled labour shortage” is not very appropriate. Better
would be: ”cheap labour shortage”. ]
(Arbeitsmarktforscher: Deutschland profitiert, Spiegel, 27.12.2013)
These impressions are further nurtured by fears of ’social dumping’ (see 4.5
peak at green line). The peak presents the frequent association of ’labour mi-
grants’ with concerns of decreasing living standards and wage levels in the com-
ments. This association is stronger for this category than for the other ’migrant
groups’ (’Eastern Europeans’, yellow line and ’refugees and asylum seekers’, red
line). Commenters construct a chain of negative consequences, a vicious circle
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of maldistribution of German citizens. There is a sense that foreign - said to be
’cheap’ - labour is preferred over national employees. Due to the political failure
or unwillingness to protect national labour markets, foreign workers put pres-
sure on national wage levels and promote the further development of the low
wage sector which then marginalises unemployed Germans who expect higher
salaries.
In this way, German commenters discuss to what extent skilled labour mi-
gration, that is, highly qualified migrants benefit the labour market, yet doubt
that this type of immigration actually takes place. Qualified labour migrants are
considered as those who can contribute to a developed German labour market.
Such comments are often characterised by stereotypical assumptions of other
countries’ educational standards. Qualification and skills are determined through
country of origin. Here, ’Eastern Europeans’ are generally regarded as less qual-
ified workers.
Ich kenne einen Anästhesisten, der schon viele Jahre freiberuflich u.a. im
Osten gearbeitet hat, insbesondere in Sachsen. Die Krankenhäuser sind da
voll von Azubis aus Polen, Tschechien, Ukraine etc und sogar aus Kasach-
stan. Viele sind ganz gut, einige richtig gut aber auch ein ganzer Haufen,
der zu nichts zu gebrauchen ist. […] Wenn die dann gelernt haben, wie es
geht und auch ein gutes Deutsch drauf haben, sind die natürlich aus diesen
Ausschussbuden weg in die guten Häuser. Die schlechten Ärzte bleiben da.
[I know an anaesthetist who has freelanced several years a.o. in the East,
especially in Saxony. The hospitals are crowded with apprentices from Po-
land, the Czech Republic, Ukraine etc and even from Kazakhstan. Many are
ok, some quite good but there’s a whole bunch of people who are of no use.
As soon as they have learned enough and speak good German, they leave
again to better places. The bad doctors stay.]
(ZugewanderteMediziner: Doktor Kannitverstan, Spiegel Online, 04.11.2012)
These perceived developments exacerbate living conditions in German soci-
ety since cheap labour is preferred which leads to increasing unemployment rate
among Germans. The ways in which German commenters categorise ’labour mi-
grants’ is thus connected to a broader sense of marginalisation of German citizens;
those who have been educated in Germany and struggle with neoliberal tenden-
cies on a more and more international labour market.
The categorisation of ’labour migrants’ among German commenters might
illustrate more general attitudes of people who are critical of immigration. As
the Eurocrisis has exacerbated economic risk perceptions, public debates about
skills shortage and integrated labour markets are likely to appear as particularly
167
counter-productive with regards to these risks.
4.2.3.2 Refugees and asylum seekers: Conditional solidarity in German com-
ment sections
Especially in German comment sections, the role of the refugee or asylum seeker
receives attention.
Commenters tend to perceive (identified) refugees typically from an economic
perspective. Particularly in German comments concerns and demands over in-
creasing immigration rates from people in need for support become visible. At
the core of these debates one finds a type of conditional solidarity based on the
distinction between ’real’ and ’bogus’ refugees (see peak of red line at ’good and
bad foreigners’, figure 4.5) and statements regarding the rights to welfare these
different groups should or should not have (peak at ’rights discussions’). Much
attention is given to national politics (peak at ’domestic political actors’). Com-
menters demand here are stricter political stance on inhibiting ’bogus refugees’
from immigrating to Germany.
More precisely, in the German comment sections there are lively debates
about refugees deserving of support and ’bogus’ refugees who are perceived as
undeserving. Generally, a majority of commenters assumes that only a small
amount of asylum seekers in Germany deserve support and protection by the
German state.
Nochmal. Es kommen nicht die Ärmsten derArmen, die vomHunger getrieben
hier Zuflucht suchen. Diese können sich das Schlepperticket gar nicht leisten.
Abgesehen davon ist schon interessant, wie viele Männer jungen und mit-
tleren Alters nach Ihrer Theorie weit überproportional von Hunger bet-
roffen wären. Es kommen u.a. Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge, die sich einzig ein
BESSERES Leben versprechen, bei dem es nicht ums existentielle geht, son-
dern um Luxusgüter. Über diese Gruppe sprechen wir hier. Dass wir Leute,
die aus humanitären Gründen (pol. Verfolgung, etc.) fliehen, aufnehmen
sollten, darüber herrscht breiter Konsens. Also vermengen Sie nicht immer
diese beiden Gruppen, denn schlussendlich erreichen Sie dadurch nur, dass
mehr Bundesbürger für eine Totalabschottung plädieren.
[Again. It’s not the poorest of the poor who seek refuge here and are driven
by hunger. Those would not even be able to pay for the ticket of the traf-
ficker. Besides that, it is interesting how many young and middle-aged men
would be suffering from hunger in your [another commenter] view. There
are a.o. economic refugees who come who merely hope for a BETTER life,
which does not refer to existential aspects but about luxury goods. This is
the group we are talking about here. It is commonly agreed on that we take
in people who flee out of humanitarian reasons (political prosecution, etc,).
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Therefore stop confusing these two groups since, after all, you only promote
that federal citizens plead for more, total isolation.]
(Die Union und die haftierten Asylbewerber, ZEIT, 13.05.2014)
The quote above illustrates how commenters define the boundaries between
a refugee deserving support and people illegitimately claiming to be in need of
such support. For instance, the term “Wirtschaftsflüchtling” (see comment above,
engl. translation ’economic refugee’) describes a person fleeing due to economic
deprivation. Among commenters such economic reasons are not considered a
valid justification to deserve access and rights in Germany.
Through determining the deservingness of others commenters draw boundar-
ies not only between ’legitimate refugees’ and asylum seekers who are potentially
not eligible for being granted official refugee status in Germany, but also between
themselves and the incoming group. Such a boundary might be described best as
maintaining a beneficent-benefactor relationship. The perception of oneself as
being entitled to decide about deservingness is related to what Zick, Hövermann,
and Krause (2012) refer to as Ideologie der Ungleichwertigkeit (engl. translated
here to ’ideology of unequal worthiness’): Devaluation of ’others’ can lead to an
assumption of superiority and being in charge to determine the attributes and
status of the one that is unequal. ’Bogus’ refugees are those who are ’not edu-
cated or skilled enough’ and therefore ’seek after’ social benefits elsewhere. Due
to their assumed lack of skills, these ’others’ are perceived as ’undeserving’ since
they are unlikely to participate in the labour market. Accordingly, resources that
are redistributed to ’the undeserving’.
Yet, the inclusion of those supposedly ’undeserving outgroups’ do to polit-
ical norms and lack of border checks poses a threat to the welfare system. As
resources are redistributed to ’the undeserving’, they are being taken away from
national ’good citizens’. Hence, it can be argued that commenters apply some
sort of conditional solidarity on refugees. Consequently, developing solidarity
towards people in need maintains an asymmetrical relationship between ‘us, the
helpers’ and ‘them, receiving help’.
Possibly, these debates shed light on commenters’ own perceptions of social
mobility and distributive justice in Germany: limited resources, overburdened
administration and incompetent political decision-making to protect the weak in
society.
Warum heißt es immer Flüchtlinge? Es handelt sich vor allem um illegale
Einwanderer. Undwenn die Verhältnisse in Afrika nachAnsicht der Grünen
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und Roten so schrecklich und hoffnungslos sind, wäre es dann nicht eine
große Gnade Europas, den afrikanischen Kontinent zu rekolonialisieren?
Die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse in Europa gefallen den
Afrikanern ja offensichtlich so sehr (sonst wären sie nicht so begierig da-
rauf, selbst unter Lebensgefahr unbedingt hierher zu kommen), dass sie
diese auch in Afrika sicherlich außerordentlich schätzen würden. Wie es
mal ein junger arbeitsloser Nordafrikaner ganz freimütig ausdrückte: ”En-
tweder die Europäer kommen hierher und schaffen hier Ordnung, oder wir
kommen zu ihnen.”
[Why does it always say refugees? This is mainly about illegal immigrants.
And if, according to the Greens and the Reds [refers to left-leaning political
parties], the conditions in Africa are so horrific and desperate, would it not
be a great deed of Europe to re-colonise the African continent? TheAfricans
obviously like the political and economic conditions in Europe that much
(otherwise they weren’t that eager to risk their lives coming here), that they
would appreciate those in Africa as well. As one young, unemployed North-
ern African put it frankly: ”Either the Europeans come here and establish
law and order, or we’re coming to them.”]
(Bei Einwanderer-Flut erlaubt EU Grenzkontrollen, Welt, 30.05.2013)
Particularly the rights discussions, which are more dominant in this category
than in others in the German sample (see peak at ’rights discussion’, red line,
figure 4.5), represent broader questions of a perceived responsibility to identify
and care for those peoplewho are perceived as to be ’legitimately’ in need. Despite
the tendency toward an asymmetrical relationship between the host society as
potential ’helper’ and the claimants for help, commenters show general support
for the constitutional right to seek asylum. While some in these discussions claim
that the asylum law should be further extended, the majority perceives politicians
to stretching its principles too far. Often, commenters refer to distinctions of
deservingness and appropriate responsibilities in relation to national and local
capacities to accommodate ’legitimate’ refugees:
Sie können das Grundrecht auf Asyl wie eine Monstranz vor sich her tra-
gen, dennoch werden Sie sehen , dass eine feindliche Einstellung der Bürger
vor Ort , sowie eine menschenunwürdige Unterbringung dieses Recht aus-
höhlen können. Kaum einer wird Personen dieses Recht verweigern wollen,
wenn eine ”existentielle Gefährdung ”vorliegt: politische Verfolgung oder
Flucht vor Krieg. Die Kapazitäten für diese Verfolgten Personen müssen
ihnen auch bereitstehen und nicht durch Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge blockiert
werden, deren Verfahren endlos dauern.
[You can refer to the basic right to asylum as often as you want, yet you will
see that a hostile attitude of citizens on site aswell as an unbearable situation
could undermine this right. Hardly anyone would want to deny this right to
people at ”existential risk”: political prosecution and refuge fromwar. There
also have to be capacities available for these prosecuted persons and these
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should not be blocked by economic refugees whose acceptance procedure
will take forever.]
(Kretschmann rechtfertigt Ja zum Asyl-Kompromiss, ZEIT, 19.09.2014)
In this way, ”economic refugees” are seen as burden to the welfare system.
Perceptions of a permanent lack of self-sufficiency and dependants of the German
welfare system regarding refugees, people assume responsibility to select between
the deserving and undeserving. This again indicates perceptions of superiority.
Taken together, while there are comments with harsh rejections of refugees in
general, the majority of these comments displays discussions on responsibilit-
ies towards those perceived to be in need of support. Deservingess becomes a
way to draw social boundaries that are believed to be necessary to uphold living
standards in Germany and to secure the capacities of the welfare system. Thus,
redistribution is justified if the criteria of economic deservingness are met.
4.2.3.3 Criminal foreigners: Concerns about security in Danish comment sec-
tions
Another way of categorising migrants in the comments emerges with regards to
crime. In the Danish sample, the ’criminal foreigner’ is one of the three most
dominant categorisations, while not as much emphasis can be found among Ger-
man commenters (see tables 4.6 and 4.5). The migration-securitisation nexus and
the role mass media play in the framing of immigration as a security issue has
already received much scholarly attention. While securitisation frames have been
found to be dominant in press coverage, there is disagreement on whether secur-
ity frames have replaced economic frames of immigration (see Caviedes, 2015).
The cluster analysis identified specific clusters about security issues and immig-
ration in the Danish sample (see section 4.1.1).
The qualitative analysis of comments suggests that particularly in Danish
comment sections ’criminal foreigners’ spark debates in combination with claims
over stricter political stance on immigration. Referring to crime in the com-
ments frequently overlapswithmigrants from central and eastern European coun-
tries and (perceived) Muslims (see peak at ’Eastern Europeans’ and ’(perceived)
Muslims’, green line, figure 4.6). The group-specific focus on ’criminal foreign-
ers’ is based on describing a group that has distinct socio-cultural attributes (i.e.
originates from a certain region, or has a certain religion). This suggests a focus
in the comments on ’cultural compatibility’ and the evaluation of deservingness
based on assumed group differences. These debates might therefore be indicative
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of notions of recognition. In the following, I will further describe and discuss such
engagement in ’group-making’ in the comments based on illustrative comments
in the material.
A recurring pattern that points to commenters’ focus on cultural deserving-
ness and notions of recognition emerges as questions of whether ’criminal for-
eigners’ are entitled to claim rights in Denmark becomes particularly visible in
the prevalence of (see peak at ’rights discussions’, green line, figure 4.6). In the
comment sections there is a strong sense that by committing crimes foreigners
revoke their right to stay in Denmark and should therefore be excluded from so-
ciety, even expelled (peak at ’send foreigners out’, green line).
Folk der har fået statsborgerskab, men som bliver ved med at lave kriminal-
itet, skal have deres statsborgerskab ophævet. Og er det hjemmeboende
børn, der gentagne gange begår kriminalitet, så kyl hele familien ud af
landet, uanset om de påstår at de vil blive smidt i fængsel eller dræbt.
[People who get citizenship but who continue committing crimes should
have their nationality [citizenship] revoked. And if it’s the children who
still live at home that commit crimes repeatedly, then drive the entire family
out of the country, even if they claim that they will be thrown in prison or
get killed.]
(Levacovic må blive i Danmark, Ekstrabladet, 02.04.2014)
This pattern points to moral or normative ideas of citizenship. Thewithdrawal
of citizenship is considered an appropriate strategy for those people who are not
perceived to be Danish despite having a Danish passport. This further implies a
sense of being emotionally attached to Danish nationhood that makes boundar-
ies between ’the other’ versus ’us, the Danes’ visible. For example, commenters
explain how foreigners are more prone to commit crimes as they are indifferent
to Danish traditions and way of life.
The demands resulting from this are directed at national politicians, who have
been too naive or incompetent to foresee and prevent or deal with such a situation.
Here, commenters connect rising immigration rates with rising criminal activity
in the country. National politicians fail to implement this demanded exclusion of
criminals (peak at ’domestic political actors, green line, figure 4.6).
Den røde regering foretrækker jo tom signal- og symbol politik, fremfor ef-
fektiv handling. (kick-starten, akutpakken osv., osv.) Og de radikale har jo
som speciale at forkæle forbryderne og behandle dem med fløjlshandsker.
(det skal dog indrømmes at også VKOs retspolitik var en sølle omgang.)
Kun eet parti har ønsket grænsekontrollen genindført, og derfor foregår der
stadig en stor indstrømning af kriminelle bander fra over 50 lande. Derfor er
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bl.a. mængden af villa-indbrud, røverier og overfald nærmest eksploderet.
Men fint hvis regeringen virkelig vil begynde at vise interesse for at be-
skytte danskerne mod den omsiggribende kriminalitet, ved at udnytte de
nye muligheder for udvisning
[The red government prefers an empty politics of symbolism over effect-
ive action. (kickstart, acute package aso., aso. [referring to integration
policies]) And the Radikale [political party] have specialised in spoiling
criminals and in treating themwith nicely. (it should be said that also VKO’s
[government coalition] judicial policies were poor.) Only one party has de-
manded to reintroduce border controls, and this is why there is still a flood
of criminal gangs coming in from over 50 countries. This is why a.o. the
number of villa break-ins, robbery, and assaults has almost exploded. But
fine if the government really wants to show an interest in protecting Danes
against the increase in criminal activity everywhere by exploiting the new
possibilities for expulsion]
(Ny domstol praksis øger mulighedern for at sætte kriminelle udlændinge
på porten, Berlingske, 28.11.2014)
Generally, there is a strong sense in the comments that ’criminal foreigners’
have a negative effect on social peace for Danes, where people cannot feel save
anymore and higher security measures for the protection of Danes in everyday
life are necessary. For example, when addressing the situation in Danish prisons,
commenters often demand that the Danish state should not be burdened with
the crime of foreign people who supposedly exploit the high living conditions in
Denmark even in prisons.
Nu har verden jo ændret sig en del de sidste 20 år.. For 20 år siden havde
vi ikke det store problem med udviste kriminelle der få dage senere stod
ved grænsen igen.. Dengang kunne vi have stoppet dem, det kan vi ikke i
dag.. Billedet har ændret sig og fremover vil vi have problemer med folk
som forsøger at komme ind i landet igen. Det er efterhånden ikke nogen
hemmelighed at der er en del kriminelle som gør hvad de kan for at komme
til Danmark , dels fordi det er uhindret og skulle de blive taget af politiet og
ryge i fængsel, så er det ikke andet end en ferie på 5 stjernet hotel.. Danmark
er så meget til grin over for de kriminelle og det vil vi fortsætte med at være,
indtil vi smækker døren i…..
[So the world has changed quite a lot the last 20 years.. 20 years ago we
didn’t have that big a problemwith expelled criminals who, a few days later,
stood at the boarder once again.. Back then we could have stopped them,
that we cannot do that today.. The picture has changed and in the future we
will have problems with people who are trying to get back into the country.
It is no longer a secret that there are quite a few criminals who do whatever
they can to come to Denmark, partly because they are free to do so and if
they should get caught by the police and go to jail it is just like a holiday in
a five star hotel.. Denmark is a laughing stock to the criminals and it will
continue to be so until we slam the door.]
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(Bendt Bendtsen: Grænsebomme hjælper ikke, Ekstrabladet, 09.05.2014)
Deviant behaviour by migrants implies their cultural and social ’incompatib-
ility’ with Danish society. Criminal migrants are thus not perceived to have the
same rights as criminals of Danish nationality. This categorisation therefore in-
dicates that commenters oppose the inclusion of migrants if they perceive them
as criminals. In this way, notions of deservingness refer here to evaluations of
certain groups in terms of ’social or cultural value’. Such an evaluation of ’lower
worthiness’ of a group then justifies the exclusion from certain privileges in the
national community, most generally, social participation. Moreover, deviant be-
haviour from ’good citizenship’, that is harming social peace and being destructive
of social goods (i.e. the opposite of what it means to be a ’good fellow citizen’)
justifies exclusion from national territory. As illustrated above, the latter aspects
are also tied to notions of misrepresentation and misrecognition of Danish cit-
izens when politicians fail to protect the needs of the national citizen (see also the
section on political actors, 4.2.2).
As indicated above, the coding shows a tendency in the comments to cat-
egorise ’Eastern Europeans’ and ’Muslims’ as ’criminal foreigners’. Since both
categories are dominant in the Danish comments (see table 4.6), I will address
these issues in-depth in the following.
4.2.3.4 (Perceived) Muslims: Impressions of cultural incompatibility in Dan-
ish comment sections
Indeed, it has been argued that conceptions of incompatibility of Islam in Den-
mark are subject to frequent and heated debates (Hervik, 2011). Muslims are dom-
inantly seen as ’incompatible’ with Danish culture which suggests cultural eval-
uations of ’deservingness’ in this regard. Commenters focus on undemocratic as-
pects of Islam while emphasizing Danish democratic norms and principles, thus
excluding those Muslims, who practice Islam, by negating the compatibility in
Danish society. The discussions in the Danish comments suggests an understand-
ing of rights as ’symbolic resource’ which becomes rare if shared with ’culturally
others’ (peak at ’rights discussions’ and ’nationals vs. foreigners’ in figure 4.6).
This indicates notions of misrecognition of the western, national citizen in favour
or ’Muslim groups’.
The analysis shows a tendency in the Danish comments to associate Muslims
with crime acts (peak at ’criminal foreigners’, red line ). As briefly addressed in a
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section earlier, commenters refer to violence when describing criminal behaviour
of people they identify as Muslims.
Jeg har ALDRIG, ALDRIG hørt, læst eller på anden måde erfaret at en etnisk
dansker sammen med sine brødre er taget på tæsketur, BARE fordi deres
søster var blevet forelsket i en dreng. Men vi har efterhånden talrige ek-
sempler på dette, fra muslimske indvandrere. Og hver eneste gang, savner
vi at folk fra det muslimske samfund træder frem og fordømmer det. Man
tier, fordi de selv er bange for de kræfter der findes i de radikale kredse. Og
derved forstærker de det faktisk.
[I have NEVER, NEVER heard, read or in any other way learned that an
ethnic Dane has gone on a spree togetherwith his brothers just because their
sister had fallen in love with a boy. But we now have numerous examples
of this from Muslim immigrants. And never ever do we see people from the
Muslim society stepping forward to condemn it. They keep quiet because
they themselves are scared of forces at play in the radical circles. And this
way they are actually reinforcing it.]
(Brødre domt for at skære øre af i ’æresrelateret’ sag slipper for udvisning,
Politiken, 12.11.2013)
Muslims are perceived committing crimes that are supposedly motivated by
radical religious beliefs. One the one hand, commenters address such religious
crimes by demanding restrictions on immigration of people from countries where
Muslim populations are in the majority. This is seen as a means to protect social
peace and to reduce social problems in Denmark. On the other hand, commenters
address these perceived problems ofmanyMuslims tending to commitmore crime
than Danes from a cultural-deterministic view: Muslims are perceived as ‘not
fitting’, i.e. ’culturally incompatible’, and as a cultural threat to ’Western’ societies.
This has also been found in an analysis of Canadian commentary in which the
author refers to commenters’ cultural racism ”as a methodology for sorting out”
(Park, 2013, p. 585), i.e. to determine ’cultural deservingness’. In similar vein,
Islam practices and being Muslim is perceived to be incompatible with Danish
society in general, its norms and values more precisely.
What makes successful integration, however, is not clearly reflected in the
comments. The failure to integrate is suspected to stem from a lack or will or ef-
fort which makes seems to confirm commenters’ views on many Muslims’ hostile
attitudes towards national values. Particularly here the morality of ’good citizen-
ship’ becomes visible: It refers to cultural, nationalistic conceptions of citizenship
as citizens are to value nationhood and its traditions. Furthermore, particularly
in the Danish comment sections ’Muslim incompatibility’ occurs in discussions of
rights and values. Danish commenters perceive Danish culture and society as lib-
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eral, tolerant and advanced. In fact, these rights discussions do not somuch centre
on demands to limit Muslims’ rights to participate in Danish society. Rather,
these discussions evolve around Danish endorsements of universal human rights
in Western societies to which people of Muslim belief do not subscribe. This is
why a consolidation ofMuslimswith commenters’ imagined societies is categoric-
ally excluded. Besides from this, Danish commenters refer to the rights of Danish
citizens which they perceive to be at risk.
Ekstremisme eller ej, så bruger den muslimske befolkningsgruppe konstant
sin religion til at gennentrumfe samfundsændringer og specielle hensyn,
ergo en politisk ideologi, hvis de vil hahalslagte må de sku selv blive slagtere
hvis du spørgermig, i stedet for at halalslagtning bliver normen i bl.a. Børne-
haver. der er dyngevis af andre eksempler hvis du skulle tørste, bare kig ud
i Danmark. Vil du stå model til at bl.a ligestillingen bliver truet? Eller du vil
måske hellere have at dine børnebørn og oldebørn deler senge med telte?
Vores Nations samfundsværdier er truet på livet, du vil måske se på hellere
se på mens vores velfærdsmodel og danskhed smuldrer?
[Extremists or not, the Muslim population is constantly using its religion to
push through changes in society and special considerations [as in rights],
ergo a political ideology, if they want to [have] halal-butchered meat they
bloody well have to become butchers themselves if you ask me, instead of
halal-butchering becomes the norm in for instance kindergardens. There are
lots of examples if you should need them, just have a closer look at Denmark.
Will you put up with, for instance gender equality gets threatened? Or
maybe you would rather have your grandchildren or great-grandchildren
to share their bed with tents? The values of the society of our Nation are
being seriously threatened, perhaps you rather want to stand by and watch
while our welfare model and Danish values fall apart?]
(Løkke: Luk Danmark for dem, der ikke vil, Ekstrabladet, 08.08.2014)
Such evaluations of deservingness with reference to socio-cultural attributes
often relate to rejection of recognition for Muslims, or even demands for their
expulsion, based on the suspicion that they lack the will to integrate and have
an unfavourable view on Danish values. Allowing someone who perceived as
unwilling to subscribe to amajority belief and value system leads to the perception
among commenters that these Danish values and rights risk to become restricted.
Muslimer kan som hovedregel ikke integreres og slet ikke assimileres i vest-
lige samfund. Det viser erfaringen fra alle de lande, hvor man har lukket
dem ind. Det er Venstre nu så småt ved at erkende og indrette sin politik
efter, men Det konservative Folkeparti kan eller vil ikke forstå, at hvis Dan-
mark ikke skal ende som en ruin, er vi tvunget til at sortere indvandrere
efter kultur og det vil i praksis sige lukke for muslimer.
[In general, Muslims cannot be integrated into and not at all be assimil-
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ated to the western society. Experiences from all the other countries where
they’ve been let in show this. Gradually Venstre [political party] realises
this and adopts its politics accordingly, but the Conservative party can’t or
doesn’t want to understand that, if Denmark should not be ruined, we are
forced to sort immigrants according to their culture and this means practic-
ally to not let Muslims in.]
(Mennesker først, Jyllands Posten, 30.09.2014)
More generally, the task of interpreting the categorisations of ’Muslims’ in
the comments in the context of (im-)migration in EU welfare states Denmark and
Germany is a tricky one. The fact that the group of ’Muslims’ emerges as one
of the most pronounced categories in the Danish comment sample collected with
keywords to target articles on immigration and migrants shows how a religious
minority is perceived as a ’foreign other’. This ’othering’ is achieved by boundary-
making mechanisms in which both Danish and German commenters engage. Yet,
media cues as well as commenters’ own understandings of cultural deserving-
ness regarding Islam seem to have a specific prevalence in Danish debates about
immigration.
4.2.3.5 Migrants from central and eastern European countries: Categorisa-
tions of ’second class Europeans’ across Danish and German comment
sections
Migrants from central and eastern European regions, to some extent Roma people,
emerge as a dominant group of ’undeserving migrants’ in both Danish and the
German comment sections. With the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 mobile
people from central and eastern EU member states have gained access to Danish
and German labour markets. Access for Bulgarians and Romanians was gran-
ted after 2011. Furthermore, survey results relate the Eastern Enlargements to
citizens’ perceptions about increasing labour competition during the economic
crisis and anti-immigration sentiments in Europe (European Commission, 2015b).
The findings of this comment analysis show that Danish and German commenters
perceive and categorize people from the central and eastern European regions as
mostly undeserving, yet with different focal points. Both in Denmark and Ger-
many they are associated with low-skilled labour (see peaks at ’labour migrants’,
yellow lines in figures 4.5 and 4.6). Yet, in Danish comments they are described to
have a tendency to petty crime or obtain social welfare under false pretences (peak
at ’criminal foreigners’, yellow line in figure 4.6). Here, categorisations of ’crim-
inal foreigners’ (as in an earlier section) match with perceptions of rejections of
177
Danish values (peak at ’nationals vs. foreigners’, yellow line in figure 4.6). These
aspects are absent in German comment sections where a comparatively strong fo-
cus is put on questions of redistribution concerning ’Eastern Europeans” welfare
receipt (peak at ’benefits, expenses, other support’ and ’labour migrants’, yellow
line in figure 4.5).
That being said, differences between Danish and German comment debates
can be found regarding commenters’ evaluations of deservingness for ’Eastern
Europeans’. Among Danish commenters people from the ’enlargement countries’
of 2004 and 200735 are often believed to be labour migrants having created a new
low wage sector in Denmark and threatening Danish jobs with higher wages.
Concerns about ’wage dumping’ relate to concerns over economic competition
between nationals and labour migrants the new member states (see peaks at ’so-
cial dumping’ and ’nationals vs foreigners’, yellow line, figure 4.6). Danish com-
menters discuss the lack of regulations for greater economic protection.
[…] Hvis det bliver lettere at få dagpenge i Danmark for andre EU borgere
( Især østeuropæere ) så vil der ske det at, lande som Rumænien, Bulgarien,
Letland og lignende vil miste borgere i hobetal. Resultatet vil så være at,
landene mister skatteindtægter og bliver dermed endnu fattigere. Men så
skal de vel bare have hjælp fra EU ikke? Jeg kan oplyse at, der bor rigtig
mange Rumænere i de andre EU lande. Og det drejer sig ikke bare om 10,000
eller 100,000 men flere millioner. En enkelt kommentar mere. Man skal her
i Danmark have haft arbejde i et år for at, få dagpenge. Synes du ikke at, det
er fornuftig nok Gustav Uffe Nymand? ”Først yde så nyde”. Og som salmen
lyder ”De gode græd de onde lo, hvor ingen hegne kun torne gro” God Dag
til alle.
[If it gets easier to receive unemployment money in Denmark for other EU
citizens (especially Eastern Europeans), this will lead to the fact that coun-
tries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia and others loose citizens in a store
number. Consequently, these countries lack taxpayers and become even
poorer. But then they should just have help from the EU, right? I can say
that there are quite many Romanians living in other EU countries. And it is
not only about 10,000 or 100,000 but several millions. One more comment.
Here in Denmark does one have to be employed for one year before one [is
entitled to] receive unemployment money. Don’t you think, this is sensible
enough, Gustav Uffe Nymand? “Merit, then pleasure” and as the [assumed
biblical] verse goes [no translation]. Have a nice day.]
(EU undersøger danske dagpenge, Jyllands Posten, 24.08.2013)
In the German sample there are doubt and cynicism over the lack of skilled
workers, an issue that has become popular among politicians and the media to
35These are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia in 2004; Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.
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refer to as ’Fachkräftemangel’. While these labels are more fluid than clear dis-
tinctions between Danish and German discussions, the analysis nevertheless in-
dicates that commenters in the German sample are similarly critical of migrants
from central and eastern Europe and suspect them to obtain social benefits under
false pretences or are generally interested in social benefits but not in employment
(peak at ’benefits, expenses, other support’, yellow line, figure 4.5)
[…] Es gab auch bereits positive Gerichtsurteile für das Recht auf Sozial-
leistungen, obwohl Einwanderer bisher nicht auf dem Arbeitsmarkt tätig
waren. Ein Problem stellt aber auf jeden Fall Zuwanderungen aus bestim-
mten Ländern Osteuropas da. Hier hat sich inzwischen ein reges Geschäfts-
modell entwickelt, indem ganze Busse Richtung Deutschland fahren, um
hier Kindergeld zu bekommen. Die Schleuser ziehen Geld ab für den Trans-
port, für die Unterkunft und für die Beantragung des Kindergelds. Die Kom-
munen und Gemeinden sind es dann, die dafür aufkommen müssen. Klagen
hat es hier ja bereits gegeben. Nebenbei sind das die neuen Arbeitskräfte für
den Niedriglohnbereich von 3€ die Stunde. Das muss auch einmal kritisch
bemerkt werden.
[[…] There has already been conforming jurisdiction concerning the right
to receive social welfare although immigrants had not been active on the
labour market. In any case, one problem is the immigration from certain
countries in eastern Europe. Here, a lively business model has emerged as
entire busses drive in the direction of Germany in order to receive child
benefits here. The traffickers cash money for transport, accommodation
and application fro child benefits. It’s the municipalities that have to com-
pensate for this. There have been law suits already. Besides this, this is the
new workforce for the low wage sector for 3€ per hour. This also has to be
critically remarked.]
(Flucht ins deutsche Glück, Spiegel Online, 09.05.2013)
As illustrated in the quote, the migrants ”from certain countries in eastern
Europe” are not expected to being able to contribute to the welfare system but
to work in the low wage sector which requires even more financial support from
the state, i.e. ’tax payer money’. Based on these stereotypes, commenters perceive
that labourmigrants show a lack of solidarity towards nationalswho are perceived
to have been contributing to the welfare state. Generally, migrants from central
and eastern European countries are in direct competition to the perceived ’hard-
working’ national citizens.
With some caution one might consider to relate these differences in categor-
isations to the different types of welfare regimes in Denmark and Germany. The
welfare state in Denmark is described as a social democratic welfare system with
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universal distribution.36 Among Danish comments Eastern European migrants
are perceived primarily as ’foreign workers’ with rights provided by EU citizen-
ship. While they do compete for Danish jobs, there is less emphasis on them
as recipients of social benefits. With a focus on foreign workers in the Danish
sample, this could explain the stronger focus on direct competition among the
commenters. Danish commenters seem to be less concerned about distribution
of social welfare to labour migrants but perceive them as a risk factor responsible
for a decrease in domestic wage levels (see distribution of high peak at ’labour mi-
grants’ in Danish sample, figure 4.6 but not at ’benefits, expenses, other support’).
In the German case, however, described as conservative corporatist system, ac-
cess to welfare is mainly possible through employment. Since the way to access-
ing benefits in the German welfare system is based on participation in the labour
market (Sainsbury, 2012), supposedly lower skilled and lazy labour migrants can
access social welfare, thus, competing with German workers by working on atyp-
ical employment contracts. German commenters perceive these migrants often as
illegitimately accessing social welfare, whereas German workers are perceived to
have work hard to be eligible for social benefits (see distribution of high peak at
’benefits, expenses, other support’ in German sample, figure 4.5). In other words,
in German comments there is a sense of assumed superiority of Germans over the
’Eastern European welfare recipient’. ’Eastern Europeans’ are seen as relying on
welfare and misleading institutions to be legitimate labour migrants.
One more noteworthy aspect from the analysis is the association of migrants
from central and eastern European countries with criminal activity among the
Danish commenters (see peak at ’criminal foreigners’, yellow line, figure 4.6). The
comments about petty and organised crime committed by ’Eastern Europeans’ as
well as the stigmatisation of Eastern European migrants as ’criminal’ in general
are embedded in discussion over the potential disadvantages of the Schengen area.
Among Danish commenters Schengen is often perceived as a facilitator for not
only poor and unskilled migrants but also of organised groups of criminals from
the Eastern European region to reach Denmark.
Siden 1988 er der sket en hel del. I takt med at Danmark er blevet viklet
mere og mere ind i EU, er Danmark blevet en meget populær destination
for flygtninge alle steder fra. Øst europæere kommer herop uden udsigt
til fast arbejde, men kan lige nå at rede sig nogle ydelser og som skrevet
længere oppe kriminelle vender tilbage igen og igen grundet lave straffe og
36Although only in theory while less in practice, as Morissens and Sainsbury (2005)
have explored.
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fordi de kan.. Vi er i 2014 og problemet har aldrig været større….
[Since 1988 quite a bit has happened. As Denmark has become more and
more entangled in the EU, Denmark has become a very popular destination
for refugees from all over. Eastern Europeans come up here without hope of
a steady job, but can just manage to save some benefits for themselves and as
written above criminals return again and again due to the low punishments
and because they can…]
(Bendt Bendtsen: Grænsebomme hjælper ikke, Ekstrabladet, 09.05.2014)
Studies have shown that in several EU member states Eastern Europeans are
considered as ‘white immigrants’ and thus less affected by racialization based on
somatic characteristics but by cultural racism, based on “essentialized cultural
and social attributes” (Fox et. al. 2012:690). Looking at the respective comments,
there is a considerable amount of such cultural racism with regards to Eastern
Europeans as criminals. The type of crime as aforementioned usually concerns
petty crime, such as stealing and cheating and believed to be organised as well
as based on assumptions of ’groups of criminals’ arriving in Denmark (also in
Germany yet less dominant in the sample). This relates to further stigmatization
of ’Eastern Europeans’ as known criminals who disturb national ’good’ citizens’
everyday lives. The analysis suggests a general scepticism regarding freedom of
movement for migrants from central and eastern EU member states since, as they
believe, this contributes to cross-border crime from Eastern European countries to
Denmark but also as an active promoter and therefore a risk for Danish national
security. As the comment above shows, stereotypes of ’criminal foreigner’s within
Schengen trigger further demands to re-introduce border controls and support for
politicians opposing further European integration.
To sum, the findings from the comments analysis reflects other studies that
show the cultural and social stigmatisation of migrants from Eastern European
countries. This is particularly distinct in Germany and Denmark as receiving
welfare states where economic competition through limited access to welfare in
Germany or the labour market in Denmark create different ways of how national
citizens and EU migrants can gain access.
4.2.3.6 Summary
In the above part of this chapter, I have analysed how critics of immigration in
Danish and German commentary sections contest citizenship as an organising
principle for just social interaction between themselves and others. In particular, I
have focused on scrutinising this relationship through people’s notions regarding
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recognition and redistribution. Notions of redistribution concern people’s ques-
tions of and criteria for what makes just redistribution to themselves and others.
Notions of recognition refer to people’s understandings of differences between
assumed groups of people and their social status (see Fraser, 2003; Fraser, 2008).
Based on this, people’s notions of recognition and redistribution help to under-
stand how commenters contest citizenship as organising principle of just interac-
tion between themselves and others, the ”substance of justice” (see Fraser, 2008,
p. 2).
The analysis suggests notions of justice regarding different justifications of
’undeservingness’ regardingmigrants. The perceived inclusion of these ’undeserving
outgroups’ relates to notions of maldistribution and misrecognition of national
citizens in the commentary sections. Questions of redistribution often relate to
a sense of economic competition between national citizens and migrants. As a
consequence, commenters demand that national citizens should be favoured over
foreigners when it comes to access to social welfare and employment. Questions
about recognition are more visible in perceptions of risks, such as crime rates, as
well as evaluations of ’cultural compatibility’ of foreigners.
The findings here point to differences between Danish and German com-
ment sections in the ways in which these ’migrant groups’ are considered as ’un-
deserving’. In Danish comment sections, questions regarding cultural recognition
of receive attention, while among German commenters redistributive aspects are
more visible. ’Refugees and asylum seekers’ and ’labour migrants’ are particu-
larly visible in comment sections below German news articles. This might be
related to the work-based access to welfare and steeper social stratification due to
labour merit in Germany as well as fits to the national conception of the ’diligent
working citizen’ who supports the social economy. In turn, those ’undeserving
groups’, due to their perceived cultural incompatibility, fuel concerns of cultural
marginalisation of Danish and German values, liberal ways of life and threat of
influence of Islam on society and thus corresponds to notions of misrecognition.
Migrants are considered ’undeserving’ if they claim rights and freedoms that are
considered to support different cultural norms and values than the perceived na-
tional values of the community.
Possibly, this relates to regulations and conditions on the receipt of welfare
and conceptions of ’good citizenship’ on the national level. While not clear cut,
given that categorisations of perceived Muslims and criminal foreigners are more
dominant in Danish comment sections, one might consider how the national con-
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ception of the ’good citizen’ as liberal and socially engaged stands in contrast
with cultural ’otherness’ of Islam which becomes especially relevant in the Dan-
ish sample. In this sense, also criminal foreigners are assumed to harm society
by increasing crime and insecurity. Likewise, ’cultural incompatibility’, accord-
ing to commenters, is a criterion for denying rights and access to welfare while
access and rights for the ’undeserving’ leads to notions of misrecognition. There-
fore, the findings suggest that such conceptions of undeservingness are related to
the perception of ’cultural incompatibility’ of Muslims, criminal foreigners and, to
some degree migrants from central and eastern Europe. On the other hand, labour
migrants and refugees as well as central and eastern Europeans are categorised
economically incapable and a burden to the welfare state.
In this sense, economically burdensome groups of migrants trigger notions of
maldistribution due to commenters’ perceptions of being economically disadvant-
aged if those who supposedly do not contribute to welfare systems gain access to
welfare, for instance, by means of EU citizenship or refugee status (although to a
very limited extent in the latter case) and take jobs by lowering average salaries. In
other words, notions of maldistribution arise because resources are redistributed
to the ’undeserving’ while being taken away from themselves as ’good citizens’.
Commenters understand the inclusion of particularly ’undeserving groups’ as a
direct risk to the entitlements of the national citizens following the rules and reg-
ulations of ’good citizenship’ and welfare access.
The more general description of categorisations that analysis finds in com-
bination to the different ’migrant groups’ are broadly speaking in harmony with
previous research on categorisations of migrants. Generally, nationalism and cul-
tural essentialism emerge as important mental scripts throughwhich commenters
evaluate the ’deservingness’ of people with certain attributes (see Brubaker, 2004;
Brubaker, 2009). Studies suggest that perceptions of Muslims and criminal for-
eigners are related to attitudes of cultural essentialism and ’othering’ (Hellwig
and Sinno, 2017). Similarly, labour migration and migrants from CEE countries
are often stigmatised in economic terms with reference to social welfare and un-
employment (Hellwig and Sinno, 2017).
Based on these findings, the role of the media as agenda-setters for these no-
tions of justice can be discussed. To a degree, the findings are in line with other re-
search on the agenda-setting role of the mass media regarding the focus and prob-
lematisation of certain groups of migrants over others (see Hainmueller and Hop-
kins, 2014; Sheets, Bos, and Boomgaarden, 2016). The differences in the clusters
183
between Danish and German coverage match the differences across Danish and
German comment sections (see section 4.2.1). On the other hand, it seems that not
every ’migrant group’ which is addressed in the news resonates in comments. For
example, the absence of EU citizens as a category in comments despite the pre-
valence in the articles underlines that commenters also adopt their own ’spins’
regarding migration (see cluster results in section 4.1). ’EU citizens’ as broad cat-
egory receives less attention; rather ’group-making’ according to national and
cultural differences is more frequent.
It seems that by applying criteria of economic and cultural deservingness,
commenters’ own interpretations of how redistribution and recognition organise
rights and access among people who live within the national welfare community
become visible. The analysis of the comments has not focused on the quality of
discourse or asked to what degree commentary sections display political debates
among people. It is therefore not possible to measure the extent of democratic de-
bate and processes of opinion formation. Nevertheless, these emerging patterns
of economic and cultural deservingness suggest a more shared, homogeneous un-
derstanding among commenters and about what they interpret as just and unjust
regarding recognition and redistribution. In the concluding part of this chapter,
I bring the different branches of the analysis together. I elaborate on how the
focus on misframing and misrepresentation as well as the nationalistic categor-
isations that ’group’ certain migrants together according to assumed economic or
socio-cultural attributes and prevalent notions of deservingness emphasise com-
menters’ moral understandings of citizenship. Together, these findings indicate
that critics of immigration contest the political frame of reference for in- and ex-
clusion because national politics seem to fail them.
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter was concerned with the empirical investigation of how critics of
immigration contest citizenship in relation to migration in the EU (sub-question
1). In chapter 2, I have argued that by commenting, people who are critical of
immigration enact their affectedness of migration. I have proposed that online
and social media enable such an enactment in new ways for people to constitute
themselves as political subjects. Comment sections are often considered to be
platforms for ’like-minded’ individuals that are sceptical of mainstream politics
and tend toward the right political spectrum (Baden and Springer, 2014). This
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suggests that comment sections might reflect rather polarised views on migration
if one aims to relate the findings to representative national populations.
First, the analysis has focused on how commenters contest citizenship in re-
lation to political authorities, that is, which political frame they understand to be
legitimate as provider of justice. I have argued that this understanding becomes
visible in their notions of representation and misframing. Moreover, the analysis
focused on how commenters contest citizenship in relation to others, that is, how
citizenship organises just social interaction within a political community. Here, I
have highlighted commenters’ notions regarding recognition and redistribution.
Given the social conflict over migration in Denmark and Germany during the
Eurocrisis regarding welfare receipt and increased perceptions of economic risk
among parts of the population in Denmark and Germany (see Mau and Verwiebe,
2010; Statham and Trenz, 2013; Blum and Kuhlmann, 2016; Greve, 2016), it was
initially assumed that contestation of how recognition and redistribution are or-
ganised among people living within a national welfare community becomes par-
ticularly visible. Furthermore, given the mass media’s role as agenda-setters as
well as in terms of focusing on coverage in relation to national audiences, this fur-
ther suggested a particular resonance of migration as a challenge among people
within a community.
However, the findings of the analysis suggest that among both Danish and
German commenters notions of misrepresentation and misframing are particu-
larly dominant. Commenters understand the national frame to be under threat,
which has implications of how they interpret recognition and redistributionwithin
a national welfare community.
First, the chapter has provided an overview of online news coverage regarding
EU migration in Danish and German mainstream online print media. A cluster
analysis of online news articles has suggested group-specific reporting on immig-
ration. Following research on the media’s agenda-setting influence regarding the
coverage of immigration and representation of migrant groups, the patterns sug-
gested in the clusters have been used as entry points for the qualitative comment
analysis. Possibly, these similarities and differences between the Danish and Ger-
man clusters can be related to the news media’s selection of issues according to
what is assumed to be most relevant for their national audiences and users. As
discussed above, Germany has experienced an increasing number of refugees in
the last years, while in Denmark an EU referendum as well as EU regulations have
been discussed.
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In the second part, the chapter presented the findings of the comment analysis.
Focusing on commenters’ notions of representation and frame-setting, the ana-
lysis has found that commenters in both samples share a strong sense of political
failure. Since political actors and authorities are perceived to betray ’their own cit-
izens’ to the advantage of ’foreigners’, they do not live up to their role as political
representatives who provide justice to citizens in exchange for ’good citizenship’.
Commenters further emphasise particularly domestic politicians and oppose na-
tional cooperation with the EU. Regarding the latter aspect, the analysis has also
found differences between Danish and German commenters. While in Danish
comment sections, there is a strong sense of the EU as a threat to national sover-
eignty, the German comment sections highlight complaints that Germany over-
extends its economic responsibility for the rest of the EU member states. These
differences could partially be related back to the patterns in the news articles. EU
issues in the Danish clusters suggested domestic relevance. In the German art-
icle samples, the clusters suggested reporting on EU issues with a focus on other
countries. More generally, these differences might also reflect Denmark’s and
Germany’s rather opposite ways to participate in EU affairs, particularly in rela-
tion to cross-border cooperation regarding freedom ofmovement. Here, Denmark
has been characterised as a more ”reactive”, sometimes reluctant implementer of
EU regulations (Wind, 2014, p. 160). Germany, on the other hand, is considered
as promoting EU integration more actively (see Katzenstein, 1997). Despite these
differences, the findings regarding how commenters relate to political authorities
make notions of misframing visible in both Danish and German comment sec-
tions. The EU is widely opposed, while national sovereignty is considered to be
under threat for various reasons.
Regarding commenters’ notions of recognition and redistribution, the analysis
has identified five dominant categorisations of migrants. These categorisations
present ’undeserving migrant groups’ and match the group-specific patterns in
the news articles, highlighting again the role of the media as agenda-setters in
issues of immigration. There are however different tendencies in the comments:
Migrants from central and eastern European countries receive similar attention in
both Danish and German comment sections. ’(Perceived) Muslims’ and ’criminal
foreigners’, however, are particularly visible in the Danish commenters. Here,
notions of ’undeservingness’ are based on the assumption of ’cultural incompat-
ibility’. In this way, the inclusion of these supposed groups evoke notions of
misrecognition and are particularly ’ethnicised’ and so constructed as a ’group’
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of lower social status. In German comment sections, labour migrants and ’bogus’
refugees are devalued through depicting them as ’economic burdens’ to welfare
system triggering notions of maldistribution.
I have proposed here that these differences might relate to national concep-
tions of how Denmark and Germany define ’the good citizen’. The findings re-
garding the Danish online commentary be potentially understood against the
background of national conceptions of ’active citizenship’ in Denmark where the
’good citizen’ is portrayed as contributing to the national community and support-
ing her fellow citizens (medborgerskab) (see Mouritsen, 2012, p. 97). One might
therefore speak of a sense of misrecognition that evolves from impressions that
the status of national citizens is being disregarded. If a focus on active engage-
ment and Danish values has been internalised, commenters might tend toward
relating undeservingness to cultural attributes and perceive that Danish values
are at risk by increased immigration.
Regarding the findings of the analysis of German online commentary, one ex-
planation might be that receiving welfare and a lack of economic self-sufficiency
collide especially with the German conception of ’good citizenship’, i.e. with
the image of the ’educated and diligent worker citizen’ (see Mouritsen, 2012,
p. 92). This ’good citizen’ contributes to the ’social market economy’ (Soziale
Marktwirtschaft) by means of self-education and workforce (see Mouritsen, 2012,
p. 92). Furthermore, access to the welfare system in Germany is heavily based on
labour market contribution through which unemployment and healthcare insur-
ance are channelled (Sainsbury, 2012, see 3.2.1,). Labour migrants might therefore
be considered as direct competitors of German workers and as a burden to the so-
cial security system that provides welfare to national citizens. Equally, ’bogus
refugees’ are stereotyped as abusing the good will of the German welfare state
and will contribute to further undermining it. In this way, German ’good’ cit-
izens are perceived to suffer from maldistribution due to this overburdening of
the welfare system. The German conception of being diligent and economically
self-sufficient might resonate more strongly with categorising migrants compet-
ition for German national citizens.
Together, the different parts in the analysis suggest that contestation of cit-
izenship among the commenters as critics of immigration comes back to nation-
alist understandings of access to justice, i.e. the frame of justice. Political dissat-
isfaction indicating the strong presence of notions of misrepresentation due to a
perceived betrayal of ’good citizens’ suggests commenters’ moral understandings
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of citizenship and their focus on the national community as legitimate political
frame. In this sense, the inclusion of ’undeserving groups’ is further seen as a
breach of a symbolic trade between ’good citizenship’ for justice and thus evoking
notions of misrecognition and maldistribution not because of migration as such
but based on the way how commenters perceive migration is handled by their
political representatives. These ways of contesting citizenship that are bound to
a nationally defined community describes a mechanism that is not specific to na-
tional context. Rather, it seems that such nationalist views of moral citizenship
might be a feature of critics of immigration within migration receiving welfare
states.
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Chapter 5
EU mobiles in Berlin and
Copenhagen
In this chapter, I am concerned with the question of how EU mobiles contest cit-
izenship. Generally, EU mobiles have been considered as a socio-economically
privileged group of people, a privilege which gives them ’exit options’ in times of
economic recession (see Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, et al., 2008; Díez Medrano, 2011).
EU citizenship has facilitated these options and has thus potentially made these
young and flexible people more socially resilient during the Eurocrisis (Duru, Mi-
chailidou, and Trenz, 2016).
Yet, it has been argued that experiences of freedom of movement also concern
’entry’ pathways, that is, settlement phases into new national and local surround-
ings (see Olsen, 2015). Accordingly, mobility and settlement phases might present
different sets of experiences for these EU mobiles. Therefore, contestation of cit-
izenship regarding the political frame for in- and exclusion as well as regarding
the organisation of rights and access within a national welfare community might
apply at different stages of EU mobiles’ migration experiences.
This chapter describes the experienced ’banality’ of migration and citizenship
during mobility phases as well as impressions of misrecognition and misframing
during settlement periods. The findings will be presented through an in-depth
analysis of how they experience migration to Denmark and Germany and their
lives in Copenhagen and Berlin. The findings suggest that intra-EUmobility is be-
ing taken for granted, EU citizenship ’normalised’. EU citizenship might ’replace’
migration with mobility as a more flexible, spontaneous and possibly temporary
form in which national boundaries have become rather insignificant (see R. King,
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2002). These experiences among EU mobiles make certain expectations of migra-
tion visible, i.e. that it is free from political or administrative interferences, for
example. Citizenship is understood in a pragmatic way.
Notions of justice become therefore visible if such expectations are being dis-
appointed. The analysis finds that this is the case when settling down in another
member state. In this sense, the nation-state and its requirements and obstacles on
the local level present some sort of ’bottle-neck’ throughwhichmobile EU citizens
have to pass through. Since they have expectations of being rather privileged
’mobiles’, the problems they vividly remember make notions of misrecognition
visible. Their expectations of being ’unproblematic migrants’, who can move and
settle freely, shift toward perceptions of ’feeling foreign’.
This chapter proceeds by, first, describing EU mobiles’ various reasons to
move to Denmark and Germany. These reasons are related to “worklife path-
ways” (see Krings et al., 2013, p. 88), instead of merely economic intentions. In
a second step it analyses the expectations regarding intra-EU mobility and their
status as EU citizens. In the third part of the chapter I am concerned with the
period after arriving in Denmark and Germany and when settling in. Here, the
analysis shows how such expectations are being disappointed: As a right to settle
down without further obstacles, the status of being an EU citizens is perceived
to be misrecognised when applying for jobs but also in the face of administrat-
ive requirements in local and national contexts. While mobility is experienced
as freedom to pursue individual freedoms, experiences of settling in contradict
those initial experiences. In fact, EU citizenship loses its perceived salience, as
the respondents report to ’enter’ a national system of regulations, bureaucracy
that is often accompanied with struggling for access on the local labour markets
in Berlin and Copenhagen.
5.1 Demographic background: Young, educated, and flex-
ible
Counting the number of EU citizens living in another member state resembles
a Sisyphean task: Usually, EU citizens do not have to undergo border checks
and residence registration depends on national regulations. In fact, the official
registration of residency does not provide enough incentives to them to actu-
ally register even if it is mandatory (Poulain, 2006). What poses a methodolo-
gical challenge for statisticians or economists interested in the impact of foreign
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EU citizens on national economies, emphasise one of the benefits of this mobil-
ity regime for EU citizens themselves: Low bureaucratic obstacles for travelling,
re-locating one’s centre of living for a few years, studying and working in an-
other EU member state facilitate the ”worklife pathways” for a young, flexible
and skilled middle-class of EU mobiles (see Krings et al., 2013, p. 88). In other
words, in line with Favell (2008) mobile EU citizens cannot be understood as ‘ra-
tional actors’. Individuals’ intra-EUmobility is also determined by the availability
of resources and opportunities as offered by higher education and higher-status
jobs (Kuhn, 2015, p. 93). This might suggest a privileged position in comparison
to other migrants who have less opportunities on labour market due to less social
resources or a lack of rights to move freely. Online and social media facilitate
such ”transnational encounters” among this privileged group of migrants (Duru
and Trenz, 2016). They typically seek information about migration experiences
on other countries by asking peers in Facebook groups, organise local meet-up
after arrival and ’stay online’ to keep in touch with friends and family abroad.
Via social media the online questionnaire was designed to reach these rather re-
sourceful mobile EU citizens. Their privileged social position suggests that they
experience migration to Denmark and Germany in positive ways. Their experi-
ences of migration stand therefore in contrast to people contesting migration and
emphasise.
The majority of the respondents of the online questionnaires, 85 percent in
Denmark and Germany, is between 18-35 years old. 37,4% in Denmark indicated
to be between 18-25 years old and 47,2% fall into the group of 26 to 35 year-olds.
The majority of survey respondents had moved to Denmark during the years of
economic turmoil where central and eastern European countries and southern
European countries had been affected particularly hard. At the time of the survey
in Denmark, 41% of respondents had been living there for one to three years.
Respondents living in Germany are on average a bit older than the ones living
in Denmark: 29,2% living in Germany can be counted to the age group of 18-25
year-olds, 56,1% were aged between 26 to 35 years. At the time of the survey in
Germany, 42.8% of respondents had been living there for 1-3 years, that is, also
moved there during the aftermaths of the Eurocrisis. Taken together, this means
that almost half of the survey respondents moved to Denmark and Germany in
the years from 2011 to 2014. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 summarise these information.
The majority of respondents is highly skilled or in higher education (further
detailed in figure 5.3). Among those respondents living in Germany, 82,6% in-
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Figure 5.1: Survey respondents living in Denmark
Figure 5.2: Survey respondents living in Germany
dicated to have obtained a higher education degree. Among the ones living in
Denmark, 77,2% have completed at least one completed degree of higher educa-
tion. This might also be reflected in their current situation (see figure 5.4). More
than half of respondents in the German survey (57,2%) are employed, 16,7% work
freelance or run their own business (compared to 5% in Denmark), 16,1% study
and 8% seek employment at the time of the survey. Among respondents in Den-
mark, 39,1% of the respondents work as an employee and 36,2% study; 15,6% seek
for employment. The Danish higher education system seems to be attractive for
these generally younger people. A reason for this could be that Denmark in gen-
eral is known for the high level of English proficiency among the population (EF
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Education First, 2016). Furthermore, university education is free and EU citizens
are entitled to governmental financial support37 during their educational years.
This might also explain that they are on average a few years younger than the
respondents of the German survey.38
Figure 5.3: Survey respondents’ level of education both in Denmark and Germany
These differences might be further understood when considering the respond-
ents’ reasons for moving to Denmark and Germany (see figure 5.5). Studying was
the among the main reasons for the survey respondents to move to Denmark: 53,2
%. As aforementioned, they are on average slightly younger than respondents liv-
ing in Germany. For them, the Danish education systemmight indeed offer better
opportunities than the German one. Among respondents living in Germany, no
single factor that stands out in particular. Studying, a job offer, family reasons as
well as the prospect of better welfare and the opportunity to seek employment are
equally considered. Furthermore, this question also provided an ’open’ section to
indicate further reasons. In the Danish survey 88 our of 652 respondents added
information here; 92 out of 360 did the same in the German survey. The most
dominant themes are ‘travelling’, ‘adventure’ and ‘a change of scenery’. These
additions speak for the more ’emotional’ justifications for why people decided to
migrate. Seeking employment and education in another member state might not
37Statens Uddannelsesstøtte (SU)
38Although it would be possible to further differentiate between survey respondents
according to their countries of origins, I am abstaining from this here. The samples do
not claim to be representative of the population of mobile EU citizens in Denmark and
Germany and, consequently, such information might be misleading.
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Figure 5.4: Survey respondents’ current occupation
only be an economic or ’rational’ choice but might as well refer to the respond-
ents’ curiosity of life abroad and an international ’life style’.
These findings are in line with large-scale research showing that intra-EU
mobility cannot be reduced to labour migration or other single factors. It is es-
pecially the possibility to pursue individually relevant motivations (Braun and
Arsene, 2009, p. 57). Relationships, education, employment, quality of life and
other factors have shown to play a role for people to move (Braun and Arsene,
2009, p. 58). Furthermore, for young and high-skilled people freedom of move-
ment also serves as an emancipatory step which often is taken at career-entrance
level or for educational purposes (Bartolini, Gropas, and Triandafyllidou, 2017).
This is further related to their intentions of how long they plan on staying in
Denmark and Germany (figures 5.6 and 5.7). Indecisiveness is most common in
both samples. 41,7% in Denmark and 45,3% percent in Germany indicated to not
know how long they would stay. On the one hand, this is in line with research
that finds intra-EUmobility as ’provisional’ (Favell, 2008, p. 101) and characterised
by further plans of mobility or, at least, non-permanent stays in another member
state (Recchi, 2015). Temporary employment contracts, graduation and other as-
pects might be possible reasons. In fact, it might be argued that the temporariness
of staying in another country motivates these people to move elsewhere in the
first place. Low administrative thresholds and the possibility to return without
major efforts as well as the close proximity within the EU can make the change
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Figure 5.5: Survey respondents’ reasons for moving to Denmark and Germany
to another country less overwhelming.
On the other hand, flexibility might not be the reason for everyone. A quarter
of the respondents (24,7% among respondents in Denmark, 25% in Germany) in-
dicated to stay indefinitely, that is, with an intention to possibly settle down more
permanently. One might argue that the economic recession in eastern and south-
ern EU member states makes return migration less attractive for respondents at
the moment. Graeber (2016), for example, finds that the Eurocrisis was accom-
panied with rising numbers of citizenship acquisition in another EUmember state
and so argues that the value of national citizenship in countries less affected by
the crisis has increased. However, this aspect cannot be further elaborated here
but will be addressed in the analysis of interviews with some of the respondents.
In sum, the responses to the surveys suggest that the respondents can indeed
be considered a group of young, educated and flexible people which make use
of EU freedom of movement not only for economic reasons but also regarding
quality of life. This characterises them as a rather privileged group of migrants.
The survey results so far suggest that freedomofmovement enables of EUmobiles’
pursuit of ”worklife pathways” (see Krings et al., 2013, p. 88). This emphasises
how EU citizenship facilitates their occupational opportunities in this regard as
most of the respondents obtain skills and degrees that further qualify them for
an international high-skilled employment sector but also lowers the threshold
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Figure 5.6: Survey respondents living in Denmark
Figure 5.7: Survey respondents living in Germany
to move to another member state because mobility and temporary stays are not
complicated by national borders. It is now time to investigate the experiences
of migration behind these numbers in further detail particularly regarding the
expectations to EU citizenship this triggers and how these expectations are met
when settling into Berlin and Copenhagen.
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5.2 Mobility phases: Raising expectations towards the EU
frame
Earlier I have argued that by committing and participating in Facebook groups
specifically for foreigners, EUmobiles enact their affectedness of migration. Face-
book groups are spaces for social networking, but also for coping and exchanging
information regarding their stay in a different country. In the analysis of the
interviews, EU mobiles narrate and reflect on how they cope with migration dur-
ing mobility and settlement and what their experiences are. The analysis finds a
breach of expectations frommobility to settlement phase. In this way, the findings
question that mobile EU citizens in general are winners of EU integration. They
highlight that people who enact their affectedness of migration particularly con-
test citizenship regarding the frame of justice, which then leads to contestation
of social order during settlement. EU citizenship promises to pursue individual
”worklife pathways” that are facilitated by freedom of movement (see Krings et
al., 2013, p. 88). Before investigating how settlement periods disappointment such
experiences, the following section further details these people’s expectations de-
riving from mobility and what notions of justice become visible. Such expecta-
tions emphasise how people contest citizenship as the political frame for in- and
exclusion.
The analysis is based on analysing to EU mobiles’ narratives and reflections
of intra-EU mobility and what expectations regarding EU citizenship become vis-
ible. The findings suggest that there is an absence of contestation in EU mobiles’
perceptions and experiences of migration. Freedom of movement seemingly is
understood as ’banal’ and ’normalised’, possibly taken for granted. Their recol-
lections suggest an understanding of citizenship as an instrument for pursuing
their life plans. For some this means to pragmatically navigate between national
(German or Danish) and EU citizenship if they intend to stay more permanently.
The EU is therefore not perceived as ’borderless’ but in order to fulfil their own
life plans, they consider the use of different citizenships. The aim of this section
is to elaborate on how this ’normalisation’ of the EU as political frame for these
people’s lives has shaped expectations regarding EU citizenship as uncontested,
which are then disappointed during settlement phases (as I will discuss in the
section afterwards).
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5.2.1 ’Normalisation’ of EU citizenship
When asking the interview participants about their moving experiences to Den-
mark or Germany, they report no major problems but vividly remember what it
was like to organise and plan their move and arrive in the new surroundings. The
banality of general organisation from travel bookings and packing to sketching
out the first weeks or possibly getting in touchwith employers or international of-
fices at universities to resolve the last logistics were crucial practices of preparing
and moving become salient.
Indeed, it has been argued that people’s ways to think about the EU and to
develop a sense of identity attached to Europe evolves from themundane in every-
day life (Cram, 2001; Cram, 2009). Despite differences in language and currency
for some of the participants, the experience of intra-EUmobility during this phase
is less influenced by a change of state territories and national borders but possibly
more by differences of localities, i.e. first impressions of the city or town when
leaving the airport and finding their ways into these new surroundings. In other
words, the absence of political or administrative interference seems to give way
for the everyday concerns and tasks of moving.
The absence of bordering-practices such as visa applications, border controls
and other aspects that could hint at the shift from one nation-state to the other
might have led to a sense of ’normalisation’ of EU citizenship. By ’normalisation’
of EU citizenship I mean that the EU as a political frame for in- and exclusion is
accepted and taken for granted. On the one hand, this implies an absence of con-
testation during mobility phases. On the other hand, this suggests the existence
of EU mobiles’ expectations regarding this EU frame.
Interviewer: […] So… how was your moving experience. Was it difficult or
was it easy?
Austrian man (living in Denmark): Like a standard sortiment that I buy
from Ikea every day [both laugh]. No it’s… It’s not that difficult I have to
say, because, but I also tend to leave a lot of stuff behind. […] (AustrianM1,
DK, 30.09.2014)
He moves often, he says, and has developed a system to organise this:
Austrianman (living in Denmark): […] I have like a storage closet in Austria
that is full of stuff that I just pay every month, and there is nothing that I
would ever use anymore probably. So there is something that you cut down,
and I think… at least… and I move like twice in one yeah, and at this point
you realize that you don’t need a lot of stuff, so you just cut down that.
(AustrianM1, DK, 30.09.2014)
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EU citizenship has enabled this way of life, as he later implies when he says
that ”as a European Union citizen, you can of course do what you want, right?”
(AustrianM1, DK, 30.09.2014). Indeed, many interviewees refer to moving abroad
as something that can happen more spontaneously and without the need to take
any serious decisions. Both for people inDenmark andGermanymovingwas con-
sidered easy and unproblematic. Moving to a different member state for many has
become a routinised practice in everyday life, not a political ”act of citizenship.”
A woman from Italy living in Denmark summarised moving as something that is
possible ”without even thinking […] about too much” (ItalianF4, DK, 18.07.2014).
This privileged social position is not a matter of social struggle or conflict but
of expectation. On the one hand, this development might be due to socialisation
within the EU. Given that almost all interview participants are in their 20s and
early 30s, freedom of movement for themmight be more a matter of emancipation
(Bartolini, Gropas, and Triandafyllidou, 2017) and a way to ones socialisation that
entails the pursuit of post-materialist values (see Inglehart, 1971; Inglehart, 2008),
rather than a political or economic struggle for representation or redistribution.
In this way, EU citizenship has become ’banal’, a part of everyday life.
Interviewer: Has EU citizenship also affect your moving experience?
Greek woman (living in Germany): Yes. I cannot compare it, of course, with
my personal experience, but I can compare it with the experience of other
people that are not EU citizens and many things were much more difficult
for them, like, having to get the visa… many, many things.
Interviewer: And for you it was fine
Greek woman: Yes, it was very easy (GreekF1, GER, 05.12.2016)
Such accounts of their own rather smooth moving phase compared to non-EU
friends or colleagues, who face bureaucratic hurdles during VISA applications fre-
quently occur. Subjectively speaking, EU citizenship becomes a privilege allowing
to pursue a more flexible lifestyle and temporary migration. In other words, for
EU mobiles mobility presents a matter of individual ’provisionality’, not so much
a personal cost-benefit analysis (Favell, 2008, p. 101).
Thinking about EU citizenship during mobility as an individual freedom that
is being taken for granted foregrounds how deeply it has become intertwinedwith
EU mobiles’ individual lives. The benefits of EU citizenship emerge therefore in
the absence of political and administrative interference. Having EU citizenship
and exercising one’s right to move can be considered “not only as a status of rights
but also as a life experience” (Duru, Michailidou, and Trenz, 2016, p. 138). As
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such, respondents perceive EU citizenship as a tool that facilitates their decisions
to move and exercise their EU citizenship as a way of living. Consequently, when
looking for more quality of life or a better job, they implicitly expect that these
can be found in another city or country.
On the other hand, the interviews suggest a decoupling of their own migra-
tion experience from political salience of migration in the EU. In fact, some parti-
cipants explained that they were indeed ‘pro-European’ but not necessarily ‘pro-
EU’. When asked about how he personally feels about the EU, one participant
explains:
Croatian man (living in Germany): When Croatia entered the European
Union, I was very happy. I went to celebrate with my friend as well as
when there was referendum when the people said ‘yes, were going to be
part of a European Union’. It’s a very good situation because it allows me
to travel freely all across Europe, to look for happiness somewhere else, to
trade goods and services with the people and everything. It’s the best thing
that has happened to Croatia in the last 25 or even more than 25 years.
Interviewer: So, you would say you are pro-European in these respects?
Croatian man: In these respect, yes. Even though I think that European
Union has way too large administration and all this stuff with the parlia-
ments, and governments and the Council of Europe, the European Council,
the … all this instances and stuff like that. So, I’m not a fan of that but I am a
fun of no borders, free trading, free job market… that’s all what I am about.
(CroatianM1, GER, 01.12.2015)
Other respondents criticise how money is distributed among member states
during the crisis. The politics in the EU are contested but not attached to indi-
vidual migration experiences.
Polish woman (living in Germany): Well, I think it [EU] is a great thing
because it allowed me to do what I am doing at the moment, it allowed
me to study abroad without any problem , to find a job without all this
bureaucracy, and stuff like that so I think it is a great thing and I am always
very much for it. I was never a psycho fan of the EU, I think it has incredible
values and ideas, but as well it is… I as well know that there are reasons
for which some countries are benefiting against the others so it is… and
I as well saw people using European money in very weird way, EU fund
in a very weird wrong way, and so I think there is not enough… probably
it is with all things of such scale, the system is not good enough to control
everything therefore there is a lot of money going to shady place. (PolishF1,
GER, 08.12.2015)
In this sense, recurring criticism of the EU does not lead to contestation but to
a decoupling of one’s own experiences of migration with those of other migrants
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in less privileged situations and political aspects. There is a common tendency of
political frustration against institutions and the actual implementation of auster-
ity measures, the general use of EU funds, and the disagreements between mem-
ber state governments leading to political stagnation. Yet, this frustration is not so
much linked to people’s own perceptions and experiences of migration. Intra-EU
mobility for them is a ’normal’ aspect of their lives that does not trigger notions
of justice but expectations of being able to pursue individual life plans. Rather,
by highlighting the benefits of EU citizenship during mobility phases, EU mobiles
seem to experience migration as an individual freedom which is not interfered
with by politics or administration.
5.2.2 Navigating between national and EU citizenship
On the one hand, scholars in ’top-down’ approaches to citizenship emphasise the
link between the individual and the political community or authority (see literat-
ure review 2.1). Here, EU citizenship has challenged the relevance of national cit-
izenship as membership to such a community (see Brubaker, 1992; Soysal, 1994).
On the other hand, from a ’bottom-up’ perspective the concepts of membership is
controversial in relation to migrant status and freedom of movement. The earlier
addressed results highlighting temporariness and flexibility in the questionnaire
show how EU citizenship allows to remain indecisive about settling down more
permanently and flexible when it comes to planning and deciding on intra-EU
mobility (see figure 5.6 on page 196 and figure 5.7 on page 196). Yet, as Graeber
(2016) finds, economic recession has influenced more people to obtain citizenship
of another, less crisis-affected member state, while the above findings suggest that
mobile EU citizens decouple their migration experiences from political affairs and
community. In this sense, one might argue that citizenship does indeed not con-
cern political membership but access to participation. To a certain extent, such
pragmatic approaches to passports and citizenship imply that these EU mobiles
are less concerned with belonging to political community or becoming political
subjects with political rights.
Instead, the interviews indicate that EU mobiles expect that this sense of at-
tachment and political community is not required from them. As EU citizens there
is not need to integrate and assimilate to national habits and traditions. Aspects
related to integration and political community becomemore important as orwhen
they plan on staying in Denmark or Germany more permanently. Otherwise EU
citizenship is understood to provide sufficient opportunities to pursue one’s life
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plans. Therefore, EU mobiles understanding of citizenship can be considered as
rather pragmatic. They ’navigate’ between national and EU citizenship as they
reflect on what suits best in order to lead the lives according to their individual
intentions. In other words, citizenship functions as an instrument to facilitate ac-
cess for self-fulfilment and to overcome the more ’banal’ obstacles in daily live.
For example, Berlin or Copenhagen might become more attractive destinations
for long-term residence if economic recession has worsened professional oppor-
tunities and quality of life ’at home’.
Among EUmobiles in Berlin and Copenhagen there is a shared understanding
that EU citizenship provides sufficient rights and an expectation of unproblematic
access for those with future plans of mobility or indecisiveness about how long
they will stay in Denmark and Germany. Experiences of migration and underly-
ing reasons are personal, even emotional. When asked about obtaining Danish
or German citizenship, however, the conversations almost turn into individual
’cost-benefit’ analyses. Interviewees navigate between the benefits and efforts a
Danish or German passport means for them. For example, a woman with both a
Hungarian and Romanian passport does not see any advantages in German cit-
izenship due her legal status as an EU citizen. Shementions to be concerned about
her boyfriend living with her in Berlin who has not been able to find a job yet.
This renders their future unclear asking whether he might find better employ-
ment elsewhere (Hungarian-RomanianF1, GER, 15.12.2015). The question comes
up whether she would like to stay in Germany long-term.
Interviewer: Scenario. Let’s say your boyfriend finds a job next week, would
you plan on going for German citizenship? Would that be an option?
Hungarian-Romanian woman (living in Germany): I think until we are in
the EU, we don’t really need that. So, no.
Interviewer: What do you mean?
Hungarian-Romanian woman: If youwant to become a German citizen, you
can have only one citizenship, which is the German. But now I have two,
which is Hungarian and Romanian. I mean, the Romanian one doesn’t give
me too many advantages. But with my Romanian passport I can travel to
Turkey for free [laughs]. Or if I want to visit some countries, then I could go
onmyHungarian passport to the US and the Romanian to Iran, for example.
Interviewer: So, is there a hierarchy in citizenship?
Hungarian-Romanian woman: Not really a hierarchy but it gives you dif-
ferent advantages.
Interviewer: So you wouldn’t disregard one of your citizenships?
Hungarian-Romanian woman: No.
(Hungarian-RomanianF1, GER, 15.12.2015)
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The informant goes to German classes, she invests time to engage with her
neighbours and reading the local news in Berlin but she is unsure about the be-
nefits of German citizenship. To her, EU citizenship is sufficient to live in Ger-
many for nowwhile national citizenship there does not promise any other benefits
but comes with application processes, paper work and preparation for citizenship
tests. A similar exchange took placewith awoman fromRomania living in Copen-
hagen who is unsure about how long she will stay in Denmark. After graduation
she will look for jobs, she explains:
Interviewer: Last year it was suggested from the Danish politicians that you
could get dual citizenship.
Romanian woman (living in Denmark): Yes, I heard about it.
Interviewer: Would you consider that for instance?
Romanianwoman: If I could stay long enough in Denmark, then yes, I might
consider it. And I don’t know, for example one of my friends went to get a
Danish citizenship, it is because from Denmark you can go to more places
that you could go from Romania. So, or you get visa here, that would be a
good reason to get a visa here.
Interviewer: So actually you see a lot of advantages of getting for instance
a Danish passport?
Romanian woman: Yes, I haven’t been yet in the position of needing some-
thing like this but there might be some advantages.
(RomanianF1, DK, 18.10.2014)
The above conversations illustrate many EU mobiles’ rather pragmatic un-
derstanding of national citizenship as a common theme in the interviews. Nat-
uralisation is not considered a means of integration and membership to a polit-
ical community but of access to professional opportunities or to implement more
personal life choices. In this sense, political representation is not the question
for many mobile EU citizens living in Denmark and Germany. Much more, the
interviews indicate that EU mobiles have developed expectations regarding the
political frame for in- and exclusion. While the national frame can shift, the EU
frame is expected to guarantee a certain degree of autonomy and freedom.
As already mentioned, the Eurcrisis might have prevent some to return to
the countries where they grew up. Disillusionment with the national economy,
the feeling of a lack of opportunities for individual development and worsening
standards of living further motivated one woman from Italy to stay in Berlin in-
stead of moving elsewhere. She feels attached to the city, speaks fluent German
and works in a start-up company with an international environment.
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Italian woman (living in Germany): […] I have never been to the same city
as much as I have been in Berlin, I moved very often, the longest was 9
years, now I have been in Berlin more than anywhere else, it [holding Ger-
man citizenship] would be one motivation. The other [reason speaking for
German citizenship] is that unfortunately I know that German passport or
document has a certain, I mean, higher level of credibility even if it is in the
EU… […]
Interviewer: Would you give up the Italian one?
Italian woman: No. I only started thinking about it when I heard they allow
the double. Because it would be too extreme. At the same time I do not
know how much longer I am going to stay here. I do not think that Italy
will become a Wonderland in a year because to repair the damage at least
20 years are needed. But I do not know, I have never decided for myself that
I am going to be here, it just has happened. So having to decide, ok, I am
now German and nothing else, it is too hard.
(ItalianF3, GER, 12.01.2016)
The growing economic imbalance among member states, for her, has turned
Italy into a chaotic system while her life is in Berlin. The Eurocrisis might have
even highlighted hierarchies between different member states because under eco-
nomic recession the existing ”welfare gap” (Mau andVerwiebe, 2010, p. 295) between
eastern and southern in contrast to north-western member states has widened.
For the informants, these perceptions manifest as subjective impressions on ‘bet-
ter’ or ‘worse’ citizenships in terms of practicality or even ’esteem’.
But also if citizenship is not considered, as it is the case for the following in-
formant from Spain, the Eurocrisis has prolonged her stay in Berlin from 2 weeks
to around 8 years now. The quality of life she sees in Berlin beats Barcelona where
”everything is grey and there is a lot of people and a lot of tourisms” (SpanishF2,
GER, 29.12.2015).
Interviewer: Has EU citizenship made it possible for you to think about ‘I
could go there, go there’?
Spanish woman (living in Germany): No, it’s my parents always insisting
on travelling with us and telling us how you open your mind by travelling
around. And I did think it is like that. but if I had to.. I had a romance
with Australia and if I had chosen Australia, I would have gone through the
bureaucracy as well.
Interviewer: So it’s not about citizenship?
Spanish woman: No.
Interviewer: Because I would have asked, if you wanted to stay in Germany
for a longer time, whether for example applying for German citizenship
would have been an option?
Spanish woman: No, also not.
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Interviewer: And why not?
Spanish woman: I have more than enough with one nationality. It might
become two anyhow because of the independence in Catalonia […].
(SpanishF2, GER, 29.12.2015)
Therefore, economic conditions in countries of origin can in this way keep
them from returning back home. In this sense, the Eurocrisis might have contrib-
uted to prolonged stays abroad. In line with Graeber (2016), the interviews sug-
gest that for some the economic recession has contributed to apply for German
or Danish citizenship. Nevertheless, EU citizenship is understood as sufficient for
many informants and their life plans.
All in all, this speaks for a pragmatic understanding of citizenship as an in-
strument for fulfilling personal plans. Such navigation between national and EU
citizenship questions understandings of citizenship as membership and as a moral
institution. EU citizenship enables the transnational activities that people con-
sider valuable, such as travelling, visiting family and friends in other member
states and still finding professional fulfilment in Copenhagen and Berlin. German
and Danish citizenship might have become more attractive in the aftermath of the
Eurocrisis. Additionally, this might derive from perceived ’esteem’ of a Danish
or a German passport when it comes to the rights to travel outside Europe and
Visa provision as well as a sense of trust into the functioning of the German and
Danish governmental system.
5.2.3 Summary
In the above section, I have presented the findings of how EU mobiles experience
migration to Denmark and Germany. In particular, I have focused on their recol-
lections in mobility phases. By investigating how these EU mobiles experience
their moves from one place to another, the analysis especially concentrated on
people’s understandings of the relationship between themselves and political au-
thorities. Freedom of movement and intra-EU mobility are not only concerned
with ’exit’, that is, leaving a particular political community, but crucially also
with ’entry’, i.e. moving to another one (Olsen, 2015). Crucially, in the EU mobil-
ity occurs within the EU frame but also concerns exit and entry between national
frames. Mobility experiences make visible how people make sense of and poten-
tially contest this overlap of political frames with more than one political author-
ity (see Bauböck, 2010). Such experiences make visible how they understand and
contest citizenship as the ”frame of justice” (see Fraser, 2008, p. 16).
205
Among both interview groups (living in Berlin and Copenhagen) absence of
contestation regarding the political frame for in- and exclusion becomes an im-
portant theme. Yet, this absence of contestationmight be replaced by expectations
regarding what EU mobiles consider as the legitimate frame. The analysis finds
that EU mobiles take freedom of movement for granted, which I have described
as a ’normalisation’ of EU citizenship and the EU frame. The analysis further
shows that EU mobiles approach citizenship pragmatically, that is, they navigate
between EU and national citizenship by considering which one of them suits their
life plans most appropriately. These findings suggest that the EU is considered as
a legitimate frame in which these people lead their lives and can follow their indi-
vidual life plans. Regarding ’normalisation’, experiences of intra-EU mobility all
make visible a ’normalisation’ of EU citizenship, a sense of taking the EU frame
for granted. Freedom of movement is perceived as freedom from political and ad-
ministrative interference in life plans. Migration experiences are decoupled from
political affairs and a sense of belonging to a political community. Rather, these
EU mobiles’ experiences of migration speak for the ’banality’ of EU citizenship:
The absence of political interference when moving between EU member states
has created an expectation that life plans can be pursuit without any political in-
terference in other places. In other words, experiences of mobility (’exit’) shape
expectations about settling in to Denmark and Germany (’entry’). The findings
EU citizenship is not only a tool to pursue certain freedoms, i.e. to be allowed to
make use of mobility and related aspects, it is now internalised as an expectation
of being in a more privileged situation than other migrants without EU citizen-
ship.
As people expect the EU frame as legitimate, access to the Danish or German
political community is not a necessity. These findings manifest most dominantly
in people’s ways to navigate between national and EU frames. It seems that people
consider navigating between national and EU citizenship in accordance to their in-
dividual life plans. The Eurocrisis has rendered countries in southern Europe less
attractive and decreases the chances to return there or has prolonged short-term
stays. For some, this has led to considerations of obtaining German or Danish cit-
izenship particularly if they intend to stay more long-term. For others, it has not,
especially if they plan on leaving Denmark and Germany after some years. These
findings suggests a pragmatic understanding of citizenship as political frame for
in- and exclusion.
The mobility phase needs to be considered as a shared commonality of both
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EU mobiles living in Denmark as well as Germany. This means, that EU mobiles’
recollections about mobility should not be seen in comparative perspective just
yet. Rather, the findings regarding experiences in this particular phase make vis-
ible EU mobiles’ expectations regarding their settlement phases in two national
contexts and two capital cities. Crucially, these findings are indicative for a group
of young, skilled, and personally flexible people rather than for mobile EU citizens
in their entirety. Other research on intra-EU mobility has shown that low skilled
EU citizens, but also people with children are less inclined to navigate between
the EU and the national level (Braun and Arsene, 2009).
These analysed perceptions and experiences of migration during mobility em-
phasise the importance of a ’bottom-up’ approach to citizenship contestation that
focuses on lived experiences and social practices rather than legal categories. By
reflecting on their own lived experiences, the informants highlight what seems
most relevant to themselves. This implies that nationality and national citizen-
ship seem less important factors for their experiences of mobility and their ways
to ’shift’ between EU and national frames. Much more, these experiences need
to considered in relation to these people’s socio-economic situation as well as to
their stage in life.
People’s expectations regarding the EU frame duringmobility phases are likely
to be enabled through the legal status as an EU citizen. Yet, the ways in which
these EU mobiles experience and perceive their mobility implies that they do not
have to consider their legal status. While ’top-down’ approaches automatically
assume legal frameworks as their categories of analysis, the adopted lens on cit-
izenship ’from below’ questions the salience of this focus. The next section builds
on the above findings. It focuses on how EUmobiles’ expectations that arise from
impressions of an uncontested EU frame transform into contestation when set-
tling into Denmark and Germany, more precisely, Copenhagen and Berlin.
5.3 Settlement processes: Disappointment and contesta-
tion
In the following section I am concerned with investigating how EU mobiles con-
test citizenship as organising principle of just social order between themselves
and others. I will therefore focus on their notions regarding recognition and re-
distribution as they settle into Copenhagen and Berlin. The above section has
highlighted that during mobility expectations of being free from political inter-
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ference by authorities in the host countries as well as from the obligations to adopt
or depend on national or cultural habits. Generally, the findings suggest that their
expectations of freedom of movement, that is, absence of political and adminis-
trative interference, flexibility, and privileged status as EU citizens that does not
require a sense of national attachment are disappointed after arrival.
In this way, the analysis highlights the ways in which migration is experi-
enced not only in terms of mobility but also in terms of ’entry’ (Olsen, 2015, see).
Here, the comparative dimension of the analysis regarding contexts in which EU
mobiles settle into - that is, cities and countries - points to similar triggers for
why EU mobiles’ expectations are disappointed. In both participants groups, i.e.
EU mobiles living in Berlin and in Copenhagen, the demands evolving from bur-
eaucratic structure, required skills on the labour market but also national welfare
state regulations make contestation of the national political frame visible.
Yet, a typical characteristic of capital cities is that they are quite distinct in
terms of social, cultural, political and economic structures (Gottmann and Harper,
1990, p. 63). EU mobiles’ experiences of settling into Berlin or Copenhagen are
therefore specific to these localities. It is consequently possible to connect EU
mobiles’ expectations during mobility with experiences of settlement that are
context-specific and point to people’s local surroundings through which experi-
ences of political frames can be interpreted.
Previous research suggests that EU citizenship loses its salience in host coun-
tries (Recchi, 2015). EU mobiles in Berlin and Germany become increasingly
aware that privileged access due to EU citizenship does not apply in municipalit-
ies and on the local labour markets. The political frame of the EU is experienced
to be undermined by national and local requirements. Under the impression that
EU citizenship is not relevant any longer, impressions of feeling ’foreign’ become
more dominant.
The following sectionwill present findings of such struggles in both Berlin and
Copenhagen. First it will analyse the similarities and differences of such struggles
in encounters with bureaucracy. Afterwards it will turn to local labour markets
in Berlin and Copenhagen become. While overall perceptions and experiences of
misrecognition occur in both contexts, they emerge in different ways.
5.3.1 Local bureaucracy and misrecognition in Berlin
The impact of street-level bureaucracy on migrants’ rights, access and well-being
has been part of scholarly debates for some time now. First problematised by
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Lipsky (1980), street-level bureaucrats, i.e. those in face-to-face encounters with
ordinary people, play an important role as they decide about welfare receipt and
provision of other services. This is due to the fact that they can grant or deny
access based on their discretionary powers. Time pressure and workload can lead
to decision-making based upon stereotypical impressions about ’deservingness’.
Particularly for socially vulnerable people such as low-skilled migrants, street-
level bureaucrats become important shapers of individual well-being and con-
tribute to patterns of social inequality (Breidahl, 2012).
Turning to the informants of this study, the influence of street-level bureau-
crats is less grave. The informants are economically active, enrolled at universities
or were able to find part-time jobs where necessary. Yet, they vividly remember
encounters with street-level bureaucracy as Kafkaesque processes in which their
expectations of freedom of movement have been overturned. With EU citizenship
and experiences of intra-EU mobility comes an expectation of being free from ad-
ministrative and political interference. The informants’ stories of the first months,
in some cases years, after arrival in Berlin and Copenhagen tell how such expect-
ations are disappointed. Routine practices such as registration or opening a bank
account develop into unexpected obstacles that influence individual well-being.
At this point, many experience that their assumed privileged status as EU citizens
does not apply any longer. While the actual process of mobility is experienced as
uncomplicated and does not require any planning. However, once arrived, prob-
lems begin.
Interviewer : […] But how was your moving experience, you know, when
it comes to bureaucracy, or just like hop on a plane?
Spanish woman (living in Germany): It was both kind of. The bureau-
cracy came once I was here because I had no intention to stay. Also I’m
a European, so there is no need to apply for anything, Visa or anything and
once I was here, the intention was not to stay in Berlin. So why would I
look for something beforehand. So, I just started looking for jobs and the
moment that I found a job, I looked for a house. The moment I found a
house, I started with all the German bureaucracy. By then I already knew a
person here; that was the only contact I had in Berlin, that was the sister of
my brother’s ex-girlfriend. (SpanishF2, GER, 29.12.2015)
This respondent’s case illustrates how the informality of freedom of move-
ment through low bureaucratic obstacles during the mobility phase is superseded
by local regulations that become a gatekeeper deciding about how easy or diffi-
cult the next weeks or months of settlement will become. While this might sound
familiar to almost everyone who has been in touch with administrative bodies, for
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EU mobiles such experiences become meaningful reminders of being in a differ-
ent country and, in this way, differently to their expectations that EU citizenship
has abolished regulations for migration, shifting from an understanding of them-
selves as EU citizens to becoming ’foreigners’. In such phases, social contacts
with someone familiar with the requirements of official registration and social
security systems are crucial not only to receive support in the form of necessary
translation of official documents or normally banalities such as setting up a W-
lan connection at home. Social networks with ’natives’ or those who have already
mastered this period help to establish a subjective sense of security and to find a
place to live for the first weeks.
Importantly, such recollections are recurring among informants living in Ber-
lin. Experiences of informants living in Copenhagen paint a different picture:
Interviewer: How was your moving experience? Was it difficult or was it
easy?
Italian woman (living in Denmark): The only difficult thing was finding an
apartment here in Copenhagen. And it is still like tricky, if you want to
move, like if you want to move around the city. But for diversity university
has been really helpful because all of the paper and all of the bureaucratic
things, like the CPR or the, whatever, transfer, we just had like an interna-
tional week,[…], we just had to hand in the papers and that was it. It was
super easy.
(ItalianF2, DK, 04.07.2014)
These recurring patterns of Berlin as problematic and Copenhagen as ”super
easy” might be rooted in the ways in which both cities manage migration and
diversity. Looking at recent statistics (December 2014), Berlin counts ca. 234.941
non-German EU citizens as registered residents; 2.988.824 are residents with Ger-
man citizenship. The number of actual EU residents might be higher since not
everyone registers, albeit registration is legally required after residing in Germany
for longer than 3 months. Berlin as a city usually brands itself as an unorthodox,
tolerant, international city with low living costs. Generally, the metropolitan area
of Berlin differs from other cities, like Munich or Frankfurt amMain but also from
the wider national context: Local policy-making in Berlin is characterised by at-
tempts to adopt more inclusive approaches but the authorities’ integration ef-
forts are often accused to lack substance (Graauw and Vermeulen, 2016, p. 1007).
Moreover, specifically the municipalities in Berlin and direct surroundings re-
port budgetary deficits or at least problematic financial prospects (BMI and BMA,
2014). In deed, the geographical distribution of receipt of social benefits and as-
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sistance in Germany is uneven and mostly concentrated in Berlin and urban areas
in West Germany (Bruzelius, Chase, and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2016, p. 411). In order to
counterbalance such budgetary problems, the German federal government draws
from financial resources provided by the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Fund
for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) to support “particularly affected
municipalities” including Berlin in paying social assistance to entitled residents
(BMI and BMA, 2014, p. 12). Generally, municipalities and local authorities in
Berlin, where most of the interviews have taken place, face the challenge to ac-
commodate the higher number of EU mobiles also with regards to registration,
informing newcomers and other issues relevant during settling-in periods.
Comparing the situation in Germany’s capital with Copenhagen in Denmark
the differences become obvious: The Copenhagen Municipality reports 39.480
(6,67 per cent of the total population 591.485) non-Danish EU citizens as residents
on the rise from 2008 to 2016 (numbers are based on EU-27, since 01.01.2007) and
consequently operates on a much smaller scale (Københavns Kommune, 2016).39
While the city branding is similar to the German capital, i.e. “based on the ra-
tionale that Copenhagen is a modern, vibrant, and creative city which to main-
tain and live up to this image has to be accommodating and inclusive” (Jørgensen,
2012, p. 267), an important difference is its approach to integration and diversity.
In fact, with regards to these aspects Copenhagen Municipality is considered to
”pioneer”: According to research on Non-governmental views on Copenhagen’s
diversity policy, the municipality is successful in offering an attractive and com-
petitive market for creative labour and knowledge workers with local diversity
policies promoting foreign residents’ active engagement (H. T. Andersen et al.,
2014, p. 21). Generally speaking then, while the city of Berlin presents a budget-
ary challenge to local policy makers with attempts for an inclusive approach to
diversity and integration but inefficient implementation, Copenhagen Municipal-
ity is a thriving example of success on that note. Another aspect is the Danish ad-
ministrative systemwhich is stronger centralised than the German one: The Dan-
ish Personal Identification number (CPR, short for Det Centrale Personregister), a
social security number, once obtained and obligatory if staying in Denmark for
longer than six months, this number allows opening a bank account, registering
an address and receiving a healthcare card but also for public library passes and
printers as well as individualised passes for public transport. In short, the CPR
number is access and condition to settle down in Denmark. The CPR composes
39Data only for Copenhagen Municipality, excluding Greater Copenhagen area.
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the legal population in Denmark which has more or less universal access to the
welfare system (Poulain, 2006, p. 403).
Keeping this in mind, the interviewees encounters with local bureaucracy are
reflections of some of these differences between Berlin and Copenhagen. A lack
of training and resources in Berlin municipalities might be one of the reasons
why informants experience ’foreigness’, feel misunderstood and misrecognised.
Simply the inability to communicate in English becomes stressful for this woman
from Fance and others living in Berlin (FranceF1, GER, 01.12.2015). She says that
she would travel back to France for appointments with general practitioners and
how thoughts of potential health emergencies made her want to move back for
good. When asked why this was the case, she replied:
French woman (living in Germany): Because I find it very uncomfortable;
I have seen German friends at the hospital. To me the nurses were not
very friendly, the language barrier was a big problem. I think the language
barrier is always fun when you are healthy and you are full of energy to go
beyond it but as soon as it is involved with other aspects of life, when you
feel weak or sick, or that you’re situation is like unclear, and it is stressful,
this is problematic. I think administration it creates frustration because it
feels like, as a foreigner, I always put a lot of energy in trying to understand
the system but the administrative language in Germany is not the same the
German I know everyday. So, it’s like learning a new language. […]
(FrenchF1, GER, 01.12.2015)
The lack of English speaking street-level bureaucrats and service providers is
a commonly perceived problem for EU mobiles living in Berlin. Indeed, looking
at the levels of English language proficiency, Denmark ranks 3rd according to the
EF English Proficiency Index, a global comparison with 70 countries, while Ger-
many reaches rank 11 (EF Education First, 2016). For administrations specifically
Spencer and Price (2014) find in a case study of job-centres in Madrid and Berlin
how bureaucratic language and a lack of inter-cultural skills and training among
other factors contribute to unequal treatment of migrants in comparison to na-
tional citizens. In this way, encounters with administrative bodies in Berlin are
more prone to make experiences for EU mobiles vividly remembered instances
of being treated as a ’foreigner’. These experiences of discrimination or unequal
treatment collide with their expectations that they are legally entitled to live in
another member state.
Moreover, many respondents in Berlin reported early problems regarding re-
gistration and feeling overwhelmed by the administrative apparatus. Another
interviewee describes her first weeks as a period of insecurity and naiveté.
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Interviewer: How difficult or how easy was it for you to move from the UK
to Germany?
British woman (living in Germany): Logistically, it was very easy. Physic-
ally, it’s like a half hour train journey to the airport and then it’s half and an
hour on the plane, so… No, it takes me longer get to parts of England than
to Berlin. But I did have this problem when I first moved here with all the
bureaucracy that I wasn’t expecting. Slightly naïve.
Interviewer: So what did you have to do?
British woman: This system of having to register your address with the
authorities doesn’t exist in England. It’s not something that I kind of …. So
there was this problem… to rent a flat I needed… most people wanted to
be paid from a German bank account. To get a German bank account you
need an Anmeldung [engl. translation: registration of residence] to set up
an account, which means you have to have somewhere to live…. This lead
to a bunch of paper work where you move from one person to the other.
(UKF1, GER, 07.12.2015)
These are interesting anecdotes of how mobile EU citizens cope with the in-
security of the first weeks due to bureaucratic requirements. She explains that she
stayed at her ”mum’s friend’s, son’s friend… [who] lives in this feminist-anarchist
commune in Friedrichshain” (UKF1, GER, 07.12.2015). The local bureaucratic ap-
paratus in Berlin can be overcome if social networks exist prior to arrival or if
employers and universities offer support. The dimension of ’entry’ is not gran-
ted by EU citizenship in line with evidence that the local implementation of EU
citizenship rights in Germany is fragmented and insufficient (Henningsen et al.,
2013).
Turning to informants in Copenhagen, encounters with street-level bureau-
cracy appear somewhat more ’pleasant’. Successful diversity management and
the general higher level of English proficiency might contribute to positive ex-
periences. The distinct role of local municipalities is crucial here. Experiences of
an interviewee from Poland illustrate how the recognition of official documents
turns into personal feelings of personal insecurity:
Interviewer: So how would you describe the moving experience in bureau-
cratic terms? Was it easy or difficult to come here?
Polish woman (living in Denmark): First, I should mention, when I was liv-
ing in Copenhagen it was very easy for me to get all the papers, all the
permissions, because I was part of studies at the University of Copenhagen.
It was very easy to get it in Copenhagen. But when I moved to [town in
Denmark] where I live right now, I had a lot of problems with my local
community. They made a lot of problems with making my CPR-number
ready and the yellow card. I had to wait around half a year to get my papers
confirmed. And I found it really difficult and surprising because I never had
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this problem before in Copenhagen. That is why I was very disappointed
and I didn’t know what else can I do, because I provided all the necessary
documents, I confirmed that I am a student, an employee, I am working, I
have all permissions, all papers, all documents. And still there was a prob-
lem with some kind of health insurance from Poland. They didn’t want to
transfer my records and it took half a year to get new papers. That is why
I was very disappointed. […] Interviewer: So you describe two different
experiences of the Danish system.
Polish woman: Yes, exactly. It was completely different how they treated
me in Copenhagen and how they did in Helsingør.
(PolishF1, DK, 18.11.2014)
On the one hand, these experiences indicate that settlement periods depend on
the way municipalities are organised and have implement EU law. The Copenha-
gen Municipality is considered as having developed a more efficient system with
experienced street-level officers than other municipalities (see Jørgensen, 2012).
On the other hand, these experiences emphasise how specific localities become
sites of struggles of recognition during which mobile EU citizens lose their priv-
ileges as an EU citizen and become aware of being a ’foreigner’. Since in Denmark,
registration of residence is based on a centralised system, problems occur before
the obtainment of the CPR number, as this interviewee remembers:
Germanwoman (living in Denmark): I think a very special thing about Den-
mark is the whole CPR thing. And I really think that there would be some
measures needed that would facilitate moving especially for parents and
single parents. Just an example would be the CPR number and connection
to the childcare spot. So I couldn’t really apply for childcare and had no cer-
tainty to actually start my studies full time with having a childcare in back
because I could only apply for childcare having a CPR number which can
only be started as soon as you move to Denmark. So you have possibly a
gap and your education were [it’s] just difficult. But apart from that I think
bureaucratically it is fairly easy, the housing situation has been a big prob-
lem. I think just like in the inner institution of the university there could be
a lot more done in terms of bureaucratic help. Especially regarding housing.
(GermanF2, DK, 29.09.2014)
Individual bureaucratic hurdles depend on national circumstances, such as
the proceedings to acquire a CPR number in Denmark or the residence registra-
tion in Germany. These then combine with the particularities on the local level,
for example, a cramped housing market in Copenhagen. Thus, in line with re-
search on the implementation of EU citizenship rights on the local level, local
bureaucracy considerably influences the settlement process and contributes to
the individuals’ sense of having to struggle for being recognised as an EU cit-
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izen. Such experiences during settling in primarily show how local authorities
contribute to smooth or problematic transitioning periods and, thus, either con-
tribute positively or negatively to subjective struggles for expected recognition of
EU citizenship.
5.3.2 Access to welfare and local labour markets: ’Feeling foreign’
Young and high-skilled EU mobiles in the best case use freedom of movement
as ”an alternative trajectory” to the traditional route through the national capital
for social mobility (see Favell, 2008, p. 93). Yet, Favell’s Eurostars and Eurocities
focuses on Amsterdam, Brussels and London, three cities that host a consider-
able blend of international institutions and corporations. According to the EURES
‘Job Mobility Portal’, Berlin has an average of 7.9 unemployed applicants to each
notified job vacancy compared to its national average 5.0 (numbers from Janu-
ary 2016) (EURES, 2016b). The labour market conditions are considered “unfa-
vourable” and occupational categories with highest success rates are to be found
mainly in mechatronics, engineering or utility supply and waste disposal. Prob-
lematic is further that Berlin “has a large supply of academically qualified workers
spanning virtually every specialist subject area” (EURES, 2016b). This makes the
local labour market a particularly competitive area to seek employment for mo-
bile EU citizens at career-entrance level. In Copenhagen unemployment has fallen
again since the economic crisis although recent graduates still make a consider-
able number among the unemployed (Greve, 2016). Generally, there is a demand
in the sector of high-skilled job categories and graduate occupations (EURES,
2016a). This raises the question in how far contextual factors of the labour mar-
kets in Berlin and Copenhagen connect with the perceptions and experience EU
mobiles living there. The analysis suggests that mobile EU citizens’ experiences
of struggle for recognition relate to national welfare state systems as well as local
contexts.
Among informants living in Berlin, access to healthcare is experienced as
problematic. Access to social welfare in the German conservative-corporatist
model is based on labour market contribution (see Esping-Andersen, 1990 and
3.2.1). In typical employment, insurance costs are shared between the employer
and employee. Students are allowed a lower fee. Yet, those in atypical employ-
ment, such as short- and part-time but also some doctoral candidates often face
high health insurance costs in this way and health insurance is obligatory in the
German system, as one interviewee mentions. To her, this is not only unexpected
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but unjust:
Portuguese woman (living in Germany): Health insurance was a headache
cause everything was in German and many people say different thing, I
contacted eight insurance, phone and mails, and they all say different things
in terms of conditions and what do I have to admit and what will be the fee,
cause I am student and not a student at the same time…at the same time it
is not flexible, so it is not age of… my contract says that I am tolerated in
my institute (laughs) so they told I have to pay my health insurance…[…] I
tried to fight for it, I asked, and I argued, but everything was like this…Their
English was not so good and that was a headache, I spent at least two weeks
reading European law because it is the most general to see if I can get my
Portuguese one instead of the German which by the way I cannot because
I live here and it’s also in my requirement from the Graduate School that I
have an insurance in Germany. So that was a big headache. […]
(PortugueseF1, GER, 10.12.2015)
Her unfamiliarity with problems regarding the transferability of EU social se-
curity and the lack of information contributes to a sense of uncertainty and her
perception that it would be necessary to “fight for it”. Important to note is further
the expectation to keep Portuguese healthcare as an EU citizen in another mem-
ber state. Indeed, her experience with the German welfare system contradicts her
own understanding of what her status and rights as EU citizen living and working
in another EU member state are. Her recollection of the situation presents a per-
ceived collision between the expectation to pick and choose among social welfare
as one of the advantages of the EU as a ’social space’ that is however restricted by
national regulations with which she is not familiar and thus in a more vulnerable
position also due to a lack of German skills, or as she perceives it, a lack of English
skills of the service provider. Specifically, literature on the integration of labour
migrants has shown that knowing the host country’s language is among the key
factors influencing migrants’ social position in new societies (Shubin and Dickey,
2013, p. 2969). Yet, for EU mobiles English is much more important to get along
during temporary mobility not only in professional but also in social networks as
most interviewees suggest. In this way, a certain sense of insecurity and actual
social vulnerability on the labour market in Berlin and the German social wel-
fare system is common in the experiences of EU mobiles in atypical employment
positions.
Along these lines, interview respondents share experiences that suggest pre-
carious working conditions despite higher education degrees. In their cases, the
conditions on the local labour market do not contribute to social mobility but
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seem to hinder it. One informant who has already been quoted earlier describes
his experiences on the Berlin labour market as unsuccessful. Although having a
university degree in biology, he was not able to put his qualifications at use:
Croatian man (living in Germany): I came to Germany in July 2015 because
I wanted to move out of Croatia. I was bored with my life and two of my
friends told me that they are going to Berlin, Germany and I asked them ‘can
I go with you’ and they said ‘it’s fine’ and that’s how the decision was made.
I came here to look for a job, but I haven’t one yet, so I’ve been working as
a self-employed cleaner and I got promoted to a part-time job cleaner, so
I got a bit a of German pension and health care. But now I am in some
negotiation and I think that by the end of the year I will move to England,
because that’s where I found a job.
(CroatianM1, GER, 01.12.2015)
His experience illustrates the difficulties many EU mobiles face when trying
to enter the job market in Berlin. Croatia, as many other countries in central and
eastern Europe have been hit hard by the crisis despite becoming an EU member
state only in 2014. Moving to Berlin did result in a rather precarious employ-
ment situation. The benefits of the right to move freely then lies in being able to
exit this situation, if anything. Especially in Berlin, interviewees report to be em-
ployed in atypical contracts (see 3.2.1) in what is called ‘mini-job’ contracts. These
aremainly part-time positions and entitle to only a limited amount of social secur-
ity and benefits according to the German welfare system based on labour market
participation. For some this leads to illegitimate working conditions without any
social protection at all. It is worth quoting her experience at length since it il-
lustrates how her experiences on the local labour market relate to perceptions of
being ’foreign’:
Interviewer: How happy are you now? It’s been almost six years, right?
How happy are you now to live in Berlin?
Spanish woman (living in Germany): I am happy. I mean, I must admit
that also my life changed a lot since I have a German boyfriend. Because
previously a lot of things happened to me that I did not know, maybe I could
get something better. For example, in my first job in this ‘lager’ [storage]
they paid me 400 euros without insurance and it was 40 hours per week and
no holidays. I did not know anything about it and I was so desperate! […]
I worked like seven months but there is something… because that was at the
beginning and then I met other Spanish people and they told me that there
was this help from job centre and I went there to ask and I got some kind
of tutor […]. And then I just wanted, please, I need that someone pays my
insurance because I cannot pay 100 Euros of my insurance so I just asked
them if they were so kind to pay my insurance and then I can live somehow.
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And they told me, no, if you want to do that or you tell your boss, no, you
just have to work like a mini-job and then you come to German classes and
we pay you the insurance or you go by yourself and you don’t ask us to
help. And I was, oh shit, I have to talk to my boss. And then my boss told
me, give me number of this woman, I do not know why they talked… and
then they got the agreement that I would work just two days per week, a
mini-job for 400 Euros, so the same (laughing) So I was working twomonths
because I started on November, two horrible months for 40 hours per week
for 400 Euros and then he told me, ok, on January you will work two days
per week, so mini-job 400 Euros but you have to go the other day to VHS
[abbr. for ’Volkshochschule, engl. adult education school]. For the German
classes. I said ok, perfect, ok, it is a good deal! (SpanishF3, GER, 18.01.2016)
Unfamiliarity with the rights and regulations in the German employment sys-
tem makes these people vulnerable to illegitimate working conditions. Given
these difficult conditions in the Berlin labour market, young, high-skilled EU mo-
biles face high competition and possibly disadvantages especially if they do not
speak fluent German or have limited or low professional experience as recent
graduates. Particularly vulnerable to weak social protection are those that have
not been able to establish social networks and ‘cannot work the system’ yet.
In the Danish social democratic system where access to welfare is based on
access through residence via the CPR, these aspects are less problematic. Yet,
among interview participants living in Copenhagen, suspicions of discrimination
due to their nationality was a more common theme:
Bulgarian woman (living in Denmark): […] I was starting Danish when I
lived here, and then when I was studying my Bachelor I stopped, because
I did not have the energy or the time. And then I was expecting that I
would continue know and I was unemployed, it was the perfect time. But it
turns out that there was a bunch of rules that I should have tried to convince
them four years ago that I am stopping for a good reason, and [mumbles], so
basically I lost the right to get it for free, and I have to pay for it myself. And
the only thing I could get now is this job centre basic six weeks course. So I
could get this in Danish, but it took like two months to convince everyone
that I needed it. So this strange bureaucratic situation… Because I am not
likely to get a job without speaking Danish. The chance is zero. Sooo…
They are giving me money to stay at home, but they do not want to pay
my education to learn Danish and to actually find a job. At some point you
always feel some kind of hostility, but… to… I do not know to what extend
it is actual or if it is just a feeling you get?
(BulgarianF2, DK, 16.10.2014)
Formally, EU citizenship does away with bureaucratic discrimination and es-
tablishes individual rights for every EUmobile, no matter the nationality. In prac-
tice, however, respondents do perceive that they have less chances than Danish
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citizens. This, in turn, contributes to notions of misrecognition both of their so-
cial position as educated and qualified as well as regarding their legal status as
EU citizens.
Interviewer: How happy are you to live in Copenhagen?
Lithuanian woman (living in Denmark): I am quite happy. I am right now
looking for a job, which is really hard, but, the… If I had a job I would be
really happy.
Interviewer: What do you mean it is hard to get a job? What are the kind
of challenges?
Lithuanian woman: I am guessing they are not even reading my CV. Even
I finished law and I have a master degree in law, I do not wish to work as a
lawyer. For me it would be a much simpler job. Of course, I would not like
to work as a shop assistant, but I would like to work somewhere in between,
but I guess no one is even readingmy CV or my applications or cover letters.
Interviewer: Why do you think that? Because no one got back to you?
Lithuanian woman : No one even responded, I mean… I do not know how
it is, but if they say that they have found 80 applications, then I guess you
have to choose what to read. And because of my name maybe, or because
of some other reason, they do not even look at it – I am not sure.
(LithuanianF1, DK, 11.11.2014)
Competing on the local labour market in Copenhagen evokes impressions of
being ’foreign’ and not recognised as an EU citizen in a privileged social posi-
tion. Compared to the situation for some EU mobiles in Berlin, in Copenhagen
social security is less of a problem. However, other such non-institutionalised
or informal problems occur that relate to perceptions of discrimination based on
nationality. Moreover, in the underlying analysis it appears that not the status
as EU citizen is important but in how far one qualifies to be part of the welfare
state and its organizational structure. This further implies that EU mobiles’ status
defined by the Danish authorities and welfare system substitute EU citizenship
during day to day life. Furthermore, the analysis found that perceptions of dis-
crimination do not constitute sites of struggles of EU citizenship since EUmobiles
regard themselves more as foreigners than as EU citizens. While as a ‘foreigner’
one is supposed to adapt to a host society, as EU citizen one is a citizen by defini-
tion who can claim certain rights. Perceiving oneself as a ’foreigner’ who despite
qualifications is being discriminated highlights how expectations of freedom of
movement and EU citizenship shift towards notions of misrecognition.
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5.3.3 Summary
In this section I have analysed how EU mobiles contest citizenship as organising
principle for just social interaction between themselves and others. In particu-
lar, the investigation has focused on how this relationship is expressed through
their notions of recognition and redistribution. Notions of recognition and redis-
tribution make visible people’s understandings of who gets what and on which
basis, i.e. the ”substance of justice” (see Fraser, 2008, p. 2). Notions of recogni-
tion concern how EUmobiles understand themselves to be accepted and valued in
Denmark and Germany (see Fraser, 2003; Fraser, 2008). Notions of redistribution
refer to their experiences and evaluations of getting access to social welfare and
economic participation when settling in.
The analysis has focused on how EU mobiles experience ’entry’ into two par-
ticular contexts, Berlin and Copenhagen. Across both groups of informants - EU
mobiles in Berlin as well as Copenhagen - the findings imply that people’s ex-
pectations regarding the EU frame as legitimate political authority are being dis-
appointed and make contestation of citizenship visible. By focusing on this set-
tlement phase, the analysis has been able to relate the findings during settlement
back to the expectations regarding the privileges of EU citizenship which have
been internalised during mobility.
By means of a division between mobility and settlement phases, it is possible
to describe and compare how people’s notions of recognition and redistribution
are embedded into local and national peculiarities. In both cases, that is, EU mo-
biles in Berlin as well as in Copenhagen, the analysis of interviews has identified
two recurring patterns which point to notions of misrecognition during settle-
ment periods: first, bureaucratic hurdles partially evoked by language problems
and a lack of administrative transparency. Second, the peculiarities of the local
labour markets play a significant role for employment and to make a living. Such
problems are further influenced by expectations of English language skills in local
administration which facilitates or exacerbates experiences of receiving recogni-
tion as an EU citizens instead of ’feeling foreign’.
However, there are differences in how such notions of misrecognition ap-
pear and which need to be discussed in relation to the differences between Ber-
lin and Copenhagen as well as the national contexts of Germany and Denmark.
On the one hand, Berlin and Copenhagen present metropolitan ’hubs’ attracting
the young and high-skilled with a mix of international outlook and a vibrant so-
cial and cultural atmosphere. While many but not all respondents have achieved
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a certain level of economic independence, feelings of being ’foreign’ and thus
challenged by stereotyping when applying for jobs and encountering service pro-
viders have been reported as particularly problematic in the settlement period and
beyond. These experiences have to do with the overlapping and colliding of EU
and national citizenship especially with regards to the expectations EU mobiles
bring along from experiences of actual mobility to settlement in a national sys-
tem. Here, the interview respondents perceive to remain ’foreign’ no matter the
economic participation in terms of working and taxpaying in the host country
and resulting perceptions of misrecognition.
On the other hand, the differences between local unemployment rates among
highly skilled residents, in the provision and infrastructure of social welfare or
with regards to local diversity management policies in Berlin and Copenhagen
lead to different experiences among the interview informants. The findings sug-
gest that EU mobiles have less problems with street-level bureaucracy in Copen-
hagen than in Berlin. One reason might be that the Danish system in combination
with a well-functioning municipality in Copenhagen protects EU mobiles from
formal injustices by providing access and enables the individual to exercise her
rights based upon EU citizenship. However, the interviewees’ experiences and
interpretations regarding the local labour market suggest how stereotyping and
discrimination can lead to perceived misrecognition.
Looking at Germany and Berlin the opposite seems to be the case. Here, atyp-
ical employment is a more common way of making a living among the interview
participants and those who do so struggle with formal requirements on the local
level as well as vulnerability due to a lack of social security. This manifests espe-
cially in informants’ expressions of a sense of insecurity and being dependent on
the help of ’insiders’, a Danish or German social support network. Such hurdles
and dependencies are usually associated with foreigners’ experiences. The find-
ings suggest here how EU mobiles struggle with realisations that the status of
being an EU citizen does not help in overcoming such hurdles.
To summarise, these perceptions and experiences in Berlin and Copenhagen
speak for a sense of vulnerability among EU mobiles and so contradict the mean-
ing of EU citizenship as a status providing individual freedom to settle in another
member state within a common European framework. The migration policy re-
quirements that have been abolished through EU citizenship and particularly Dir-
ective 2004/38 have created certain expectations of justice and security among
the interviewees that allows for individual freedom. Yet, national welfare sys-
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tems, bureaucracies and obstacles on the local labour markets present obstacles
through which EUmobiles experience themselves as ’foreign’ and express a sense
of misrecognition as an EU citizen. The expectation of being able to rely on the
EU frame as provider of recognition and redistribution clashes with the ways in
which street-level bureaucracy and local labour markets function in Berlin and
Copenhagen.
5.4 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to empirically scrutinise how EU mobiles contest
citizenship in relation to migration in the EU (sub-question 2). It has been argued
that having EU citizenship and the right to move freely contributes to people’s
social resilience particularly in reference to ’exit options’ during economic crisis
(Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, et al., 2008; Duru, Michailidou, and Trenz, 2016). Yet,
young people entering the labour market have been facing more problems with
the processes of globalization (Mills, Blossfeld, and Klijzing, 2005). Furthermore,
freedom of movement still implies not only ’exit’ but also ’entry’ into a national
welfare community, regulated by the national frame (see Olsen, 2015).
The chapter has first described the socio-demographic backgrounds and reas-
ons for migration of these EU mobiles. An online survey across Facebook ’ex-
pat groups’ for people living in Denmark and Germany has shown that these EU
mobiles form a group of young, geographically flexible and generally high-skilled
people. These results are in line with previous research, which suggests that intra-
EUmobility is a phenomenon among the more educated middle-class in in Europe
(see Braun and Arsene, 2009; Recchi, 2015). This suggests that intra-EU mobility
can be considered a new type of migration that is based on not only migrants’
rational interests to find employment elsewhere. For these mobile EU citizens,
mobility enables the pursuit of life trajectories for quality of life and professional
fulfilment. This indicates how freedom of movement is not merely a matter of
redistribution but of individual pursuits and life plans.
In the second and third part, the chapter has presented the analysis of the
semi-structured interviews with these EU mobiles. The analysis has focused on
how EU mobiles contest citizenship in terms of how they understand their rela-
tionship with political authorities. Here, I have highlighted how during the period
of mobility people’s understandings of the EU as the legitimate political frame
become visible. Afterwards, the analysis has concentrated on EU mobiles’ under-
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standings of how citizenship organises just social order between themselves and
others when settling into Denmark and Germany, i.e. their notions of recognition
and redistribution.
First, the analysis has focused on people’s experiences during the mobility
phase, thus highlighting how they relate to the EU and national frames to provide
justice. The analysis suggests that EU mobiles overwhelmingly consider the EU
as legitimate frame in which they have the right to move freely. Their recol-
lections make expectations regarding the EU frame and EU citizenship visible.
Among both groups of interviewees, the analysis suggests an absence of con-
testation here. An important recurring pattern is people’s expectation to be free
from political interference. EU freedom of movement and, thus, the right to pur-
sue life plans beyond national borders have been internalised. This, in turn, can
be considered a ’normalisation’ of EU citizenship. In other words, EU freedom of
movement evokes the expectation of being free from political and administrative
interference which provides a more subjective space to individual plans without
bureaucratic obstacles. It seems that EU citizenship might create expectations of a
more flexible, spontaneous and possibly temporary way of life in which national
boundaries have become rather irrelevant.
In relation to this, the findings suggest a pragmatic understanding of citizen-
ship among EU mobiles. In order to pursue life plans, citizenship has serves
as a tool for access in order to pursue their life plans. In so doing, they navig-
ate between national and EU citizenship according to their individual life plans.
The Eurocrisis might have rendered countries in southern Europe less attractive,
which provides less incentives to return there. For those planning to settle down
in Germany or Denmark more permanently, national citizenship has become an
opportunity. For those who want to stay flexible EU citizenship is sufficient.
These findings indicate that for EU mobiles national membership in a political
community is not intended. Rather citizenships help gain access and opportunit-
ies in the pursuit of future prospects.
In the third part of this chapter, the analysis has pointed to a disappointment
of these expectations during EU mobiles’ settling into Berlin and Copenhagen.
Urban contexts and cities play an important role in the integration of migrants by
means of policy implementations and service provision (Graauw and Vermeulen,
2016). In this sense, the ways in which EU regulations regarding foreign EU cit-
izens are implemented can influence EU mobiles’ experiences during settlement
phases. In this regard, two recurring issues emerge from the interviews. The first
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one relates to street-level bureaucracy and registration processes at the local mu-
nicipality. The second one concerns finding employment on local labour markets
and achieving economic independence. The findings suggest that these issues
present hurdles for EU mobiles. After arrival, many mobile EU citizens experi-
ence how their privileged position as EU citizens are not relevant in encounters
with street-level bureaucrats and experience discrimination as ’foreigners’. As the
expectations that come along with EU citizenship and freedom from political and
administrative interferences are disappointed, notions of misrecognition become
visible.
While the themes of street-level bureaucracy and labourmarkets emerge among
both EU mobiles living in Berlin and in Copenhagen, the analysis has also poin-
ted out differences in EU mobiles’ experiences in this regard. First, looking at
Berlin, we see that EU mobiles struggle with receiving access to healthcare and
other insurances which is principally based upon labour market participation in
the German welfare system (see Esping-Andersen, 1990; Sainsbury, 2012). Young
migrants are particularly vulnerable since they often take up part-time or in-
formal employment next to their studies or in order to compensate for the trans-
ition phase between graduation and career entry. In Berlin, this aspect is even
more emphasised possibly due the difficult situation on the local labour market
with rather low salaries and competitiveness among highly educated people (see
EURES, 2016b).
If we look at EU mobiles’ experiences in Copenhagen, the universal welfare
state is rather accessible for those fitting the institutionalised schemes as employ-
ees or students. Students benefit from state support and employees from more
long-term job prospects and a strong social security net (see Sainsbury, 2012).
Furthermore, the demand for employment in Copenhagen is not limited to the
low wage sector as much as it is the case in Berlin but, despite the fact that people
in the career-entry stage are more affected by unemployment, includes employ-
ment opportunities in the high-skilled and academic sector as well (see EURES,
2016a). Here, the respondents struggle with perceptions of stereotypes toward
foreigners as their job applications are unsuccessful, for example.
Thus, the findings suggests here that different bureaucratic capacities on the
municipality level as well as national regulations regarding the incorporation of
foreign EU citizens into the welfare system play a role here. Since EU mobiles
have expectations of being rather privileged ’mobiles’, the problems they vividly
remember make visible notions of misrecognition. Their expectations of being
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’unproblematic migrants’ that can move and settle freely shift toward percep-
tions of ’feeling foreign’. The findings regarding street-level bureaucracy also
suggest that the ways in which national and local authorities implement EU reg-
ulations are important here (see Spencer, Ruhs, et al., 2007; Henningsen et al.,
2013; Spencer and Price, 2014). In this sense, the nation-state and its require-
ments and obstacles on the local level present some sort of ’bottle-neck’ through
which mobile EU citizens have to pass through.
Consequently, contestation regarding the political frame for in- and exclusion
might require more attention despite the right to move freely within through EU
citizenship and the resulting easier access in other member states. Indeed, the
findings question whether EU mobiles’ experiences during settlement can be re-
duced to a matter of either legal or socio-economic factors, but of misframing
more broadly. Notions of redistribution and recognition might derive from their
socio-economic and legal status, yet do become matters of contestation when the
Eu as expected provider of rights, access, and, more generally, justice is under-
mined by experiences in local surroundings. In this sense, EU mobiles’ expecta-
tions regarding the EU frame and their notions of misrecognition might suggest
how EU citizenship has created an awareness of being a political subject, i.e. the
’right to have rights’. In expressing notions of misrecognition as ’foreigners’, EU
citizens contest how the EU frame on which their rights are based is being under-
mined by national and local implementations of their rights. A ’bottom-up’ ap-
proach highlights here, how EU mobiles’ experiences cannot be related to either
legal status and rights nor to socio-economic factors and resilience only. Rather,
their notions of justice emerge from their expectations regarding the legitimate
frame from which these rights are provided. Consequently, as this chapter has
shown that in order to understand EU mobiles’ ways of contesting citizenship,
their notions regarding citizenship as the legitimate political frame or yardstick
have to be taken into account.
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Chapter 6
Contestation of citizenship: The
importance of the frame of justice
and the meaning of membership
’from below’
The empirical investigation of people’s contestation of citizenship was based on
an understanding of contestation as a heterogeneous and flexible phenomenon
emerging from people’s own sense of political subjectivity. As self-constituting
political subjects, I have focused on critics of immigration in chapter 4 and EU
mobiles in chapter 5. Thus, each chapter presented and analysed the findings
for one form of contestation of citizenship from a distinct perspective. This has
required to employ a theoretical framework which is able to encompass such dis-
tinct perspectives. I have suggested to tackle each perspective through an ana-
lysis of people’s notions of notions of justice, i.e. of recognition, redistribution,
and representation. I have categorised these justice notions in two relationships
that conceptualise citizenship contestation ’from below’: the first one between
the self and political authorities (representation), and the second between the self
and others (recognition and redistribution).
The following chapter is concerned with relating the empirical investigation
of citizenship contestation back to the implications of the ’bottom-up’ approach
applied here. More specifically, it will discuss the findings of chapter 4 and 5
in reference to broader patterns of how people contest citizenship in relation to
migration in the EU. In the first section, I highlight how contestation of citizen-
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ship as the political frame for in-and exclusion needs more attention. In both
comparative studies, the analyses could identify notions of misrepresentation, es-
pecially misframing. To my knowledge, this impression of misframing has not
yet received much attention beyond the dynamics of in- and exclusion of people
according to their legal statuses and rights. In the second section, I will then dis-
cuss people’s notions of misframing in relation to the meanings of membership
and representation within the EU.
6.1 Contesting the national frame of justice
As discussed in chapter 2 (see 2.1), ’top-down’ approaches conceptualise social
conflict over migration as amatter of legal status and rights and the ways in which
status and rights are implemented on EU, national and local levels. In so doing,
they highlight an area of tension between different levels of citizenship and focus
on how these levels affect migrants as opposed to national citizens, EU as opposed
to non-EU citizens, or foreign as opposed to national EU citizens. Specifically con-
cerning migration in the EU, ’top-down’ approaches emphasise that the group of
EU citizens is a case in point to understand how migration challenges citizen-
ship conceptualisations. Conflict over migration has often been related to newly
emerging questions of redistribution between different legal categories of citizens
or migrants. During the Eurocrisis, migration was discussed as a trigger for re-
newed questions about redistribution between national citizens from southern EU
member states moving to the less crisis-affected northern EU member states (see
Statham and Trenz, 2013; Kriesi, Grande, Dolezal, et al., 2012) as well as regarding
widening social cleavages and ’welfare gaps’ between eastern EU member states
and the wealthier Northwest (Favell, 2008; Mau and Verwiebe, 2010).
Yet, as mentioned in section (see 2.2.2.2) and according to Fraser (2008, pp. 16-
17), the consequences of globalisation such as increasing interdependence between
nation-states, new citizenship regimes and increasing migration flows, thus also
European integration, require considering the concept of political representation
beyond the national framework. First, within the national framework, such ques-
tions concern ”ordinary-political” representation and misrepresentation (Fraser,
2008, p. 19). This concept refers to the questions about domestic, national func-
tions of democratic representation and whether everyone can equally participate
in this regard (Fraser, 2008, p. 19). However, ”misframing” as a second form of
misrepresentation refers to the establishment of boundaries in the sense of de-
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ciding about who is included and who is not and based on which criteria (Fraser,
2008, p. 19). Thus, political representation also concerns issues related to the in-
and exclusion of citizens and non-citizens which poses more fundamental ques-
tions about membership (Fraser, 2008, p. 19). It is this broader, combined under-
standing of political representation that leads to a contested relationship between
political subjects and political authorities. I will therefore refer to it accordingly.
The ’bottom-up’ approach that is put forward in this thesis questions the focus
on people according to their legal status and on conflict over migration as a matter
of opposing groups (see Brubaker, 2004). In particular, the empirical findings in
chapter 4 and 5 highlight that people’s contestation of citizenship regarding the
political frame for in- and exclusion necessitates more attention by focusing on
how notions misframing emerge through ordinary people’s perspectives. Since
’bottom-up’ approaches do not assume a legal group as category of analysis, they
can ask about when and how people engage with questions of the frame and, in
particular, how they evaluate different political authorities.
Regarding critics of immigration (see chapter 4), the comparative case study
of comment sections in Denmark and Germany finds that contestation of citizen-
ship was concerned with commenters’ moral questions over deservingness and
’good citizenship’. Critics of immigration across Danish and German comment
sections share a deep sense of political misrepresentation. Domestic politicians
are held responsible for the economic and cultural marginalisation of national
citizens by supposedly allowing the inclusion of ’undeserving migrant groups’.
This, in turn, leads to perceptions of national citizens being victims of maldis-
tribution and misrecognition. The analysis has suggested that these people tend
to conceive of justice and citizenship in a ’zero-sum’ relationship: Redistribu-
tion and recognition for migrants results in maldistribution and misrecognition
for national, ’good’ citizens. In this sense, ’good citizenship’ and justice are be-
ing symbolically traded between political representatives and citizens. Notions
of misrepresentation occur when people are under the impression that this trade
is broken by political actors who also offer justice to migrants although these
migrants are not considered to be equal participants, i.e. ’good citizens’, in this
trade. Citizenship as such means more than legal status and rights. It implies that
national citizens fulfil moral obligations to receive justice.
What the findings suggest is that group-specific coverage on immigration,
that is, incorporation of certain ’migrant groups’ is taken up by commenters as a
justification of their deservingness criteria that emphasise the privilege of the na-
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tional citizen over the ’outgroup’. Such notions of recognition and redistribution,
that is, contesting citizenship as an organising principle for just social interaction
between people within a national welfare community might be especially salient
during economic crises. For example, media can contribute to a reconfirmation of
national identity (Galpin, 2017), thus resulting in more nationalistic understand-
ings of citizenship and exclusive notions of justice. On the one hand, the findings
might confirm scholarship that has been sceptical of the democratic and deliber-
ative potential of online and social media.40 The dominantly nationalistic sense
in the comment sections and widespread distrust in political actors on national
and EU levels suggests a homogeneous debate about ’like-minded’ people and not
a balanced deliberation of different view points. The findings of the comparison
of Danish and German comment sections has suggested an overwhelming sense
of political misrepresentation and misframing in which the EU frame is rejected
and the national frame deemed as insufficiently protected and valued by domestic
politicians. The qualitative comment analysis points to a rather polarised under-
standing of citizenship and agreement over immigration as a threat to national
citizens. Here, the analysis could identify group-specific coverage in the news
articles and has found that these groups often emerge as ’undeserving migrant
groups’ in the comment sections.
However, on the other hand, the findings therefore point to the role of na-
tional mass media as agenda-setters that possibly shape commenters’ focus on
the national frame and domestic politics at risk. Indeed, the analysis of chapter 4
indicates that commenters take up on the same groups that emerge in the patterns
of the news coverage. The dominance of domestic political actors and EU institu-
tions as providers of justice shifts attention away from a focus on redistribution
and recognition toward the role of political actors as thosewho decide about redis-
tribution and recognition. The agenda-setting power of the mass media is widely
acknowledged, also in relation to immigration attitudes. They select issues that
seem relevant to national concerns (McQuail, 2010). In this way, they automat-
ically reconfirm the nation-state and highlight migration as a phenomenon that
has to do with ’people crossing national boundaries’.
This coverage on immigration as ’incoming’ or ’crossing’, I would argue, be-
comes visible in the comments as contestation of the political frame. The strong
focus on political actors to manage and control immigration points to the con-
40See (Michailidou, Trenz, and de Wilde, 2014) for an overview and a discussion in the
literature.
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tested nature of the relationship between political actors and people within a na-
tional welfare community. Commenters here assume that the boundaries of this
community are defined inappropriately and lack political protection. In partic-
ular, the role of domestic politicians that fail to protect the nation-state implies
a ’decoupling’ of national political authorities from what commenters define as
the national welfare community. Thus, this indicates that commenters as crit-
ics of immigration ’reimagine’ a national community that is not defined through
its democratic representatives any longer but by means of a shared community
among national citizenswhose interests are tied to the national frame. In this way,
the findings also speak to a growing trend of populist claims about cleavages and
lack of representation between the elites and ’the people’.
If we now turn to the analysis of chapter 5 regarding EU mobiles, the analysis
suggests that contestation emerges from disappointed expectations of the EU as
legitimate political frame to provide justice. These expectations indicate prag-
matic conceptions of citizenship. EU citizenship is understood as an instrument
for individual freedom from and the expectation of absence of political interfer-
ence and independence from the nation-state. This disappointment of expecta-
tions regarding their EU citizen status becomes visible as notions of misrecogni-
tion in the ’entry’ phase (see Olsen, 2015). The findings suggest here that nav-
igating the labour markets and to find employment are obstacles for EU mobiles
in both Berlin and Copenhagen. These problems occur despite the privilege of
EU citizenship regarding low bureaucratic thresholds and the absence of visa re-
quirements that could restrict taking employment in another country in the first
place. As such, these struggles are similar among mobile people across contexts
suggesting that there is a gap between legal status and its national and local im-
plementation.
These findings point to another aspect of citizenship contestation regarding
the political frame. By highlighting how EUmobiles have developed expectations
regarding the EU frame and how the disappointment of these expectations during
settlement in Denmark and Germany transform into notions of misrecognition,
the analysis highlights how the shifting of political frames contributes to contest-
ation. Contestation is not only heterogeneous and develops in relation to people’s
social situations, it is also not stable but dynamic and in flux. Again, this questions
’top-down’ approaches that take legal statuses as their categories of analysis. The
analysis of both mobility and settlement periods suggests that EU mobiles do not
understand this change as a shift in their legal status from national to foreign EU
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citizens but as a change in the ways in which they are being treated and valued
as EU citizens.
A focus on legal status would require to determine a priori the focus of the
political frame. For example, a focus on EU citizens and non-EU citizens can as-
sess how both groups are affected by the EU frame and the (lack of) status and
rights deriving from it. However, particularly with regard to EU citizens, migra-
tion patterns do not allow to distinguish clearly between foreigners and nation-
als anymore. For EU citizens political frames have become more flexible. Fur-
thermore, in principle both national and foreign EU citizens are supposed to be
treated equally within a member state according to EU and national regulations of
citizenship. As a result, ’top-down’ approaches lack the analytical tools to scru-
tinise questions that concern citizenship contestation in relation to the political
frame of reference. Due to the fact that within the EU people are subject to more
than one political authority, for approaches that focus on people’s legal statuses
as concepts for citizenship and social conflict over migration, the political frame
is a fixed concept and taken as manifest entity that decides about in-and exclu-
sion according to legal definitions and territories of political competencies. In this
sense, the political frame has become a ’moving target’ for such approaches that
cannot be grasped fully through such definitions.
In contrast, a ’bottom-up’ approach starts from the premise that people’s ex-
periences of political frames in relation to in- and exclusion are, indeed, ’moving’
and can show how and when these dynamics become relevant in people’s lives.
Thus, a ’bottom-up’ approach highlights that nationality and legal status are in-
sufficient categories to understand how people contest citizenship ’from below’.
The findings concerning citizenship contestation among critics of immigration as
well as among EU mobiles indicate that citizenship as the political frame of ref-
erence from which justice is provided is contested. In other words, the role and
responsibility of the political community as provider of justice, i.e. ”the frame of
justice” (Fraser, 2008, p. 15), is less and less clear.
So far, the brief discussion and synthesis of these findings that has been at-
tempted in the underlying chapter implies that an understanding of contestation
needs to be decoupled from categories of legal status and rights and considered
in relation to people’s own, subjective ways of making sense of migration. In this
sense, one might ask about possible implications for the relationship between the
individual and the political community; and, regarding EU citizenship, whether
such a relationship is (or should?) be possible after all. In the following, I will
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further discuss these aspects.
6.2 Representation and membership
As aforementioned, the findings suggest that among people, the relationship between
the political community and the individual, or as I refer to it in the following,
between the political representative and the political subjects to representation is
contested. In this section I discuss this relationship with regards to the concept
of membership in the EU and its different implications for people’s lives.
Seen from a ’top-down’ perspective, EU citizenship has created a ”new geo-
graphy of citizenship” (Wiener, 1997, p. 531). As EU citizenship is not based on
nationality in the strictest sense, the concepts of citizenship and nationality need
to be ”clearly distinguished” from each other (Wiener, 1997, p. 531). ”The new
geography of citizenship” is best characterised not in terms of national identity
but, as Wiener argues, in terms of ”citizenship identity”, that is, based on social
boundaries and practices, not national ones (Wiener, 1997, p. 531). According
to Wiener (1997, p. 533), the relationship between the individual and the polit-
ical community is made of these ”citizenship practices.” In this way, both political
actors and citizens are engaged in the constitution and negotiation of citizenship
through ”citizenship practices” (Wiener, 1997, p. 533).
A ’bottom-up’ approach to citizenship has provided yet an additional take on
the ”new geography of citizenship” (see Wiener, 1997, p. 531), this time focusing
explicitly onwhat ordinary people think about it. In particular, I point to the so far
unfulfilled potential of EU citizenship to provide justice beyond national borders.
The so far unfulfilled potential becomes especially visible if one understands
the concept of political representation in relation to the ambiguous dynamics of
in- and exclusion within the EU.The findings of this thesis point to a dispute over
political representation and national membership in the EU more generally. As
discussed in the previous section, the national frame for the provision of justice
has become controversial. Indeed, ordinary people challenge the assumption that
representation is considered legitimate within the boundaries of the nation-state.
For the critics of immigration, political representatives have not fulfilled their
part in representing national over EU interests or the interests of ’undeserving
migrant groups’. For EU mobiles, local and national regulations do not recognise
the status of the EU citizen who is expected to be free from domestic political and
administrative interference also and especially when settling down in another EU
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member state.
I propose that the findings of citizenship contestation visible in people’s no-
tions regarding representation and frame-setting as well as regarding the dynamic
nature of contestation in flux raises fundamental questions about the link between
representation, membership and the nation-state. Themeaning and scope of polit-
ical representation is up for debate among ordinary people. In line with Brubaker
(1992, p. 22), I argue that the implications of the findings in this thesis support
the point of views that the concept of membership has been ”taken for granted”
by scholars for too long. Furthermore, the findings might confirm that conflict
about migration and contestation is not a matter of opposing groups, but high-
lights the conflicted nature of political representation in the EU where several
political authorities and frames overlap and maybe clash (see Bauböck, 2010).
Contestation of citizenship as the political frame for in- and exclusion high-
lights how conceptions of citizenship as territorial membership are defined too
narrow to grasp the social conflict over migration in the EU. Rather, the actual
meaning of membership is controversial as the distinct forms of contestation shed
light on. People interpret the concept of membership in the EU through their own
perspectives and social situations. Accordingly the meaning of membership can
be used as a justification for the exclusion of others and entitlements of national
citizens. Others question its legitimacy in the face of supranational EU citizen-
ship.
Indeed, one might argue that the findings indicate that ”the new geography
of citizenship” in the EU, that is, the relationship between national membership
and the entitlement to recognition, redistribution and representation is not agreed
upon (seeWiener, 1997, p. 531). It might therefore be the case that the relationship
between political representatives and the subjects of political representation is
currently undergoing a process of renegotiation. This renegotiation is not amatter
of public debate but emerges out of people’s own awareness as political subjects
regarding migration.
Based on the perspective of the political subjects, the thesis has analysed dis-
tinct forms of contestation and can thus present distinct meanings of membership
which stand in contrast to legal and political frameworks of citizenship in the EU.
According to critics of immigration, this relationship should be ’closed’, that is, ex-
clusive to national members complying with the moral obligations of the nation-
bound community. Therefore, national citizens are entitled to the privileges of
access and rights and are legitimate recipients of recognition, redistribution and
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representation. In such a nationally bounded community, the inclusion of non-
nationals is contested as there is no legitimate basis on which political represent-
atives of the community can provide justice to other people than national citizens.
As EU citizenship41 challenges this understanding of the national community in
EU member states, critics of immigration understand the contractual relationship
between political representatives and national citizens to be breached; a sense of
misrepresentation manifests. In the findings, this becomes particularly visible in
impressions of political incompetence and political corruption as EU politics inter-
feres with domestic politics as well as a lack of trust in politicians more generally
(see chapter 4).
When looking at mobile EU citizens, the permeability of national borders is
being negotiated. The relationship between people and political representatives
should be ’open’, that is, dynamically employable across various contexts in re-
sponse to their individual needs. EU citizenship provides entitlements regarding
justice beyond one’s ’own’ national community. Therefore, regulations and ob-
ligations to access and rights in another country collide with one’s expected priv-
ileged status as EU citizen. As EU citizenship grants rights and access, the national
community of another member state cannot legitimately claim any commitments
nor be responsible for political representation. National regulations and obliga-
tions when settling in therefore trigger a sense of misrecognition among mobile
EU citizens. In the findings, such understandings emerge as perceptions of being
treated as ’a foreigner’ instead of an EU citizen on an equal basis (see chapter 5).
Critically, the legal and political framework of citizenship(s) in the EU does
not allow for either understanding. On the one hand, EU citizenship is based on
national membership (Maas, 2008). Only national citizens of the member states
become EU citizens. The conditions for access and rights to welfare and other
social services, for example, vary from member state to member state. In prin-
ciple, EU citizens have the right to equal treatment within another member state,
not across member states. To this extent, the welfare state is a ’closed’ national
community as national and local conditions of rights implementation apply. The
implementation of access and rights granted by EU citizenship is a matter of the
sovereign member state and local administration, if decentralised competencies
apply, as it is the case in Denmark and Germany (see Henningsen et al., 2013;
41As EU citizenship challenges national boundaries, it cannot be considered the only
institution that does so. International human rights declarations and other international
institutions in various ways and with more or less influence keep doing so as well.
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Graauw and Vermeulen, 2016).
On the other hand, EU citizenship challenges the sovereignty of the state to
decide who can claim rights. The legitimacy of the political community (or state)
to represent only the interests of national citizens is challenged. By introducing
the legal status of the EU citizen beyond nationality, new citizenship practices
have emerged (see Wiener, 1997; Wiener, 1998; Wiener, 1999). For instance,
questions regarding the transferability of social welfare across member states be-
come more relevant for mobile people (Moriarty et al., 2016). Moreover, the right
to family reunification enables EU citizens to live together with their ’non-EU’
spouses and children in another member state than their own despite national
restrictions which concern primarily national citizens (Guild, 2014). These prac-
tices bring into question a citizenship model in which entitlements are attached
to national membership. In this regard, EU citizenship challenges national mem-
bership by committing EU countries to recognise the legal status of EU citizens
and to provide rights to them. Crucially, these rights are not anchored in the na-
tional community but based on the EU level, yet apply to national conditions and
in relation to national citizens only.
Therefore, the renegotiation of the relationship between the subjects of polit-
ical representation, i.e. EU citizens, and political representatives (domestic polit-
ical actors and the state) sheds light on the contested meaning of membership.
In this sense, I would argue that one important implication of the findings of this
thesis points to the not fully exhausted potential of EU citizenship to further shape
the meaning of membership.
Yet, instead of establishing a common frame for justice in the EU, the tension
between national sovereignty and European integration has created a legal status
that is based on a different form of membership. As mentioned above, EU citizen-
ship is indirectly based on nationality as it citizens of EU member states are EU
citizens (Maas, 2008). Yet, it is orchestrated on various levels and the implications
for ordinary people come with their contexts: Whether they are mobile, reside in
their country of origin or not within the EU, all these situations and contexts in-
fluence the way in which rights and status can be exercised and, thus, how people
interpret themselves as subjects to justice within a certain political frame.
In this way, the legal and political frameworks of citizenship in the EU provide
membership that is both ’open’ and ’closed’ at the same time and varies according
to different situations and across different national systems of implementation.
Perhaps this can be called a form of ’situational membership’ for which certain
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dimensions of justice apply under specific conditions. When living in another
EU country, the EU citizen is neither a national member nor a migrant in the
traditional sense. In light of ordinary people’s notions of political misrepresenta-
tion and misrecognition regarding citizenship, one might ask about the meaning
of this form of ’situational membership’. EU citizens become visible through cit-
izenship practices especially regardingmobility and other transnational practices.
This status is therefore rather invisible for people living in their ’member state of
origin’. It appears therefore that ”for most European citizens it [EU citizenship]
is elsewhere than where they live” (Guild, 2014, p. 422). Therefore, one could also
ask about the role of national membership in general since, with the relationship
between subjects of representation and representatives in dispute, the very notion
of membership as a legitimate basis for redistribution, recognition and represent-
ation is contested.
This speaks for a lack of ways to practice EU citizenship in a way that is
meaningful and relevant to the individual. For mobile people, the status of the
EU citizen is essential as it grants them rights and access without national mem-
bership in another EU country. Yet, in light of the findings, it seems important
here that EU citizenship can also be experienced or practised by those who do not
wish or cannot afford to become mobile. This can, for example, mean consider-
ing possible ’ordinary’ functions of democratic representation beyond voting for
the European Parliament and local elections. More importantly, I would argue
that the findings imply a need to engage yet again with the meaning of member-
ship from a European perspective, that is, related to the framing of justice, this
reaching beyond conceptualisations of membership in relation to in- and exclu-
sion (see Fraser, 2008, p. 19). In other words, EU citizenship could be a helpful
instrument to overcome the nation-state as a site of struggle by providing justice
to both mobile people as well as those feeling politically misrepresented by do-
mestic representatives.
This is not to argue that for critics of immigration the answer is to delegate
political representation to a commonEU framework. Rather, it seems that political
representation only within national borders cannot address the complexities and
interdependencies in which member states are embedded. Social conflict over
migration in the aftermath of the economic crisis has indeed shown that ’ordinary’
forms of democratic politics, such as voting also for the European Parliament, do
not provide the required ”social arrangements that permit all to participate as
peers in social life” (see Fraser, 2008, p. 16). The findings suggest here, that social
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conflict over migration in the EU seems to be only partially rooted in concerns
over redistribution. The ways in which people contest citizenship emphasise the
importance of recognition and representation for people where understandings of
nationhood are evoked to justify in- and exclusion of national members. Realising
the full potential of EU citizenship then lies in the engagement to counterbalance
national membership based on nationhood by supplying a European framework
for representation in the broadest sense (see Fraser, 2008, p. 19).
6.3 Summary
This chapter has discussed and interpreted the findings about people’s contesta-
tion of citizenship in relation to questions about the political frame for member-
ship and representation.
First, I have proposed that the aspect of representation and the political frame
requires more scrutiny when dealing with questions of citizenship and migration
in the EU. I have discussed how a ’bottom-up’ approach contributes to this shift in
attention since it detaches people’s contestation regarding citizenship as the polit-
ical frame for membership from legal status. Furthermore, I have argued that the
findings regarding the contested relationship between the individual and polit-
ical representatives raises not only questions about the nation-state as such, but
about the ”frame of justice” and profoundly challenges the concept of member-
ship in the EU (see Fraser, 2008, p. 15). I have discussed that with EU citizenship
a form of ’situational membership’ has been established which applies under cer-
tain circumstances, especially when EU citizens live in another member state, and
under specific conditions, i.e. national and local regulations. The potential of EU
citizenship to provide a common framework for justice for ordinary people across
member states, not only within, has not been fully exploited.
In the following last chapter of this thesis, I will further reflect on the findings
with regards to the broader literature and point to avenues for further research.
More precisely, I will broaden the scope of these findings by reflecting on their
relevance with regards to the current EU context and the still prevalent focus in
citizenship literature on grouping people according to legal categories.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Economic crises, increased immigration and mobility as well as growing inequal-
ities among people living in the EU have made social conflict over rights, access
and membership in the EU more salient. Denmark and Germany as migration
receiving welfare states are a case in point. In this thesis, my aim was to better
understand this situation ’from below’, that is, what ordinary people make of it.
The thesis was guided by the overall question: How do people contest citizen-
ship in relation to migration in the EU? I have argued that in order to answer this
question, it is necessary to come to termswith a conceptual problem in the current
and more dominant ’top-down’ literature on citizenship. This problem concerns
an understanding of social conflict overmigration that opposes or juxtaposes legal
categories of people or groups of migrants and citizens. I have questioned this un-
derstanding, arguing that such dichotomies do not sufficiently reflect the nuances
of this conflict and contestation. Instead, I have suggested that there is a need to
investigate how people themselves make sense of migration in relation to citizen-
ship, hereby asking what about citizenship it is that people contest.
Therefore, the thesis has followed a ’bottom-up’ approach that emphasises
people’s active role regarding citizenship. I have proposed that contestation of
citizenship becomes visible in people’s enactment of their affectedness of mi-
gration. I have argued that through this enactment they constitute themselves
as political subjects regarding migration. Drawing from scholarship on media
practices and political engagement online, the thesis has particularly focused on
two distinct media practices: commenting against immigration on online news
sites and engaging in Facebook ’expat groups’. My suggestion wast that through
these migration-related online media practices, people ”assert their political sig-
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nificance as people with something to say” about migration (see Coleman, 2013,
p. 219).
By means of such a focus, contestation of citizenship could be conceptualised
as a heterogeneous and dynamic way of making oneself visible as political sub-
ject, no matter one’s legal status. Based on this specification, two sub-questions
have been formulated which allow for an empirical investigation of citizenship
contestation ’from below’:
• How do critics of immigration contest citizenship in the EU?
• How do EU mobiles contest citizenship in the EU?
Following Isin (2013, p. 21), enactment means to ask ”question of justice and
injustice”. Therefore, each sub-questionwas tackled by an analysis of these people’s
notions regarding justice. For this purpose, I have drawn from Fraser’s (2008)
three-dimensional theory of justice that incorporates the dimensions of political
representation, recognition and redistribution. Political representation hereby
concerns the scope or ”frame” of political legitimacy not only within but beyond
boundaries of national states (Fraser, 2008, p. 19). Recognition and redistribution,
on the other hand, refer to how equal participation can be guaranteed in relation
to cultural and legal status or economic class (Fraser, 2003, p. 35). None of these
dimensions stand alone and there is no agreement on how they relate to each
other (Fraser, 2008, p. 2).
Drawing from this theory, it was possible to conceptualise contestation of
citizenship based on two ’axes’: people’s notions of representation in relation to
political authorities as well as their notions of recognition and redistribution in
relation to others. These dimensions have enabled two analyses of how people re-
flect on their own social position and at whom they direct these notions of justice.
They comprise at least two relationships between the self and political authorities
and between the self and others (see figure 2.1).
In light of people’s distinct ways and personal motivations of constituting
themselves as political subjects (see Isin, 2008; Isin, 2013), each sub-question was
approached by a distinct set of empirical material and methods. Furthermore, in
order to extend the findings beyond the single national context, each sub-question
contained a cross-national comparison betweenDanish andGerman contexts. My
point was that neither the single focus on critics of immigration nor on EUmobiles
alone would have sufficiently presented the ambiguities and complexities in the
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ways in which people contest citizenship regarding migration in the EU. In the
following, I will reflect on the findings of the empirical analysis and relate them to
some of the aspects that have staged the scene for this research in the introductory
chapter. Furthermore, this chapter looks at the questions which surface from the
analysis and present suggestions for further research.
7.1 Migration and the political frame
As Schierup, Hansen, and Castles (2006) argue, the national welfare state in the
EU is undergoing a “dual crisis”: first, the meaning of national membership and
transforming national identities; second, the widening gaps between people liv-
ing in a modern welfare state that is adapting to economic globalisation and
European integration dynamics. But also beyond the nation-state such cleavages
might have become more salient, especially since the Eurocrisis. ”Welfare gaps”
between northern and southern as well as western and central and eastern regions
in Europe have become wider (Mau and Verwiebe, 2010, p. 295). The economic
crisis has also contributed to increased intra-EUmigration from the crisis-affected
member states especially among young and high-skilled people who seek oppor-
tunities elsewhere (Bartolini, Gropas, and Triandafyllidou, 2017). Other research
could further show that EU citizenship has increased the resilience of younger
mobile people (Olsen, 2015; Duru, Michailidou, and Trenz, 2016). In this sense,
mobile EU citizens might have benefited from EU citizenship, while those without
such exit options, due to a lack of resources, stay behind not only in countries
with higher emigration rates but also in migration receiving welfare states (see
Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, et al., 2008; Mau and Verwiebe, 2010). That being said,
there is considerable evidence for cleavages between ’winners’ and ’losers’ not
only within welfare states but also between populations in EU member states.
However, the findings of this thesis suggest that people’s perceptions and ex-
periences of migration need not be reduced to redistribution claims. The empirical
investigation of two distinct forms of citizenship contestation suggests that the
relationship between ordinary people as political subjects and political authorit-
ies is contested and is undergoing a process of renegotiation. This points to the
need to reconsider questions regarding the political frame of justice in the EU.
To critics of immigration, domestic political actors are involved in a symbolic
trade of ’good citizenship’ in return for justice. Both citizenship and justice have
thus a certain value attached to them. ’Good citizenship’ provides access to mem-
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bership and rights within the ’closed system’ of the national state. It is assumed
that migrants are not required to be ’good citizens’ in order to gain access to mem-
bership and rights. This places political actors and authorities at the heart of such
notions of injustice, i.e. of misrepresentation and misframing, which are most
dominantly expressed as a lack of political trust and contestation of legitimacy of
the EU frame which supposedly challenges national borders.
When compared across commentary sections, the analysis has further sug-
gested that citizenship is understood in nationalist terms which relate to national
conceptions of citizenship in Denmark and Germany. Accordingly, across Dan-
ish and German commentary sections it has also become visible that different
national conceptions of ’good citizenship’ might evoke the categorisation of ’un-
deserving’ groups in more economic or cultural terms, that is, make either per-
ceptions of maldistribution or misrecognition more visible.
Therefore, in comparing Danish and German comment sections, one might
argue that people living in a welfare state that conceives of ’good citizenship’
as an actively sought ’way of life’, as it is the case in Denmark (see Mouritsen,
2012), might tend towards categorisations of ’undeservingness’ that relate to mis-
recognition. In the Danish sample, perceived Muslims, criminal foreigners and
the cultural attitudes of people from central and eastern European countries are
deemed as particularly incompatible with the Danish conception of ”active and
responsible citizens” (see Mouritsen, 2012, p. 100). Regarding the perceptions and
experiences of migration in the German context, notions of maldistribution are
a more recurring theme in the sample than in Danish comment sections. This,
as I have argued, seems to be related to the national ”passive conception of the
virtuous citizen” in Germany (see Mouritsen, 2012, p. 92). Here, labour migrants,
refugees and migrants from central and eastern European countries are deemed
’undeserving’ if they are perceived as not being able to contribute to the German
social welfare system and are not self-sufficient.
Of course, notions ofmaldistribution andmisrecognition occur in both samples.
Yet, when related to the patterns in the news articles, the analysis finds matches
between group-specific reporting in the news and a focus on these groups in the
comments. Therefore, the analysis has also pointed out the agenda-setting role of
(online) national media which emphasise national frames for national news and
offer critics of immigration a platform to express notions of misrepresentation
and a sense of political distrust.
For EU mobiles, the findings suggest that the political frame becomes particu-
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larly relevant when people settle into national and local contexts. More precisely,
contestation of citizenship emerges depending on people’s own situations and ex-
pectations when shifting from one frame to the other. Thus, the analysis points
out that citizenship contestation is not only based on people’s subjective experi-
ences and heterogeneous in form, it is also flexible and unstable.
EU mobiles understand citizenship as an instrument which facilitates a cer-
tain way of life and adapts to their own needs. National citizenship becomes, for
example, relevant if it is understood as opening up more possibilities to the indi-
vidual’s aims of settling more permanently in Denmark or Germany. Here, EU
citizenship might have led to a subjective process of ’normalisation’ of freedom of
movement among EU mobiles who are now able to transcend nationally defined
frameworks and shift the frame from where they can claim recognition and redis-
tribution in principle. In a way, EU citizenship breaks up the restraints of national
citizenship through intra-EU mobility.
During settlement phases in another member state, however, the effectiveness
of citizenship as a tool of individual freedom vanishes as soon as national and local
regulations are experienced as more powerful in influencing EU mobiles’ ways of
life. The analysis of the interviews suggests that they experience a shift from the
privileged status of the EU citizen during mobility toward notions of misrecogni-
tion as a ’foreigner’ in the country of residence. The most obvious experiences in
this regard are EU mobiles’ encounters with street-level bureaucracy and admin-
istration, and the local labour markets in Berlin and Copenhagen. Encounters
with bureaucracy refer to how EU mobiles contest of the relationship between
authorities and themselves and are experienced as a form misrepresentation of
the EU citizen as a ’foreigner’. Struggles on the local labour markets in Berlin
and Copenhagen indicate that the impressions of ’being foreign’ are understood
as notions of misrecognition from employers and other citizens.
Comparatively speaking, this shift from notions of justice during mobility to
notions of injustice during settlement is consistent among both participant groups
living in Denmark and in Germany. To this extent, the analysis might point to
the possibility that contestation of citizenship regarding the political frame is a
more common phenomenon among mobile EU citizens and is independent from
country of origin and national citizenship.
Together, these findings potentially indicate that people’s understandings of
the political frame shapes their evaluations of citizenship as a principle that or-
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ganises how they share access and rights with others in a national welfare com-
munity. Thus, this thesis emphasises that in regions and contexts, where a variety
of institutional frameworks of citizenship have created overlapping political au-
thorities, the relation between political subjects and representatives is likely to be
contested.
Thus, in reflection of these findings from a ’bottom-up’ approach, the focus
on cleavages between ’winners’ and ’losers’ as well as regarding the meaning of
(national) membership as legitimate criterion for access and rights in the ’top-
down’ literature might ignore how frame-setting shapes people’s conceptions of
what is just within and across national welfare communities.
This aspect is particularly relevant in the EU and the role of membership in
this context. The key question that is raised in these respects is how far EU citizen-
ship has challenged national conceptions of citizenship and, thus, membership in
a nationally-bound welfare state. As I have mentioned earlier (see chapter 2), es-
pecially the works by Brubaker (1992) and Soysal (1994) seem complementary to
each other instead of contradictory. Brubaker (1992) emphasises the importance
of national status of citizenship as nation-states exercise their power to define
members and non-members. Soysal (1994) observes how international human
rights norms permeate the power of nation-states and pressure them to provide
rights for non-members.
In particular, the findings of the empirical analysis of EU mobiles here sug-
gests that both aspects are experienced, yet at different stages. In light of these
findings, looking at how people perceive and experience migration during the
Eurocrisis might much more speak for notions of misrepresentation that lead to
notions of misrecognition and, to a lesser extent, maldistribution. Ironically then,
the different meanings of citizenship and notions of justice that become visible
through the eyes of people show both the weakness and strengths of EU citizen-
ship. In other words, they highlight how the national welfare state is contested
as a frame both if membership is conceived in national terms or detached from
national territory. Thus, my findings suggests that these scholarly debates ignore
the problems and notions of misframing and misrecognition that occur when ’en-
tering’ local or national regulatory systems as a ’situational member’.
In the next section, I will relate the implications of these findings to some of
the broader issues that is debated in the literature in these regards.
243
7.2 ’So what?’
Indeed, scholars have become more critical of approaches to migration and ques-
tions of membership that dichotomise national citizens and migrants based on
their legal statuses. Here, it has been argued that a focus on social conflict regard-
ing migration between legal categories or opposing groups is misleading: Groups
of people are not ”substantial entities” but they are constructed (Brubaker, 2004,
p. 8). During conflict, these groups are being evoked, identities affirmed, and cer-
tain distinctions begin to matter (see Brubaker, 2004).
Furthermore, this line of argument has been emphasised by the criticism of
”methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002). According to
its critics, the methodological focus on states as the main unit of analysis, which
is still common in the social sciences, ”inhibit[s]” a critical investigation of the
social interactions and structures beyond national boundaries (Wimmer and Glick
Schiller, 2002, p. 304). There is a risk that we forget ”how transnational themodern
world has always been, even in the high days when the nation-state bounded and
bundled most social processes” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002, p. 302). The
point made by Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) is not to ignore the nation-state
or legal statuses and consider them to be obsolete. Rather, they criticise that in
taking them for granted, we fail to notice when and how they are being contested.
I would like to address this important criticism by highlighting the benefits of
the underlying ’bottom-up’ approach to citizenship here. In my view, this thesis
has acknowledged the role of political frames and territories within an EU context
as it emerges as relevant enough for people to become aware of their political
subjectivity and, thus, to ask ”questions of justice and injustice” (see Isin, 2013,
p. 21).
On the one hand, the introduction of EU citizenship in theMaastricht Treaty of
1992 has created a common legal status for national citizens of every EU member
state, i.e. a status as EU citizens that ”complements” national membership (Treaty
on European Union (Maastricht text) (1992, art. 8) and Treaty on European Union
(Consolidated Version) (2016, now art. 9 to 12)). Concerning EU citizens, EU cit-
izenship has relocated the legal dichotomy of the national citizen with status and
rights and the migrant without status and rights. This dichotomy now applies
particularly to EU citizens and non-EU citizens. Seen from this perspective, EU
citizens would not need to contest citizenship.
Yet, on the other hand, as we turn our attention to the aftermaths of ’Brexit’,
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understanding citizenship through the eyes of ordinary people reveals experi-
ences of grave injustice by some. To EU mobiles it means being stripped of their
status, rights and individual interpretations of EU citizenship, while others might
not give too much meaning to EU citizenship at all and perceive the removal of
EU citizenship as regaining of political representation within a sovereign nation-
state. As emerging forms of pro-European mobilisation since Brexit suggest, new
and more questions of justice and injustice can therefore be expected in relation
to membership and the political frame in the EU (see Brändle, Galpin, and Trenz,
2017). A distinction between EU citizens as foreign or national citizens that com-
pete over rights and access, i.e. redistribution, seems particularly unfitting to
assess challenges of migration. This is especially the case in a context where
frame-setting, as it turns out, can be redone and people’s rights and legal statuses
revoked.
As aforemention, this thesis has approached such difficulties by means of a
’bottom-up’ approach. It has based its research design on a focus on people’s so-
cial practices regarding migration (here online media). Yet, it did not stop there
by empirically investigating such practices: Social practices on online and social
media as well as the underlying intentions and purposes of why people use them
are diverse and distinct as well. Much more, it has developed a theoretical frame-
work that focuses on people’s subjective notions of justice which can be accessed
via people’s practices as enactments of affectedness.
Thus, in a way, approaching contestation of citizenship through people’s no-
tions of justice takes away the need to compare them. Notions of justice are sub-
jective per definitionem; they are fluid and dynamic. Nevertheless, people have in
common that they formulate notions of justice when they contest issues that they
feel affected by (see Isin, 2008; Isin, 2013). Certainly, people’s notions of justice
do not emerge in a ’mental vacuum’, that is, they rest on perceptions and experi-
ences of social structures, rights, local surroundings and other aspects. With the
’bottom-up’ approach, this thesis has aimed to acknowledge and emphasise the di-
versity of people’s social situations. The theoretical framework in this thesis was
able to encompass such distinct social situations for an understanding of citizen-
ship contestation ’from below’ without adapting to categories of different legal
statuses and rights as well as cross-group comparisons.
The ’bottom-up’ approach in this thesis has followed is therefore particularly
appropriate in a time where opinion polarisation and social cleavages escape di-
chotomous understandings of group-specific migration perceptions and experi-
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ences such as migrants and national citizens, right-wing vs left wing, or ’winners’
and ’losers’. In other words, in times of opinion polarisation and social cleavages,
the ways in which people constitute themselves as political subjects needs to be
taken into consideration. Polarisation indicates that views, opinions, experiences
develop independently from each other and do not share common underlying
principles, structures, attributes and so forth. This poses methodological chal-
lenges since these perspectives might not be comparable and do not always relate
to each other. So far, it seems that there is a lack of appropriate instruments meth-
odologically approach these distinct perspectives under a common framework.
7.3 Suggestions for further research
So far, I have reflected upon the empirical findings and have related them to the
relevant debates in the literature. This last section reflects on questions that sur-
face from the analysis and provides suggestions for further research.
The findings presented here are neither representative of national public opin-
ion nor of mobile EU citizens in general. Obtaining generalisable and represent-
ative results was not the primary purpose of this research. Rather, qualitative
research, which I have primarily employed here, sheds new or a different light on
social phenomena. In this context, my findings raise several questions that might
potentially serve as hypotheses to be tested through quantitative measures in or-
der to contribute to a more general understanding about citizenship contestation
on the level of public opinion.
For example, is there a more causal relationship between contestation of mi-
gration and political contestation? Furthermore, in how far do EU mobiles ex-
periences in Berlin and Copenhagen as attractive capital cities reflect experiences
in other cities in Germany and Denmark, such as the finance hub Frankfurt am
Main, and the university town Aarhus? Can one further expect that resources
and skills in local administration essentially shape migration experiences and if
so, would one expect notions of misrecognition to be experienced even more in
urban or rural areas? That being said, it would furthermore be interesting to in-
vestigate in how far the discretionary powers of street-level bureaucrats influence
migrants’ experiences of misrecognition as well as their actual access to welfare
and public services. This could, for example, be further connected to those ap-
proaches that investigate the role of regions or cities, in which migrants become
active participants, instead of countries and nations and also question how cities
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or metropolitan areas are interrelated in Europe (see the volume by Glick Schiller
and Çağlar, 2011).
Moreover, the analysis could be expanded to other countries. Selecting crisis-
affected countries as national contexts, or liberal welfare state types, such as the
UK, could further verify when and how national conceptions of citizenship be-
come relevant for ordinary people. Here, one could investigate the hypothesis of
whether strong and economically stable welfare tend more towards specific no-
tions of undeservingness and misrepresentation. In contrast, this thesis could not
include the diverse backgrounds of migrant populations and it would be helpful to
see whether diversity patterns evoke specific constellations and categorisations
of (un-)deservingness. Note further that only critics of immigration who enact
their affectedness of immigation online have been taken into consideration here.
Further research should therefore include migration proponents in the majority
population and those expressing solidarity for migrants. This would provide de-
tailed insights into broader understandings of citizenship ’from below’. In similar
vein, it would be desirable to take into account less privileged groups of mobile
EU citizens by including low-skilled people, on the one hand, or expand the re-
search to juxtapose EU citizens’ experiences with non-EU citizens. In addition,
another pressing issue is to take into consideration the new situation and chal-
lenge of refugee well-being and their opportunities to participate in their new
surroundings.
This thesis has also emphasised the need to acknowledge a potential crisis of
political trust and legitimacy in Europe and beyond as implied by more recent
events since 2014. For example, the 2016 referendum in Britain about leaving the
EU has made ordinary people’s polarised understandings about EU citizenship in
relation to Euroscepticism and populism salient. Especially the question of what
happens to the ’normalisation’ of EU citizenship, i.e. taking freedom of movement
for granted as soon as EU citizenship is lost, raises not only theoretically import-
ant issues but empirical ones, too. In light of the findings about ordinary people’s
notions of justice, an empirical investigation into a loss of EU citizenship would,
at last, highlight how citizenship presents not only a legal or political concept
through which citizens and non-citizens are being governed and legally defined
but a ’category of practice’ which influences social encounters and experiences of
justice and injustice.
Finally, waves of populism and political cleavages have made the issue of
political contestation in relation to media debates, ’fake news’, and ’filter bubbles’
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even more salient. The US Presidential Election in 2016 and its preceding cam-
paigns have raised questions about the potential of discursive practices on online
and social media to fuel opinion cleavages and fragmentation. More in-depth
research about ordinary people’s self-created content (user-generated content)
would reveal interpretations that allow to better understand opinion cleavages
instead of simply identifying them. More qualitative research, enabled by new
technologies that go far beyond of what has been attempted here with a cluster
analysis, is invaluable to better understand people’s understandings about politics
and decision-making within a supranational context. Consequently, this kind of
in-depth research would contribute to linking abstract concepts such as citizen-
ship, identity or nationalism to everyday experiences and people’s way to enact
their affectedness in this regard. In this way, it would point to critical aspects
regarding democratic representation and cleavages between political elites and
citizens.
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Appendix A
Clustering
A.1 Stopword lists
Stopword list for Danish sample of online articles:
ad, af, alle, alligevel, andet, andre, at, bare, begge, blev, bleve, bliver, blive, da,
de, dem, den, denne, der, deres, det, dette, dig, din, din, dog, du, efter, ej, eller, en,
end, endnu, ene, eneste, enhver, et, er, fem, fik, fire, for, fordi, forrige, fra, få, fået,
får, før, gå, går, gik, gør, han, hans, har, have, havde, hendes, her, hos, hun, hvad,
hvem, hver, hvilken, hvilket, hvis, hvor, hvordan, hvorfor, hvornår, i, ind, inde,
ingen, intet, jeg, jeres, kan, kun, lav, laver, lave, lidt, lille, man, med, meget, men,
mener, mens, mig, min, mit, må, ned, nede, ni, nogen, noget, nu, når, nær, næste,
næsten, og, også, om, op, oppe, otte, på, sagde, se, seks, ses, sige, siger, sin, sine,
sit, skal, skulle, som, syv, så, sådan, tage, tager, ti, til, to, tog, tre, ud, ude, uden,
under, var, ved, vil, være, været, ikke, over, ovre, ret, kunne, sidder, sidde, lige,
derfor, helt, jo, hele, nemlig, bagved, foran, siden, mellem, desuden
Stopword list for German sample of online articles:
ab, aber, aber, ach, acht, achte, achten, achter, achtes, ag, alle, allein, allem,
allen, aller, allerdings, alles, allgemeinen, als, also, am, an, andere, anderen, an-
dern, anders, au, auch, auch, auf, aus, ausser, außer, ausserdem, außerdem, bald,
bei, beide, beiden, beim, beispiel, bekannt, bereits, besonders, besser, besten, bin,
bis, bisher, bist, da, dabei, dadurch, dafür, dagegen, daher, dahin, dahinter, dam-
als, damit, danach, daneben, dank, dann, daran, darauf, daraus, darf, darfst, darin,
darüber, darum, darunter, das, dasein, daselbst, dass, dasselbe, davon, davor, dazu,
dazwischen, dein, deine, deinem, deiner, dem, dementsprechend, demgegenüber,
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demgemäss, demgemäß, demselben, demzufolge, den, denen, denn, denn, densel-
ben, der, deren, derjenige, derjenigen, dermassen, dermaßen, derselbe, derselben,
des, deshalb, desselben, dessen, deswegen, d.h, dich, die, diejenige, diejenigen,
dies, diese, dieselbe, dieselben, diesem, diesen, dieser, dieses, dir, doch, dort, drei,
drin, dritte, dritten, dritter, drittes, du, durch, durchaus, dürfen, dürft, durfte,
durften, eben, ebenso, ehrlich, ei, eigen, eigene, eigenen, eigener, eigenes, ein,
einander, eine, einem, einen, einer, eines, einige, einigen, einiger, einiges, einmal,
eins, elf, ende, endlich, entweder, er, Ernst, erst, erste, ersten, erster, erstes, es,
etwa, etwas, euch, früher, fünf, fünfte, fünften, fünfter, fünftes, für, gab, ganz,
ganze, ganzen, ganzer, ganzes, gar, gedurft, gegen, gegenüber, gehabt, gehen,
geht, gekannt, gekonnt, gemacht, gemocht, gemusst, genug, gerade, gern, gesagt,
gesagt, geschweige, gewesen, gewollt, geworden, gibt, ging, gleich, gott, gross,
groß, grosse, große, grossen, großen, grosser, großer, grosses, großes, gut, gute,
guter, gutes, habe, haben, habt, hast, hat, hatte, hätte, hatten, hätten, heisst, her,
heute, hier, hin, hinter, hoch, ich, ihm, ihn, ihnen, ihr, ihre, ihrem, ihren, ihrer,
ihres, im, immer, in, indem, infolgedessen, ins, irgend, ist, ja, jahr, jahre, jahren,
je, jede, jedem, jeden, jeder, jedermann, jedermanns, jedoch, jemand, jemandem,
jemanden, jene, jenem, jenen, jener, jenes, jetzt, kam, kann, kannst, kaum, kein,
keine, keinem, keinen, keiner, kleine, kleinen, kleiner, kleines, kommen, kommt,
können, könnt, konnte, könnte, konnten, kurz, lang, lange, leicht, leide, lieber, los,
machen, macht, machte, mag, magst, mahn, man, manche, manchem, manchen,
mancher, manches, mann, mehr, mein, meine, meinem, meinen, meiner, meines,
mensch, menschen, mich, mir, mit, mittel, mochte, möchte, mochten, mögen,
möglich, mögt, morgen, muss, muß, müssen, musst, müsst, musste, mussten, na,
nach, nachdem, nahm, natürlich, neben, nein, neue, neuen, neun, neunte, neun-
ten, neunter, neuntes, nicht, nichts, nie, niemand, niemandem, niemanden, noch,
nun, nun, nur, ob, ob, oben, oder, offen, oft, ohne, Ordnung, richtig, rund, sache,
sagt, sagte, sah, satt, schlecht, Schluss, schon, sechs, sechste, sechsten, sechster,
sechstes, sehr, sei, seid, seien, sein, seine, seinem, seinen, seiner, seines, seit, seit-
dem, selbst, selbst, sich, sie, sieben, siebente, siebenten, siebenter, siebentes, sind,
so, solang, solche, solchem, solchen, solcher, solches, soll, sollen, sollte, sollten,
sondern, sonst, sowie, später, statt, tag, tage, tagen, tat, teil, tel, tritt, trotzdem, tun,
über, überhaupt, übrigens, uhr, um, und, und?, uns, unser, unsere, unserer, unter,
vergangenen, viel, viele, vielem, vielen, vielleicht, vier, vierte, vierten, vierter,
viertes, vom, von, vor, wahr?, während, währenddem, währenddessen, wann,
war, wäre, waren, wart, warum, was, wegen, weil, weit, weiter, weitere, weiteren,
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weiteres, welche, welchem, welchen, welcher, welches, wem, wen, wenig, wenig,
wenige, weniger, weniges, wenigstens, wenn, wenn, wer, werde, werden, werdet,
wessen, wie, wie, wieder, will, willst, wir, wird, wirklich, wirst, wo, wohl, wollen,
wollt, wollte, wollten, worden, wurde, würde, wurden, würden, z.b, zehn, zehnte,
zehnten, zehnter, zehntes, zeit, zu, zuerst, zugleich, zum, zum, zunächst, zur,
zurück, zusammen, zwanzig, zwar, zwar, zwei, zweite, zweiten, zweiter, zweites,
zwischen, zwölf
A.2 Article samples
A list of articles and clusters is available upon request.
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Appendix B
Comments
The following presents a list of comment threads fromwhich I have quoted. ’Work
versions’ are available upon request.
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Article Online
newspaper
Date of
publication
Zweisprachigkeit anerkennen, nicht
miesmachen
ZEIT On-
line
08.12.2014
Om flag og frihed Berlingske 03.04.2012
Borgmester træt af sende 66 børnechecks til
Polen
Ekstrabladet 03.09.2012
Grundsatzrede: Gauck fordert großzügigere
EU-Flüchtlingspolitik
Die Welt 30.06.2014
Antallet af udenlandske studerender fra EU
eksploderer
Ekstrabladet 18.04.2013
Danskere får tysk børnecheckfor 50 millioner Ekstrabladet 09.05.2014
No taxation without without representation Berlingske 13.01.2014
Rumänen und Bulgaren sind oft
Hartz-IV-Aufstocker
Die Welt 16.01.2014
Griechen und Spanier suchen ihr Heil in
Deutschland
Die Welt 27.06.2012
Einwanderungsrepublik Deutschland beliebt
wie nie
Die Welt 25.05.2014
Zugewanderte Mediziner: Doktor
Kannitverstan
Spiegel On-
line
04.11.2012
EU undersøger danske dagpenge Jyllandsposten24.08.2013
Bendt Bendtsen: Grænsebomme hjælper ikke Ekstrabladet 09.05.2014
Die Union und die haftierten Asylbewerber ZEIT On-
line
13.05.2014
Kretschmann rechtfertigt Ja zum
Asyl-Kompromiss
ZEIT On-
line
19.09.2014
Levacovic må blive i Danmark Ekstrabladet 02.04.2014
Brødre domt for at skære øre af i ’æresrelateret’
sag slipper for udvisning
Politiken 12.11.2013
Flucht ins deutsche Glück Spiegel On-
line
09.05.2013
Løkke: Luk Danmark for dem, der ikke vil Ekstrabladet 08.08.2014
Ny domstol praksis øger mulighedern for at
sætte kriminelle udlændinge på porten
Berlingske 28.11.2014
Mennesker først Jyllandsposten30.09.2014
Arbeitsmarktforscher: Deutschland profitiert Spiegel 27.12.2013
Bei Einwanderer-Flut erlaubt EU
Grenzkontrollen
Welt 30.05.2013274
Appendix C
Online survey
C.1 Distribution of survey link
A list of Facebook groups in which survey link was distributed
C.2 Survey responses
Survey responses (’raw data’) mobile EU citizens in Denmark and Germany. The
Danish survey is co-property of the EuroChallenge project at the University of
Copenhagen and was conducted within this framework.
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Facebook groups
Germany
Links
Life in Germany https://www.facebook.com/GermanWay
Language Tandem
Berlin
https://www.facebook.com/groups/LaTaBe/
Expats in Germany https://www.facebook.com/groups/
1423705027882340/
International friends
Dresden
https://www.facebook.com/groups/
internationalfriendsdresden/permalink/
578235242264780/
International friends
Munich
https://www.facebook.com/groups/
816678275049303/?fref=ts
Erasmus and
International friends
meetup Stuttgart
https://www.facebook.com/groups/
245792888799065/
Munich- international
friends
https://www.facebook.com/groups/munich.
international.friends/?notif_t=group_
r2j_approved
Expats in Hamburg https://www.facebook.com/groups/
253520918142987/
berlin EXPATS https://www.facebook.com/groups/
berlinexpats/
Expats in Germany https://www.facebook.com/groups/
expatsingermany/
Toytown Berlin
Young English
Speakers
https://www.facebook.com/groups/
toytownberlin/?fref=ts
Frankfurt aM Friends https://www.facebook.com/groups/
Frankfurt.a.M.Friends/
Espanoles en Berlin https://www.facebook.com/groups/
espanolesenberlin/
Les francais de Berlin https://www.facebook.com/groups/
379965438688495/?fref=ts
Foreigners in
Berlin-Brandenburg
https://www.facebook.com/groups/
561144050631871/
Free advice Berlin https://www.facebook.com/groups/
719264084796021/?fref=ts
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Facebook groups
Denmark
Links
2Go Copenhagen https://www.facebook.com/2gocopenhagen/
?fref=ts
Foreigners in
Denmark
https://www.facebook.com/groups/findk/
Studieskolen https://www.facebook.com/studieskolen/
?fref=ts
Expats in
Copenhagen
https://www.facebook.com/groups/
expatsincopenhagen/
Expat in Denmark https://www.facebook.com/groups/
4386755843/?hc_ref=SEARCH
Free Stuff
Copenhagen
https://www.facebook.com/groups/
freethestuffcph/
International Events
in Copenhagen
https://www.facebook.com/groups/
GetTheEventGroup/?fref=nf
Århus Internationals https://www.facebook.com/groups/
16968296511/
International Society https://www.facebook.com/groups/
IntlSociety/
Españoles en
Dinamarca2/Spaniere
i Danmark 2
https://www.facebook.com/groups/
144278955594132/?fref=ts
University of
Copenhagen
https://www.facebook.com/groups/
2264991869/?fref=ts
International House https://www.facebook.com/
internationalhousecopenhagen?fref=ts
International
Churches in Denmark
https://www.facebook.com/
InternationalChurchesinDenmark/info
Worktrotter in
Denmark
https://www.facebook.com/worktrotter.dk/
info
To Love, Work, Study
and Travel in
Denmark
https://www.facebook.com/pages/
To-Love-Work-Study-and-Travel-in-Denmark/
161315182531?id=161315182531&sk=info
Internationals in
Roskilde
https://www.facebook.com/groups/
internationalsinroskilde/?fref=ts
Copenhagen Cultural
Network
https://www.facebook.com/groups/
329601167142222/277
4.2% 15
13.3% 48
9.4% 34
42.8% 154
17.2% 62
13.1% 47
Q1 How long have you been in Germany?
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
Total 360
Less than a
month
2-6 months
7 months to a
year
1-3 years
4-6 years
Over 6 years
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
4.2%
13.3%
9.4%
42.8%
17.2%
13.1%
Answer Choices Responses
Less than a month
2-6 months
7 months to a year
1-3 years
4-6 years
Over 6 years
1 / 48
Verena GERMANY SurveyMonkey
68.2% 245
31.8% 114
Q2 What is your gender?
Answered: 359 Skipped: 1
Total 359
Female
Male
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
68.2%
31.8%
Answer Choices Responses
Female
Male
2 / 48
Verena GERMANY SurveyMonkey
29.2% 105
56.1% 202
11.4% 41
1.9% 7
1.4% 5
0.0% 0
Q3 How old are you?
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
Total 360
18 to 25
26 to 35
36 to 45
46 to 55
56 to 65
over 65
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
29.2%
56.1%
11.4%
1.9%
1.4%
Answer Choices Responses
18 to 25
26 to 35
36 to 45
46 to 55
56 to 65
over 65
3 / 48
Verena GERMANY SurveyMonkey
0.6% 2
9.7% 35
6.7% 24
40.6% 146
38.1% 137
3.9% 14
0.6% 2
Q4 What is the highest level of education
you have completed?
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
Total 360
Primary school
High school
diploma
Vocational
training or...
Bachelor
degree...
Master degree
(University)
PhD degree
No formal
qualificatio...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0.6%
9.7%
6.7%
40.6%
38.1%
3.9%
0.6%
Answer Choices Responses
Primary school
High school diploma
Vocational training or technical college
Bachelor degree (University)
Master degree (University)
PhD degree
No formal qualification of any type
4 / 48
Verena GERMANY SurveyMonkey
Q5 What is your country of citizenship?
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
5 / 48
Verena GERMANY SurveyMonkey
Belgium 
1.1% (4)
Bulgaria 
2.8% (10)
Croatia 
1.7% (6)
Estonia 
1.9% (7)
Finland 
1.9% (7)
France 
17.2% (62)
Greece 
2.5% (9)
Hungary 
0.8% (3)
Iceland 
0.3% (1)
Italy 
10.0% (36)
Ireland 
5.6% (20)
Latvia 
1.1% (4)
Lithuania 
0.6% (2)
Netherlands Norway 
Poland 
3.9% (14)
Portugal 
2.8% (10)
Romania 
6.1% (22)
Slovakia 
0.3% (1)
Slovenia 
0.8% (3)
Spain 
5.0% (18)
Sweden 
3.6% (13)
Switzerland 
0.3% (1)
Cyprus 
0.6% (2)
Denmark 
3.1% (11)
United Kingdom 
21.7% (78)
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Q6 In which country did you reside just
before moving to Germany?
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
9 / 48
Verena GERMANY SurveyMonkey
Belgium 
1.7% (6)
Bulgaria 
1.1% (4)
Croatia 
1.1% (4)
Finland 
1.4% (5)
France 
11.7% (42)
Greece 
1.7% (6)
Italy 
7.8% (28)
Ireland 
3.9% (14)
Latvia 
1.1% (4)
Netherlands 
3.6% (13)
Poland 
2.5% (9)
Portugal 
2.5% (9)
Romania Spain 
Sweden 
3.6% (13)
Switzerland 
1.1% (4)
Denmark 
3.9% (14)
United Kingdom 
26.4% (95)
Australia 
1.1% (4)
China 
0.8% (3)
Russia 
0.3% (1)
Singapore 
0.6% (2)
Turkey 
0.3% (1)
United States 
1.4% (5)
South Africa 
0.3% (1)
Zambia 
0.3% (1)
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42.5% 153
9.4% 34
5.6% 20
0.6% 2
1.1% 4
40.8% 147
Q7 What were you doing before you moved
to Germany?
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
Total 360
Worked as an
employee
Worked
freelance/ r...
Was looking
for jobs
Retired
Looked after
my...
Studied
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
42.5%
9.4%
5.6%
0.6%
1.1%
40.8%
Answer Choices Responses
Worked as an employee
Worked freelance/ ran my own business
Was looking for jobs
Retired
Looked after my children/family (not in employment)
Studied
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21.7% 78
21.7% 78
22.8% 82
28.3% 102
28.6% 103
Q8 What were your reasons for leaving your
country and coming to Germany? (select all
that apply)
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
Total Respondents: 360  
# Other (please specify) Date
1 My boyfriends job 12/4/2015 11:16 AM
2 For the opportunity to live abroad, learn a new language and live within a different culture 12/4/2015 9:04 AM
3 to take a sort of gap year and learn the language 12/3/2015 10:56 PM
4 Interesting life experience 12/3/2015 10:16 PM
5 To embrace a new culture and learn a new language. 12/3/2015 9:39 PM
6 To learn a new language and a new culture. 12/3/2015 8:58 PM
7 For cheaper and higher quality of living 12/3/2015 8:36 PM
8 to change something :) 12/3/2015 8:26 PM
9 to try living in another country 11/20/2015 10:42 PM
10 change 11/20/2015 11:44 AM
11 European Voluntary Service 11/16/2015 10:20 PM
12 Provide mukticultural experience to my children 11/14/2015 9:30 AM
13 Didn't like France. Paris very stressful, no security at all, felt like in a prison. 11/13/2015 7:59 PM
14 Moving with partner because of job offer (with children) 11/13/2015 7:01 PM
To look for
jobs
To have better
welfare and/...
To join a
family...
I got a job
offer and ha...
To study
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
21.7%
21.7%
22.8%
28.3%
28.6%
Answer Choices Responses
To look for jobs
To have better welfare and/or salary
To join a family member/partner/spouse already in Germany
I got a job offer and had to move here
To study
14 / 48
Verena GERMANY SurveyMonkey
15 I am still working for the same Italian company. We have a customer in Germany, and I work with them as an
external consultant. I don't have a German contract. So it's a sort of job offer, but I haven't changed my company -
just the project I am following
10/27/2015 1:00 AM
16 For artistic community & business opportunities 10/22/2015 1:56 AM
17 Part of university course 10/21/2015 11:40 PM
18 Got scholarship to conduct learning traineeship. 10/21/2015 9:23 PM
19 To live somewhere different/learn a new language 10/21/2015 4:05 PM
20 Bored of London 10/21/2015 3:27 PM
21 Wanted to move to Berlin 10/21/2015 12:32 PM
22 A simple change/ more creative opportunities 10/21/2015 11:41 AM
23 I fell in love with my German husband 10/21/2015 11:38 AM
24 more nature in the city 10/21/2015 9:29 AM
25 Internship 10/21/2015 9:22 AM
26 Wanted to try something else 10/21/2015 9:17 AM
27 Just because I love Berlin. 10/21/2015 8:34 AM
28 To live somewhere interesting and safe 10/21/2015 7:47 AM
29 To try and live in a different city/country 10/21/2015 5:23 AM
30 to use the European visa law to have my American spouse come to Europe 10/21/2015 2:28 AM
31 To experience the lifestyle (Berlin) and be in a German-speaking environment. 10/21/2015 12:08 AM
32 Quality of life 10/20/2015 11:57 PM
33 Cheaper cost of living 10/20/2015 11:51 PM
34 Learn German 10/20/2015 11:19 PM
35 better lifestyle 10/20/2015 11:13 PM
36 I specifically looked for a job in a germany speaking country. 10/20/2015 11:13 PM
37 Partner got a job here so we all moved 10/20/2015 11:06 PM
38 Above answer is untrue. I came for new experiences - wanted a change of lifestyle 10/20/2015 10:58 PM
39 Always wanted to live in a city 10/20/2015 10:44 PM
40 To get to know a new culture and get more job experience 10/20/2015 10:11 PM
41 To party 10/20/2015 10:07 PM
42 Out of interest 10/20/2015 9:59 PM
43 more interesting jobs 10/20/2015 9:53 PM
44 to live away from the conservative society in Zagreb (Croatia) 10/20/2015 9:48 PM
45 Au Pair position 10/20/2015 9:47 PM
46 cheaper rent 10/20/2015 9:43 PM
47 to live more openly and freely 10/20/2015 9:18 PM
48 Internship as part of bachelor degree 10/17/2015 5:09 PM
49 protect the futur of my kids 10/17/2015 3:30 PM
50 To learn german 10/15/2015 11:25 AM
51 to change country 10/14/2015 5:52 PM
52 and to live in Berlin 10/14/2015 5:36 PM
53 for fun 10/14/2015 1:51 PM
54 to discover the world 10/14/2015 12:51 PM
55 Art + Learn German 10/14/2015 1:20 AM
56 To have a better quality of life, by living in a capital city like Berlin with a wide array of cultural events and lots of
history without the expenses of a big city.
10/13/2015 7:47 PM
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57 internship in a german speaking country 10/13/2015 7:11 PM
58 Change of scenery, had friends here 10/12/2015 2:30 PM
59 Experience a new culture 10/8/2015 1:00 PM
60 To experience a different culture 10/8/2015 8:22 AM
61 Had a friend that wanted to live and try it out here , too. We wanted to live and search possibilities in the same
place.
10/7/2015 11:22 PM
62 A Career Break - Possible Business Opportunities 10/7/2015 10:03 PM
63 My Company closed their Spanish operations and moved me to Berlin (or be fired) 10/7/2015 9:44 PM
64 i love germany and wanted to change 10/7/2015 8:51 PM
65 Adventure, to learn german 10/7/2015 8:44 PM
66 To Live in a bigger city ( Berlin ) 10/7/2015 8:20 PM
67 Mostly for fun. 10/7/2015 8:00 PM
68 To get out of Icelands crumbling economy and shortsightedness. 10/7/2015 7:46 PM
69 for fun 10/7/2015 7:37 PM
70 I first moved to Munich for 4 years as a child because of my father's job & after my studies I moved to Berlin to do
an internship & ended up staying.
10/7/2015 7:35 PM
71 I feel more at home in Berlin than anywhere in Denmark 10/7/2015 7:10 PM
72 Attracted to the Berlin lifestyle 10/7/2015 6:53 PM
73 I like the culture 10/7/2015 6:16 PM
74 to enjoy 10/7/2015 6:08 PM
75 to live in a country and in a city that best aligns to my core values and needs. You can still feel a lot of tension in
the people and in the system of the post-communist country that is Romania. Which is not that present or manifests
in a different way in countries more to the west of Europe.
10/7/2015 6:03 PM
76 Love 10/7/2015 5:47 PM
77 quality of life and space 10/6/2015 5:22 PM
78 to get away from corruption and everyday-life-chaos 10/6/2015 3:56 PM
79 To get away from home, learn a language, try something new 10/6/2015 1:57 PM
80 ex british forces. met wife whilst serving in germany 10/5/2015 9:50 PM
81 liked the city better 10/5/2015 3:23 PM
82 To learn German as well and work in an International Company 10/5/2015 3:16 PM
83 To experience a new country and culture. To learn German. 10/3/2015 1:50 PM
84 better quality of life 10/3/2015 12:10 PM
85 My partner is german 10/3/2015 9:46 AM
86 My husband had a new contract in Germany so moved the family 10/2/2015 7:31 PM
87 mainly to live in a more organised country 10/2/2015 12:48 AM
88 Au pair 10/1/2015 10:09 PM
89 I can be a stay at home mom here, thats is hard in Denmak because of high taxes. Here we have high family
welfare, and good or better real welfare in hospials, scholls..
10/1/2015 5:59 PM
90 To enjoy a new experience in live 10/1/2015 12:01 PM
91 To learn a new language 10/1/2015 11:29 AM
92 Better quality of life 9/30/2015 10:13 AM
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16.7% 60
57.2% 206
7.8% 28
0.0% 0
2.2% 8
16.1% 58
Q9 What describes best your current
situation?
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
Total 360
I work
freelance/ r...
I work as an
employee
I am looking
for jobs
I am retired
I look after
my...
I study
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
16.7%
57.2%
7.8%
2.2%
16.1%
Answer Choices Responses
I work freelance/ run my own business
I work as an employee
I am looking for jobs
I am retired
I look after my children/family (not in employment)
I study
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Q10 On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 is the least and 5
is the most) how much do you feel informed
about your rights as a foreigner living in
Germany?
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
20.8%
75
29.2%
105
30.3%
109
17.5%
63
2.2%
8
 
360
 
2.51
1 2 3 4 5
(no label)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2.2%
17.5%
30.3%
29.2%
20.8%
 1 2 3 4 5 Total Weighted Average
(no label)
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Q11 On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 is the least and 5
is the most) please tell us which rights
motivated you to move to Germany?
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
The right to
move freely ...
The right to
seek job...
The right to
run my own...
The right to
receive soci...
45.0%
33.9%
6.7%
4.4%
21.9%
24.4%
7.2%
4.4%
8.3%
15.0%
12.8%
12.5%
4.7%
8.3%
17.5%
14.2%
20.0%
18.3%
55.8%
64.4%
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20.0%
72
4.7%
17
8.3%
30
21.9%
79
45.0%
162
 
360
 
3.67
18.3%
66
8.3%
30
15.0%
54
24.4%
88
33.9%
122
 
360
 
3.47
55.8%
201
17.5%
63
12.8%
46
7.2%
26
6.7%
24
 
360
 
1.91
64.4%
232
14.2%
51
12.5%
45
4.4%
16
4.4%
16
 
360
 
1.70
49.2%
177
16.4%
59
16.9%
61
9.4%
34
8.1%
29
 
360
 
2.11
73.1%
263
13.6%
49
10.3%
37
1.4%
5
1.7%
6
 
360
 
1.45
1 2 3 4 5
The right to
have German...
The right to
vote
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
8.1%
1.7%
9.4%
1.4%
16.9%
10.3%
16.4%
13.6%
49.2%
73.1%
 1 2 3 4 5 Total Weighted Average
The right to move freely in Europe (free movement)
The right to seek job employment
The right to run my own business
The right to receive social benefits
The right to have German language classes
The right to vote
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Q12 Now that you are in Germany, on a
scale of 1 to 5 (1 is the least and 5 is the
most) please tell us which rights do you
consider important?
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
The right to
move freely ...
The right to
seek job...
The right to
run my own...
The right to
receive soci...
71.7%
64.7%
36.1%
33.3%
13.9%
20.0%
12.8%
18.3%
8.1%
7.8%
19.7%
16.9%
1.7%
2.5%
11.1%
12.5%
4.7%
5.0%
20.3%
18.9%
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4.7%
17
1.7%
6
8.1%
29
13.9%
50
71.7%
258
 
360
 
4.46
5.0%
18
2.5%
9
7.8%
28
20.0%
72
64.7%
233
 
360
 
4.37
20.3%
73
11.1%
40
19.7%
71
12.8%
46
36.1%
130
 
360
 
3.33
18.9%
68
12.5%
45
16.9%
61
18.3%
66
33.3%
120
 
360
 
3.35
22.8%
82
12.2%
44
18.9%
68
13.9%
50
32.2%
116
 
360
 
3.21
29.7%
107
12.8%
46
18.6%
67
11.4%
41
27.5%
99
 
360
 
2.94
1 2 3 4 5
The right to
have German...
The right to
vote
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
33.3%
32.2%
27.5%
13.9%
11.4%
18.9%
18.6%
12.2%
12.8%
22.8%
29.7%
 1 2 3 4 5 Total Weighted Average
The right to move freely in Europe (free movement)
The right to seek job employment
The right to run my own business
The right to receive social benefits
The right to have German language classes
The right to vote
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Q13 On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 is the least and 5
is the most) please tell us which rights
motivated you to move to Germany?
Answered: 0 Skipped: 360
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
! No matching responses.
 1 2 3 4 5 Total Weighted Average
The right to travel freely in the Schengen zone
The right to seek asylum
The right to receive social benefits
The right to family reunification
The right to have German language classes
The right to obtain permanent German residence/citizenship
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Q14 Now that you are in Germany, on a
scale of 1 to 5 (1 is the least and 5 is the
most) please tell us which rights do you
consider important?
Answered: 0 Skipped: 360
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
! No matching responses.
 1 2 3 4 5 Total Weighted Average
The right to travel within the Schengen zone
The right to seek asylum
The right to family reunification
The right to receive social benefits
The right to have German language classes
The right to obtain permanent German residence/citizenship
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45.8% 165
33.1% 119
40.8% 147
32.2% 116
50.0% 180
23.9% 86
33.1% 119
29.7% 107
1.4% 5
Q15 How did you socialise when you first
moved to Germany? (select all that apply)
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
Total Respondents: 360  
through
family/frien...
through people
from my coun...
through social
media (e.g....
through
websites for...
work place
study
German
language...
Social
activities...
religious
community (e...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
45.8%
33.1%
40.8%
32.2%
50.0%
23.9%
33.1%
29.7%
1.4%
Answer Choices Responses
through family/friends already in Germany
through people from my country of origin
through social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter)
through websites for foreigners/expats/newcomers to Germany (e.g. Internations, Meet up)
work place
study
German language classes
Social activities (hobbies, sports, associations)
religious community (e.g. church, mosque)
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57.5% 207
41.1% 148
47.5% 171
25.6% 92
62.2% 224
17.8% 64
17.8% 64
43.6% 157
0.8% 3
Q16 How do you currently socialise? (select
all that apply)
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
Total Respondents: 360  
through
family/frien...
through people
from my coun...
through social
media (e.g....
through
websites for...
work place
study
German
language...
Social
activities...
religious
community (e...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
57.5%
41.1%
47.5%
25.6%
62.2%
17.8%
17.8%
43.6%
0.8%
Answer Choices Responses
through family/friends already in Germany
through people from my country of origin
through social media (e.g. Facebook. Twitter)
through websites for foreigners/expats/newcomers to Germany (e.g. Internations, Meet up)
work place
study
German language classes
Social activities (hobbies, sports, associations)
religious community (e.g. church, mosque)
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60.8% 219
57.8% 208
85.3% 307
8.6% 31
17.5% 63
Q17 Your circle of friends in Germany is
formed of ... (select all that apply)
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
Total Respondents: 360  
Germans
People from
your country...
Non-German
foreigners
I spend time
mostly with ...
I do not
socialize mu...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
60.8%
57.8%
85.3%
8.6%
17.5%
Answer Choices Responses
Germans
People from your country of origin
Non-German foreigners
I spend time mostly with my own family
I do not socialize much here and keep in touch with friends and family abroad via internet /phone
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Q18 On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being very
negative and 5 very positive, how would
you rate your experience of staying in
Germany?
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
1.9%
7
6.9%
25
24.7%
89
46.9%
169
19.4%
70
 
360
 
3.75
1 2 3 4 5
(no label)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
19.4%
46.9%
24.7%
6.9%
1.9%
 1 2 3 4 5 Total Weighted Average
(no label)
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Q19 And in particular (rate again from 1 to
5, 1 being very negative and 5 very
positive):
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
How satisfied
are you with...
How satisfied
are you with...
How satisfied
are you with...
1.7%
7.2%
20.6%
26.9%
15.8%
30.0%
46.9%
33.9%
23.9%
16.4%
24.2%
18.9%
5.6%
11.1%
6.7%
2.5%
7.8%
7.2%
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6.7%
24
18.9%
68
23.9%
86
30.0%
108
20.6%
74
0.0%
0
 
360
 
3.39
2.5%
9
5.6%
20
16.4%
59
46.9%
169
26.9%
97
1.7%
6
 
360
 
3.92
7.8%
28
11.1%
40
24.2%
87
33.9%
122
15.8%
57
7.2%
26
 
360
 
3.42
1 2 3 4 5 N/A
How well do
you feel you...
How would you
rate the...
How would you
rate the...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0.6%
8.6%
32.5%
13.9%
7.2%
7.2%
30.3%
13.1%
10.8%
29.4%
21.7%
16.1%
18.6%
20.8%
14.2%
28.6%
19.2%
 1 2 3 4 5 N/A Total Weighted
Average
How satisfied are you with your social life?
How satisfied are you with the quality of your life?
How satisfied are you with your work?
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7.2%
26
18.6%
67
29.4%
106
30.3%
109
13.9%
50
0.6%
2
 
360
 
3.25
28.6%
103
20.8%
75
21.7%
78
13.1%
47
7.2%
26
8.6%
31
 
360
 
2.45
19.2%
69
14.2%
51
16.1%
58
10.8%
39
7.2%
26
32.5%
117
 
360
 
2.60
How well do you feel you fit in German society in general?
How would you rate the support you received from the German
authorities (e.g. government, municipality)?
How would you rate the support you received from Non-governmental
organisations, such as charities and/or expatriate communities?
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Q20 Could you name one organization that
has been very useful for you in terms of
support since you arrived in Germany?
Answered: 165 Skipped: 195
# Responses Date
1 none 1/4/2016 4:25 AM
2 - 12/12/2015 1:19 PM
3 Burgeramt 12/8/2015 10:16 PM
4 No 12/4/2015 11:56 PM
5 Kaiser's supermarket as I can find a nice selection of food. Otherwise there doesn't seem to be much support. 12/4/2015 3:18 PM
6 no 12/4/2015 2:30 PM
7 No 12/4/2015 9:08 AM
8 NONE! 12/4/2015 12:34 AM
9 no 12/4/2015 12:12 AM
10 Oficina Precaria 12/4/2015 12:06 AM
11 - 12/3/2015 11:44 PM
12 no 12/3/2015 10:58 PM
13 no 12/3/2015 9:52 PM
14 Arbeitsamt 12/3/2015 9:41 PM
15 Berlin gaa 12/3/2015 9:17 PM
16 VHS 12/3/2015 9:09 PM
17 NO 12/3/2015 9:04 PM
18 Toytown Berlin 12/3/2015 8:38 PM
19 - 12/3/2015 8:27 PM
20 oase 11/20/2015 11:48 AM
21 Na 11/18/2015 4:34 PM
22 Sadly No 11/18/2015 7:29 AM
23 My employer, however I find government offices and banking very straight forward as long as you make
appointments.
11/18/2015 2:48 AM
24 centre français de berlin 11/17/2015 12:26 AM
25 Humboldt University in Berlin 11/16/2015 9:05 PM
26 Humboldt University 11/16/2015 7:53 PM
27 don't know any 11/15/2015 11:28 PM
28 Mieterverein 11/14/2015 1:20 PM
29 i have not yet refered to any organisation 11/13/2015 10:34 PM
30 VHS 11/13/2015 8:04 PM
31 Jobcenter 11/13/2015 7:16 PM
32 None 10/27/2015 1:04 AM
33 LernLaden 10/25/2015 6:04 AM
34 PAD 10/21/2015 11:42 PM
35 No 10/21/2015 10:10 PM
36 - 10/21/2015 9:26 PM
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37 no 10/21/2015 4:07 PM
38 Can't think of one 10/21/2015 3:29 PM
39 Free Advice Berlin 10/21/2015 12:34 PM
40 berlin.de 10/21/2015 12:18 PM
41 no 10/21/2015 11:47 AM
42 toytown 10/21/2015 11:44 AM
43 no 10/21/2015 11:34 AM
44 Oficina Precaria Berlin 10/21/2015 11:19 AM
45 No 10/21/2015 11:03 AM
46 no 10/21/2015 10:02 AM
47 Oficina precaria Berlin 10/21/2015 8:22 AM
48 Auslandbehorde 10/21/2015 2:31 AM
49 Free Advice Berlin (Facebook group) 10/21/2015 1:49 AM
50 http://www.bamf.de/ 10/21/2015 1:28 AM
51 Finamzamt 10/20/2015 11:56 PM
52 ZAV 10/20/2015 11:54 PM
53 None 10/20/2015 11:22 PM
54 kindernachsorge klinik Brandenburg 10/20/2015 11:17 PM
55 My work place 10/20/2015 11:17 PM
56 Jobcenter 10/20/2015 11:16 PM
57 Facebook group- Expat baby berlin 10/20/2015 11:09 PM
58 Neighborhood-based groups organising local meetings and activities 10/20/2015 11:02 PM
59 TK - Health Insurance 10/20/2015 11:01 PM
60 no 10/20/2015 10:35 PM
61 Berlin Amateurs 10/20/2015 10:16 PM
62 Zalando 10/20/2015 10:06 PM
63 AWO, ARBEIT UND LEBEN e.V.,berufsverband bildender künstler berlin 10/20/2015 10:06 PM
64 No organisations 10/20/2015 10:03 PM
65 Facebook - Free Advice Berlin 10/20/2015 10:01 PM
66 None; I haven't turned to organizations for help. 10/20/2015 9:51 PM
67 Meetup 10/20/2015 9:48 PM
68 http://www.susi-frauen-zentrum.com/ 10/20/2015 9:41 PM
69 / 10/20/2015 9:36 PM
70 Arbeitsamt / Agentur für Arbeit 10/20/2015 9:34 PM
71 no 10/20/2015 9:33 PM
72 HU Berlin 10/20/2015 9:20 PM
73 Agentur für Arbeit 10/18/2015 12:18 AM
74 none 10/17/2015 3:34 PM
75 none 10/15/2015 3:14 PM
76 Goethe institut 10/15/2015 11:28 AM
77 - 10/15/2015 9:12 AM
78 Galeries Lafayette 10/14/2015 10:49 PM
79 no 10/14/2015 5:57 PM
80 DAAD 10/14/2015 5:39 PM
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81 wooga HR 10/14/2015 1:42 PM
82 Ambassade of France 10/14/2015 11:46 AM
83 ERASMUS 10/14/2015 11:33 AM
84 none 10/14/2015 10:42 AM
85 Studentenwerk 10/14/2015 9:58 AM
86 my work 10/13/2015 9:13 PM
87 AWO / AYEKO 10/13/2015 8:44 PM
88 -- 10/13/2015 8:43 PM
89 Language school 10/12/2015 2:34 PM
90 none 10/12/2015 1:48 PM
91 None 10/8/2015 7:08 PM
92 No. 10/8/2015 3:19 PM
93 N/A 10/8/2015 1:03 PM
94 no 10/8/2015 12:22 PM
95 my employer 10/8/2015 9:58 AM
96 no 10/8/2015 1:04 AM
97 friends who are already in berlin (I have not used any organisations for support) 10/8/2015 12:54 AM
98 Something to tell me HOW the very complicated and terrible bureaucracy works 10/8/2015 12:11 AM
99 none 10/7/2015 11:36 PM
100 AWO 10/7/2015 11:30 PM
101 Employer 10/7/2015 10:52 PM
102 Toytown Germany, free advice Berlin, expath 10/7/2015 10:41 PM
103 not really... 10/7/2015 10:34 PM
104 Agentur fur Arbeit for German classes 10/7/2015 10:29 PM
105 None 10/7/2015 10:06 PM
106 TK Health Insurance 10/7/2015 9:17 PM
107 TK 10/7/2015 8:26 PM
108 Jobcenter 10/7/2015 8:24 PM
109 Caritas 10/7/2015 7:58 PM
110 Haven't required any support. 10/7/2015 7:49 PM
111 No 10/7/2015 7:46 PM
112 Facebook groups (& to be honest, my German flatmate) 10/7/2015 7:38 PM
113 - 10/7/2015 7:35 PM
114 No 10/7/2015 7:25 PM
115 mietervereinigung 10/7/2015 7:22 PM
116 No 10/7/2015 6:42 PM
117 None 10/7/2015 6:41 PM
118 AWO 10/7/2015 6:33 PM
119 Studentenwerk 10/7/2015 6:20 PM
120 None 10/7/2015 6:19 PM
121 Meetup.com 10/7/2015 6:18 PM
122 None 10/7/2015 6:12 PM
123 n/a 10/7/2015 5:55 PM
124 none 10/7/2015 5:50 PM
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125 No 10/7/2015 5:50 PM
126 Arbeits Agentur 10/7/2015 5:46 PM
127 No 10/6/2015 5:12 PM
128 Verdi 10/6/2015 4:00 PM
129 no 10/5/2015 9:54 PM
130 None. 10/5/2015 6:31 PM
131 TK HEALTH INSURANCE 10/5/2015 5:09 PM
132 Arbeitsamt 10/5/2015 4:11 PM
133 No 10/5/2015 3:26 PM
134 Institut des Français à Berlin 10/5/2015 3:22 PM
135 No 10/5/2015 3:20 PM
136 GGI 10/4/2015 2:09 AM
137 no 10/3/2015 6:34 PM
138 N/A 10/3/2015 3:19 PM
139 Alexander Von Humboldt Foundation 10/3/2015 2:24 PM
140 The Volkschule 10/3/2015 1:52 PM
141 GGI/ Internations 10/3/2015 1:45 PM
142 expats in Hamburg on FB 10/3/2015 1:17 PM
143 no 10/3/2015 12:14 PM
144 Nope 10/3/2015 9:50 AM
145 no 10/3/2015 9:37 AM
146 Bucerius Law School 10/2/2015 8:32 PM
147 no 10/2/2015 8:03 PM
148 Internet forums 10/2/2015 7:33 PM
149 none 10/2/2015 7:29 PM
150 I am not sure if this will be a valid answer but I'd say Facebook groups and websites. 10/2/2015 12:58 AM
151 - 10/2/2015 12:57 AM
152 DABGO 10/1/2015 11:49 PM
153 - 10/1/2015 9:45 PM
154 internations 10/1/2015 6:09 PM
155 No 10/1/2015 5:51 PM
156 IZ team Stuttgart and AEEGE stuttgart 10/1/2015 4:48 PM
157 no 10/1/2015 1:52 PM
158 La Red, MaMis 10/1/2015 1:20 PM
159 no 10/1/2015 11:31 AM
160 - 10/1/2015 10:41 AM
161 TK krankenkasse (somehow) 9/30/2015 10:33 PM
162 Argentur für arbeit 9/30/2015 5:00 PM
163 ANY 9/30/2015 10:19 AM
164 No single organisation 9/30/2015 10:15 AM
165 No 9/30/2015 9:35 AM
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Q21 Could you name one website/social
media platform that has been very useful
for you in terms of support since you
arrived in Germany?
Answered: 237 Skipped: 123
# Responses Date
1 facebook 1/4/2016 4:25 AM
2 - 12/12/2015 1:19 PM
3 facebook groups 12/8/2015 10:16 PM
4 Facebook 12/4/2015 11:56 PM
5 Girl gone international on Facebook 12/4/2015 5:33 PM
6 Toytown Germany forums 12/4/2015 3:18 PM
7 toytowngermany's Facebook group 12/4/2015 2:30 PM
8 Facebook groups 12/4/2015 11:32 AM
9 Facebook 12/4/2015 11:17 AM
10 Facebook 12/4/2015 9:40 AM
11 Toytown 12/4/2015 9:08 AM
12 http://berlinocacioepepemagazine.com 12/4/2015 12:34 AM
13 Toytown Germany 12/4/2015 12:26 AM
14 meetup 12/4/2015 12:12 AM
15 Facebook 12/4/2015 12:06 AM
16 Toytown 12/3/2015 11:44 PM
17 no 12/3/2015 10:58 PM
18 thelocal.de 12/3/2015 10:19 PM
19 facebook 12/3/2015 9:55 PM
20 Ex pat groups on facebook 12/3/2015 9:52 PM
21 toytown/Resident Advisor (Techno for the win!) 12/3/2015 9:41 PM
22 Facebook 12/3/2015 9:17 PM
23 Berlin for all the family, FB groups like expat babies 12/3/2015 9:11 PM
24 meetup, toytown 12/3/2015 9:09 PM
25 toytowngermany 12/3/2015 9:04 PM
26 Toytown 12/3/2015 8:44 PM
27 Toytown Berlin 12/3/2015 8:38 PM
28 - 12/3/2015 8:27 PM
29 facebook instagram 11/20/2015 10:44 PM
30 oase 11/20/2015 11:48 AM
31 Facebook 11/18/2015 4:34 PM
32 Facebook 11/18/2015 7:29 AM
33 n/a 11/18/2015 2:48 AM
34 facebook 11/17/2015 12:26 AM
35 Facebook 11/16/2015 11:14 PM
36 Berlino Cacio e Pepe 11/16/2015 10:23 PM
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37 Facebook 11/16/2015 9:05 PM
38 facebook 11/15/2015 11:28 PM
39 no 11/14/2015 1:20 PM
40 online translator web sites for learning german like: en.bab.la 11/13/2015 10:34 PM
41 Facebook 11/13/2015 7:16 PM
42 International friends dresden 11/13/2015 7:05 PM
43 toytowngermany.com 11/13/2015 6:24 PM
44 Sekis, Girl Gone International Berlin 10/25/2015 6:04 AM
45 Facebook 10/21/2015 11:42 PM
46 Free your advice Berlin (facebook group) 10/21/2015 10:49 PM
47 No 10/21/2015 10:10 PM
48 - 10/21/2015 9:26 PM
49 Free advice Berlin (facebook) 10/21/2015 9:06 PM
50 settle-in-berlin.org 10/21/2015 4:07 PM
51 toytown 10/21/2015 1:43 PM
52 Facebook 10/21/2015 12:34 PM
53 Facebook group Free advice 10/21/2015 12:18 PM
54 craigslist 10/21/2015 11:47 AM
55 free advice berlin- fb 10/21/2015 11:44 AM
56 no 10/21/2015 11:34 AM
57 Facebook 10/21/2015 11:24 AM
58 Facebook 10/21/2015 11:19 AM
59 facebook 10/21/2015 11:03 AM
60 no 10/21/2015 10:02 AM
61 Facebook 10/21/2015 9:27 AM
62 Facebook 10/21/2015 9:20 AM
63 free advice Berlin, Facebook group. 10/21/2015 9:08 AM
64 facebook and google 10/21/2015 8:38 AM
65 Facebook 10/21/2015 8:22 AM
66 Free advice Berlin (Facebook group) 10/21/2015 7:50 AM
67 Facebook 10/21/2015 5:43 AM
68 Facebook 10/21/2015 5:26 AM
69 Expatbabies Berlin Facebook group 10/21/2015 2:31 AM
70 Facebook 10/21/2015 1:49 AM
71 toytown germany 10/21/2015 1:28 AM
72 Facebook 10/21/2015 12:01 AM
73 Toytown.com 10/20/2015 11:56 PM
74 Facebook 10/20/2015 11:54 PM
75 English in Bcity 10/20/2015 11:22 PM
76 expat babies berlin 10/20/2015 11:17 PM
77 Free your stuff Berlin 10/20/2015 11:17 PM
78 Free advice Berlin 10/20/2015 11:16 PM
79 Facebook 10/20/2015 11:09 PM
80 couchsurfing facebook 10/20/2015 11:08 PM
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81 Facebook, such as "free advice Berlin" group 10/20/2015 11:02 PM
82 Facebook groups. Foreigners always share their best experiences 10/20/2015 11:01 PM
83 Toytown Germany 10/20/2015 11:00 PM
84 facebook 10/20/2015 10:35 PM
85 Facebook groups 10/20/2015 10:16 PM
86 facebook 10/20/2015 10:06 PM
87 Facebook groups 10/20/2015 10:06 PM
88 https://service.berlin.de 10/20/2015 10:06 PM
89 Facebook! Especially free advice Berlin 10/20/2015 10:03 PM
90 Facebook - Free Advice Berlin 10/20/2015 10:01 PM
91 Tinder 10/20/2015 9:59 PM
92 Facebook 10/20/2015 9:51 PM
93 Reddit, Meetup 10/20/2015 9:48 PM
94 facebook 10/20/2015 9:46 PM
95 facebook 10/20/2015 9:41 PM
96 facebook 10/20/2015 9:36 PM
97 facebook 10/20/2015 9:34 PM
98 fb 10/20/2015 9:33 PM
99 Free Advice Berlin 10/20/2015 9:20 PM
100 Thelocal.de 10/18/2015 12:18 AM
101 Facebook group Dutch people in Berlin (Nederlanders in Berlijn) 10/17/2015 5:12 PM
102 facebook 10/17/2015 3:34 PM
103 none 10/15/2015 3:14 PM
104 Facebook 10/15/2015 11:28 AM
105 - 10/15/2015 9:12 AM
106 Les Français à Berlin Facebook 10/14/2015 10:49 PM
107 francais de berlin 10/14/2015 6:57 PM
108 facebook 10/14/2015 5:57 PM
109 planetromeo.com 10/14/2015 5:00 PM
110 facebook 10/14/2015 1:54 PM
111 facebook/twitter/instagram 10/14/2015 12:54 PM
112 Facebook group for French expats 10/14/2015 12:38 PM
113 Facebook 10/14/2015 11:46 AM
114 facebook 10/14/2015 10:42 AM
115 Les Francais de Berlin 10/14/2015 9:58 AM
116 Français de berlin 10/14/2015 8:58 AM
117 Facebook groups 10/13/2015 10:48 PM
118 facebook 10/13/2015 9:51 PM
119 Facebook 10/13/2015 9:25 PM
120 facebook 10/13/2015 9:13 PM
121 Facebook 10/13/2015 9:05 PM
122 Facebook 10/13/2015 8:59 PM
123 facebook 10/13/2015 8:44 PM
124 Facebook 10/13/2015 8:43 PM
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125 Facebook 10/13/2015 7:42 PM
126 Dutch People in Berlin FB Website 10/13/2015 7:25 PM
127 fb group of the French community of Berlin 10/13/2015 7:15 PM
128 MeetUp 10/12/2015 4:11 PM
129 wg-gesucht 10/12/2015 2:34 PM
130 none 10/12/2015 1:48 PM
131 Toytown 10/8/2015 7:08 PM
132 free advice berlin group on facebook is good. 10/8/2015 3:19 PM
133 ToyTown Facebook Group 10/8/2015 1:03 PM
134 facebook 10/8/2015 12:22 PM
135 facebook 10/8/2015 12:15 PM
136 facebook 10/8/2015 11:15 AM
137 Facebook group for toytowngermany 10/8/2015 9:58 AM
138 Facebook 10/8/2015 8:25 AM
139 toytown forum (I don't post but I find most answers there) 10/8/2015 1:04 AM
140 facebook group - free advice berlin 10/8/2015 12:54 AM
141 See above 10/8/2015 12:11 AM
142 Toytown Germany 10/8/2015 12:01 AM
143 cant think of any 10/7/2015 11:36 PM
144 toytown 10/7/2015 11:32 PM
145 Toytown 10/7/2015 10:52 PM
146 Facebook 10/7/2015 10:41 PM
147 nope 10/7/2015 10:34 PM
148 facebook, google 10/7/2015 10:29 PM
149 Facebook Groups (Free Advice Berlin) 10/7/2015 10:06 PM
150 Meetup 10/7/2015 9:17 PM
151 Berliner zeitung 10/7/2015 8:51 PM
152 Facebook groups e.g toytown young english speakers 10/7/2015 8:48 PM
153 Toytown 10/7/2015 8:43 PM
154 Meetup 10/7/2015 8:26 PM
155 Kleinanzeigen 10/7/2015 8:24 PM
156 Facebook has many useful groups 10/7/2015 8:08 PM
157 toytown Berlin 10/7/2015 7:59 PM
158 Facebook Groups, Toytown Germany 10/7/2015 7:49 PM
159 WWW.berlinforallthefamily.com 10/7/2015 7:46 PM
160 Facebook 10/7/2015 7:46 PM
161 Facebook 10/7/2015 7:45 PM
162 facebook 10/7/2015 7:39 PM
163 Facebook 10/7/2015 7:38 PM
164 - 10/7/2015 7:35 PM
165 meet up 10/7/2015 7:31 PM
166 No 10/7/2015 7:25 PM
167 free your stuff berlin 10/7/2015 7:22 PM
168 Facebook groups 10/7/2015 6:55 PM
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169 tinder.com 10/7/2015 6:42 PM
170 Toytown berlin 10/7/2015 6:41 PM
171 facebook 10/7/2015 6:33 PM
172 Toytown English Speakers Berlin on Facebook 10/7/2015 6:20 PM
173 Free Advice Berlin - Facebook Group 10/7/2015 6:19 PM
174 Meetup.com 10/7/2015 6:18 PM
175 Toy town Berlin young English speakers - Facebook group 10/7/2015 6:12 PM
176 facebook groups 10/7/2015 6:12 PM
177 facebook, toytowngermany.com 10/7/2015 6:11 PM
178 facebook 10/7/2015 5:55 PM
179 Toytown 10/7/2015 5:50 PM
180 Facebook 10/7/2015 5:50 PM
181 Toytown Berlin 10/7/2015 5:48 PM
182 Facebook groups such as NETTwerk 10/7/2015 5:46 PM
183 Facebook 10/6/2015 5:12 PM
184 Facebook 10/6/2015 2:12 PM
185 Job börse 10/6/2015 9:39 AM
186 toytown germany 10/5/2015 9:54 PM
187 None. 10/5/2015 6:31 PM
188 UBERLIN 10/5/2015 5:09 PM
189 Restrealität 10/5/2015 4:11 PM
190 les francais à Berlin, facebook group 10/5/2015 3:26 PM
191 Les Français à Berlin - Facebook Group 10/5/2015 3:22 PM
192 No 10/5/2015 3:20 PM
193 GGI 10/4/2015 2:09 AM
194 Facebook 10/3/2015 9:24 PM
195 no 10/3/2015 6:34 PM
196 Couchsurfing 10/3/2015 3:56 PM
197 N/A 10/3/2015 3:19 PM
198 Internations.org/ Meetup.com 10/3/2015 1:45 PM
199 Facebook, hamburg.de 10/3/2015 1:17 PM
200 some expat site csnt rem name 10/3/2015 12:14 PM
201 Facebook I guess 10/3/2015 9:50 AM
202 girl gone international 10/3/2015 9:37 AM
203 girl gone international 10/3/2015 8:38 AM
204 Expats in Hamburg 10/2/2015 8:32 PM
205 GGI 10/2/2015 8:08 PM
206 facebook 10/2/2015 8:03 PM
207 couchsurfing 10/2/2015 7:55 PM
208 Facebook (unfortunately!) 10/2/2015 7:33 PM
209 facebook 10/2/2015 7:29 PM
210 Facebook 10/2/2015 7:23 PM
211 Facebook groups : "Portugueses na Alemanha", "Portugueses em Munique", "Munich international friends";
"toytowngermany"
10/2/2015 12:58 AM
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212 Facebook, Toytown Germany 10/2/2015 12:57 AM
213 Meetup 10/1/2015 11:49 PM
214 International Friends - Munich on Facebook 10/1/2015 11:39 PM
215 toytown Germany 10/1/2015 11:36 PM
216 Facebook 10/1/2015 10:11 PM
217 - 10/1/2015 9:45 PM
218 facebook 10/1/2015 8:20 PM
219 Internations 10/1/2015 7:36 PM
220 Toytown 10/1/2015 7:07 PM
221 Internations 10/1/2015 7:05 PM
222 Google 10/1/2015 6:33 PM
223 facebook 10/1/2015 6:09 PM
224 ToyTown Germany, Internations, Munich international friends facebook group 10/1/2015 5:57 PM
225 Ebay 10/1/2015 5:51 PM
226 toytown Germany 10/1/2015 5:49 PM
227 no 10/1/2015 1:52 PM
228 Bebés en Berlin on FB 10/1/2015 1:20 PM
229 Munich International Friends 10/1/2015 11:01 AM
230 Toytown 10/1/2015 10:41 AM
231 couchsurfing 9/30/2015 10:33 PM
232 Facebook 9/30/2015 10:27 PM
233 Stil in berlin 9/30/2015 5:00 PM
234 WG gesucht 9/30/2015 10:43 AM
235 ANY 9/30/2015 10:19 AM
236 Twitter - you can ask questions about anything there! 9/30/2015 10:15 AM
237 wg-gesucht.de 9/30/2015 9:35 AM
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10.6% 38
17.2% 62
25.0% 90
1.9% 7
45.3% 163
Q22 How long do you plan to stay in
Germany?
Answered: 360 Skipped: 0
Total 360
6 months to a
year
1-3 years
Indefinitely
Until
retirement
I don’t know
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10.6%
17.2%
25.0%
1.9%
45.3%
Answer Choices Responses
6 months to a year
1-3 years
Indefinitely
Until retirement
I don’t know
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1.7% 11
9.8% 64
21.0% 137
41.0% 267
16.1% 105
10.4% 68
Q1 How long have you been in Denmark?
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
Total 652
Less than a
month
2-6 months
7 months to a
year
1-3 years
4-6 years
Over 6 years
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
1.7%
9.8%
21.0%
41.0%
16.1%
10.4%
Answer Choices Responses
Less than a month
2-6 months
7 months to a year
1-3 years
4-6 years
Over 6 years
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68.0% 441
32.0% 208
Q2 What is your gender?
Answered: 649 Skipped: 3
Total 649
Female
Male
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
68.0%
32.0%
Answer Choices Responses
Female
Male
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37.4% 244
47.2% 308
12.4% 81
2.1% 14
0.3% 2
0.5% 3
Q3 How old are you?
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
Total 652
18 to 25
26 to 35
36 to 45
46 to 55
56 to 65
over 65
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
37.4%
47.2%
12.4%
2.1%
0.3%
0.5%
Answer Choices Responses
18 to 25
26 to 35
36 to 45
46 to 55
56 to 65
over 65
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0.0% 0
16.1% 105
6.7% 44
35.1% 229
34.7% 226
7.4% 48
0.0% 0
Q4 What is the highest level of education
you have completed?
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
Total 652
Primary school
High school
diploma
Vocational
training or...
Bachelor
degree...
Master degree
(University)
PhD degree
No formal
qualificatio...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
16.1%
6.7%
35.1%
34.7%
7.4%
Answer Choices Responses
Primary school
High school diploma
Vocational training or technical college
Bachelor degree (University)
Master degree (University)
PhD degree
No formal qualification of any type
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Q5 What is your country of citizenship?
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
5 / 60
real survey SurveyMonkey
Austria 
1.2% (8)
Belgium 
1.1% (7)
Bulgaria 
5.2% (34)
Estonia 
2.0% (13)
Finland 
2.6% (17)
France 
5.2% (34)
Greece 
3.2% (21)
Hungary 
3.8% (25)
Italy 
7.1% (46)
Ireland 
1.4% (9)
Latvia 
1.7% (11)
Lithuania 
3.8% (25)
Netherlands 
5.7% (37)
Poland 
7.1% (46)
Portugal 
1.8% (12)
Romania 
9.7% (63)
Slovakia 
1.1% (7)
Spain 
9.7% (63)
Sweden 
1.2% (8)
Switzerland 
0.2% (1)
Czech Republic 
1.8% (12)
Germany 
9.4% (61)
United Kingdom 
12.4% (81)
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Q6 In which country did you reside just
before moving to Denmark?
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
9 / 60
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Austria 
1.5% (10)
Bulgaria 
4.4% (29)
Estonia 
1.8% (12)
Finland 
1.4% (9)
France 
4.4% (29)
Greece 
2.6% (17)
Hungary 
2.5% (16)
Italy 
5.4% (35)
Ireland 
1.5% (10)
Latvia 
1.4% (9)
Lithuania 
3.5% (23)
Netherlands 
6.3% (41)
Poland 
5.7% (37)
Slovakia 
0.9% (6)
Spain 
9.2% (60)
Sweden 
2.0% (13)
Switzerland 
0.6% (4)
Czech Republic 
1.8% (12)
Germany 
8.6% (56)
United Kingdom 
14.4% (94)
Australia 
0.5% (3)
Canada 
0.9% (6)
China 
0.5% (3)
United States 
2.0% (13)
South Africa 
0.3% (2)
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0.2% 1
1.5% 10
4.9% 32
4.9% 32
41.4% 270
47.1% 307
Q7 What were you doing before you moved
to Denmark?
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
Total 652
Retired
Looked after
my...
Worked
freelance/ r...
Was looking
for jobs
Worked as an
employee
Studied
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0.2%
1.5%
4.9%
4.9%
41.4%
47.1%
Answer Choices Responses
Retired
Looked after my children/family (not in employment)
Worked freelance/ ran my own business
Was looking for jobs
Worked as an employee
Studied
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13.2% 86
18.7% 122
19.3% 126
27.6% 180
53.2% 347
Q8 What were your reasons for leaving your
country and coming to Denmark? (select all
that apply)
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
Total Respondents: 652  
# Other (please specify) Date
1 icelandic girlfriend 7/14/2014 5:57 PM
2 Improve my career 7/8/2014 5:36 PM
3 My family member Got a job from Denmark 6/4/2014 6:17 PM
4 I moved to Denmark together with my husband, who got a job at AU 5/31/2014 7:00 PM
5 Adventure 5/25/2014 11:27 PM
6 and subsequently, to work as well. 5/24/2014 11:33 AM
7 To explore a new country 5/23/2014 11:59 AM
8 to move to Denmark, where my boyfriend came from. He lived in Holland at the time with me. 5/22/2014 11:15 PM
9 Met a Danish man and moved to Denmark to be with him 5/22/2014 9:43 PM
10 kvæggård 5/22/2014 9:43 PM
11 To live with my boyfriend 5/22/2014 7:46 PM
12 Offer a better education to my son 5/22/2014 6:51 PM
13 To join my partner, who is a Dane 5/22/2014 6:01 PM
14 my husband got a job in Dk 5/21/2014 1:08 PM
To look for
jobs
To have better
welfare and/...
I got a job
offer and ha...
To join a
family...
To study
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
13.2%
18.7%
19.3%
27.6%
53.2%
Answer Choices Responses
To look for jobs
To have better welfare and/or salary
I got a job offer and had to move here
To join a family member/partner/spouse already in Denmark
To study
14 / 60
real survey SurveyMonkey
15 My husband got a job offer 5/20/2014 11:57 PM
16 no particular reason 5/20/2014 1:15 PM
17 start a new life 5/19/2014 10:35 PM
18 healthy lifestyle 5/19/2014 8:34 PM
19 Copenhagen is a place I've always wanted to live 5/19/2014 5:36 PM
20 my husband got a job offer in CPH and I had to move with him 5/19/2014 12:31 PM
21 to gain a foreign experience 5/19/2014 11:58 AM
22 also wanted to live in a culture closer to my own 5/19/2014 11:27 AM
23 husband's new job 5/19/2014 11:08 AM
24 To have international experience - I chose Denmark first to attend a hojskole, and a year after looked for an
internship specifically in Denmark.
5/12/2014 2:03 PM
25 learn a new culture and language 5/6/2014 8:34 PM
26 Got married to a Dane 5/6/2014 10:46 AM
27 to see the world 5/5/2014 6:24 PM
28 (I didn´t come to look for jobs, but cannot tick "other", my reasons are: to have better work-life balance, better
possibility to combine future family life and a carreer
5/5/2014 5:47 PM
29 To work in an international environment in the future and to have the knowledge to work in a high paying job. 5/5/2014 12:51 PM
30 My girlfriend wanted to study in Denmark and i came with her. 5/5/2014 12:23 PM
31 to join my Danish partner 5/5/2014 11:56 AM
32 To get better life 5/5/2014 11:50 AM
33 To learn about Danish culture and society 5/5/2014 11:38 AM
34 The option above is not quite right - I applied for a job here partly because I was interested in living in Denmark, I
didn't 'have to'
5/2/2014 10:41 AM
35 There is a problem with the survey: you cannot chose "other" alone, one has to tick a box above… I am married to
a Dane and we chose to move for cultural purpose for our children
5/1/2014 8:55 AM
36 to enjoy life and live the adventure a bit longer 4/30/2014 9:59 PM
37 To know a new country and culture 4/30/2014 6:25 PM
38 Love, love, love 4/30/2014 6:06 PM
39 I like the country and I wanted to live here 4/30/2014 4:50 PM
40 I accept a job offer to improve my CV, but I kept my position in Spain (1 year leave permission) 4/30/2014 2:26 PM
41 I married with a danish man 4/30/2014 1:18 PM
42 One year voluntary contract to teach English 4/30/2014 11:33 AM
43 Wife was homesick, she's Danish 4/30/2014 10:17 AM
44 wanted changes in my life! 4/30/2014 7:11 AM
45 Threats 4/29/2014 7:42 PM
46 travel 4/29/2014 7:30 PM
47 Partner got a job in Denmark. 4/29/2014 6:30 PM
48 to do an au pair year 4/29/2014 4:51 PM
49 I love Denmark 4/29/2014 2:20 AM
50 I was already married to a Dane and we decided to move to Denmark (his country) rather than England (my
country) after an overseas posting.
4/28/2014 9:02 PM
51 internship in a specific company / other 4/28/2014 7:56 PM
52 Danish husband, small children better life here than London 4/28/2014 7:15 PM
53 For a better life for my children, in particular my handicap son. It was a choice between here (where my husband is
from) or the UK (where I'm from)
4/28/2014 6:44 PM
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54 Culture, politics: less corrupt politicians and lobbying compared to Brussels, I am pro Europe but against the
European Union. Denmark also has some constitutional protections against releasing sovereignt which Belgium
does not.
4/28/2014 3:32 PM
55 free and high level of education 4/28/2014 3:18 PM
56 Quality of life and something different 4/28/2014 2:38 PM
57 Danish partner 4/28/2014 1:41 PM
58 To have a better life-work balance 4/28/2014 1:16 PM
59 to escape from political and cultural opression 4/28/2014 1:10 PM
60 I was supposed to be here half a year to see how life is in Denmark. But I really liked it here and chose to move for
real. Just because I could.
4/28/2014 1:10 PM
61 Enjoy living in denmark, made alot of friends in denmark, and now my social life is primarely in denmark 4/28/2014 12:44 PM
62 voluntary programme 4/28/2014 12:43 PM
63 Wamted to live in Scandanavia 4/28/2014 12:36 PM
64 Because of my son - to train in higher level in badminton 4/28/2014 11:48 AM
65 To be together with the person for whom I had feelings. 4/28/2014 8:58 AM
66 Bored of London 4/27/2014 8:44 AM
67 To take up a position as a PhD Scholar 4/26/2014 9:13 PM
68 I am working and studying, please next time let us choose both options on 4/26/2014 5:08 PM
69 And look for jobs 4/25/2014 8:30 PM
70 I got an internship 4/25/2014 1:50 PM
71 move to another country 4/25/2014 12:54 PM
72 family friendly working conditions for dual working parents 4/25/2014 5:46 AM
73 Learn languages 4/25/2014 1:39 AM
74 Had a short term job 6 months evey year, but loved copenhgen and wanted to move over and live there 4/25/2014 1:05 AM
75 tired of the political climate 4/24/2014 11:35 PM
76 i did not graduated . i tried different educations, but couldn't manage with challenges outside of my education. 4/24/2014 11:35 PM
77 Returning to job after placement. Chose not to stay in the USA as my American wife fancied travelling. 4/24/2014 9:43 PM
78 to have fun 4/24/2014 6:46 PM
79 Follow my now ex wife and child 4/24/2014 6:28 PM
80 To accompany my husband who was posted to work in Denmark 4/24/2014 6:04 PM
81 for fun 4/24/2014 5:57 PM
82 I wanted to move here because I had also lived here before 4/24/2014 5:33 PM
83 my husband got a job here 4/24/2014 5:32 PM
84 Working culture / Internationalization of career 4/24/2014 4:48 PM
85 Got married and moved over 4/24/2014 4:43 PM
86 My husband's job moved to Denmark 4/24/2014 4:43 PM
87 internship 4/24/2014 4:27 PM
88 plus problematic divorce 4/24/2014 4:21 PM
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0.5% 3
3.4% 22
5.2% 34
15.6% 102
36.2% 236
39.1% 255
Q9 What describes best your current
situation?
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
Total 652
I am retired
I look after
my...
I work
freelance/ r...
I am looking
for jobs
I study
I work as an
employee
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0.5%
3.4%
5.2%
15.6%
36.2%
39.1%
Answer Choices Responses
I am retired
I look after my children/family (not in employment)
I work freelance/ run my own business
I am looking for jobs
I study
I work as an employee
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Q10 On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 is the least and 5
is the most) how much do you feel informed
about your rights as a foreigner living in
Denmark?
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
12.4%
81
31.0%
202
34.4%
224
18.4%
120
3.8%
25
 
652
 
2.70
1 2 3 4 5
(no label)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
3.8%
18.4%
34.4%
31.0%
12.4%
 1 2 3 4 5 Total Weighted Average
(no label)
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Q11 On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 is the least and 5
is the most) please tell us which rights
motivated you to move to Denmark?
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
The right to
move freely ...
The right to
seek job...
The right to
run my own...
The right to
receive soci...
38.2%
28.1%
3.7%
6.7%
19.9%
21.6%
6.3%
10.4%
15.3%
18.4%
15.0%
15.6%
7.8%
11.0%
16.0%
19.2%
18.7%
20.9%
59.0%
48.0%
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18.7%
122
7.8%
51
15.3%
100
19.9%
130
38.2%
249
 
652
 
3.51
20.9%
136
11.0%
72
18.4%
120
21.6%
141
28.1%
183
 
652
 
3.25
59.0%
385
16.0%
104
15.0%
98
6.3%
41
3.7%
24
 
652
 
1.80
48.0%
313
19.2%
125
15.6%
102
10.4%
68
6.7%
44
 
652
 
2.09
39.4%
257
19.5%
127
16.6%
108
13.7%
89
10.9%
71
 
652
 
2.37
66.6%
434
16.1%
105
12.1%
79
3.4%
22
1.8%
12
 
652
 
1.58
1 2 3 4 5
The right to
have Danish...
The right to
vote
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
10.9%
1.8%
13.7%
3.4%
16.6%
12.1%
19.5%
16.1%
39.4%
66.6%
 1 2 3 4 5 Total Weighted Average
The right to move freely in Europe
The right to seek job employment
The right to run my own business
The right to receive social benefits
The right to have Danish language classes for free
The right to vote
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Q12 Now that you are in Denmark, on a
scale of 1 to 5 (1 is the least and 5 is the
most) please tell us which rights do you
consider important?
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
The right to
move freely ...
The right to
seek job...
The right to
run my own...
The right to
receive soci...
57.8%
58.0%
26.5%
32.2%
16.4%
20.1%
16.1%
22.2%
12.3%
9.8%
19.9%
22.5%
5.2%
5.8%
13.3%
10.0%
8.3%
6.3%
24.1%
13.0%
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8.3%
54
5.2%
34
12.3%
80
16.4%
107
57.8%
377
 
652
 
4.10
6.3%
41
5.8%
38
9.8%
64
20.1%
131
58.0%
378
 
652
 
4.18
24.1%
157
13.3%
87
19.9%
130
16.1%
105
26.5%
173
 
652
 
3.08
13.0%
85
10.0%
65
22.5%
147
22.2%
145
32.2%
210
 
652
 
3.51
12.4%
81
9.2%
60
17.9%
117
21.9%
143
38.5%
251
 
652
 
3.65
28.2%
184
15.3%
100
20.4%
133
13.5%
88
22.5%
147
 
652
 
2.87
1 2 3 4 5
The right to
have Danish...
The right to
vote
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
32.2%
38.5%
22.5%
21.9%
13.5%
17.9%
20.4%
9.2%
15.3%
12.4%
28.2%
 1 2 3 4 5 Total Weighted Average
The right to move freely in Europe (free movement)
The right to seek job employment
The right to run my own business
The right to receive social benefits
The right to have Danish language classes for free
The right to vote
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Q13 On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 is the least and 5
is the most) please tell us which rights
motivated you to move to Denmark?
Answered: 0 Skipped: 652
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
! No matching responses.
 1 2 3 4 5 Total Weighted Average
The right to travel freely in the Schengen zone
The right to seek asylum
The right to receive social benefits
The right to family reunification
The right to have Danish language classes for free
The right to vote
The right to obtain permanent Danish residence/citizenship
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Q14 Now that you are in Denmark, on a
scale of 1 to 5 (1 is the least and 5 is the
most) please tell us which rights do you
consider important?
Answered: 0 Skipped: 652
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
 
0
 
0.00
! No matching responses.
 1 2 3 4 5 Total Weighted Average
The right to travel within the Schengen zone
The right to seek asylum
The right to family reunification
The right to receive social benefits
The right to have Danish language classes for free
The right to vote
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51.5% 336
49.2% 321
42.2% 275
38.3% 250
37.1% 242
37.0% 241
30.7% 200
23.8% 155
2.6% 17
Q15 How did you socialise when you first
moved to Denmark? (select all that apply)
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
Total Respondents: 652  
Danish
language...
study
through
family/frien...
work place
through people
from my coun...
through social
media (e.g....
Social
activities...
through
websites for...
religious
community (e...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
51.5%
49.2%
42.2%
38.3%
37.1%
37.0%
30.7%
23.8%
2.6%
Answer Choices Responses
Danish language classes
study
through family/friends already in Denmark
work place
through people from my country of origin
through social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter)
Social activities (hobbies, sports, associations)
through websites for Foreigners/expats/News comers to Denmark (e.g. Internations, Meet up)
religious community (e.g. church, mosque)
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58.0% 378
52.1% 340
48.8% 318
47.1% 307
45.2% 295
45.2% 295
39.4% 257
24.7% 161
2.8% 18
Q16 How do you currently socialise? (select
all that apply)
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
Total Respondents: 652  
through
family/frien...
work place
through social
media (e.g....
through people
from my coun...
study
Social
activities...
Danish
language...
through
websites for...
religious
community (e...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
58.0%
52.1%
48.8%
47.1%
45.2%
45.2%
39.4%
24.7%
2.8%
Answer Choices Responses
through family/friends already in Denmark
work place
through social media (e.g. Facebook. Twitter)
through people from my country of origin
study
Social activities (hobbies, sports, associations)
Danish language classes
through websites for Foreigners/expats/News comers to Denmark (e.g. Internations, Meet up)
religious community (e.g. church, mosque)
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85.7% 559
57.2% 373
54.8% 357
17.3% 113
10.6% 69
Q17 Your circle of friends in Denmark are
formed of ... (select all that apply)
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
Total Respondents: 652  
Non-Danish
foreigners
People from
your country...
Danes
I do not
socialize mu...
I spend time
mostly with ...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
85.7%
57.2%
54.8%
17.3%
10.6%
Answer Choices Responses
Non-Danish foreigners
People from your country of origin
Danes
I do not socialize much here and keep in touch with friends and family abroad via internet /phone
I spend time mostly with my own family
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Q18 On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being very
negative and 5 very positive, how would
you rate your experience of staying in
Denmark?
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
1.2%
8
7.8%
51
27.8%
181
45.9%
299
17.3%
113
 
652
 
3.70
1 2 3 4 5
(no label)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
17.3%
45.9%
27.8%
7.8%
1.2%
 1 2 3 4 5 Total Weighted Average
(no label)
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Q19 And in particular (rate again from 1 to
5, 1 being very negative and 5 very
positive):
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
How satisfied
are you with...
How satisfied
are you with...
How satisfied
are you with...
0.3%
0.3%
15.3%
16.4%
28.8%
20.4%
30.2%
41.6%
25.5%
28.4%
21.0%
16.4%
16.7%
5.7%
12.3%
8.0%
2.6%
10.1%
10.4%
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8.0%
52
16.7%
109
28.4%
185
30.2%
197
16.4%
107
0.3%
2
 
652
 
3.30
2.6%
17
5.7%
37
21.0%
137
41.6%
271
28.8%
188
0.3%
2
 
652
 
3.89
10.1%
66
12.3%
80
16.4%
107
25.5%
166
20.4%
133
15.3%
100
 
652
 
3.40
1 2 3 4 5 N/A
How well do
you feel you...
How would you
rate the...
How would you
rate the...
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0.6%
7.8%
37.3%
11.5%
13.0%
4.6%
28.8%
26.4%
9.8%
30.4%
25.5%
17.5%
18.3%
14.3%
11.8%
13.0%
19.0%
 1 2 3 4 5 N/A Total Weighted
Average
How satisfied are you with your social life?
How satisfied are you with the quality of your life?
How satisfied are you with your work?
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10.4%
68
18.3%
119
30.4%
198
28.8%
188
11.5%
75
0.6%
4
 
652
 
3.13
13.0%
85
14.3%
93
25.5%
166
26.4%
172
13.0%
85
7.8%
51
 
652
 
3.13
19.0%
124
11.8%
77
17.5%
114
9.8%
64
4.6%
30
37.3%
243
 
652
 
2.51
How well do you feel you fit in Danish society in general?
How would you rate the support you received from the Danish authorities
(e.g. government, municipality)?
How would you rate the support you received from Non-governmental
organisations, such as charities and/or expatriate communities?
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Q20 Could you name one organization that
has been very useful for you in terms of
support since you arrived in Denmark?
Answered: 336 Skipped: 316
# Responses Date
1 kk 7/21/2014 7:57 AM
2 sprogcenter 7/14/2014 6:01 PM
3 University of copenhagen 7/12/2014 11:33 PM
4 International Citizen Service 7/8/2014 5:40 PM
5 One of my colleagues informally has helped me most, but that's not an organisation. My university has helped me a
bit, but not very much.
6/18/2014 1:27 PM
6 Just work place 6/18/2014 1:15 PM
7 n/a 6/18/2014 12:39 PM
8 Sprogskolen 6/5/2014 1:53 PM
9 Fagførening K&S 6/4/2014 6:22 PM
10 none 6/3/2014 11:29 PM
11 University International Club (AU) 6/1/2014 11:30 PM
12 International office 6/1/2014 9:26 AM
13 Work in Denmark 5/31/2014 7:04 PM
14 Velkomscenter 5/30/2014 9:00 AM
15 My bank 5/25/2014 11:31 PM
16 children's school 5/25/2014 9:03 AM
17 Internatioal house of university of copenhagen 5/24/2014 4:49 PM
18 None 5/24/2014 3:37 PM
19 my lanlord :D for real. 5/24/2014 11:38 AM
20 AU Herning 5/23/2014 10:18 PM
21 VIA University College 5/23/2014 9:11 PM
22 Uni Copenhagen 5/23/2014 4:19 PM
23 DTU 5/23/2014 2:32 PM
24 University 5/23/2014 12:46 PM
25 Roskilde University 5/23/2014 12:04 PM
26 My employer, Techical University of Denmark 5/23/2014 11:20 AM
27 ucn 5/23/2014 11:09 AM
28 internations, meet up 5/23/2014 11:05 AM
29 - 5/22/2014 11:17 PM
30 Havent had any 5/22/2014 9:47 PM
31 Kommune 5/22/2014 8:58 PM
32 No i can't 5/22/2014 7:51 PM
33 No 5/22/2014 6:52 PM
34 university 5/22/2014 6:51 PM
35 Sprogskole (language School) 5/22/2014 6:07 PM
36 none, there was no help offered 5/22/2014 5:46 PM
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37 LINK 5/22/2014 4:14 PM
38 Holstebro International 5/22/2014 1:20 PM
39 sprogskole 5/22/2014 12:24 PM
40 none 5/22/2014 9:57 AM
41 No 5/21/2014 12:04 PM
42 International Staff Mobility - University of Copenhagen 5/21/2014 10:59 AM
43 Link, Expat in Denmark, Copenhague Accueil and association from my daughters' schools 5/21/2014 12:05 AM
44 International community 5/20/2014 7:19 PM
45 none 5/20/2014 5:06 PM
46 Aarhus Student House 5/20/2014 3:29 PM
47 Akassen 5/20/2014 3:18 PM
48 none .. only danish and uk friends that have pointed me in the right direction 5/20/2014 1:17 PM
49 NO 5/19/2014 11:59 PM
50 The local Council (through language lessons) 5/19/2014 11:57 PM
51 - 5/19/2014 10:38 PM
52 None 5/19/2014 9:17 PM
53 Kommune 5/19/2014 9:15 PM
54 None. 5/19/2014 9:07 PM
55 friends 5/19/2014 8:30 PM
56 AIESEC, LÆRDANSK ODENSE 5/19/2014 8:11 PM
57 government 5/19/2014 8:01 PM
58 International community aarhus 5/19/2014 7:25 PM
59 Aarhus University 5/19/2014 7:19 PM
60 Business Academy Aarhus 5/19/2014 6:42 PM
61 youth for understanding 5/19/2014 6:37 PM
62 N/A 5/19/2014 6:36 PM
63 international citizens service 5/19/2014 6:34 PM
64 Bogerservice 5/19/2014 6:23 PM
65 ics 5/19/2014 6:22 PM
66 i don't know any 5/19/2014 6:19 PM
67 PPR 5/19/2014 12:48 PM
68 UPCH Mentor Program 5/19/2014 12:42 PM
69 Clarion Collection Hotel Mayfair 5/19/2014 12:41 PM
70 kommune 5/19/2014 12:33 PM
71 Ism 5/19/2014 12:30 PM
72 None that comes to my mind. 5/19/2014 12:07 PM
73 SKAT 5/19/2014 12:06 PM
74 KU 5/19/2014 12:03 PM
75 my school which provided me with all crucial information about living in DK - Copenhagen Business Academy 5/19/2014 12:03 PM
76 International House 5/19/2014 11:54 AM
77 Ramsdal Rekrutering 5/19/2014 11:32 AM
78 Language school 5/19/2014 11:20 AM
79 - 5/19/2014 11:16 AM
80 International House 5/19/2014 10:56 AM
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81 Work in Denmark 5/19/2014 10:53 AM
82 Borgerservise 5/19/2014 10:50 AM
83 i dont know 5/19/2014 12:38 AM
84 / 5/14/2014 3:02 PM
85 the university 5/13/2014 8:00 PM
86 Sagnlandet Lejre 5/13/2014 10:46 AM
87 copenhague accueil 5/12/2014 3:23 PM
88 Not really, but if I had to, I'd say the International House Copenhagen 5/12/2014 2:08 PM
89 Foreningen RETRO 5/12/2014 1:15 PM
90 No 5/12/2014 11:44 AM
91 No 5/10/2014 12:45 PM
92 via university college 5/10/2014 2:33 AM
93 første job/International House 5/9/2014 6:30 PM
94 ERASMUS Exchange Program 5/9/2014 4:16 PM
95 - 5/9/2014 3:06 PM
96 my kommune 5/9/2014 3:05 PM
97 Non 5/8/2014 10:05 AM
98 International Society Herning 5/8/2014 10:01 AM
99 Clavis Roskilde 5/7/2014 1:21 PM
100 kumune 5/7/2014 1:09 PM
101 nope 5/7/2014 12:50 PM
102 university 5/7/2014 12:23 PM
103 Scandinavianstudy 5/7/2014 11:18 AM
104 International House 5/6/2014 10:18 PM
105 LærDansk 5/6/2014 9:38 PM
106 Borgerservice 5/6/2014 9:31 PM
107 International House Copenhagen 5/6/2014 8:59 PM
108 Rotary,Rotaract 5/6/2014 8:37 PM
109 VIAUC TEKO 5/6/2014 6:35 PM
110 Lærdansk, and my university (if that counts as an organization) 5/6/2014 6:03 PM
111 none 5/6/2014 5:54 PM
112 SKAT 5/6/2014 5:51 PM
113 n/a 5/6/2014 5:46 PM
114 Business Academy Aarhus 5/6/2014 5:24 PM
115 non 5/6/2014 1:12 PM
116 Police 5/6/2014 11:31 AM
117 Studenterhus Aarhus 5/6/2014 11:30 AM
118 Studenterlauget (BSS;AU) 5/6/2014 11:02 AM
119 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints 5/6/2014 10:49 AM
120 -- 5/6/2014 10:33 AM
121 Aarhus International Center 5/6/2014 9:24 AM
122 i didnt get any support 5/6/2014 3:26 AM
123 Det Danske spedjere 5/5/2014 10:54 PM
124 No 5/5/2014 10:35 PM
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125 CAB 5/5/2014 8:03 PM
126 citizenship services? 5/5/2014 7:15 PM
127 Su 5/5/2014 6:28 PM
128 International Community 5/5/2014 5:50 PM
129 AIESEC 5/5/2014 5:21 PM
130 UIC 5/5/2014 3:55 PM
131 International Community Service 5/5/2014 3:54 PM
132 AIESEC 5/5/2014 2:09 PM
133 UCN, Skat, Kommune 5/5/2014 2:03 PM
134 School 5/5/2014 1:46 PM
135 Aarhus University 5/5/2014 12:57 PM
136 bruger hjælper formidlingen 5/5/2014 12:36 PM
137 no 5/5/2014 12:27 PM
138 commune 5/5/2014 12:21 PM
139 Lærdansk 5/5/2014 11:59 AM
140 Municipality 5/5/2014 11:53 AM
141 none 5/5/2014 11:51 AM
142 International Citizen Service Aarhus 5/5/2014 11:47 AM
143 Laer Dansk 5/5/2014 11:45 AM
144 Aarhus University 5/5/2014 11:45 AM
145 Anglo-Danish Society 5/5/2014 11:39 AM
146 Integrationsnet 5/5/2014 11:35 AM
147 no 5/5/2014 11:33 AM
148 Does not apply 5/4/2014 11:17 PM
149 my university, laerdansk 5/2/2014 2:56 PM
150 Copenhagen University 5/2/2014 2:45 PM
151 3F 5/2/2014 2:39 PM
152 international citizen servicee 5/2/2014 10:51 AM
153 My workplace, University of Copenhagen 5/2/2014 10:44 AM
154 København Kommune 5/1/2014 3:53 PM
155 university-related 4/30/2014 10:06 PM
156 Workindenmark 4/30/2014 9:18 PM
157 relocation scandinavia 4/30/2014 6:59 PM
158 A kasse :-) 4/30/2014 6:51 PM
159 Host Program from KK 4/30/2014 6:29 PM
160 Any expact group 4/30/2014 6:11 PM
161 University of Copenhagen (?) 4/30/2014 5:42 PM
162 Borgersevice 4/30/2014 4:53 PM
163 Danish Technical University (DTU) 4/30/2014 2:31 PM
164 I can 4/30/2014 1:22 PM
165 DTU 4/30/2014 12:48 PM
166 my workplace, Alm Brand, to have routine 4/30/2014 11:40 AM
167 INH Horsens 4/30/2014 10:41 AM
168 No 4/30/2014 9:03 AM
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169 none 4/30/2014 7:18 AM
170 --- 4/29/2014 11:54 PM
171 / 4/29/2014 11:03 PM
172 Studiskolen 4/29/2014 10:33 PM
173 International house 4/29/2014 10:18 PM
174 nyidanmark.dk 4/29/2014 9:47 PM
175 Danske magister forening 4/29/2014 9:31 PM
176 My employer's Global Mobility department 4/29/2014 8:15 PM
177 Copenhagen Business School 4/29/2014 8:10 PM
178 Youth Goodwill Ambassador Corps 4/29/2014 7:58 PM
179 Kvinfo 4/29/2014 7:46 PM
180 International House in Copenhagen 4/29/2014 7:35 PM
181 University of Copenhagen 4/29/2014 7:22 PM
182 no 4/29/2014 7:17 PM
183 Studieskolen 4/29/2014 7:00 PM
184 Housing department of the University 4/29/2014 6:41 PM
185 St Alban's Church, Churchillparken, Copenhagen 4/29/2014 6:41 PM
186 ? 4/29/2014 6:36 PM
187 Lærdansk 4/29/2014 6:21 PM
188 KU 4/29/2014 6:20 PM
189 international house 4/29/2014 6:15 PM
190 KVINFO 4/29/2014 5:56 PM
191 University of Copenhagen 4/29/2014 5:45 PM
192 International house 4/29/2014 5:38 PM
193 Litauisk Forening i Danmark 4/29/2014 5:29 PM
194 Events organized by my school 4/29/2014 5:24 PM
195 Danish Ministry 4/29/2014 5:22 PM
196 ESN Copenhagen, University of Copenhagen 4/29/2014 5:19 PM
197 Expat in Denmark Facebook group 4/29/2014 5:09 PM
198 no 4/29/2014 5:07 PM
199 expats in denmark 4/29/2014 5:02 PM
200 Studieskolen 4/29/2014 4:59 PM
201 - 4/29/2014 4:55 PM
202 - 4/29/2014 4:54 PM
203 Studieskolen 4/29/2014 4:50 PM
204 N/a 4/29/2014 4:49 PM
205 The local kommune 4/29/2014 2:17 PM
206 Study in Denmark 4/29/2014 1:05 PM
207 no 4/29/2014 12:35 PM
208 Københavns Kommune 4/29/2014 12:30 PM
209 Kommune 4/29/2014 2:22 AM
210 LaerDansk 4/28/2014 11:05 PM
211 International community 4/28/2014 10:46 PM
212 LINK 4/28/2014 9:06 PM
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213 Youth for Understanding 4/28/2014 9:05 PM
214 InterCollege ApS, iLife 4/28/2014 8:50 PM
215 University 4/28/2014 8:47 PM
216 International office 4/28/2014 8:22 PM
217 international staff mobility 4/28/2014 7:49 PM
218 Unfortunately not 4/28/2014 7:21 PM
219 The Copenhagen Post newspaper 4/28/2014 6:49 PM
220 NA 4/28/2014 6:21 PM
221 Viborg International Group 4/28/2014 5:44 PM
222 Statens Uddannelsesstøtte 4/28/2014 4:59 PM
223 International house 4/28/2014 4:31 PM
224 Internations 4/28/2014 3:38 PM
225 my university - Aarhus University 4/28/2014 3:21 PM
226 Copenhagen Volunteers 4/28/2014 3:19 PM
227 international house 4/28/2014 3:15 PM
228 Københavns Sprogcenter 4/28/2014 3:01 PM
229 - 4/28/2014 2:47 PM
230 VUF 4/28/2014 2:41 PM
231 Dream Foundation 4/28/2014 2:19 PM
232 Studieskolen 4/28/2014 2:06 PM
233 Spousecare 4/28/2014 1:52 PM
234 Aalborg Commune 4/28/2014 1:50 PM
235 no 4/28/2014 1:44 PM
236 kvinde til Kvinde 4/28/2014 1:24 PM
237 International Citizen Service 4/28/2014 1:18 PM
238 Borgerservice 4/28/2014 1:16 PM
239 No 4/28/2014 1:14 PM
240 Student Organization Aarhus University International Model United Nations 4/28/2014 12:56 PM
241 NEMID? 4/28/2014 12:46 PM
242 school I work at 4/28/2014 12:45 PM
243 Odense Kommune 4/28/2014 12:44 PM
244 International Sosiety 4/28/2014 12:07 PM
245 work in denmark, Volunteers in Copenhagen 4/28/2014 12:06 PM
246 no 4/28/2014 11:56 AM
247 kommune 4/28/2014 11:46 AM
248 N/A 4/28/2014 11:28 AM
249 Kommune 4/28/2014 10:03 AM
250 Copenhagen Business School 4/27/2014 11:43 PM
251 No, none! 4/27/2014 2:31 PM
252 Væksthus Hovedstadregionen 4/27/2014 11:19 AM
253 FFF 4/27/2014 11:12 AM
254 No 4/27/2014 8:47 AM
255 meetup 4/26/2014 9:11 PM
256 CA a-kasse 4/26/2014 6:01 PM
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257 Department of Chemistry - KU 4/26/2014 5:13 PM
258 Dont know any 4/26/2014 5:12 PM
259 maersk 4/26/2014 4:37 PM
260 studieskolen 4/26/2014 2:53 PM
261 Københanvns Retshjælp 4/25/2014 8:36 PM
262 Skat 4/25/2014 6:38 PM
263 IA Sprog 4/25/2014 4:08 PM
264 no 4/25/2014 3:46 PM
265 KU's ISM office 4/25/2014 2:08 PM
266 n/a 4/25/2014 1:52 PM
267 university 4/25/2014 1:29 PM
268 Frederiksberg Kommune 4/25/2014 10:33 AM
269 Are there any for Europeans? 4/25/2014 10:19 AM
270 Novum 4/25/2014 9:57 AM
271 Copenhagen house 4/25/2014 8:16 AM
272 DTU 4/25/2014 8:00 AM
273 International Citizen Service in Copenhagen 4/25/2014 5:52 AM
274 none 4/25/2014 2:37 AM
275 No 4/25/2014 1:43 AM
276 Spanish Comunity 4/24/2014 11:53 PM
277 Brøndby Kommune 4/24/2014 11:40 PM
278 University of Copenhagen 4/24/2014 11:23 PM
279 no 4/24/2014 11:03 PM
280 KBH Rådgiver 4/24/2014 11:03 PM
281 Kvinfo 4/24/2014 11:01 PM
282 Trampoline Center 4/24/2014 11:00 PM
283 SU 4/24/2014 10:32 PM
284 skat 4/24/2014 10:19 PM
285 / 4/24/2014 10:09 PM
286 borgerservice 4/24/2014 9:56 PM
287 Dansk Rugby League Forbund (www.rugbyleague.dk) 4/24/2014 9:45 PM
288 International house 4/24/2014 9:42 PM
289 No 4/24/2014 9:34 PM
290 none 4/24/2014 9:34 PM
291 no 4/24/2014 9:14 PM
292 Studieskolen 4/24/2014 9:04 PM
293 university of Copenhagen 4/24/2014 8:46 PM
294 Kirkens Korchar 4/24/2014 8:41 PM
295 Work in Denamark, Red Cross for volunteer work 4/24/2014 8:30 PM
296 - 4/24/2014 7:56 PM
297 no 4/24/2014 7:46 PM
298 I dont know any organistation, I recived help and answer to my questions moste of the time from my profesors 4/24/2014 7:40 PM
299 borgerservice 4/24/2014 7:39 PM
300 studieskolen 4/24/2014 7:31 PM
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301 PPR (my son is hearing impaired) 4/24/2014 7:15 PM
302 none 4/24/2014 7:04 PM
303 International house 4/24/2014 6:59 PM
304 international citizen service 4/24/2014 6:47 PM
305 akademikernes a kasse 4/24/2014 6:44 PM
306 CBS 4/24/2014 6:39 PM
307 DTU 4/24/2014 6:39 PM
308 Pub 4/24/2014 6:32 PM
309 Link 4/24/2014 6:24 PM
310 Retro, Cph Volunteers, INternational House 4/24/2014 6:14 PM
311 Aarhus Universitet 4/24/2014 6:09 PM
312 LINK 4/24/2014 6:07 PM
313 no 4/24/2014 6:00 PM
314 None 4/24/2014 5:50 PM
315 Meetup 4/24/2014 5:46 PM
316 No 4/24/2014 5:45 PM
317 Non exist 4/24/2014 5:42 PM
318 International House 4/24/2014 5:39 PM
319 Couchsurfing 4/24/2014 5:36 PM
320 my children's school 4/24/2014 5:35 PM
321 Copenhagen Business School 4/24/2014 5:29 PM
322 Erasmus student network 4/24/2014 5:28 PM
323 International House 4/24/2014 5:23 PM
324 Southern Denmark Unversity 4/24/2014 5:20 PM
325 None 4/24/2014 5:10 PM
326 SKAT 4/24/2014 5:05 PM
327 KUA 4/24/2014 5:02 PM
328 Expats in Denmark 4/24/2014 4:57 PM
329 AAU - CPH 4/24/2014 4:51 PM
330 None 4/24/2014 4:46 PM
331 International Citizen Service 4/24/2014 4:39 PM
332 Copenhagen International House 4/24/2014 4:38 PM
333 N/A 4/24/2014 4:35 PM
334 - 4/24/2014 4:32 PM
335 None. 4/24/2014 4:30 PM
336 - 4/24/2014 4:29 PM
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Q21 Could you name one website/social
media platform that has been very useful
for you in terms of support since you
arrived in Denmark?
Answered: 400 Skipped: 252
# Responses Date
1 Meet up 9/15/2014 8:13 PM
2 borger.dk 7/21/2014 7:57 AM
3 dba.dk 7/14/2014 6:01 PM
4 facebook 7/13/2014 11:05 PM
5 https://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-us/ 7/12/2014 11:33 PM
6 Tinder 7/9/2014 5:37 PM
7 LinkedIn 7/8/2014 5:40 PM
8 workindenmark 6/18/2014 1:27 PM
9 Facebook 6/18/2014 1:15 PM
10 n/a 6/18/2014 12:39 PM
11 none 6/5/2014 1:53 PM
12 Borger.dk workindenmark, kk.dk/english 6/4/2014 6:22 PM
13 did not exist 25 years ago 6/3/2014 11:29 PM
14 Twitter 6/1/2014 11:30 PM
15 International community site 6/1/2014 9:26 AM
16 Facebook 5/31/2014 10:07 PM
17 Facebook 5/31/2014 7:04 PM
18 none 5/30/2014 9:00 AM
19 Facebbook 5/25/2014 11:31 PM
20 business friends 5/25/2014 9:03 AM
21 Skat webpage 5/24/2014 4:49 PM
22 None 5/24/2014 3:37 PM
23 facebook 5/24/2014 11:38 AM
24 Facebook 5/23/2014 10:18 PM
25 IS 5/23/2014 9:29 PM
26 Facebook 5/23/2014 9:11 PM
27 Facebook 5/23/2014 4:21 PM
28 Facebook 5/23/2014 4:19 PM
29 Facebook 5/23/2014 12:46 PM
30 Foreigners in Denmark 5/23/2014 12:04 PM
31 facebook 5/23/2014 11:42 AM
32 aalborgportal 5/23/2014 11:09 AM
33 internations 5/23/2014 11:05 AM
34 Facebook 5/23/2014 10:47 AM
35 - 5/22/2014 11:17 PM
36 Facebook (but only to 'make' new friends and stay in touch with them back home 5/22/2014 9:47 PM
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37 Facebook 5/22/2014 8:01 PM
38 Facebook 5/22/2014 7:59 PM
39 Borger.dk 5/22/2014 7:51 PM
40 Facebook 5/22/2014 7:00 PM
41 No 5/22/2014 6:52 PM
42 facebook 5/22/2014 6:51 PM
43 Dutch in Denmark, facebook community 5/22/2014 6:07 PM
44 denemarkenforum.nl 5/22/2014 5:57 PM
45 Facebook 5/22/2014 5:46 PM
46 Facebook 5/22/2014 4:14 PM
47 Facebook 5/22/2014 1:20 PM
48 expat in denmark 5/22/2014 12:37 PM
49 borger.dk 5/22/2014 12:24 PM
50 BnD - brasileiros na Dinamarca (facebook) 5/22/2014 11:43 AM
51 none 5/22/2014 9:57 AM
52 globejob, workindenmark 5/21/2014 3:47 PM
53 http://www.fyidenmark.com/ 5/21/2014 12:50 PM
54 couchsurfing 5/21/2014 12:04 PM
55 Expats living in Cph; several groups in Meetup 5/21/2014 10:59 AM
56 facebook, meetup 5/21/2014 12:28 AM
57 Expat in Denmark 5/21/2014 12:05 AM
58 Meet Up, Godsbannen 5/20/2014 8:00 PM
59 Facebook 5/20/2014 7:19 PM
60 none 5/20/2014 5:06 PM
61 aok.dk 5/20/2014 3:39 PM
62 Facebook 5/20/2014 3:29 PM
63 facebook 5/20/2014 1:17 PM
64 facebook 5/20/2014 8:57 AM
65 Life in denmark 5/20/2014 8:48 AM
66 Meetup.com 5/20/2014 12:23 AM
67 NO 5/19/2014 11:59 PM
68 n/a 5/19/2014 11:57 PM
69 Facebook 5/19/2014 10:38 PM
70 Favebook 5/19/2014 9:17 PM
71 Facebook 5/19/2014 9:15 PM
72 Facebook expat groups. 5/19/2014 9:07 PM
73 Facebook 5/19/2014 8:58 PM
74 Facebook 5/19/2014 8:44 PM
75 couchsurfing.org 5/19/2014 8:37 PM
76 Facebook 5/19/2014 8:11 PM
77 database.sceda.eu 5/19/2014 8:01 PM
78 facebook 5/19/2014 7:25 PM
79 Facebook 5/19/2014 7:19 PM
80 visitaarhus.dk 5/19/2014 7:06 PM
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81 Facebook 5/19/2014 6:42 PM
82 facebook 5/19/2014 6:37 PM
83 Couchsurf 5/19/2014 6:36 PM
84 Facebook 5/19/2014 6:34 PM
85 AU International Service 5/19/2014 6:23 PM
86 facebook 5/19/2014 6:22 PM
87 facebook 5/19/2014 6:19 PM
88 Aarhus Internationals 5/19/2014 6:11 PM
89 facebook 5/19/2014 5:38 PM
90 Work in Denmark 5/19/2014 2:49 PM
91 meetup.com 5/19/2014 12:48 PM
92 Facebook 5/19/2014 12:47 PM
93 Facebook, through student groups etc. 5/19/2014 12:42 PM
94 www.vkodani.cz 5/19/2014 12:41 PM
95 facebook 5/19/2014 12:33 PM
96 None. 5/19/2014 12:07 PM
97 facebook 5/19/2014 12:06 PM
98 Facebook 5/19/2014 12:03 PM
99 facebook groups e.x 'expats living in Copenhagen' 'Polonia w Danii' 5/19/2014 12:03 PM
100 facebook 5/19/2014 11:57 AM
101 Facebook 5/19/2014 11:54 AM
102 Facebook 5/19/2014 11:44 AM
103 expacts living in Copenhagen (facebook page) 5/19/2014 11:42 AM
104 the Copenhagen Post 5/19/2014 11:32 AM
105 Facebook 5/19/2014 11:20 AM
106 Facebook 5/19/2014 11:20 AM
107 - 5/19/2014 11:16 AM
108 facebook 5/19/2014 11:12 AM
109 Facebook groups 5/19/2014 11:07 AM
110 Mett up 5/19/2014 10:56 AM
111 Facebook 5/19/2014 10:53 AM
112 Facebook 5/19/2014 10:48 AM
113 i dont know 5/19/2014 12:38 AM
114 / 5/14/2014 3:02 PM
115 facebook 5/13/2014 10:46 AM
116 facebook 5/12/2014 6:30 PM
117 borger.dk 5/12/2014 3:23 PM
118 - 5/12/2014 2:08 PM
119 exapts in copenhagen on FB 5/12/2014 1:41 PM
120 facebook 5/12/2014 1:15 PM
121 Portugueses in Copenhagen FB group 5/12/2014 11:44 AM
122 No 5/10/2014 12:45 PM
123 facebook 5/10/2014 2:33 AM
124 facebook! 5/9/2014 6:30 PM
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125 www.ku.dk 5/9/2014 4:16 PM
126 - 5/9/2014 3:06 PM
127 facebook 5/9/2014 3:05 PM
128 Slovaks in Denmark 5/8/2014 10:05 AM
129 Facebook 5/8/2014 10:01 AM
130 Facebook group 5/7/2014 1:21 PM
131 Facebook 5/7/2014 12:50 PM
132 university website 5/7/2014 12:23 PM
133 couchsurfing 5/7/2014 11:18 AM
134 Facebook 5/6/2014 10:18 PM
135 Jobindex 5/6/2014 8:59 PM
136 Facebook 5/6/2014 8:37 PM
137 all facebook groups for international people 5/6/2014 6:35 PM
138 - 5/6/2014 6:03 PM
139 hospitality 5/6/2014 5:54 PM
140 www.workindenmark.dk 5/6/2014 5:51 PM
141 nyidanmark.dk 5/6/2014 5:46 PM
142 Facebook 5/6/2014 5:24 PM
143 facebook 5/6/2014 4:01 PM
144 Facebook 5/6/2014 3:53 PM
145 the websiye where i found this survey 5/6/2014 1:12 PM
146 Facebook 5/6/2014 11:31 AM
147 Facebook 5/6/2014 11:30 AM
148 facebook 5/6/2014 11:02 AM
149 -- 5/6/2014 10:33 AM
150 Facebook 5/6/2014 9:24 AM
151 - 5/6/2014 3:26 AM
152 Facebook 5/6/2014 12:37 AM
153 International community 5/5/2014 10:54 PM
154 No 5/5/2014 10:35 PM
155 Link 5/5/2014 8:03 PM
156 rejesplanen 5/5/2014 7:15 PM
157 Facebook 5/5/2014 5:50 PM
158 poloniainfo.dk 5/5/2014 5:21 PM
159 internations.org 5/5/2014 3:54 PM
160 Facebook 5/5/2014 2:09 PM
161 borger.dk 5/5/2014 2:03 PM
162 Facebook 5/5/2014 1:46 PM
163 Facebook 5/5/2014 12:57 PM
164 facebook 5/5/2014 12:36 PM
165 facebook 5/5/2014 12:27 PM
166 Facebook 5/5/2014 12:21 PM
167 Facebook 5/5/2014 12:05 PM
168 - 5/5/2014 11:59 AM
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169 Facebook 5/5/2014 11:53 AM
170 google 5/5/2014 11:51 AM
171 skat.dk 5/5/2014 11:48 AM
172 Facebook Groups for foreigners in Denmark 5/5/2014 11:47 AM
173 Facebook 5/5/2014 11:45 AM
174 Facebook 5/5/2014 11:45 AM
175 workindenmark.dk 5/5/2014 11:45 AM
176 Facebook 5/5/2014 11:39 AM
177 Facebook 5/5/2014 11:35 AM
178 no 5/5/2014 11:33 AM
179 kk.dk 5/5/2014 9:32 AM
180 Does not apply 5/4/2014 11:17 PM
181 international students in Denmark 5/2/2014 2:56 PM
182 ESN CPH 5/2/2014 2:45 PM
183 Meetup 5/2/2014 2:41 PM
184 Facebook 5/2/2014 2:39 PM
185 No - generally I need to call up to find information 5/2/2014 10:44 AM
186 http://www.kk.dk/da/borger 5/1/2014 3:53 PM
187 facebook 5/1/2014 11:29 AM
188 workindenmark 5/1/2014 8:59 AM
189 facebook 4/30/2014 10:06 PM
190 Facebook (Expat groups) 4/30/2014 9:40 PM
191 www.expatindenmark.com 4/30/2014 9:18 PM
192 Meetup 4/30/2014 7:15 PM
193 http://www.nyidanmark.dk/ 4/30/2014 7:04 PM
194 facebook - expats in copenhagen 4/30/2014 6:59 PM
195 facebook 4/30/2014 6:51 PM
196 NewInDenmark 4/30/2014 6:29 PM
197 also, any expact forum 4/30/2014 6:11 PM
198 none 4/30/2014 5:42 PM
199 none 4/30/2014 4:53 PM
200 Facebook 4/30/2014 2:15 PM
201 nyidanmark.dk 4/30/2014 1:22 PM
202 faceboook 4/30/2014 12:48 PM
203 Expat in Denmark 4/30/2014 11:40 AM
204 Facebook groups 4/30/2014 10:41 AM
205 aok.dk 4/30/2014 10:37 AM
206 borger.dk 4/30/2014 10:21 AM
207 Nope 4/30/2014 9:03 AM
208 studieskolen.dk, krak.dk, 4/30/2014 7:18 AM
209 Facebook 4/30/2014 4:45 AM
210 Facebook 4/30/2014 12:38 AM
211 rejseplanen 4/30/2014 12:02 AM
212 -------- 4/29/2014 11:54 PM
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213 facebook 4/29/2014 11:03 PM
214 rejseplanen 4/29/2014 10:54 PM
215 Facebook 4/29/2014 10:33 PM
216 Facebook 4/29/2014 10:18 PM
217 facebook 4/29/2014 9:47 PM
218 Facebook 4/29/2014 9:31 PM
219 NA 4/29/2014 8:15 PM
220 Facebook 4/29/2014 8:10 PM
221 Facebook 4/29/2014 7:58 PM
222 Statforvaltningen 4/29/2014 7:46 PM
223 kk.dk 4/29/2014 7:35 PM
224 SKAT website 4/29/2014 7:22 PM
225 foreigners in Denmark 4/29/2014 7:17 PM
226 Skat.dk 4/29/2014 7:00 PM
227 Facebook 4/29/2014 6:41 PM
228 Visitcopenhagen.com 4/29/2014 6:36 PM
229 Facebook 4/29/2014 6:21 PM
230 Facebook groups 4/29/2014 6:20 PM
231 no 4/29/2014 6:15 PM
232 Facebook 4/29/2014 6:08 PM
233 Meet up 4/29/2014 6:06 PM
234 can't remember 4/29/2014 5:56 PM
235 Facebook 4/29/2014 5:47 PM
236 I didn't use them 4/29/2014 5:45 PM
237 Facebook 4/29/2014 5:38 PM
238 Facebook, lifeindanmark.dk 4/29/2014 5:29 PM
239 Skat.dk, minsu.dk 4/29/2014 5:24 PM
240 no 4/29/2014 5:22 PM
241 ESN CPH, KU Uni Copenhagen 4/29/2014 5:19 PM
242 facebook 4/29/2014 5:11 PM
243 New in Denmark 4/29/2014 5:09 PM
244 no 4/29/2014 5:07 PM
245 facebook 4/29/2014 5:02 PM
246 Facebook 4/29/2014 4:59 PM
247 Facebook group "Italiani in Danimarca" 4/29/2014 4:58 PM
248 Facebook 4/29/2014 4:55 PM
249 Facebook 4/29/2014 4:54 PM
250 Facebook 4/29/2014 4:53 PM
251 Borger service 4/29/2014 4:51 PM
252 Newindenmark 4/29/2014 4:49 PM
253 Facebook 4/29/2014 1:05 PM
254 housing in cph (fb) 4/29/2014 12:35 PM
255 facebook 4/29/2014 12:30 PM
256 Facebook 4/28/2014 11:05 PM
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257 Facebook, meetup 4/28/2014 9:25 PM
258 facebook 4/28/2014 9:12 PM
259 no, I was here before social media 4/28/2014 9:06 PM
260 Facebook 4/28/2014 9:05 PM
261 facebook 4/28/2014 8:50 PM
262 jobindex.dk 4/28/2014 7:49 PM
263 Facebook 4/28/2014 7:21 PM
264 Facebook 4/28/2014 7:16 PM
265 Facebook definetly! 4/28/2014 6:49 PM
266 facebook 4/28/2014 6:37 PM
267 Expat Blog 4/28/2014 6:21 PM
268 Facebook 4/28/2014 5:44 PM
269 Facebook 4/28/2014 4:59 PM
270 New in Denmark 4/28/2014 4:31 PM
271 http://www.aok.dk/ 4/28/2014 4:24 PM
272 Facebook 4/28/2014 3:38 PM
273 Facebook 4/28/2014 3:21 PM
274 no 4/28/2014 3:19 PM
275 http://kk.dk 4/28/2014 3:15 PM
276 facebook 4/28/2014 3:05 PM
277 work in denmark 4/28/2014 3:01 PM
278 Facebook 4/28/2014 2:47 PM
279 Facebook 4/28/2014 2:41 PM
280 romanian danish friendship organization 4/28/2014 2:32 PM
281 rejseplanen.dk 4/28/2014 2:19 PM
282 borger.dk 4/28/2014 1:57 PM
283 Meetup 4/28/2014 1:52 PM
284 CoachSurfing 4/28/2014 1:50 PM
285 facebook 4/28/2014 1:44 PM
286 Not really 4/28/2014 1:16 PM
287 Facebook, Google Maps 4/28/2014 1:14 PM
288 Facebook 4/28/2014 12:56 PM
289 Virk.dk, facebook 4/28/2014 12:51 PM
290 facebook 4/28/2014 12:46 PM
291 facebook 4/28/2014 12:45 PM
292 FynBus 4/28/2014 12:44 PM
293 Meet Up 4/28/2014 12:38 PM
294 facebook 4/28/2014 12:06 PM
295 no 4/28/2014 11:56 AM
296 italians in denmark 4/28/2014 11:28 AM
297 ? 4/28/2014 10:03 AM
298 Facebook 4/27/2014 11:43 PM
299 No, ditto! 4/27/2014 2:31 PM
300 Ex Patriot group on Facebook 4/27/2014 11:37 AM
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301 No 4/27/2014 8:47 AM
302 meetup 4/26/2014 9:11 PM
303 - 4/26/2014 6:01 PM
304 http://studyindenmark.dk/ 4/26/2014 5:13 PM
305 Dont know any 4/26/2014 5:12 PM
306 Facebook 4/26/2014 5:09 PM
307 facebook 4/26/2014 4:37 PM
308 expat.com 4/26/2014 2:53 PM
309 facebook 4/25/2014 9:44 PM
310 facebook 4/25/2014 9:33 PM
311 www.retsinformation.dk 4/25/2014 8:36 PM
312 Facebook 4/25/2014 6:38 PM
313 Facebook 4/25/2014 4:08 PM
314 no 4/25/2014 3:46 PM
315 I've probably used meet up the most. 4/25/2014 2:08 PM
316 Facebook 4/25/2014 1:52 PM
317 facebook 4/25/2014 1:29 PM
318 I was mostly looking at this page and forum foreignersindenmark.dk, it looks now that it has been changed, back in
the day the forum was rather active. Though it was just me looking for information, not sure if that counts as
support
4/25/2014 12:09 PM
319 Facebook, expats living in Copenhagen 4/25/2014 10:33 AM
320 Internationals In Roskilde on Facebook 4/25/2014 10:19 AM
321 facebook 4/25/2014 9:57 AM
322 Work in Denmark 4/25/2014 8:16 AM
323 facebook 4/25/2014 7:48 AM
324 Expads in Denmark 4/25/2014 5:52 AM
325 none 4/25/2014 2:37 AM
326 No 4/25/2014 1:43 AM
327 Facebook 4/24/2014 11:53 PM
328 facebook 4/24/2014 11:43 PM
329 www.newindenmark.dk 4/24/2014 11:40 PM
330 none 4/24/2014 11:23 PM
331 no 4/24/2014 11:03 PM
332 Internations 4/24/2014 11:03 PM
333 Meetup 4/24/2014 11:01 PM
334 Facebook 4/24/2014 11:00 PM
335 Facebook 4/24/2014 10:32 PM
336 linkedin 4/24/2014 10:19 PM
337 Facebook groups 4/24/2014 10:18 PM
338 https://www.borger.dk/Sider/default.aspx 4/24/2014 10:13 PM
339 meetup 4/24/2014 10:09 PM
340 Facebook 4/24/2014 9:54 PM
341 facebook 4/24/2014 9:45 PM
342 Facebook 4/24/2014 9:42 PM
47 / 60
real survey SurveyMonkey
343 No 4/24/2014 9:34 PM
344 Facebook 4/24/2014 9:34 PM
345 facebook - dba.dk 4/24/2014 9:14 PM
346 Citizen center at www.subsite.kk.dk 4/24/2014 8:46 PM
347 Facebook 4/24/2014 8:41 PM
348 https://www.workindenmark.dk/ 4/24/2014 8:31 PM
349 Work in Denmark, Ny i Danmark 4/24/2014 8:30 PM
350 Facebook 4/24/2014 7:56 PM
351 no 4/24/2014 7:46 PM
352 facebook groups 4/24/2014 7:40 PM
353 meetup 4/24/2014 7:39 PM
354 facebook 4/24/2014 7:31 PM
355 facebook 4/24/2014 7:15 PM
356 Expat in Denmark 4/24/2014 7:15 PM
357 none 4/24/2014 7:04 PM
358 none 4/24/2014 6:59 PM
359 Facebook 4/24/2014 6:52 PM
360 facebook 4/24/2014 6:47 PM
361 jobindex 4/24/2014 6:44 PM
362 Facebook 4/24/2014 6:39 PM
363 www.dtu.dk 4/24/2014 6:39 PM
364 Facebook 4/24/2014 6:32 PM
365 Couchsurfing 4/24/2014 6:26 PM
366 Facebook 4/24/2014 6:24 PM
367 Facebook groups 4/24/2014 6:14 PM
368 University website for expats 4/24/2014 6:09 PM
369 facebook 4/24/2014 6:00 PM
370 facebook 4/24/2014 6:00 PM
371 Facebook 4/24/2014 5:50 PM
372 Facebook 4/24/2014 5:46 PM
373 Facebook 4/24/2014 5:45 PM
374 Work in denmark 4/24/2014 5:42 PM
375 Workindenmark 4/24/2014 5:39 PM
376 Facebook 4/24/2014 5:36 PM
377 facebook 4/24/2014 5:35 PM
378 expats in Copenhagen (Facebook) 4/24/2014 5:35 PM
379 New to Denmark 4/24/2014 5:29 PM
380 Facebook groups 4/24/2014 5:28 PM
381 International House / Kommune 4/24/2014 5:23 PM
382 workindenmark 4/24/2014 5:20 PM
383 facebook 4/24/2014 5:15 PM
384 danmark.dk/ and facebook groups 4/24/2014 5:10 PM
385 groups on facebook 4/24/2014 5:07 PM
386 facebook 4/24/2014 5:05 PM
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387 Facebook 4/24/2014 5:02 PM
388 Facebook 4/24/2014 4:57 PM
389 newindenmark 4/24/2014 4:54 PM
390 Facebook 4/24/2014 4:51 PM
391 Facebook 4/24/2014 4:46 PM
392 Link 4/24/2014 4:46 PM
393 work in denmark 4/24/2014 4:45 PM
394 Work in Denmark 4/24/2014 4:39 PM
395 Copenhagen International House 4/24/2014 4:38 PM
396 N/A 4/24/2014 4:35 PM
397 - 4/24/2014 4:32 PM
398 None. 4/24/2014 4:30 PM
399 facebook 4/24/2014 4:29 PM
400 facebook 4/24/2014 4:29 PM
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7.5% 49
23.5% 153
24.7% 161
2.6% 17
41.7% 272
Q22 How long do you plan to stay in
Denmark?
Answered: 652 Skipped: 0
Total 652
6 months to a
year
1-3 years
Indefinitely
Until
retirement
I don’t know
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7.5%
23.5%
24.7%
2.6%
41.7%
Answer Choices Responses
6 months to a year
1-3 years
Indefinitely
Until retirement
I don’t know
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Appendix D
Interview guide
The following presents the interview guide used for interviews with EU and non-
EU citizens.
Migration narrative, socialization and experience in the city, and diversity
• Whatwere the reasons of leaving your country andmoving toDenmark/Germany?
• (for EU people) You moved within Europe, how was your moving experi-
ence? How difficult or easy it was?
• (for non- EU) You moved to a European Union country. How was your
moving experience? How difficult or easy it was?
• How happy are you to live in this city? What are some of the things that
you like and don’t like about it?
• (Do you like your neighbourhood? What are some of the things that you
like and don’t like about it?)
Living diversity in the city
• Who did you hang out with when you first came here? (how did you social-
ize when you first came here). Where do they (people you hang out) come
from?
– If they have started talking about colleagues and work life then ask
these questions about work.
* Where do your colleagues come from?
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* How is it toworkwith peoplewho come from different countries?
* Do you socialize together outside of work?
* (Is language a barrier to communication in your work?)
• How important it is to you to have friends fromyour country, Danish/German
friends, friends from other countries? What kinds of activities you do with
your friends? How useful has it been to speak English, foreign languages
andDanish/German in your experience of socializing inDenmark/Germany?
• You have just told us that you have friends from different countries… This
country, like many others in the world, is becoming more diverse in terms
of people’s origins.
• What do you like about it?
• Is there anything that you don’t like about it?
• How would you evaluate your experience of living in Denmark/Germany
as a foreigner?
• How was the situation in X? (country of origin and also the previous coun-
try of residence, if different).
• What do you think about the situation of the foreigners living in Den-
mark/Germany?
• What do you think of the attitude of the Danish/German government to-
wards the new comers/foreigners moving to Denmark/Germany?
– What do you think of the attitude of the Danes/Germans as a host
society towards …
– How about your home country? As a government? As a host society?
– What about other countries of Europe? Do you have any experience
or knowledge about the situation of foreigners living in these coun-
tries?
Use of Internet/social media in everyday life
• How important is the use of Internet/social media to your life in Denmark?
What do you use them for? Why?
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• Are there specificweb sites you find useful to seek information inDenmark?
• Do you feel you know what is going on in Denmark/Germany (in how
far?/why not?)?
• Do you engage in political discussions online?
• There are some social events organized by Internations or meet up or face-
book groups (e.g expats living in Copenhagen). Have you attended any of
these? (if they attended then ask “How significant/important are they to
your social or professional life in Denmark/Germany?”)
• I have one more question about following media and political news…where
do you read political news online? (Do you read Danish/German and/or
foreign newspapers or follow foreign media? [If yes] What media? How
often? Why?)
On Crisis and the EU: I would like to talk about the crisis in Europe. What is
your perspective of the crisis that Europe is going through? Now that you live in
Denmark/Germany, how is it felt here?
• How is the situation in your work place? Has it been affected by the crisis?
– Does your organization do any business with firms and/or cooperate
with individuals from other European countries?
– Howeasy or difficult to cooperate and/orwork/do business/with people/organizations
in other European countries during this crisis? Why?
• How about (your country of origin)? How is the situation there?
– How did it affect you personally?
– Did your family and/or friends experience the current European crisis?
If so, can you tell me more about this? Who do you think is respons-
ible for the current crisis?
– Doyou think that Denmark/Germany or the rest of Europe have helped
the people in your country to overcome the crisis? Is there enough
solidary in Europe?
– How do you feel about the EU, can the EU contribute to solve the
crisis? How can or cannot the EU do that?
364
– (Is there anything else you would like to tell us about what you think
of Europe?)
Plans for the future and questions on citizenship
• How long do you plan to stay in Denmark/Germany?
• Would you consider moving back to your country of origin if conditions
there were improved?
• You are an EU-citizen. How do you feel about it? Do you see advantages?
• For EU: How has having EU-citizenship affected your move and stay in
Denmark/Germany? Easy to settle in? bureaucracy and formalities? Have
you considered or would you consider moving outside of the EU?
• For non-EU: as a non-EU citizen, how was your experience in moving to
and living in Denmark/Germany? Any difficulties?
• For non-EU. Now you have residence permit in Denmark/Germany. Where
do you see the advantages? What difficulties do you experience with this?
• Do you plan to apply for permanent residence or citizenship inDenmark/Germany?
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Appendix E
Interview transcripts
Out of respect for the interview participants and to guarantee their anonymity,
the transcripts are not added in the appendix.
366
